Gary Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, Rowan Williams, and the Theological Transformation of Sovereignties by Horstkoetter, David Wade
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects
Gary Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, Rowan Williams,
and the Theological Transformation of
Sovereignties
David Wade Horstkoetter
Marquette University
Recommended Citation
Horstkoetter, David Wade, "Gary Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, Rowan Williams, and the Theological Transformation of Sovereignties"
(2016). Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 632.
http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/632
	
GARY DORRIEN, STANLEY HAUERWAS, ROWAN WILLIAMS,  
AND THE THEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION  
OF SOVEREIGNTIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
David W. Horstkoetter, B.S., M.A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School,  
Marquette University, 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
 
May, 2016
	
ABSTRACT 
GARY DORRIEN, STANLEY HAUERWAS, ROWAN WILLIAMS,  
AND THE THEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION  
OF SOVEREIGNTIES 
 
 
David W. Horstkoetter, B.S., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
 
 
 Christianity’s political voice in US society is often situated within a simplistic 
binary of social justice versus faithfulness. Gary Dorrien and Stanley Hauerwas, 
respectively, represent the two sides of the binary in their work. Although the justice-
faithfulness narrative is an important point of disagreement, it has also created a 
categorical impasse that does not reflect the full depth and complexity of either Dorrien’s 
or Hauerwas’s work. Their concerns for both justice and faithfulness differ only in part 
because of their different responses to liberalism and liberal theology. Under all those 
issues are rival accounts of relational truth that indicate divergent understandings of 
reality. At the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies and differences are the issues 
of God’s sovereign agency and humanity’s subjectivity and agency. Dorrien emphasizes 
love, divine Spirit, human spirit, and freedom for flourishing. Hauerwas stresses gift, 
triune creator, human creaturehood, and flourishing in friendship. Those divergent 
positions issue forth in rival responses to political sovereignty. Dorrien’s panentheistic 
monism is integrated with the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Hauerwas rejects the 
state’s hegemonic sovereignty as an attempt at autonomy that rejects God’s gifts and 
aspires to rival God’s sovereignty. 
 While Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s discussion might then appear at an impasse, it 
can be opened and developed in reference to Rowan Williams’s horizon. Although his 
political work overlaps with much in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions, Williams goes 
beyond them by calling for the transformation of the modern nation-state’s sovereignty 
and by supplying a vision of it transformed. Williams’s advance opens Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s disagreement by freeing them from their common assumption, the 
permanence of state sovereignty. Williams’s political horizon is underwritten by his 
theological horizon, which fuses love and gift within triune mutuality and plenitude. This 
account offers critical help to issues that Dorrien and Hauerwas find problematic in each 
other’s position. Such development thereby opens the possibility of a fresh and fruitful 
discussion. Therefore, Williams’s work offers important help for Dorrien and Hauerwas 
to address the heart of their disagreement over divine and political sovereignty, and 
human subjectivity and agency.
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INTRODUCTION 
I. The Conventional Problem in Theology and Social Ethics:  
The Impasse between Social Justice and Christian Faithfulness 
 A simplistic binary of either social justice or faithfulness structures much of the 
discourse about the political meaning of Christianity in the United States. Some have 
used this binary to describe a split between academic theologians and the churches, 
respectively. Ethicist-theologians Gary Dorrien and Stanley Hauerwas can be construed 
as representing this justice-faithfulness binary. Although that description of Dorrien and 
Hauerwas is oversimplified and superficial, the binary is exacerbated and re-enforced by 
the theological milieu.1 
 Dorrien’s project seems to be an argument for social justice. He has written two 
significant books on the history of social ethics. In both he argues that social ethics as a 
discipline began as, and largely continues to be, a progressive movement of liberal 
theology for transforming society through the pursuit of justice and related ideals. 
Further, he understands himself to be in continuity with liberal theology––the mainstream 
of social ethics––and its transformative mission. Dorrien consistently argues for 
																																																								
1 For the academy-church differentiation, see Raphael Warnock, The Divided Mind of the Black Church: Theology, Piety, and Public 
Witness (New York: New York University Press, 2014). As here, sources to support sentences without quotes will be placed at the end 
of the paragraph and generally in an order that matches the paragraph. Citations associated with a sentence that has a quote in it––
although not necessarily for the quote itself––will be directly attached to the sentence with the quote. The source of the quote will be 
cited first and set apart from the other sources for the sentence that follow. This citation strategy enables a significant reduction of 
footnotes and the repetitive naming of the same sources. The latter saves significant space beyond the norm not only because Gary 
Dorrien, Stanley Hauerwas, and Rowan Williams have each written a great deal. But also, when they make their normative, 
constructive arguments, they do so in what is functionally an essayist style. That includes even Dorrien. His articles, wherein he is 
often more explicit about his normative position, are the tip of the iceberg, the rest of which are his histories upon which his articles 
draw and sometimes summarize. So in order to connect his normative voice to his historical descriptions, much less connecting 
different issues spread across different articles and books, one can see how simply citing Dorrien could become long and complex. 
That does not include Hauerwas and Williams on their own, or even more burdensome, putting them all together. But as much as 
space is saved, I have endeavored to maintain the connection between what I argue and what I cite. This link is achieved by generally 
mirroring the flow of the non-quoting sentences in the paragraph in the order of the cited works in the footnote to the end of the 
paragraph, and by immediately citing the quoted source distinct from but still with other sources supporting issues in the same 
sentence as the quote. By following these two citation methods, the amount of the citations are spread out and reduced while still 
connected to the argument. 
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economic justice like his social gospel forbearers, as well as for liberation theology and 
ecological process theology. Like Reinhold Niebuhr and Union Theological Seminary 
(NYC) formed by his legacy, Dorrien articulates what Hauerwas calls “advocacy ethics,” 
social ethics in support of critical activism for liberative justice.2 Social ethics for 
transformative, liberative social justice has indeed been crucial to Union’s place, if not 
mission, in the theological world. Such focus is why Dorrien embraced his appointment 
to the Niebuhr chair there in 2005. The subtitle of Dorrien’s recent Economy, Difference, 
Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice makes Dorrien’s project clear.3 
 In contrast, Hauerwas has broken from social ethics as a discipline and instead 
seems concerned with faithfulness to Christian identity rather than justice. He agrees that 
justice is central to social ethics as a discipline, but he points out that such a focus is 
problematic. The goal of social ethics as a discipline is about “making America work,” 
which is about transforming society or making Christianity relevant on the United 
States’s terms instead of Jesus’s.4 Generally ‘making America work’ is achieved by 
deriving a universal, moral ethic from Christianity in order to serve US interests or to 
make society more just. Implicit here, according to Hauerwas, is the disconnection of 
Christian social ethics from the church and ultimately from Jesus. Liberal theology’s 
diverse positions, he continues, are unified by their agreement about the pursuit of justice, 
																																																								
2 Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resources for a Church Confronting Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Brazos, 2000), 61 (hereafter BH). 
3 Gary Dorrien, Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social Christianity (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1995) 
(hereafter SS); Gary Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) 
(hereafter SEM); Gary Dorrien, Economy, Difference, Empire: Social Ethics for Social Justice (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 407 (hereafter EDE). The cited chapter in EDE was previously published as Gary Dorrien, “Social Ethics in the Making: 
Method, History, White Supremacism, Social Salvation,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 61, no. 1-2 (2008) and American Journal 
of Theology & Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2008). Two points of clarification. First, a couple of Dorrien’s USQR articles were reprinted in 
AJTP. I will note that when such an article is first cited. However, I will use the USQR articles for citation purposes. Second, Dorrien 
began at Union in 2005, but he was not officially inaugurated into the chair until January 2007. 
4 Hauerwas, BH, 33, 62. See also Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in a Christian Colony (Nashville, 
TN: Abingdon, 1989), 37 (hereafter RA). 
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not doctrinal topics like the Trinity. Furthermore, a disconnection between ethics and the 
church allowed Christian ethics to move from seminaries to graduate schools. But the 
result has been that Christian social ethics has forgotten its theological roots and has 
become a vague religious ethic among other university disciplines. Hauerwas concluded, 
therefore, that Christian social ethics “has come to its end.”5 He was so disillusioned with 
it as a discipline that he abandoned the book he was writing on its history.6 
 In response, Hauerwas’s project is about maintaining the theological core: to 
remain within the church and explore what it means to be faithful to the Christian part of 
Christian ethics because “only theology overcomes ethics.”7 Rather than propound a 
Christian theory of social ethics to augment US interests, Hauerwas has long argued that 
the “church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic” as it faithfully 
embodies Jesus.8 So Hauerwas abandoned the path Dorrien has developed. In contrast to 
Dorrien’s Soul in Society (1995), once used as history of social ethics, Hauerwas wrote In 
Good Company: The Church as Polis (1995) and A Better Hope (2000). In contrast to 
Dorrien’s mature history of social ethics, Social Ethics in the Making (2009), Hauerwas 
co-edited The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics (2004), where the focus is on 
“the practices of Christian tradition” rather than “the turn to the subject.”9 Dorrien and 																																																								
5 Hauerwas, BH, 67. 
6 In Dorrien’s SEM, Hauerwas is placed within the chapter “Disrupting and Expanding the Tradition” because Hauerwas broke with 
social ethics as a discipline after a long struggle (Hauerwas, BH, 67-68). Before giving up on the project, Hauerwas described it in 
Stanley Hauerwas, Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1992), 23-50 (hereafter AN); Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1995), 193-194 n. 18 (hereafter DF). For the rest of the paragraph: Hauerwas, BH, 32-34, 61-62, 66-68; 
Stanley Hauerwas, Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 19 (hereafter STT).  
7 Hauerwas, BH, 117-128. See also Hauerwas, AN, 9-10, 23-44. 
8 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 
99 (hereafter PK). For more see ibid., 100-111, 131-133; Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive 
Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 9-12, 37, 40, 90-92 (hereafter CC). 
9 Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, “Why Christian Ethics was Invented,” in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. 
Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 29; Stanley Hauerwas, A Cross-Shattered Church: Reclaiming 
the Theological Heart of Preaching (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2009), 154 (hereafter CSCH). Others have seen the difference 
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Hauerwas, consequently, seem to be in conflict over whether the church should have a 
social ethic or be a social ethic.10 
 Even worse, they appear to be in irresolvable conflict in light of the Niebuhr 
brothers’ immensely influential legacy. Hauerwas’s variation on Anabaptism holds that 
the world does not know it is the world without the witness of the church being the 
church. This ecclesiology has been panned by critics over the past few decades as a 
fideist, tribalist, sectarian withdrawal from society. Yet the substance of those criticisms 
is not new. H. R. Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture typology developed the substance of his 
earlier, Weberian and Troeltschian charge that the Anabaptists are “sectarian.”11 R. 
Niebuhr made the same critique nearly two decades earlier. Although he granted that the 
Anabaptists’ “sectarian perfectionism” was an important witness, it was also an 
unrealistic political vision that leads Christianity into an irresponsible withdrawal from 
society, and thereby Christianity into irrelevance.12 Similarly, Dorrien has criticized 
Hauerwas for “isolationism” based on his rejecting the biblical command to pursue social 
justice and on his “dichotomizing the world between Christians and pagans.”13 In fact, 
Dorrien once argued that Hauerwas is the mirror opposite to R. Niebuhr. But Hauerwas 
argues that Niebuhr’s quest for securing Christianity’s relevance in society ironically 
																																																								
between Dorrien and Hauerwas on giving an account of the history of social ethics. See Richard A. Davis, review of Social Ethics in 
the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition, by Gary Dorrien, Studies in Christian Ethics 24, no. 3 (2011): 389. 
10 Stanley Hauerwas, In Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) (hereafter 
IGC). 
11 H. R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (N.p. Henry Holt and Company, 1929; repr. New York: Meridian Books, 
1959), pp. 17-21 and chp. 2, esp. pp. 37-39; H. R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (N.p. Harper & Row, 1951; New York: HarperCollins, 
n.d.), chp. 2; Hauerwas, RA, 39-42. 
12 Reinhold Niebuhr, “Why the Church is not Pacifist,” The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays and Addresses, ed. Robert 
McAfee Brown (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 104. See also Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics 
(N.p. Harper Collins, 1997; Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1998), 115-117; Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study 
in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 263-277; Dorrien, SEM, 249-251; Hauerwas, IGC, 58-57. 
13 Dorrien, SS, 359. See also ibid., 374-375. I will return to Dorrien’s critiques of Hauerwas in chapter one. 
	 5 
made Christianity irrelevant through deep unfaithfulness. Under the guise of reality’s 
demands, R. Niebuhr allowed political liberalism’s versions of justice, freedom, and 
unity to supersede the politics of Jesus in the public sphere. Thus, the appearance of an 
incompatible division between Dorrien’s social justice and Hauerwas’s faithfulness stems 
from unresolved conflict within the Niebuhr brothers’ legacies.14 
 This appearance of incompatibility makes it difficult to perceive any deeper, 
substantive difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas than the reified dichotomy social 
justice versus faithfulness. But even worse is that the incompatible appearance has been 
promulgated in the theological milieu in such a way that incompatibility turns into 
impasse. Consequently, the milieu surrounding Hauerwas and Dorrien exacerbates, and 
																																																								
14 Gary Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 2, Idealism, Realism, and Modernity, 1900-1950 (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 2003), 436, 555-556 (hereafter MALT, 2); Dorrien, SEM, 226, 242; Hauerwas, CC, 246-247 n. 5; Hauerwas, 
DF, 104; Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom?: How the Church is to Behave if Freedom, Justice and a Christian Nation are Bad 
Ideas (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1996), 36 (hereafter AC); Hauerwas, CC, 91-92; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 94; for the 
charges of fideism, tribalism, and sectarianism, see below; Dorrien, SS, 358-359; Hauerwas, AN, 30-32, 36; Hauerwas, DF, 98-104; 
Hauerwas, AC, 31; Stanley Hauerwas with Michael Broadway, “The Irony of Reinhold Niebuhr: The Ideological Character of 
‘Christian Realism,’” in Stanley M. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth-Century Theology and Philosophy 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), esp. 50, 54-56 (hereafter the volume is WW). 
 The terms of the charges against Hauerwas come from James M. Gustafson, “The Sectarian Temptation: Reflections on 
Theology, the Church, and the University,” Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society 40 (1985). For response, see Stanley 
Hauerwas, Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World, and Living in Between (Labyrinth Press, 1988; repr. Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2010), 1-19 (hereafter CET). Nevertheless, Gustafson has repeated his critiques, and most recently in James M. 
Gustafson, An Examined Faith: The Grace of Self-Doubt (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 37-44, 85, 88, 113 n. 3. For 
Hauerwas’s response, see Stanley Hauerwas, The State of the University: Academic Knowledges and the Knowledge of God (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 165 n. 3 (hereafter SU). 
 Ten years after Gustafson’s critique, similar concerns were repeated by Gloria Albrecht and Dorrien. See Gloria Albrecht, 
“Myself and Other Characters: A Feminist Liberationist Critique of Hauerwas’ Ethics of Christian Character,” Annual of the Society of 
Christian Ethics 12 (1992); Gloria Albrecht, The Character of Our Communities: Toward an Ethic of Liberation for the Church 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1995); Gloria Albrecht, review of In Good Company: The Church as Polis, by Stanley Hauerwas, Scottish 
Journal of Theology 50, no. 2 (1997); Dorrien, SS, 18, 355-360, 374; Gary Dorrien, review of Dispatches from the Front: Theological 
Engagements with the Secular, by Stanley Hauerwas, Journal of Religion 75, no. 4 (1995). For Hauerwas’s respective responses to 
Albrecht and Dorrien, as well their own to Hauerwas, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Failure of Communication or a Case of 
Uncomprehending Feminism: A Response to Gloria Albrecht.” Scottish Journal of Theology 50, no. 2 (1997); Gloria Albrecht, 
“Response,” Scottish Journal of Theology 50, no. 2 (1997); Stanley Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of 
Social Christianity, by Gary Dorrien, Modern Theology 13, no. 3 (1997); Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the 
Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” Cross Currents, Fall 1997, 378 n. 1. 
 Nearly another ten years after Dorrien and Albrecht, similar concerns were noted by Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and 
Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). Stout’s and others’ criticisms of Hauerwas will be later. 
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perhaps creates, the appearance of conflict along the lines of faithfulness versus social 
justice.15 
 Hauerwas’s rhetoric has been his own worst enemy in contributing to the 
theological milieu’s divide. His polemical rhetoric is integral to his “aporetic” pedagogy 
intended to challenge fundamental assumptions.16 But his intended offensives to provoke 
can distract from his subtlety, or whatever sympathy he has for the position he critiques. 
For instance, Jeffery Stout faults Hauerwas’s rhetoric, in part, for disconnecting justice 
and faithfulness in After Christendom, where Hauerwas has his (in)famous chapter on 
justice.17 
 Even Hauerwas’s rhetoric in his constructive work has undercut its reception. He 
once likened the church to a colony in order to set the church and world “in stark 
contrast.”18 Yet colony gives the impression of faithfulness through seclusion, even 
though he qualifies the colony metaphor by stressing the active, outgoing ways that the 
																																																								
15 The impasse has been used by others albeit in a slightly different vein, like Eugene McCarraher, Christian Critics: Religion and the 
Impasse in Modern American Social Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 3. For the milieu besides what is noted 
above, see Dorrien’s account in SEM, 483, 486-487. For recent back and forth, see Massimo Faggioli, “A View Abroad: The 
Shrinking Common Ground in the American Church,” America, Feb. 14, 2014; Michael Baxter and William T. Cavanaugh, “More 
Deeply into the World: Michael Baxter and William T. Cavanaugh respond to ‘A View From Abroad,’ by Massimo Faggioli,” 
America, Apr. 21, 2014; Kelly Johnson, “Commentary on Occupy Religion by Joerg Rieger and Kwok Pui-lan,” and Joerg Rieger, “A 
Response to Kelly Johnson,” Syndicate Theology, Dec. 23 and 24, https://syndicatetheology.com/commentary/theology-at-the-service-
of-humanity/. See also Christian Century, Oct. 1, 2014, pp. 22-34, for a brief symposium on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Hauerwas 
and Willimon’s Resident Aliens where the various responses fall into the faithfulness versus social justice narrative (informed by the 
legacy of the Niebuhr brothers) in one way or another for the most part, see Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove’s “Better Religion,” Willie 
James Jennings’s “The Wall of Identity,” Brian D. McLaren’s “Targeted Medicine,” Jennifer M. McBride’s “White Protestants aren’t 
Aliens,” Miguel De La Torre’s “The Wrong Preferential Option,” Gary Dorrien’s “Unintended Aid,” James K. A. Smith’s “Church 
Against State?,” Debra Dean Murphy’s “Locating Loyalty,” Robin Lovin’s “Accidental Impact,” Nancy Bedford’s “Against 
Hegemony, not State,” Christian Scharen’s “Kenosis and Christendom,” and Hauerwas and Willimon’s “A Reply.” 
16 Brad J. Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar: Changing the Postmodern Subject (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2001), 50. See also ibid., 56-58; Hauerwas, DT, 181-182; Stanley Hauerwas, Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of 
Nonviolence (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2004), 22 (hereafter PF); Stanley Hauerwas, “Remembering John Howard Yoder: December 
29, 1927-December 30, 1997,” First Things, Apr. 1998, 16. 
17 Michael J. Quirk, introduction to “Stanley Hauerwas: An Interview,” in Stanley Hauerwas, Disrupting Time: Sermons, Prayers, and 
Sundries (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2004), 204 (hereafter the volume is DT); Dorrien, SEM, 481, 485; Stout, Democracy and 
Tradition, xi, 119, 140, 149. Stout’s own rhetoric, however, gives a limited reading of Hauerwas in relation to justice and of 
Hauerwas’s sympathy for “grassroots coalitions.” Romand Coles, “Democracy, Theology, and the Question of Excess,” Modern 
Theology 21, no. 2 (2005): 305, 310-312. For Stout’s response to Coles and Hauerwas, which accounts for Hauerwas’s development, 
see Jeffrey Stout, “Spirit of Democracy and the Rhetoric of Excess,” Journal of Religions Ethics 35, no. 1 (2007): 7-13. 
18 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 94. See also ibid., 12, 49, 71-72, 78, 91-92, 131-132, 139-140, 146, 171-172. 
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church should engage the world. Hauerwas appears to have recognized the problematic 
baggage of colony language, because he replaced it with other metaphors like polis and 
wandering in the wilderness. But the damage had already been done. Stout’s Democracy 
and Tradition concludes with the colony metaphor to make Hauerwas look like a 
reclusive, sectarian over-reaction to John Rawls’s liberalism.19 
 Stout’s line of argument typifies the criticisms made of Hauerwas by theological 
liberals, liberationists, and hybrids of the two that follow the Niebuhrian critiques of 
Anabaptists and pacifists. Miguel De La Torre’s critiques of Hauerwas are a particularly 
helpful illustration of the incompatible appearance shaping an impasse in the theological 
milieu. Although God is for justice, De La Torre argues, Hauerwas is ultimately not 
because he withdraws into a sectarian fantasy, rather than engages society with a 
liberative vision. That critique does not make a critical advance. Instead, it solidifies the 
limited justice-faithfulness narrative in the theological milieu because De La Torre 
distills the criticism for both teacher and student audiences.20 
 Other aspects of De La Torre’s constructive work and critical engagement with 
Hauerwas are more fruitful. But also reflecting the impasse in the milieu, De La Torre’s 
critiques of Hauerwas are fatally dated. It is as if Hauerwas and Hauerwas ‘types’ have 
not made important developments and clarifications since Jeffery Stout’s criticism of 																																																								
19 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 51-52; Hauerwas, IGC, 58-59; the metaphors polis and wandering in the wilderness are from the titles 
of IGC and WW respectively (Hauerwas drops the colony metaphor when explaining RA in IGC, 54); Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 
296. In later work Stout re-emphasizes that his problem with Hauerwas is the latter’s “rhetoric.” See “Response by Jeffrey Stout” in 
“Pragmatism and Democracy: Assessing Jeffrey Stout’s Democracy and Tradition,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78, 
no. 2 (2010): 441. 
20 Miguel De La Torre, “Stanley Hauerwas on Church,” in Beyond the Pale: Reading Ethics from the Margins, ed. Stacey M. Floyd-
Thomas and Miguel A. De La Torre (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 219-223; Miguel De La Torre, Latina/o Social 
Ethics: Moving Beyond Eurocentric Moral Thinking (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 21-27, 30-31; Floyd-Thomas and De 
La Torre, introduction to Beyond the Pale, xxi. Also see the back cover: “This book offers a reader-friendly introduction to Christian 
liberationist ethics.” Even though De La Torre is a liberationist, that does not disqualify him since Dorrien argues, as I note in chapter 
one, for making liberal theology a subset of liberation theology. 
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Hauerwas in Democracy and Tradition, if not earlier. Unfortunately, the initial but old 
points of disagreement and not present developments are still the primary lens for 
interpreting either side.21 
 So it is as if Hauerwas-types and liberals-liberationists are preoccupied with their 
own projects. If they ever come near each other, they pass like ships in the night, or ships 
at war. Or they stand silently side by side in an elevator, as Hauerwas and Gloria 
Albrecht once literally did. Yet, the narrative of impasse between social justice types and 
faithfulness types is rooted in a misunderstanding about the real source of conflict, which 
keeps the theological discourse fragmented and distracts us from crucial work. Despite 
the prevalence of the social justice versus faithfulness narrative, I reject it because I will 
show that it is, at best, a partial truth that pervades and shapes the theological milieu.22 
																																																								
21 De La Torre’s recent The Politics of Jesús: A Hispanic Political Theology (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015) offers an 
important advance in Christology for liberation theologies in the US. Also, when De La Torre takes more time within his hermeneutic 
of suspicion to engage Hauerwas, De La Torre puts forward more original critiques and interesting readings of Hauerwas (De La 
Torre, Latina/o Social Ethics, 26-27, 127 n. 11). For the rest of the paragraph: Miguel De La Torre, Doing Christian Ethics from the 
Margins, 2nd ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2014), 82; De La Torre, Latina/o Social Ethics, 21-27, 127-128 notes 9, 10, and 12; 
De La Torre, The Politics of Jesús, xiii, 12; De La Torre, “Stanley Hauerwas on Church.”  
 Dorrien provides a then up-to-date reading of Hauerwas in contrast to De La Torre and many others (SEM, 487-488). For a 
selection of recent but dated critiques levied at Hauerwas and Hauerwas ‘types,’ see: Theo Hobson, Reinventing Liberal Christianity 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2013), 287-292, 307; James Davison Hunter, To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, 
and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 152-166 passim, 169, 181-182, 
249-251, 253; Paul Rasor, “Theological and Political Liberalisms,” Journal of Law and Religion 24, no. 2 (2009): 433-434 n. 7. For a 
defense of Hauerwas, see Mark Ryan, The Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2011), chp. 4. 
 Even though Hauerwas’s sympathy for Sheldon Wolin and A. D. Lindsay dates back to at least 1970, Lisa Cahill’s and 
Phillip Gray’s critical articles of Hauerwas might be partly excused since they were published, respectively, in the same years as 
Hauerwas’s The State of the University (2007) and Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary (2008). But in the same year as 
Cahill, one example of bucking the trend is David True. Stanley Hauerwas, “Politics, Vision, and the Common Good,” Cross 
Currents, Fall 1970, was reprinted in Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (N.p.: Fides 
Publishers, 1974; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 224-225, 236 n. 31, 239 (hereafter VV); Stanley Hauerwas, 
“The Ethicist as Theologian,” Christian Century, Apr. 23, 1975; Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Theological Ethics, the Churches, and Global 
Politics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 34, no. 3 (2007), 381; Phillip W. Gray, “‘Peace, Peace, but there is No Peace’: A Critique of 
Christian Pacifist Communitarianism,” Politics and Religion 1 (2008); Stanley Hauerwas and Romand Coles, Christianity, 
Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary: Conversations between a Christian and a Radical Democrat (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 
2008) (hereafter CDRO); David True, “Embracing Hauerwas? A Niebuhrian Takes a Closer Look,” Political Theology 8, no. 2 (2007). 
22 Quirk, “Stanley Hauerwas: An Interview,” 204-205; Dorrien, SEM, 485-486; William Cavanaugh, “Stan the Man: A Thoroughly 
Biased Account of a Completely Unobjective Person,” in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 27 (hereafter the volume is HR). 
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 Neither Dorrien nor Hauerwas are so simple as the standard narrative. The justice-
faithfulness impasse should raise justified frustration in those who carefully read either of 
them. Dorrien is not just “one of the finest interpreters and theologians of liberalism 
writing today.”23 Although he has yet to do more than to briefly and occasionally sketch 
out his normative theology, it unites the diverse plurality of voices in liberal theology’s 
history and in liberal theology’s current, “unnoticed renaissance.”24 Dorrien thereby 
offers hope that liberal theology can still be a viable project and a coherent movement 
rather than continuing to subsist in disconnected theological niches. But Dorrien also 
acknowledges Hauerwas’s significance. Hauerwas’s bristling rhetoric contains a 
constructive, post-Christendom, Protestant alternative to Protestants like Dorrien.25 
 This acknowledgment is based on the fact that their real place of disagreement 
lies deeper than the surface grammar, hasty interpretations, or the conventional boundary 
lines marked by trenches and foxholes. Relocating the difference makes all the difference 
for upsetting the fictional impasse and the actual disagreements. The divide between 
Dorrien and Hauerwas is, I will argue, ultimately over divine and political sovereignty, 
and human subjectivity and agency. For Dorrien and Hauerwas to get out of their 
fractured discussion, I will contend, they need to further account for Rowan Williams’s 
political and theological work. 
																																																								
23 Scott Holland, “Theology, Democracy, and the Project of Liberalism,” Cross Currents, Winter 2005-2006, 439. 
24 Gary Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 3, Crisis, Irony, and Postmodernity, 1950-2005 (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 2006), 513 (hereafter MALT, 3). See also William Dean, “Dorrien the Historian,” Union Seminary Quarterly 
Review 61, no. 1-2 (2008): 41; Gary Dorrien, The Making of American Liberal Theology, vol. 1, Imagining Progressive Religion 
1805-1900 (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001), xv (hereafter MALT, 1); Gary Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, 
and Liberal Necessity: On The Making of American Liberal Theology,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 61, no. 1-2 (2008): 50-55; 
Gary Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, Decline, Renewal, Ambiguity,” Cross Currents, Winter 2005-2006, 477-
479; Gary Dorrien, “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” Journal of Unitarian Universalist History 35 (2012): 
47-48. Dean’s “Dorrien the Historian” and Dorrien’s “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity” were later also 
published in American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 29, no. 2 (2008). 
25 Dorrien, SS, 360. 
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II. Chapter Summaries 
 There are many complications that are ultimately fatal to the justice-faithfulness 
dichotomy. But I am not concerned with further addressing directly the standard narrative 
of social justice versus faithfulness. Doing so would grant its superficial, categorical 
impasse that leads to silence in an elevator. I will, therefore, show implicitly the standard 
narrative’s poverty in chapter one by going beyond it. Sometimes the standard narrative 
is broken through when the ‘social justice’ side proclaims that they are attempting to be 
faithful too. But the discussion generally ends with that proclamation. So near where that 
leaves us, I argue in chapter one that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s concerns for faithfulness 
to different accounts of relational truth undergird their rival evaluations, sometimes 
similar critiques, and wildly divergent responses to liberalism and liberal theology. Near 
the end of chapter one, I contend that their accounts of relational truth are actually rival 
descriptions of reality.26  
 But even reality, humanity’s relational existence, is created and shaped by some-
‘thing’ more. Chapter two shows that divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and 
agency are at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different theologies. Dorrien 
characterizes divine sovereignty in terms of universal Spirit and love; Hauerwas 
maintains divine sovereignty in terms of the triune gift-giver revealed by Jesus in his 
particularity. Both accounts construe divine sovereignty as creating and shaping human 
subjectivity and agency, and in turn, intra-human relations. But Dorrien and Hauerwas 
differ by construing humanity’s existence as reducible to spirit or creature, humanity’s 
																																																								
26 For the theological faithfulness of social justice work, see Dorrien, SS, 374-375. 
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relational agency as underwritten by love or gift, and humanity’s flourishing as realized 
in relations for human freedom or relations in friendship. 
 Chapter two touches on politics since human relations are politics broadly 
construed. Chapter three, however, focuses directly on political sovereignty. I will 
contend that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences over divine sovereignty and intra-
human relations issue forth in strikingly divergent positions on political sovereignty. 
Dorrien’s critiques of empire notwithstanding, his understanding of Spirit’s sovereignty 
is integrated with the modern nation-state’s sovereignty at a basic level. But Hauerwas 
argues that the state’s sovereignty is hegemonic. Under the guise of keeping unity and 
peace, the state seeks to secure and expand its power over citizens, self-interest, and 
death by marginalizing and replacing Christianity.  
 I add my own work on the state’s raison d’être (reason for being) and raison 
d’état (reason of state) for two reasons. First, the French political concepts initially 
develop Hauerwas’s position. Second, my larger end is to show how much further 
Dorrien and Hauerwas diverge on how to respond to political sovereignty because they 
diverge on how to understand the relation between divine and political sovereignty. Such 
divergence is not simply a separation; it is a significant fracture. Yet there is hope that it 
can be overcome. Both Dorrien and Hauerwas have a political surplus; that is, their 
positions cannot be fully understood in terms of political sovereignty’s status quo. 
 So how can their political fracture be overcome? How can their visions of radical 
democracy be realized for a more fruitful discussion? Those questions drive chapter four. 
Despite Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s dramatic difference over state sovereignty, I will 
contend that they still assume, in their own way, the permanence of the state’s 
	 12 
sovereignty as it stands today. Rowan Williams’s work on procedural secularism and 
interactive pluralism supplies a political horizon that, on the one hand, meets Dorrien’s 
and Hauerwas’s concerns and engages their political surplus. On the other hand, 
William’s political horizon goes beyond them by challenging the permanence of the 
state’s self-serving sovereignty and by avoiding Constantinian presumptions. Williams 
seeks to transform the state’s hegemonic sovereignty into a pluralist form of subsidiarity. 
The latter is oriented by the common good found through public discussion among not 
only individuals, but also social bodies.  
 To transform state sovereignty may seem far-fetched, despite my focus on a 
practical way to do so. Even I am still in shock that I ended up with such an argument 
that I affirm. However––besides all the other reasons I will raise––the transformation of 
state sovereignty is indeed very much necessary if I am correct about the depth of 
Dorrien and Hauerwas’s difference and about the character of their political surplus. 
 So chapter four is about freeing Hauerwas and Dorrien from the source of their 
political impasse. But if that were the final end, it would reduce Williams’s work to 
strictly a political position for pragmatically bridging between two ethicist-theologians. 
Such a pragmatic bridging is unacceptable since I hold that ethics and theology are 
united, and Christian faith is inherently political. All politics is, then, theopolitics. The 
final conclusion returns to focus on divine sovereignty, the God-human relation, and 
intra-human relations. This time, however, the horizon is Williams’s trinitarian work and 
his according theopolitics. I argue, to one degree and another, that his trinitarian fusion of 
love and gift in God’s triune mutuality and plenitude constructively challenges issues in 
Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s thought that are important for developing their respective 
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projects and their discussion. I hope, then, that those influenced by Hauerwas’s and 
Dorrien’s work can have a more interesting, fruitful, and fresh discussion than one 
formed by the faithfulness versus social justice. Such a discussion opens the possibility of 
addressing the real fractures that plague the theological milieu and the political voice of 
US Christianity. 
 In light of the argument, the subtitle to this project, “theological transformation of 
sovereignties,” is actually somewhat misleading. Transformations, although breaking 
grammatical convention, would more accurately reflect a multiplicity of changes found 
directly and indirectly in chapter four and the final conclusion. The obvious change is 
that Williams provides an alternative, transforming vision of state sovereignty that shifts 
the framework in which Dorrien and Hauerwas discuss state sovereignty. Williams offers 
that vision on the basis of divine sovereignty in terms of gift, love, mutuality, and 
plenitude. This account can initially call for development in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s 
understanding of God’s sovereign agency. That development––although briefly 
suggested in chapter four and more implied than delineated in the final conclusion––
shifts aspects of their theopolitics and, in turn, transformatively reverberates throughout 
their whole frameworks. In the interest of brevity, those transformations are developed to 
one degree or another. In particular, I will have to leave for later a more developed 
argument focused on Williams’s account of divine sovereignty directly in relation to 
Dorrien and Hauerwas. But even with that direct argument left for later, my return to the 
church-world issue in light of Williams, I believe, shows enough development to support 
my hope: that the theological fracture can be transformed into fresh, fruitful discussion. 
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III. Method and Clarifications 
 This is a dissertation in systematic theology, but my argument addresses questions 
in political theology. I do not see a conflict, however, for two reasons. First, there is no 
contemporary consensus over what is political theology. There used to be a consensus of 
sorts within each of the first two academic generations, cross-generational variations 
notwithstanding. But now what constitutes political theology is contested since the 
meaning of political theology has broadened. With the recent influx of a few important 
readers and attempts at introductory volumes, some emphasize still the continental 
discussion, some use political theology to describe what many others have called social 
ethics, and some emphasize a historical discussion reaching back to Augustine and 
earlier. Contemporary, constructive volumes share only the term political theology 
emblazoned on the cover. So political theology as a term currently appears to be fluid 
rather than definitive.27 
																																																								
27 For the first generation and their classic texts, see Erik Peterson, Theological Tractates, ed. and trans. Michael J. Hollerich 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 
trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). For the second generation, see Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in 
History and Society: Toward a Practical, Fundamental Theology, trans. J. Matthew Ashley (New York: Crossroad, 2007); Jürgen 
Moltmann, On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1984); Dorothee 
Sölle, Political Theology, trans. John Shelley (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974). For examples of other figures and their texts which 
are not often, but should be, included in an account of political theology, see: John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913); Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957); Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Jacob Taubes, To Carl Schmitt: Letters and Reflections, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013). 
 For readers and introductory volumes, see William T. Cavanaugh, Jeffrey W. Bailey, and Craig Hovey, eds., An Eerdmans 
Reader in Contemporary Political Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2012); Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward, 
eds., Religion and Political Thought (London: Continuum, 2006); Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, eds., The Blackwell 
Companion to Political Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); Michael Kirwan, Political Theology: An Introduction 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2009); Elizabeth Phillips, Political Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: T&T Clark, 2012). 
For monographs on focused on specific figures and/or time periods see: Graham Hammill and Julia Reinhard Lupton, Political 
Theology and Early Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Leonard V. Kaplan and Rudy Kosher, eds., The Weimar 
Moment: Liberalism, Political Theology, and Law (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012); Eric Jacobson, Metaphysics of the 
Profane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Sophie 
Lunn-Rockliffe, Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Andrew Shanks, Hegel’s Political 
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
 For contemporary, constructive volumes, see Sergii Bulgakov: Towards a Russian Political Theology, ed. Rowan Williams 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999); John B. Cobb, Jr., Process Theology as Political Theology (Manchester, England: Manchester 
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 Second, the lack of consensus allows me to explore my own understanding of 
political theology. It is the attempt to think through and to practice the inherent political 
(in the broad sense of polis) implications of Christian theology in ways that engage 
fundamental assumptions about social, philosophical, political, and economic theories 
and practices that inform everyday life. Political theology as such may appear to be social 
ethics in the sense that both would lead to practices like solidarity with marginalized 
immigrant workers on the picket line. What differentiates political theology and social 
ethics is their foci and methods. Political theology stresses scripture, Christian doctrine, 
and theological traditions with their practices and basic categories (systematic theology) 
of Christianity. From that position of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, political theology 
attends to fundamental assumptions in society, and then tailors action to contemporary 
contexts. Social ethics today generally assumes a set of theological principles within a 
																																																								
University Press; Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1982); Thia Cooper, Controversies in Political Theology: Development or 
Liberation? (London: SCM Press, 2007); Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (Brooklyn, 
NY: Verso, 2012); Clayton Crockett, Radical Political Theology: Religion and Politics after Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011); Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds., Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, Klaus Tanner, Michael Welker, eds., Political Theology: 
Contemporary Challenges and Future Directions (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2013); Graham Hammill, The Mosaic 
Constitution: Political Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Melanie 
Johnson-DeBaufre, Catherine Keller, and Elias Ortega-Aponte, eds., Common Goods: Economy, Ecology, and Political Theology 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2015); Paul Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Michael Jon Kessler, ed., Political Theology for a Plural Age (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Vincent Lloyd, ed., Race and Political Theology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Vincent 
Lloyd, The Problem of Grace: Reconfiguring Political Theology (Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 2011); John Marsden, 
Marxian and Christian Utopianism: Toward a Socialist Political Theology (New York: Monthly Review, 1991); J. G. McConville, 
God and Earthly Power: An Old Testament Political Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2008); John Milbank, The Future of Love: 
Essays in Political Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009); Michael S. Northcott, A Political Theology of Climate Change 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2013); David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract: An Essay in Political Theology 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political 
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Perry, The Pretenses of Loyalty: Locke, Liberal Theory, & American 
Political Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political Theology to 
Theological Politics Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1995); Jeffrey W. Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); J. Deotis 
Roberts, A Black Political Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster Press, 1974); Peter Scott, A Political Theology of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Debora Kuller Shuger, Political Theologies in Shakespeare’s England: The Sacred 
and the State in Measure for Measure (Houndmills, England: Palgrave, 2001); Aakash Singh and Péter Losonczi, eds., From Political 
Theory to Political Theology: Religious Challenges and the Prospects of Democracy (London: Continuum, 2010); Taubes, The 
Political Theology of Paul; George E. Tinker, Spirit and Resistance: Political Theology and American Indian Liberation 
(Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2004); Slavoj Zizek Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in 
Political Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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moral compass for navigating its focus on important political and socioeconomic details. 
That guiding of individual consciences is for the goal of empowering nongovernmental 
organizations in policy lobbying and other forms of activism.28 
 Social ethics, then, mostly focuses on analyzing nongovernmental organizations. 
But as a work of political theology, here I examine fundamental assumptions about state 
sovereignty. My starting point is the doctrine, the practices, and the basic categories of 
Christian tradition in history rather than first to historical projects like the liberal state 
that requires theologians to be in disguise. So even though Dorrien and Hauerwas both 
hold ethics chairs, I will be engaging their theological positions as well. There is plenty 
of warrant for doing so, despite the disciplinary boundaries between contemporary 
theology (Hauerwas), historical theology (Dorrien), and ethics (Dorrien and Hauerwas). 
In fact, I will argue that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement is a 
theological issue.29 
 The definition of political theology and the problem of disciplinary boundaries 
raise a few other issues that require clarification. Less fluid a term than political theology, 
theopolitics is often used by Hauerwas’s students and their students to indicate that 
“every ethic presupposes a sociology.”30 Or as Braden Anderson has put it, “every 
																																																								
28 For the definition of political theology, I am indebted to D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 267. 
29 For more on my starting point, see David Horstkoetter, “Getting Back to Idolatry Critique: Kingdom, Kin-dom, and the Triune Gift 
Economy,” Union Seminary Quarterly Review 64, no. 2-3 (2013): 86 n. 2, 88, and 88 n. 9. 
30 Hauerwas, WW, 109. For the use of the terms theological politics or theopolitics, for the most part in distinction to political 
theology, see Gyögry Geréby, “Political Theology versus Theological Politics Erik Peterson and Carl Schmitt,” New German Critique 
35, no. 3 (2008); William T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination (London: T&T Clark, 2002); Rasmusson, The Church as Polis. 
For a further description of the difference between political theology and theological politics see, Thomas Ekstrand, “Political 
Theology, Theological Politics,” in Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, ed. Anne L. C. Runehov and Lluis Oviedo (New York: 
Springer Reference, 2013), 1782-1785. Although I have my reservations about Ekstrand’s description of theological politics as less 
radical than political theology. 
	 17 
salvation narrative entails a politics, and every politics presumes a salvation narrative.”31 
On those terms the problem is competing politics of salvation. My sympathy for 
theopolitics as such distinguishes this work from what is commonly called “public 
theology.”32 It emphasizes cooperation, sometimes critical, with the state in pursuit of the 
common good but without a clear or systematic emphasis on competing salvific claims. 
Since Williams’s theopolitical vision of transforming the state’s sovereignty is about 
moving the state away from its hegemonic salvific claims and toward the common good, 
I use theopolitics more loosely as a short-hand for the inherent politics of deep 
theological doctrines. This is still consistent with Hauerwas because he writes, “if 
theology is done faithful to the gospel, it will not only be political but it will be so in a 
particular way.”33 With Williams, I hold to a theopolitical vision of particular human 
bodies who are created and their relations are shaped by the triune God, whose loving 
self-gift and self-giving love is the source of both superabundance and mutuality. 
 That tips some of my hand. I affirm Hauerwas’s emphasis on Jesus’s particularity, 
gift, non-violence, and a robust ecclesiology that is counter-cultural and non-
Constantinian. But interpreting Hauerwas as a theologian, much less engaging him 
appreciatively and critically, can be a precarious endeavor. Besides his polemical 
rhetoric, his theological assumptions are sometimes underdeveloped in comparison to his 
emphasis on their ‘political’ implications. While I am not one to so easily delineate 
																																																								
31 Braden Anderson, Chosen Nation: Scripture, Theopolitics, and the Project of National Identity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 
2012), xiii. As an example, see Hauerwas for Robert Jenson and against Ludwig Feuerbach in Stanley Hauerwas, The Work of 
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2015), 134-135 (hereafter WT). 
32 Thomas Hughson, Connecting Jesus to Social Justice: Classical Christology and Public Theology (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2013), 8-22. 
33 Hauerwas, WT, 171. Therein Hauerwas also finds problems with political theology. For his older criticism’s of political theology, 
see AC, 2; WW, 219. For his theological politics, see Stanley Hauerwas, Approaching the End: Eschatological Reflections on Church, 
Politics, and Life (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2013), 73-74, 78, 82-86 (hereafter AE). 
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between theological and political, the issue of those assumptions leads me to agree with 
part of Nicholas Healy’s assessment for engaging Hauerwas. There is a significant 
interpretive difference between those who know Hauerwas personally and those who do 
not. The former can fill-in the unstated assumptions or less developed positions with 
unwavering confidence. I do not have the luxury of an ‘inside track’ with Hauerwas 
himself in any significant manner. Yet, I am not claiming that closeness or distance is 
better than for interpreting him, only that more people read his books than he has the time 
to be friends with. So like Healy, I have focused my argument to Hauerwas’s published 
work. Dorrien is the only figure with whom I have an ‘inside track,’ insomuch as I was 
once his student at Union Theological Seminary (NYC). But I keep largely to his 
published work too. Even though they are far from reducible to their published work, it 
serves as the ground to prove what I argue about them and from them.34 
 Although my sympathy for Hauerwas’s theological work runs deeper than mine 
for Dorrien’s, my debt to Dorrien is by no means small. I affirm his stress on love divine, 
liberation theology, and an activist church. I am also deeply sympathetic with his 
democratic socialism, which is one of the aspects in the social gospel I still find alluring. 
It is because of my deep appreciation for Dorrien that I will attempt to engage him as a 
constructive theologian, not only as an ethicist or historian. No one has done that. In fact, 
even Dorrien’s histories have yet to be engaged in any significant way other than in 
evaluative book reviews, in a symposium on his The Making of American Liberal 
																																																								
34 Nicholas M. Healy, Hauerwas: A (Very) Critical Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014), 3-4. As for my own 
reading and critiques of Hauerwas, those differ quite a bit from Healy. I do not, however, have the space to address those differences 
in this project. There are also complications when citing Hauerwas. His essayist mode requires multiple citations. Since those make 
the footnotes already burdensome, I have kept most citations in reference to his books, even though often the book chapters were 
previously published as articles––sometimes even years before the book is published. 
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Theology trilogy, and more recently in Christopher Evans’s work. That lack of 
engagement is not because Dorrien is not respected, but presumably because his 
normative position, theological and often ethical, is developed indirectly through 
historical recovery. Further complicating my task is that his subtle editorial voice creates 
difficulty in proving the details of his normative position. Thankfully, he has quickly 
stated his normative position framed by brief appeals to historical figures. But his appeals 
and his historical work are sometimes separated by hundreds of pages of historical work 
and sometimes even different publications. These appeals also mean that Dorrien’s 
position cannot be sufficiently described without noting other figures. To address these 
issues and still support my argument, I cite his relevant historical work and his normative 
appeals to it at the same time. I also, as needed, develop his position in light of specific 
movements, like the social gospel, personalism, and liberation theology, and in light of 
specific figures he engages, like Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Walter Rauschenbusch, 
and Nels F. S. Ferré. Even then I have not been able to indicate the full breadth of 
Dorrien’s sympathies, especially his work on the hard sciences and process theology.35 
 Since the dissertation’s argumentative limits prohibit simply reconstructing 
Dorrien’s position, since Dorrien’s normative voice is often too subtle to cite as proof of 
																																																								
35 For one evaluative book review that touches on Dorrien’s normative position, see Ralph Ahlberg, review of The Making of 
American Liberal Theology: Crisis, Irony, and Postmodernity, 1950-2005, by Gary Dorrien, Conversations in Religion and Theology 
6, no. 2 (2008): 185; for the symposium, see Union Seminary Quarterly Review 61, no. 1-2 (2008); Christopher H. Evans, Liberalism 
without Illusions: Renewing an American Tradition (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010). A recent but brief and mostly 
tangental engagement with Dorrien as a theologian is in A. P. F. Sell’s Content and Method in Christian Theology: A Case Study of 
the Thought of Nels Ferré (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 2014), 205-206. 
 For one instance of Dorrien’s normative appeals, see Gary Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” Tikkun, 
Summer 2014, 49, which references indirectly his other normative appeals: Dorrien, MALT, 3:538-539; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, 
Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 55-56; Gary Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” American Journal of 
Theology & Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2009): 21-23. Those normative appeals are in reference to his historical work. For Nels F. S. Ferré, 
see: Dorrien, MALT, 3:39-57, esp. 54-55; Gary Dorrien, “Making Liberal Theology Metaphysical: Personalist Idealism as a 
Theological School,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2003): 243; Gary Dorrien, “Theology of Spirit: 
Personalist Idealism, Nels F. S. Ferré, and the Universal Word,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 27, no. 1 (2006): esp. 
27-29. For Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, see: Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern 
Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 387-393 (hereafter KRHS); Gary Dorrien, “Hegelian Spirit in Question: The 
Idealistic Spirit of Liberal Theology,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 32, no. 1 (2011): 7-12. 
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the reconstructed position, and since I have some more theological sympathies with 
Hauerwas than Dorrien, I fear––rightly or not, I am unsure––that Dorrien’s position 
might appear as a foil. I have tried my best to keep that from happening. My intention has 
always been to do right by Dorrien, especially because no one has yet to gather together 
his whole normative position, from Spirit to economics, in extended detail.  
 But how can I be sympathetic to both Hauerwas and Dorrien? There is little room 
to be so as the discussion stands now. Yet there can be room if one, first, goes ‘all the 
way down’ to the categorical disagreement, as in chapters one through three. Then, 
second, one shifts a few of the categories and follows the reverberations ‘back up’ while 
still attentive to Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s concerns, as in chapter four and the final 
conclusion.  
 The shifts to their work are not arbitrary, but instead they flow from their 
concerns about each other’s projects. My argument is then an attempt at “ad hominem 
practical reasoning,” which is also what I understand William’s political vision to be 
about.36 Further, I have in mind other discussions as well. Williams’s theopolitical 
framework is similar to the views of Luke Bretherton, an English citizen who has been 
working in the US for a few years now. Although chapter four does not have the space to 																																																								
36 D. Stephen Long, “What Make Theology ‘Political’?,” in Calculated Futures: Theology, Ethics, and Economics, by D. Stephen 
Long, Nancy Ruth Fox, and Tripp York (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2007), 81-82; Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 36. Emphasis mine. 
 The difficulty of ad hominem practical reasoning is that it “requires the attempt to articulate the implicit presumptions that 
shape the character of those making the arguments” (Hauerwas, WT, 14). I hold in high regard the character of Dorrien, Hauerwas, and 
Williams; however, I am not out to judge their character. The issue of presuppositions is my concern in this project about their 
positions. But that raises another issue. Hauerwas is wary of the term “position” because it “names the attempt by a theologian to 
develop a theological system that can bear his or her name. Accordingly the ‘position’ becomes more important than what the position 
is allegedly about, that is, God” (Hauerwas, WT, 25-26). I agree with Hauerwas. I would use terms like “perspective” instead of 
“position” as I do, except that my use of “position” allows Dorrien his own space for his technical use of perspective. I also use the 
term position because they do maintain different view points that have been solidified over time, such as liberal theology or 
theological liberalism. But my own tension with the term position should be visible in the fact that I use phrases such as Hauerwas-
types or Hauerwas’s students in an attempt to avoid some sort of monolithic, formal position connoted by something like 
‘Hauerwasians.’ 
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raise Bretherton’s recent, more concretely focused work on community organizing, 
chapters four and the final conclusion together begin to meet his equally recent call for 
trinitarian arguments to undergird the transformation of political sovereignty.37 
 Other works focus on the divide between the ‘schools’ represented to varying 
degrees by Dorrien and Hauerwas. John Allen Knight has taken up the epistemological 
issues between liberal theology and postliberal theology. In a Catholic framework Kristin 
E. Heyer addresses the divide in the figures of J. Bryan Hehir and Michael Baxter who, 
respectively, stand in for John Courtney Murray and Hauerwas. But Knight’s focus on 
epistemology and Heyer’s on the public limit the literal space they have to probe 
theological assumptions with sufficient depth. Ephraim Radner has gone deeper 
theologically, and there is thematic overlap between his work and my project here. 
However, there are simple and complicated divergences between us over quite a few 
crucial issues to the point that we end up in rather different places.38 
 Most of these differences I will have to make clear at another time. But one place 
of divergence is over liberalism, which requires some clarification from the start. I do not 
																																																								
37 Luke Bretherton, Christianity and Contemporary Politics: The Conditions and Possibilities of Faithful Witness (Malden, MA: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Luke Bretherton, Resurrecting Democracy: Faith, Citizenship, and the Politics of a Common Life 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Luke Bretherton, “Sovereignty,” in The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern 
European Thought, ed. Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 274. I would 
have given a full-throated development to meet his call if not for the sake of space––if chapter five had not been reduced to one 
important part that now constitutes the majority of the final conclusion. 
38 John Allen Knight, Liberalism Versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth-Century Theology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013); Kristin E. Heyer, Prophetic and Public: The Social Witness of US Catholicism (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2006); Ephraim Radner, A Brutal Unity: The Spiritual Politics of the Christian Church (Waco, TX: Baylor 
University Press, 2012), 221-267, 380-396, 433-437, 456. 
 Hauerwas is sympathetic to major figures in postliberal theology, but he has also distanced himself from wholesale 
identification with the school. Nevertheless, Douglas Harink directly, Dorrien and John Wright implicitly, and Joseph Incandela 
indirectly establish the possibility of still including Hauerwas within postliberalism. And Hauerwas has affirmed Harink’s reading of 
Hauerwas’s apocalypticism and his debt to Karl Barth and John Howard Yoder. Hauerwas, AN, 2-9; Hauerwas, SU, 118 n. 17; 
Douglas Harink, Paul Among the Postliberals: Pauline Theology Beyond Christendom and Modernity (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 
2003); Hauerwas, PF, 235; Gary Dorrien, “Truth Claims: The Future of Postliberal Theology,” Christian Century, Jul. 18-25, 2001; 
John Wright, introduction to Postliberal Theology and the Church Catholic: Conversations with George Lindbeck, David Burrell, and 
Stanley Hauerwas (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 8; Hauerwas, PF, 137-138; Joseph Incandela, “Similarities and 
Synergy: An Augustianian Reading of Aquinas and Wittgenstein,” in Grammar and Grace: Reformations of Aquinas and 
Wittgenstein, ed. Jeffrey Stout and Robert MacSwain (London: SCM Press, 2004), chp. 1, esp. pp. 20-24, 39-40; Hauerwas, PF, chp. 4 
(also published as “Connections Created and Contingent: Aquinas, Preller, Wittgenstein, and Hopkins,” in Grammar and Grace, chp. 
3). 
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like to traffic in words that end with “ism” because they give the appearance of an all 
encompassing and general label that is too often vague. But I initially use the term 
liberalism to help describe significant disagreement between Dorrien and Hauerwas, and 
so, as the argument proceeds, a description of liberalism shifts and changes accordingly. 
Liberalism is partly defined in the first chapter in terms of autonomy and abstract 
universality common to both Dorrien and Hauerwas. More frequently, however, the term 
liberalism is used in connection to Hauerwas. Perhaps his most holistic and succinct 
description of liberalism in one place is the following. It is the name for the 
impulse deriving from the Enlightenment project to free all people from the 
chains of their historical particularity in the name of freedom. As an 
epistemological position liberalism is the attempt to defend a foundationalism in 
order to free reason from being determined by any particularistic tradition. 
Politically liberalism makes the individual the supreme unit of society, thus 
making the political task the securing of cooperation between arbitrary units of 
desire.39  
 
Chapter one takes up those themes, and it qualifies the issue of foundationalism by 
following Dorrien’s turn from Immanuel Kant to G.W. F. Hegel. Chapter two indirectly 
furthers Dorrien’s definition of liberalism by way of his political economy’s debt to, 
again, Kant and Hegel. Later chapters develop other themes in political liberalism 
relating to the nation-state’s sovereignty and to Rowan Williams’s critical, partial 
acceptance of liberalism. Hauerwas maintains, even recently, that the fear of death is used 
to legitimate coercion of people into liberalism’s political order. Williams stresses 
liberalism insofar as it emphasizes creative participation in governance through dialogue. 
Hauerwas similarly emphasizes a local politics in discursive practical reason, but he does 
																																																								
39 Hauerwas, AN, 18. 
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not attribute that politics to liberalism. So each major figure has at least a somewhat 
different description of liberalism, which develops over the course of my argument. 
 Another important term is liberation theology. In a Catholic context, it is often 
limited to liberation theologians contextually situated in Latin American such as Gustavo 
Gutiérrez, Jon Sobrino, and others. To differentiate this liberation tradition from others, 
adjectives like black, feminist, womanist, ecofeminist, queer, etc. are used to qualify the 
label. But I understand Latin American liberation theology as one of many types of 
liberation theology for the same reason that I do not feel the need to always use an 
adjective to specify the type of liberation theology that I am discussing. Liberation 
theologies began to converge decades ago after Latin Americans––predominately 
Catholic––working on economics and African Americans––predominately not Catholic–
–working on race discovered the interrelation of the issues that they were addressing and 
the similarity of their constructive frameworks. I do not intend to gloss over important 
differences among liberation theologies. For instance, queer theology’s rejection of 
binaries can be in tension with most other liberation theologies that began and largely still 
do––with significant qualification and nuance––work on the premise of an oppressed-
oppressor dynamic. Although Dorrien is attentive to sexuality issues, he has not written 
much on them in his own voice. He focuses mostly on race, gender, economics, and 
ecology. So in reference to those issues and the broader horizon of liberation, I will use 
the terms liberation and liberation theology broadly. I add adjectives like Latin American 
or simply ecofeminist whenever I aim for specificity.40 																																																								
40 Edward P. Antonio, “Black Theology and Liberation Theologies,” in The Cambridge Companion to Black Theology, ed. Dwight N. 
Hopkins and Edward P. Antonio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 33-35, 41-42; Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer 
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 In reference to Williams’s position, I use the metaphor “horizon” to indicate a 
large but implicit whole that is, on the one hand, composed of a general orientation, a 
number of assumptions, and a cluster of secondary sources. On the other hand, the whole 
and some of its parts are not a stated or systematically defined frame of reference by the 
figure who supplies the horizon. The metaphorical phrase “going beyond” indicates the 
avoidance of the pitfalls of a politically or theologically problematic horizon or horizons 
by extricating their thought from just such horizon(s). This extraction is achieved partly 
by taking on another, more fruitful horizon. In chapter four, Williams’s political horizon 
is more fruitful than Dorrien’s or Hauerwas’s since it constructs a political framework for 
pluralism as an alternative to state sovereignty as it is generally understood today. In the 
final conclusion, Williams’s theopolitical horizon is more fruitful because it coheres with 
and realizes best a trinitarian theology that fuses love and gift. 
 I can see how one might conceive of “going beyond” as a Hegelian framework, 
wherein Williams’s horizon sublates Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s. I do put Williams in 
discussion with Hauerwas and then with Dorrien because Williams’s horizon overlaps 
with theirs but avoids some of their problematic assumptions and/or articulations. 
																																																								
God (London: Routledge, 2003), 2, 27; Victor Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious 
and Cultural Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1999); Victor Anderson, “The Black Church and the Curious Body of the Black 
Homosexual,” in Loving the Body: Black Religious Studies and the Erotic, ed. Anthony B. Pinn and Dwight N. Hopkins (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Patrick S. Cheng, Rainbow Theology: Bridging Race, Sexuality, and Spirit (New York: Seabury Books, 
2013); Horace Griffin, “Toward a True Black Liberation Theology: Affirming Homoeroticism, Black Gay Christians, and Their Love 
Relationships,” in Loving the Body, 139; EL Kornegay, Jr., A Queering of Black Theology: James Baldwin's Blues Project and Gospel 
Prose (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1; Roger A. Sneed, Representations of Homosexuality: Black Liberation Theology and 
Cultural Criticism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 12, 23-24, 45, 111-112. 
 For another, under-recognized difference, see the discussion about the distinctions between womanism and black 
feminism: Monica A. Coleman, Katie G. Cannon, Arisika Razak, Irene Monroe, Debra Mubashshir Majeed, Lee Miena Skye, 
Stephanie Y. Mitchem, and Traci C. West, “Roundtable Discussion: Must I be Womanist?” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 
22, no. 1 (2006). Dorrien’s own account of the womanist-black feminist difference (EDE, 347-348) also draws upon: bell hooks, 
Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1990); Katie G. Cannon, “Sexing Black Women: 
Liberation from the Prison-house of Anatomical Authority,” in Loving the Body; Traci C. West, Disruptive Christian Ethics: When 
Racism and Women’s Lives Matter (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 55-56, 193 n. 44; Traci C. West, “Is a Womanist 
a Black Feminist? Making the Distinctions and Defying Them: A Black Feminist Response,” in Deeper Shades of Purple: Womanism 
in Religion and Society, ed. Stacey M. Floyd-Thomas (New York: New York University Press, 2006). 
 For Dorrien on sexuality, see “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” 49. 
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However, I do not think that Williams’s “going beyond” Dorrien and Hauerwas sublates 
their work in a Hegelian synthesis. “Horizon” and “going beyond” are related, 
intentionally spatial metaphors that need not connote progress. Not only does Williams’s 
horizon have its own lacunae that I simply do not have the space to delineate. But also I 
actively eschew that I am attempting to resolve Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. 
Even if I was trying to resolve the disagreement, my work lacks Hegel’s dialectic of 
double negation, or even the popular misreading of it as thesis-antithesis-synthesis. 
Instead, Williams’s function is to open space for fresh dialogue between Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s horizons in the hopes of some kind of future reconciliation. That attempt to 
open space is potentially like Williams’s appropriation of Gillian Rose’s Hegelian mutual 
recognition and discussion. However, opening space for reconciliation is not Hegelian 
progress through sublation.41
																																																								
41 For Hegel’s dialectic, see Dorrien, KRHS, 205-206. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Faithfulness, Truth, and Reality 
 Gary Dorrien is an unabashed liberal theologian and ethicist concerned with 
social justice. Stanley Hauerwas in equal measure rejects liberal theology and emphasizes 
Christian faithfulness. Or so goes the standard narrative as raised in the introduction to 
the dissertation. The narrative is insufficient since it does not adequately address that 
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference has more to do with their differing evaluations, but 
not so much descriptions, of liberalism and liberal theology as they have been commonly 
narrated. Dorrien asserts repeatedly that “the way beyond liberalism is through it.”42 
Hauerwas proclaims “that Christians would be ill advised to try to rescue the liberal 
project either in its epistemological or political form.”43 Such an evaluative disagreement 
may still sound conventional, even well trodden, but the truth is more interesting. Their 
sharp disagreements and some critical agreements over the legacies of liberal theology 
and liberalism proceed from a common goal. Both Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s 
“alternative” trajectories to each other are for cultivating a faithful, post-Christendom, 
Protestant Christianity in the US.44 How can their disagreement and agreement as well as 
their alterity and faithfulness be explained? I will argue that the issue is Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s different accounts of relational truth, which in the end can be understood as 
rival accounts of reality.45 
																																																								
42 Dorrien, EDE, xii. For a variation on that quote which is clearly normative, see Gary Dorrien, The Word as True Myth: Interpreting 
Modern Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 9 (hereafter WTM) For other sources that are more 
descriptive, see Dorrien, EDE, 297; Gary J. Dorrien, Reconstructing the Common Good: Theology and the Social Order (N.p. Orbis 
Books, 1990; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2008), 167-168 (hereafter RCG); Dorrien, SS, 263. 
43 Hauerwas, AC, 35. 
44 Dorrien, SS, 360. I mention Protestant in order not to ignore Catholicism. Otherwise it would appear as if Catholicism is not even 
present in the US. Even though none of the major figures––Dorrien, Hauerwas, and Rowan Williams––are all Episcopal/Anglican, 
some figures I draw on later are Catholic. 
45 Dorrien, SS, 17-19, 280-281, 360-361, 374-376; Hauerwas, SU, 20 n. 19. 
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 I begin with defining liberal theology in order to establish Hauerwas’s critiques of 
it and liberalism, and to argue that his critical position is derived from Christian 
faithfulness to a hierarchy of truth known in relation. Then I raise Dorrien’s position as a 
response to Hauerwas initially and then to conventional liberal theology. Dorrien’s 
critique of Hauerwas’s arguments is sandwiched by Dorrien’s agreement with important 
criticisms that Hauerwas directs at liberal theology. But rather than side with Hauerwas, 
Dorrien’s normative project is about recovering aspects of liberal theology that are not 
directly at the center of Hauerwas’s critiques and are not promoted by most liberal 
theologians in the US today. Dorrien’s recovery, I argue, is about faithfully maintaining a 
multiplicity of truths in mutual relation. Finally, I contend that Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s 
differing accounts of relational truth signal rival accounts of reality. By showing how the 
divide between Hauerwas and Dorrien is really based on different accounts of truth and 
reality, I implicitly demonstrate how the social justice-faithfulness narrative is a 
simplistic and superficial divide. 
I. Dorrien’s Three Layers of Liberal Theology 
 Liberal theology is historically and intellectually part of the liberal project of 
emancipatory freedom for the sake of autonomy. Significantly, Dorrien and Hauerwas 
agree that liberalism and liberal theology did not fully arrive until the middle 
Enlightenment when Immanuel Kant gave the philosophical underpinnings for both. I 
will employ Dorrien’s definition of liberal theology since he has given a far more 
thorough treatment of it and liberalism than Hauerwas. For Dorrien, liberal theology is 
primarily a method. It is a “three-layered,” “mediating theology” that navigates “between 
orthodox over-belief and secular disbelief” by privileging “reason and experience” rather 
	 28 
than “external authority.”46 The three layers are described in the table below, which I will 
develop in order.47 
The Layers of Liberal Theology 
Layer 1 Liberalism’s Principle of Autonomy 
Layer 2 1. Axiom: The Necessity of Faith 
2. Mediating Dialectic Between Autonomy (Layer 1) and 
Axiom (Layer 2) 
Layer 3 Repercussions of the Mediating Dialectic  
 																																																								
46 Dorrien has articulated his definition of liberal theology in a number of different places with sometimes different emphases. The 
quotes above are from the following sources: Gary Dorrien, “Modernisms in Theology: Interpreting American Liberal Theology, 
1805-1950,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2002): 205; Dorrien, KRHS, 4; Dorrien, “The Crisis and 
Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 21. For other places where Dorrien puts forward variations on the definition, see the following. 
“Modernisms in Theology” was adapted from the introductions to MALT, 1:xxi-xxiii; MALT, 2:3, 530; MALT, 3:2-3 for Dorrien 
reflecting back on MALT, 1 and MALT, 2; Dorrien, KRHS, 5-8; Dorrien, EDE, 358; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology: Crisis, 
Irony, Decline, Renewal, Ambiguity,” 456, 458, 471-472; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 52; Gary 
Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” Conversations in Religion and Theology 6, no. 2 (2008): 186. 
  In the citations above, it is worth noting that Dorrien refers to liberal theology as a “third way theology.” He also calls 
postliberal theology a “‘third way’ theology” too. The difference is that the post-liberalism third way is not so much a mediating 
theology, but rather works to “revive the neo-orthodox ideal”; “aims to be neither conservative nor liberal, and to offer fresh 
approaches to scripture and Christian life.” Gary Dorrien, “The Origins of Postliberalism: A Third Way in Theology?,” Christian 
Century, Jul. 4-11, 2001, 16. 
47 Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 531-532; Hauerwas, CSCH, 148; Hauerwas, AN, 81-81 n.14; Hauerwas, STT, 197-198; Dorrien, KRHS, 531-532; 
Stanley Hauerwas, BH, 118, 248 n. 95, 249 n. 96; Stanley Hauerwas, AC, 31-32, 52-54; Hauerwas, AN, 27; Hauerwas, PF, 147; 
Hauerwas, STT, 29-32; Hauerwas, PK, 10-11; Hauerwas, WW, 148; Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s 
Witness and Natural Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2001), 37-38 (hereafter WGU); Stanley Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and 
Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine, ed. Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
30; Dorrien, MALT, 1:xxi-xxiii; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 53-55.  
 It is worth noting about MALT, 1 and “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity” that Dorrien’s privileging of 
method contrasts with others who define liberal theology as strictly concerned with divine immanence. Dorrien MALT, 1:xix-xx: 
Daniel Day Williams, God’s Grace and Man’s Hope (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 22; Lloyd J. Averill, American Theology 
in the Liberal Tradition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), 22-26. More recent work may take greater care, but immanence is 
still emphasized. See Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th-Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), introduction and chps. 1-2 for instance. 
 Of course there are qualifications to make. The primacy of Kant, his project setting the framework for liberalism, is not 
intended to act as if Kant was the sole beginning of philosophical underpinnings of liberalism. Dorrien and Hauerwas both point to 
Pelagius (Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 530; Stanley Hauerwas, VV, 31). Dorrien and Hauerwas also raise early modern figures, like John Locke 
and Thomas Hobbes respectively. But those figures are given limited attention in comparison to Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s focus on 
Kant. Dorrien, KRHS, ix, 1-2, 5-12, 23, 38, 108-119, 530-531; Dorrien, MALT, 1:xvi; Dorrien, WTM, 10-11; Hauerwas, AE, 128; 
Hauerwas, CC, 78; Hauerwas, PF, 147; Hauerwas, STT, 29-32; Stanley Hauerwas, War and the American Difference: Theological 
Reflections on Violence and National Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 8-10 (hereafter WAD); Hauerwas, WGU, 
37-38; Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and Ethics,” 30. 
 Much of Dorrien’s historical work has been precisely to define and develop liberal theology, with emphasis on the US 
context. Yet, definition is somewhat off the point for Hauerwas. He objects to definition to the point that the word and its cognates are 
almost entirely absent in his essays. He rejects definitions precisely because they give the appearance of definitively grasping a 
timeless, universal truth in its entirety. Such definition ends conversation and potentially abstracts content from its particularity. 
Accordingly, Hauerwas eschews definitive books to write ad hoc, conversational essays in theological ethics. They allow him to 
refine, even shift, his thought over time in response to diverse issues, particular contexts, and liberalism’s multiplicity and ever 
changing nature. For those reasons Hauerwas is reticent to give a single or full definition of liberalism. Instead, Hauerwas critiques 
liberalism and liberal theology through describing and re-describing the basic themes that constitute liberalism as the context warrants. 
Hauerwas, AN, 18; Hauerwas, DF, 6-7; Hauerwas, PF, 22; Hauerwas, PK, xx; Stanley Hauerwas, Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Brazos, 2006), 20-21 (hereafter Matt); Hauerwas, SU, 4; Hauerwas, WW, 87, 97, 168 n. 8, 229-230; Stanley Hauerwas, Working with 
Words: On Learning to Speak Christian (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), 100 n. 14, 103 including n. 21 and n. 22 (hereafter 
WwW). 
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The First Layer of Liberal Theology 
 The first layer places liberal theology squarely within liberalism. Simply put, 
liberal theology roots “all claims to truth” in the primacy of reason and experience over 
the “appeal to external authorit[ies]” such as revelation or tradition.48 How this fits within 
liberalism requires a short elaboration on the goal of liberalism itself and its philosophical 
support. Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that the liberal project is one of emancipatory 
freedom for autonomy. Positively, autonomy means that human freedom is its own end. 
Negatively, autonomy outright rejects or subtly relativizes contingent determinations like 
history or “mythic imagination” that impede “free self-determination.”49 Dorrien’s 
analysis of the philosophical basis for autonomous subjectivity as such begins with 
Kant’s philosophy of the human being, reason, and experience. Three points are 
important for this.50 
 First, Kant’s understanding of the human knower leads to the “active self.”51 For 
Kant, “we know only what we create” because the subject participates in forming its own 
understanding, and eventually itself, by reasoning through “transcendental categories” 
that order sense experience.52 But the subject’s knowledge is not only an internal ideal. 
																																																								
48 Dorrien, KRHS, 4. See also Dorrien, MALT, 1:xxiii; Dorrien, MALT, 2:1. 
49 Dorrien, KRHS, 531; Dorrien, WTM, 162. 
50 Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 531-532, 541; Dorrien, WTM, 156. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see 
Hauerwas, CC, 78, 131, 269 n. 6, 271 n. 14; Hauerwas, CSC, 148; Hauerwas, AN, 18, 81-82 n. 14; Hauerwas, CET, 27; Hauerwas, 
DF, 15, 167; Hauerwas, DT, 194; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 79-80; Stanley Hauerwas, STT, 30, 145, 148, 150, 197-198; Hauerwas, 
PK, 6-11, 41; Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Practice and the Practice of Law in a World without Foundations,” Mercer Law Review 
44, no. 3 (1993): 748. 
51 Primarily describing Kant, Dorrien uses the “active self” in an “ontological framework” of gift (which yielded the noumena-
phenomena distinction), rather than in a “cognitive” framework (KRHS, 541). I use active self in reference to the primacy of the 
subject’s own perceptions, its ordering of sense-data, and its autonomy, the “self-origination of law” (ibid., 541). That last point of 
autonomy keeps my use of the active self from collapsing Kant’s complexity. Dorrien argues that autonomy “is a type of causality” 
that unifies both Kant’s phenomena-noumena worlds and his ontological-epistemological self (ibid., 541-542).  
52 Dorrien, KRHS, 206, 537. See also ibid., 38-47, 56, 530-531; Dorrien, WTM, 13, 18-20. I will raise later the post-Kantian shift that 
assumed but also complicated the issue of autonomy on relational terms. Suffice it to say now, Kant and the post-Kantians begin with 
presupposing the idealist subject-object distinction and the subject’s experience of and reasoning through its own cognitional 
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Such knowledge must first pass through an account of the subject’s active role in forming 
its knowledge, rather than an account of the subject’s knowledge passively received from 
revelatory declarations by an “external authority.”53 In this constructive epistemology of 
the active self, the experiential and rational activity of the subject replaces external 
authority with self-awareness. Crucial for liberal theology is the theological import of the 
active self: “the religious bias in favor of spiritual creativity ha[s] a philosophical 
ground.”54 So Dorrien takes Kant’s account of the active self as the beginning of 
autonomous self-determination. Thereby, the active self is the first philosophical 
component of the autonomous subject.55 
 Second, hand in hand with the active self is a separation between form and 
content. Kant construed the active self within his assumption that only phenomena can be 
known. The post-Kantians rejected his noumena-phenomena distinction, but they 
embraced Kant’s privileging of the active self in an immanent frame (e.g., nature), which 
meant an emphasis on experience and reason. Kant’s, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s, and G. 
W. F. Hegel’s various forms of idealism privileged individual or corporate experience 
and reason. However, as idealists they all assumed that universal, objective truth is more 
basic than any individual’s particular experience. The truth of reality is located more in a 
universally general idea––the abstract content, category, concept, or ideal like Kant’s 
mind, Schleiermacher’s feeling, and Hegel’s Spirit––than how truth is manifested in the 
particularity of a specific form. This separation of form and content allows for creative 
																																																								
processes (Kant), internal feeling to sensing the universal (Friedrich Schleiermacher), or development of consciousness to Reason (G. 
W. F. Hegel). Dorrien, KRHS, 37-40, 98-101,182-187; Dorrien, WTM, 11-13, 28-31. 
53 Dorrien, KRHS, 531. See also ibid., 219, 549. 
54 Ibid., 533. 
55 Ibid., 531-532, 549. For agreeing and supplementing, see Hauerwas, AC, 53-54, 96; Hauerwas, CET, 229, 242; Hauerwas, PF, 125; 
Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 79. 
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insight into the experiences of the active self, and further relativizes external authority. 
For the active self to perceive the universal “essence” of the truth (the abstract content) 
unmarred and translatable for anyone, it is necessary to either simply eliminate or 
dialectically transcend the facade of the particularity in which content like theological 
doctrine is expressed (the particular form).56 Dorrien calls the obscuring form “over-
belief,” presumably drawing from William James.57 This abstracting of truth from 
particularity in order to recognize or construct an abstract, universal truth is vital to 
liberalism and the autonomous subject it posits. For both Dorrien and Hauerwas, 
accordingly, abstract universals (ideals) are the lifeblood of liberalism and liberal 
theology, even when liberal theology claims to be realist.58 
 Third, the active self, which abstracts experiential and/or empirical data into 
generalized universals, depends on an equally universal and autonomous reason. The 
active self rationally orders and interprets the true nature of reality in order to leave 
behind over-belief and to apprehend abstract, universal, and objective truth. Reason can 
play such a role for two reasons. First, it is the objective tool inherent to finite humans for 
																																																								
56 Dorrien, KRHS, 101. See also ibid., 89-90, 101, 107, 171, 191-195, 388-389; Dorrien, MALT, 2:17; Dorrien, WTM, 19-20; 
Hauerwas, AN, 24, 27; Hauerwas, WW, 182. 
57 Dorrien, KRHS, 4; William James: Writings 1902-1910, ed. Bruce Kuklick (New York: The Library of America, 1987), 460. 
58 Sometimes the form-content distinction is articulated in terms of fact-value or is-ought, so here are citations for all three. Dorrien, 
KRHS, 37, 41, 160, 167-168, 218, 533, 549; Dorrien, WTM, 27-30; Hauerwas, BH, 231 n. 21; Hauerwas, AC, 63-65; Hauerwas, AN, 
24, 27, 41; Hauerwas, CET, 85 n. 4; Hauerwas, DF, 138; Hauerwas, IGC, 52; Hauerwas, Matt, 20-21; Hauerwas, PF, 119, 137; 
Hauerwas, PK, 13; Hauerwas, VV, 11-16, 20, 23-25, 29, 32-34, 69-70; Hauerwas, WwW, 100 n. 14, 103 with n. 21 and n. 22. One 
might object, perhaps even from Dorrien, that Hegel did not have a form-content distinction, or at least he sought to close the gap into 
“actuality,” which was the point of absolute in his absolute idealism (Dorrien, KRHS, 205. See also ibid., 218). I will raise the issue of 
Hegel’s attempt to transcend picture-thinking later, which is a form-content distinction. 
 For the rest of the paragraph: Dorrien, KRHS, 2, 11-17, 45-47, 74, 58, 85, 87, 90-92, 98-99, 159-160, 168-169, 179, 191, 
221, 231, 241, 530-533, 387, 533, 536, 542, 549, 555; Dorrien, SEM, 261, 271, 273-274, 280; Dorrien, MALT, 2:529; Dorrien, WTM, 
20. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas BH, 34, 118, 222 n. 30; Hauerwas, DF, 
100-102; Hauerwas, STT, 29; Hauerwas, WGU, 68-71, 85, 102, 110. 
 The details of Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel on universal, abstract, and objective truth warrant their own pagination. 
See Dorrien, KRHS, 38-42, 46-48, 89-93, 99-101, 105-106, 159-160, 182, 184-185, 175-177, 192-195, 203-208, 210, 218-221, 535-
538; Hauerwas, AN, 2, 24, 27; Hauerwas, CC, 97; Hauerwas, PK, 11; Hauerwas, STT, 29-31; Stanley Hauerwas with Richard Bondi 
and David B. Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further Investigations into Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1977), 16-18 (hereafter TT); Hauerwas, WW, 86. 
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accessing abstract, universal truth. Second, then, reason is universally normative for 
human life within an immanent frame, or at least beginning with immanence. This form 
of reason is  “autonomous.”59 It determines its own method and object; it is self-
grounding like the active self rather than conditioned by external authority. Construing 
autonomous reason as essential to truth results in a mutually informing interplay between 
autonomous reason and autonomous subjectivity. On one hand, the autonomy of reason is 
key because it is constitutive of the autonomy of the subject. Only through reasoning 
unencumbered by claims of super-sensible knowledge can one discern one’s will in 
accordance with universal law and then choose the action to fulfill one’s will. On the 
other hand, the autonomy of the subject is crucial to the autonomy of reason. If over-
belief is determining the subject, then a partisan facade obstructs reason’s autonomy, and 
reason becomes suspect. Many post-Kantians, like Hegel, broke from Kant’s “mechanical 
rationalism” and opted for “intellectual intuition” in which reason is dialectically 
contingent and autonomous.60 But even then the goal of using reason is still to achieve 
autonomy by perceiving a generalized universal within particularity.61  
 Truth is articulated in universals abstracted from one’s perception of will or 
nature through rationally examining the mind and experiences and/or through reasoning 
between particularities for insight into the whole rather than through external revelation. 
This stress on nature, will, experience, and reason is integral to the account of autonomy. 
Rationally abstracting a universal within a solely immanent reality places the subject’s 
																																																								
59 Dorrien, WTM, 10. 
60 Dorrien, KRHS, 535-536. 
61 Dorrien, KRHS, 7, 36-37, 48-49, 50-52, 56-61, 71, 74, 221, 230, 531-532, 535-536, 540-542. For agreeing and supplementing, even 
within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas, CC, 130-131, 274 n. 24; Hauerwas, AC, 27, 53, 75; Hauerwas, AN, 18; Hauerwas, 
DT, 208-209; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 101; Hauerwas, STT, 29-30, 221; Hauerwas, PK, 11, 19-22; Hauerwas, SU, 47-48. 
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rational will to act autonomously within a corresponding autonomously natural ground. 
External authority is not even in the picture. So the form-content distinction and 
autonomous reason not only roots the subject in a natural foundation, but also extricates 
the subject from external authority as the particularities of over-belief. This sense of 
autonomy, reason, and experience is what liberal theology accepts when it begins with 
the primacy of reason and experience, over the “appeal to external authority,” for “all 
claims to truth.”62 The embrace of liberal autonomy in liberal theology, however, is best 
illustrated in the next two layers.63 
 Kant and the post-Kantians combined a philosophy of the mind, of abstract 
universals, of immediate sense experience, and of reason all within an immanent frame. 
Their purpose was to free the subject to apprehend universal truth. That made it possible 
to transcend one’s limited epistemological subjectivity for Kant (to a degree) and 
Schleiermacher, and also to develop consciousness for Hegel. The Kantian and post-
Kantian subject is constructed out of abstract universals joined with the active self that 
orders its knowledge and its subjectivity through the capacity of objective, autonomous 
reason. This unity created an epistemological hermeneutic of an immanent, active subject 
that did two things. First, it broke the subject’s connection to particularity and relegated 
faith to rational morality. It thereby excluded external authoritative determinations like 
tradition, and at least qualified previous notions of communal determination and 
revelation. Second, it provided the space to rationally discover (or posit) an abstract 
																																																								
62 Dorrien, KRHS, 4. 
63 Ibid., 36, 48, 50-51, 92-93, 98-99, 230, 531, 536. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see 
Hauerwas, AC, 15-16; Hauerwas, PK, 11, 13; Hauerwas, VV, 33-34. 
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anthropological foundation and its constitutive categories. The subject is now free to 
construct itself; the subject becomes its own sovereign.64 
The Second Layer of Liberal Theology 
 Yet strictly adhering to autonomy excluded even rational theology, not just 
orthodox over-belief. The second layer of “integrative mediation” answers how to retain 
faith so that one can be both liberal and Christian.65 The second layer is, on the one hand, 
its own axiom: “the viability and necessity of an alternative to orthodox over-belief and 
secular disbelief.”66 On the other hand, that axiom also explains how one can operate 
within the first layer. Born out of apologetic and survivalist concerns, liberal theology 
began in the German theology that sought to meet the criticisms of the enlightenment 
deists and atheists on their own terms. The German approach used reason and experience 
to mediate between over-belief and disbelief. Starting with Kant and the post-Kantians, 
liberal theology combined “freethinking” with theological conviction to produce a third 
way: human experience and reason largely apart from external authority was privileged 
for critically reasoning about God and for developing an account of how humanity ought 
to live.67 If faith is primarily based on the external authority of a particular revelation or 
tradition, faith is noncompliant and threatens autonomous reason at the heart of 
autonomous subjectivity. This understanding of faith is rejected as unscientific, irrational 
belief because it cannot be objectively verified by science. It may also be rejected as 
over-belief because the partisan form makes it incapable of articulating the fullness of 
																																																								
64 Dorrien, KRHS, 42-43, 46-47, 91-93, 535-536. 
65 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 3. See also Dorrien, KRHS, 4. 
66 Dorrien, KRHS, 4. 
67 Ibid., 7-8. 
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universal, objective truth. To make faith compliant and find the universal truth one needs 
to apply reason, not the biased particularity of tradition or community, to faith in 
experience and/or history. This process strips away or reinterprets the legacy of faith in 
Christian history under the rubric of liberal values.68 
 One result of this distinguishing project is the demythologizing of faith, which 
strips or radically reinterprets doctrinal formulations considered mythological or 
oppressive in a modern, scientific world. What remains is the perceived true essence of 
faith configured according to experience and modern understanding. Schleiermacher, for 
instance, may have believed the resurrection occurred, but whether it happened or not for 
him is beside the real point, “to know Christ as redeemer.”69 While this first result is a 
critical implication of autonomous reason, a second result is constructive. Reason and 
experience reconfigure faith into rational morality or feeling and theology into 
apologetics. Faith may participate in society by contributing to choosing moral norms, 
like choice itself. But faith’s public participation depends on separating faith from its 
particular form in order to explain itself within liberal categories and values to society. 
For the most part, Kant and most post-Kantians, accordingly, construe Jesus as an 
exemplar or moral teacher of enlightenment for and through freedom. For the more 																																																								
68 Ibid., 4-10, 48-49, 89-93, 98-99, 195, 221, 541-542; Dorrien, WTM, 11; Gary Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference: Barth, Whitehead, 
Modern Theology and the Uses of Worldviews,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 30, no. 3 (2009): 244-245. For agreeing 
and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas, AC, 63-64, 75; Hauerwas, AN, 5-6, 24; Hauerwas, DF, 14-
15; Hauerwas, IGC, 200; Hauerwas, STT, 29-32; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 79-80, 99-101. 
 To detail the specifics concerning history, Kant strips away history. Hauerwas notes specifically that Kant’s work is not 
only ahistorical, but anti-historical (WW, 72, 156. See also Dorrien, KRHS, 58.). As for Schleiermacher and Hegel, they reinterpret 
history by privileging, respectively, feeling or historical development. But they both do so to abstract content from the past and 
present (Dorrien, KRHS, 91-92, 98-103, 182-183, 186-187, 191-194, 203-207, 214). This trajectory continues in more recent work. 
Hauerwas notes that both Rudolf Bultmann and R. Niebuhr, despite their emphasis on history, also had a “peculiar ahistorical 
character”: “what is important is how history exhibits eternal characteristics rather than how concrete historical figures or movements 
actually changed the world” (WW, 47 n. 9). I will show later that Dorrien’s The Word as True Myth is about the struggle to recover 
some legacy of faith within the liberal theology’s larger framework of stripping. 
69 Dorrien, KRHS, 107. See also Dorrien, WTM, 12-16, 19-20. More radical demythologizing entirely dismisses or explains away 
Jesus’s miracles and resurrection. Dorrien, KRHS, 244, 249-250, 258; Dorrien, WTM, 22-31. 
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mystically inclined then and now, Jesus is a symbol. Traditional faith, then, is deemed 
over-belief, unscientific, and irrational when such faith is not reshaped by autonomous 
reason. But through autonomous reason, faith can be rationally cured from over-belief to 
become a rational morality congruent with abstract, universal truth and modern 
knowledge.70 
The Third Layer of Liberal Theology 
 The third layer is a catch-all category for the transformative shockwaves once 
autonomous reason and experience supplanted external authority in liberal thought. 
Thereby liberal theology is further distinguished from other theologies. The first and 
second layers, as ways of taking up the liberal project, mean for Dorrien that liberal 
theology “is open to the verdicts of modern intellectual inquiry, especially historical 
criticism and the natural sciences.”71 The ramifications of this are extensive for Dorrien. 
Liberal theology, first, “reconceptualizes the meaning of Christianity in the light of 
modern knowledge and values” like the idealist philosophy of the mind and the notion of 
the free, autonomous subject.72 Second, liberal theology “is reformist in spirit and 
substance, not revolutionary.”73 Change comes from within humanity’s self-development, 
and so liberal theology works with society rather than opting for divine apocalyptic in-
																																																								
70 Dorrien, KRHS, 5, 48-50, 52, 90-93, 101-102, 105, 107, 165-166, 190, 213, 244-260, 316-330, 334-356, 408, 469-499, 531-533; 
Dorrien, WTM, 10, 15-16, 101-114, 119-120, 203-208; Dorrien, EDE, 357; Dorrien, MALT, 2:502-506, 534-536, 548-549; Dorrien, 
MALT, 3:chp. 6. For agreeing and supplementing, even within an overall critical position, see Hauerwas, AC, 29, 53; Hauerwas, AN, 
77; Hauerwas, CC, 40-42, 235-236 n. 27, 271 n. 14; Hauerwas, BH, 231 n. 21; Hauerwas, PK, 7-8, 13; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 
20-21, 99, 101; Hauerwas, TT, 16-18; Hauerwas, WW, 47 n. 11, 60-61 n. 47, 132, 150. There is one qualification: Dorrien notes that 
Hegel later shifted away from Jesus as exemplar (KRHS, 221). But for now I simply concerned with a general definition of liberal 
theology. 
71 Dorrien, KRHS, 5. See also Dorrien, MALT, 2:1-10 for a sketch of what the openness looks like. 
72 Dorrien, KRHS, 5. 
73 Ibid. 
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breaking over and/or against society. Third, for liberal theology to be progressive within 
a liberal status quo, “it conceives Christianity as an ethical way of life, it advocates moral 
concepts of atonement or reconciliation, and it is committed to making progressive 
religion credible and socially relevant.”74 Consequently, liberal theology is first defined 
by reason and experience over-against external authority. But that is far from the totality 
of its work. Liberal theology seeks to plumb the theological depths of liberal autonomy.75 
II. Hauerwas Against the Unfaithfulness of Liberal Theology 
 Hauerwas decisively rejects both liberalism and liberal theology. He does so, I 
will argue, because he maintains a hierarchical and relational understanding of truth. 
Jesus, in his particularity, is the truth and is known through particular relations. Since 
Hauerwas has not articulated his specific opposition to liberal theology in terms of 
Dorrien’s definition, I show that Hauerwas’s account of truth informs his rejection of 
liberal theology’s three layers. Against layer one, he finds that liberalism’s autonomous 
subjectivity and rationality are deceptive, incoherent, and hegemonic. Under the 
hegemonic pressure to conform, in layer two liberal theology takes on an incoherent 
“double mind” by attempting to balance liberalism’s deception and incoherence with 
																																																								
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 5, 105. For an example of working within society, see Dorrien, SS, pp. 1-4 and chp. 6. Also, based on what I have already 
noted, liberal theology can be further characterized by these core themes: emancipating and unifying freedom; idealism and 
subjectivity; historical development vis-à-vis progress and an evolutionary mindset; truth and relativity; and a spiritual center 
(Dorrien, KRHS, 1, 3, 9). 
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Christian faith.76 Liberal theology’s incoherence in layer two then begets deep 
unfaithfulness to Jesus in layer three.77 
Hauerwas Against the First Layer 
 Like Dorrien, Hauerwas recognizes that the idealist turn to “the mind” and the 
active self is about autonomy.78 But he rejects this first layer of liberal theology since he 
rejects as deceptive the idealist epistemological turn to the active self, the autonomous 
subject, and the autonomy of reason. Kant’s rational autonomy is deeply problematic and 
is far from liberating. It uses rational idealism––or in Hauerwas’s terms, a “disembodied 
‘rationality’”––to ignore the contingency of history, of tradition, and an “ultimate telos” 
of life in order to clear space for autonomous self-construction through rules and 
autonomous choice.79 For Hauerwas, that anthropology and its corresponding politics 
refuses to acknowledge a fundamental reality. The subject is relationally constituted by 
the historical particularity of social bodies and social contexts, and by the particular God-
givenness of life, of meaning, and of value. So Hauerwas rejects, accordingly, the 
construal of human freedom as self-grounding, as the right to arbitrary choice, or what 
would be more specific to Dorrien, freedom as its own end. In fact for Hauerwas, Kantian 
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autonomy is a “lie,” a “self-deception.”80 In contrast to truth, “lies are nothing less than 
contradictions of the word of God and the reality that is created by God.”81 Then what is 
the truth? How is it known? Hauerwas maintains truth hierarchically ordered. Jesus, 
crucified and resurrected, is the truth that shows “there can be no truth more 
determinative” than him and his work.82 An account of Jesus as such focused on his 
particularity constitutes Hauerwas’s relational understanding of truth.83 
 Against Kantian and Hegelian accounts of knowledge as essence and rational-
epistemological abstraction, Hauerwas contends that what is “true cannot be secured by a 
theory of truth more determinative than the faith itself.”84 Otherwise he quips: “if you 
think you need a theory of truth to underwrite the conviction that Jesus was raised from 
the dead, then worship that theory––not Jesus.”85 That idolatry of theory creates an 
“ideological distortion,” an abstraction of divinity in accordance with a general, religious, 
or moral sensibility which Jesus and/or his kingdom is then made to exemplify.86 In 
contradistinction to theory and abstraction, Hauerwas stresses that Jesus in his 
particularity is simultaneously God incarnate in history and the universal truth. For 
Hauerwas, the particularity of Jesus is the truth essential for Christians to be able “to call 
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God creator or redeemer.”87 Jesus is inseparable, even theoretically, from his embodiment 
and from his teachings of God’s kingdom, for he is the “autobasileia.”88 That is, the 
particular ‘shape’ of Jesus is the ‘shape’ of God’s kingdom present in human history. 
Accordingly, Jesus-for-all is the revelation of God-for-all in God’s cosmic kingdom. 
Jesus as the autobasileia reveals within human history “how God rules” and loves.89 
Thereby, Jesus is God’s transformative speech that makes divine peace real in humanity 
and to the world.90 
 Truth, then, is not bound up in a general theory or list of abstract propositions. 
Nor is truth ‘neutral,’ autonomous data. Instead, truth is known in humanity’s relation to 
the “living God.”91 Jesus, in his particularity, is the living truth who shows humanity “the 
truth of ourselves as sinful and misunderstanding.”92 Accordingly, to known such truth 
requires living in both relation and particularity. The truth is made known in one’s 
relations to others, in the stories of those relations, and in the relational process of re-																																																								
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telling and acting those stories. Jesus is made known in and through the church, a living 
community in a particular tradition that re-tells the particular story of Jesus by 
embodying it. Truth is then found in one’s contingent, always-particular, “historical 
existence” rather than particularity as an incomplete facade for universal truth.93 Both 
that particular storied tradition and its faithful embodiment are required to know the truth. 
Truth, then, refers to human beings’ relation to God and to other human beings.94 
 However, liberalism’s autonomous subjectivity and reason undermine the 
possibility of a particular tradition. The autonomous subject’s freedom is limited to its 
self-interest since meaning and value are dependent on the subject and self-construction 
is achieved through choice. Neither Kant’s encouragement to be more rationally dutiful 
nor Hegel’s more rigorously plumbing of consciousness through the active self 
perceiving its relation to the whole will save one from self-deception or move one beyond 
self-interest. Not only does autonomous reason fail to develop the habits and skills 
necessary to act in accordance with virtues supplied by the true story embodied in a 
community, but also the position that “one can judge all belief prior to having any,” like 
standing outside a “tradition,” is “illusory.”95 That illusory assumption dismisses the 
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“contingent” rationality of tradition in order for reason to apprehend abstract universals 
over-against the contingency and particularity of storied tradition.96 Accordingly, 
autonomous reason explicitly (Kant) or subtly (Hegel) overrides particularity and 
tradition with abstract universals that form autonomy, that narrow and thin morality, and 
that distort reason into an instrument for serving self-interest in choice. Hauerwas 
concludes, then, that autonomy’s denial of tradition for self-interest, reduction of morality 
to choice, and instrumentalization of reason recapitulate the “illusions” of “self-
deception.”97 Autonomy itself is neither liberation nor the truth.98 
 Hauerwas finds that autonomy’s self-deceptive illusions and its ironic 
incoherencies are concomitant. His most common criticism of liberal autonomy’s 
incoherencies focuses on its refusal of tradition. As shown already, liberalism rejects the 
“transcendent perspective of the kind associated with traditional Christianity” on the 
grounds of autonomy.99 Liberalism’s largely immanent and ‘natural’ cosmology, 
understood through a corresponding autonomous and ‘neutral’ rationality, desacralizes 
the world from external sources and over-belief. This deception, however, “fostered its 
own tradition” in the centuries-long pursuit of autonomous self-transcendence.100 Indeed, 
not only is autonomous reason an oxymoron, despite liberalism’s rejection of a 
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“transcendent perspective,” Hauerwas also points out that liberalism aspires to achieve 
the same transcendent perspective through autonomous self-transcendence.101 
 Starting with this fundamental incoherence, an ironic hegemony over political 
arrangements rows and perniciously polices Christianity by both explicitly excluding and 
subtly supplanting it on liberal terms. Informed by Hauerwas’s account of hierarchical 
and relational truth established above, I focus here on his critique of political liberalism’s 
incoherent ironies that begin with autonomy rivaling the transcendent perspective and 
end with excluding it. In Hauerwas’s rejection of liberal theology’s second layer I address 
the issue of supplanting.102 
 Hauerwas’s reflection of death is one way he has developed a critical connection 
between liberalism’s incoherence and its political order. Death grounds liberalism’s 
desacralized autonomy by replacing ‘external authorities’ with death as the basic reality 
of existence. Although liberalism may then appear bound by death, liberalism’s attempt 
to overcome death legitimizes liberalism’s re-sacralization, the attempt to achieve a 
transcendental perspective. The threat of death justifies political liberalism’s forcing of 
people into its political arrangement as citizens with nothing in “common” but “their fear 
of death.”103 Desacralizing the world legitimates the liberal nation-state’s claims to 
autonomous ownership of and sovereignty over death and life through the state’s 
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monopoly on policing violence and its claims to ensure peace. Since such an autonomous 
attempt to overcome death is an attempt at self-transcendence, for Hauerwas the liberal 
political order is no less than a sacral order that aspires to be an alternative contrary to 
Jesus.104 
 The question for political liberalism is how should a politics be constructed that is 
both autonomous and transcendental? How does one affirm the autonomy of individuals 
and still unify them in order to keep the peace? Political liberalism answers with a 
minimalist anthropology of autonomy and a political order that reflect Kant’s universal 
morality as reason and rules. Persons are reduced to rational “individuals…[as] a 
particular unit of arbitrary desire”; the good is reduced to one’s right to freely pursue 
arbitrary desires.105 These reductions to arbitrary desire are realized through political 
rules that are arranged and enforced by the neutral modern nation-state. Key to this 
political arrangement is a concept of negative freedom for self-construction by each and 
all to construct themselves. In such an arrangement, the major issues are the autonomy of 
the individual and the self-serving procedure of rational rules rather than the substance of 
the various desires themselves. By reasoning within this empty apparatus, liberalism 
ensures political unity. Liberalism immediately affirms individual freedom on the one 
hand, and rationally resolves disputes between the conflicting, diverse desires of 																																																								
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autonomous subjects on the other hand. Justice is the name for this procedural negotiation 
between conflicting desires in order to secure freedom and unity.106 
 Hauerwas grants that the liberal political order claims to be an “empty” “system 
of rules” since it does not supply “moral content.”107 But he notes a deep irony in the 
difference between the lacunae within the procedural apparatus and the assumed morality 
in the apparatus’s procedural structure. The emptiness of the apparatus depends on an 
ideology of negative freedom, which itself presupposes liberalism’s autonomous, 
universal anthropology called human dignity. What is “moral” is “to satisfy our ‘wants’ 
and ‘needs,’” but everyone determines their own wants and needs.108 So autonomous, 
rational, and “universal principles,” such as human dignity, are the basis for an 
autonomous, rational, and “universal ethic,” typified by the idea of universal human 
rights.109 All the while dignity and rights are framed in terms of morality. In fact, 
liberalism collapses the differences between morality, human dignity, and rights in order 
to constitute a public morality. Exemplified by Kant, liberal public “morality only has 
meaning when considered as a schema of laws or principles self-evident to any 
reasonable person.”110 In that framework, what is morally wrong (injustice) is violating 
an individual’s rights and the rules for ensuring those rights. Doing so contravenes the 
two ideals ensured by autonomous rational morality. The first ideal is the social space of 
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negative freedom for pursuing self-interest. The second ideal is the underlying principle 
of the individual and one’s freedom as ends in themselves (human dignity). There is a 
moral order then, but it extends no further than individual autonomy and rules necessary 
to ensure it. Moral behavior is reduced to following legal procedures in the pursuit of 
self-interest.111 
 Nearly every step in liberalism’s political-moral order is deeply problematic for 
Hauerwas. Political liberalism presupposes but neither supplies nor gives its own account 
of virtues, of character, of the family unit, and of the other moral contributions to social 
life. So although liberalism’s desacralized world denies external sources, liberal society’s 
morality is ironically “parasitic” on sources like Christianity that are external, even 
contrary, to autonomy.112 That irony, Hauerwas contends, creates harmful ironies as 
liberalism incorporates issues, ideas, people, and politics by redefining them in terms of 
autonomy. The flashpoint that (in)famously characterizes Hauerwas’s critical position on 
liberalism is his rejection of human dignity and rights language. But his position is more 
complex than his infamy might lead one to believe.113 																																																								
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 I do not have the space above to address further problems created by the new morality, which only reinforces or masks 
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 His hierarchy of truth in particular relations, on the one hand, affirms human 
dignity in terms of the imago Dei and the creaturehood of human bodies. But on the other 
hand, he rejects the abstraction or autonomy of them as ends in themselves construed as 
rights within liberal politics. This affirmation and rejection Hauerwas derives from an 
historicized, relational frame. Humans are historical creatures constituted by their relation 
to God the creator who, as incarnated, entered history to bring about reconciliation. A 
“common humanity” does not name the abstract universal of humanity derived from the 
species’s universal capacity to reason, a presumption important for liberal peace-
making.114 In other words, human dignity is rooted in receiving and giving gifts in 
relation to God and other human creatures, not in pursuing self-interested desires. So 
Hauerwas affirms human dignity relationally because he affirms it in light of Jesus, of 
human community, and of “friendship with God” as the creature’s “telos.”115 
 Hauerwas’s relational account of human dignity contrasts sharply with a 
fundamental incoherence found in the link between liberalism’s language of human 
dignity and rights language. In accordance with the idea that human dignity is its own 
end, rights language separates people into individuals and “trains us to pursue our 
interests as ends in themselves.”116 The emphasis on individuals and their self-interests 																																																								
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not only undercuts the possibility to see “common interests or beliefs” and ultimately 
undermines the common good.117 More basically “the concept and ethics of dignity, if 
pressed too consistently, finally begin to erode the essential sociality of the human on 
which any sense of identity is possible.”118 So political liberalism eliminates the very 
social ground that it parasitically assumes in its attempt to secure the possibility of 
peaceful relations. 
 From that incoherent irony follows a second: the suppression of difference. In 
order to unify disparate individuals and their rival self-interests, political liberalism 
employs the liberal epistemology of abstract universals in the political vocabulary of 
human dignity and rights. However, those two abstract universals actually hide 
significant differences, rather than ensure relations among those with significant 
differences. The whole point of rights language, as a public morality in order to secure 
individual autonomy, is to employ abstract universals in order to mark off ‘interests’ as 
fundamentally private. That re-definition creates a minimal political-moral order which 
reduces differences and external sources to private desires.119 
 By reducing difference to private desire, the constructive suppression of 
difference supposedly ensures both autonomy and unity without being “coercive.”120 But 
for Hauerwas, such “Kantian-like” power dynamics establish an ironic and pernicious 
hegemony over public space in the name of ensuring autonomy.121 For instance, the 
pattern of employing abstract universals in order to mark off ‘interests’ as fundamentally 
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private is imposed on Christianity through the category of ‘religion,’ an abstract universal 
that construes Christian faith as one kind of individual, private interest. This classification 
is done in order to make Christianity cohere with “modern democratic assumptions” of 
autonomy vis-à-vis the citizen-consumer.122 Yet that continuity undercuts discipleship as 
learning the “craft” of following Jesus from within a tradition and a masterful 
community.123 The consequences of that undermining are catastrophic. The privatization 
of faith explicitly excludes the particularity of Christianity from the public sphere, 
thereby rendering “invisible” Christianity’s distinctiveness.124 This political, external 
policing of Christianity then works its way into US Christianity. Faith, construed as an 
interior, principled belief by individuals “separable from the social form,” undermines the 
church as a socio-political body and the social salvation that the body of Christ is 
supposed to embody.125 Liberal autonomy and privatization dissolve the socio-political 
constitution of the church, crucial to social salvation, into little more than a private, 
“voluntary association” of autonomous individuals.126 So religious freedom can be a 
Trojan horse. It polices, silences, and ultimately distorts Christianity by refashioning 
Christian self-understanding as a ‘religion’ limited by the state’s category of free but 
private belief. Liberal hegemony, Hauerwas concludes, ultimately creates a superficial 
pluralism in the liberal order.127 																																																								
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Hauerwas Against the Second Layer 
 Recall that Dorrien defines liberal theology’s second layer with reference to the 
necessity of faith, and the union of faith with liberal autonomy. Hauerwas describes such 
a union with the terms “double mind” or “double-think.”128 Under the guise of apologetic 
concerns, liberal theology seeks to explain Christianity by making it reasonable, 
“relevant,” and even “credible” on liberal society’s terms.129 In order to do so, liberal 
theology knowingly and willingly self-polices external authority out of bounds in order to 
accommodate the liberal assumptions of autonomous subjectivity, autonomous reason, 
and experience. Liberal theology, then, not only accepts the deception and incoherence of 
liberalism. In doing so liberal theology also becomes itself incoherent to both non-
theological liberalism and to Christianity. 
 For Hauerwas, granting too much credence to liberal categories ironically makes 
liberal theology incoherent for non-theological liberalism. If abstract universals are 
objectively true and can be known through the neutral objectivity of autonomous reason 
apart from the supposed bias of particularity, then theology does no more than provide 
mythological “confirmation” or “opinion” about what more experiential and rational 
disciplines already articulate.130 Whether liberal theology begins with human feeling 
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(Schleiermacher) or speculatively reasons about human history in order to transcend it 
(Hegel) over-against ‘external authority,’ liberal theology makes all theology a natural 
theology that is “tested” or “validated” in light “of the human condition” (R. Niebuhr).131 
Theology no longer begins and ends with the particularity of Jesus. Rather, theology 
contemplates “‘nature’” through and for constructing an abstract, unifying principle or 
principles.132 Such theology is, for Hauerwas, open to Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique. 
Theology is no more than the product of sociological formation from psychological 
wishing for something more than sheer immanence. Theology, then, is divested of what it 
thinks makes it theological because it really is anthropology in disguise. Theology as 
such becomes ultimately unnecessary now that it is tantamount to a perverse soft science, 
philosophy, or politics according to secular standards. So Hauerwas argues that liberal 
theology’s successful mission of accommodation has ultimately reinforced non-
theological liberal presuppositions about Christianity. It is a private affair that poorly 
expresses natural reality which are better accessed by other means than faith. The 
apologetic mission of liberal theology, ironically, made it incoherent and self-defeating. 
That is, liberal theology tacitly affirmed that it should be ignored in its pursuit of 
relevance.133 
 Hauerwas rejects the need to cooperate with the demands of liberal rationalism in 
order for faith to justify what liberalism deems “irrational.”134 He focuses instead on the 																																																								
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“content of belief” in order “to make the world credible to the gospel.”135 Christian 
categories like baptism and eucharist should reconfigure questions about suicide, capital 
punishment, and war. Yet liberal categories undercut the Christian categories crucial to 
Christianity’s distinctiveness. So here Hauerwas and liberal theology split again.136 
 Hauerwas’s position on truth in hierarchy and relation emphasizes the 
distinctiveness of Christian witness in the church’s faithful, embodied imitation of Jesus. 
The church should first seek to be an alternative to the world because the church aims for 
faithfulness to Jesus’s story by embodying Jesus. Jesus’s story is not an ethic judged by 
effectiveness; instead, his story “is a social ethic.”137 So rather than first pursuing justice 
outside of the church, “the church is a social ethic.”138 That is, the church is a new 
“polity” which “demonstrate[s] that Jesus has made possible a new world, a new social 
order.”139 The communal faithfulness to Jesus calls for true reconciliation in the form of 
friendship among human creatures, among human communities, and between humanity 
and God. In the church’s faithfulness to that polity, the church embodies God’s invitation 
to the “sinsick” world so that it may see itself in a saving relation to Jesus.140 For 
Hauerwas, then, the distinctive and robust embodiment of discipleship and not some 
external standard of rationality measures the church’s credibility, makes its convictions 
intelligible, and proves the truth of those convictions. So theological discourse is about 
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making humanity “intelligible to God” on God’s terms rather than liberal theology’s 
apologetic task of making God or the church intelligible to the world on its terms.141 
 In contrast to Hauerwas’s account of truthful witness, he argues that liberal 
theology integrates itself into society not by finding common ground but by “speak[ing] 
back to our society baptized idealizations first learned from society itself.”142 Granting 
too much credence to liberal categories results in a catastrophically incoherent 
redefinition of Christianity. Allowing autonomous reason to “unwarrantedly expand the 
realm of the irrational” sets liberal theology on the path of a natural moralism that 
defines, critiques, and demythologizes ‘over-belief.’143 Hauerwas’s reaction against 
liberal theology’s project is multi-layered. He rebuffs the presupposition of 
demythologization: that Kant’s abstract, neutral reason purifies Christian over-belief into 
a set of abstract, modern ideals that better access universal truth. That expansion of “the 
irrational” raises more fundamental problems. Christianity is situated as another 
voluntary belief system “aimed at making our lives more coherent” with a liberal and 
capitalist logic of Kantian autonomy as choice.144 To construe faith as such, Hauerwas 
argues, misunderstands that Christianity “is a constitutive set of skills that requires the 
transformation of the self to rightly see the world.”145 Deeper still, the mediating 
apologetics of liberal theology implies that the goal is “to make God intelligible to 
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‘modern man,’ whoever that may be.”146 This theological privileging of autonomy, 
Hauerwas argues, sets theology on a Pelagian trajectory where “any life-directing 
attraction toward God’s creative and redemptive being becomes unintelligible.”147 
Instead, Hauerwas maintains that “theology’s task” is “to make ourselves intelligible to 
God.”148 Hauerwas does not advocate for a high Christology over a low Christology; he 
eschews just such a dichotomy. Rather, he rejects the impulse within liberalism to control 
the church by separating it from the particularity of Jesus and marginalizing the church 
under the guise of apologetics. Thus the incoherence of liberal theology is produced by 
and at the service of the liberal project.149 
 So from layer one, liberalism’s hegemony of privatizing Christianity and 
rendering it invisible means that any public explanation of Christianity on its own terms 
is not credible for liberal society. In layer two, liberal theology’s endeavor to make 
Christianity intelligible and thereby credible to society on liberalism’s terms is an 
accommodating endeavor that renders Christianity irrelevant and incoherent. That 
rendering is advanced by a third aspect in both liberalism’s hegemony and liberal 
theology’s accommodation. Political liberalism’s pressure to translate Christianity’s 
language into secular idioms further establishes Christianity’s invisibility. When that 
translation is accommodated by liberal theology, it becomes “functionally atheistic.”150 
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 What expresses and ensures liberalism’s limited public morality is a “neutral,” 
public language, or “third language.”151 It stands over any public discussion between two 
other particularities such as the languages of particular communities or traditions. The 
third language, then, is what the ‘bias’ of Christian language must be translated in order 
to receive a public hearing. However, for Hauerwas the third language and the public 
square are “anything but neutral” or objective, no matter whether translation is described 
positively or negatively.152 Positively, Christian faith translated into a rational morality of 
rules and choice reformulates the historical story of God’s work and human response into 
a set of ahistorical propositions that assume a religious essence and that distill it into 
moral beliefs. Negatively, the third language divests faith of the particular language that 
constitutes its meaning. Any acceptable public talk of God is subject to autonomous 
reason and abstract universals that reduces God to the void of an abstract ‘god.’ 
Privatization demands that any public utterance of faith not be identified as religious. 
According to liberal reason, then, speech must be translated into a third language, the 
abstract idiom of morality that is safe for the ‘neutral’ (autonomous) public square. 
Whatever private ‘beliefs’ the liberal order allows in public must be transformed first to 
align with public procedural morality. So not only does the abstract, universal category of 
religion “domesticate” Christianity through privatization, but also translation further 
domesticates Christianity by supplanting its particularity in public with the liberal moral 
order.153 
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 Liberal theologians and ethicists like Dorrien find parallels between Christianity 
and the liberal order in categories like equality, human dignity, and justice for the 
oppressed. But for Hauerwas, the liberal version of those categories is “a universal 
that…tempts us to substitute…some moral ideal” or “external standard” like human 
rights “for our faithfulness to God” and God’s kingdom that realizes true freedom, 
justice, equality, and peace.154 The consequences of substitution through translation are 
catastrophic. As Hauerwas fatally asked of Walter Rauschenbusch, R. Niebuhr, and many 
other liberal theologians, if translation indicates that rhetoric, not substance, is the true 
difference between Christian language and secular idioms, “then why bother saying it 
theologically at all?”155 But Hauerwas’s socratic point has an even more incisive edge. 
When liberal theology bows to liberalism’s hegemonic demand to translate Christian 
language, liberal theology becomes a co-participant in supplanting Christian identity with 
the procedural morality of the liberal order. Through the likes of Rauschenbusch and 
Niebuhr, liberal theology translated Christian faith into “an ethic for ‘anyone’” in order to 
be a universal, democratic morality for co-operative participation in the “civilizing 
project” of liberalism.156 To justify this project, liberal theology asserted that 
Christianity’s mission to universally “make things right” can avoid the political chaos 
feared by liberal theology and political liberalism.157 But ironically, when the liberal 
standard is normative and Christianity is privatized, “what Christians believe or do not 
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believe about God” is made “irrelevant” while justice through violence is accepted as 
necessary and “responsible.”158 Christianity in the US, accordingly, took on the role of 
justifying the nation-state as Christian ethics became a branch of US society for US 
interests. So Christian ethics became unmoored from Jesus and hitched to liberal 
procedure, privatization, and translation. The incoherencies of liberal theology and the 
supplanting of Christianity, Hauerwas judges, are the source of liberal theology greatest 
unfaithfulness.159 
Hauerwas Against the Third Layer 
 The second layer’s shockwaves reverberate in the third layer. On Hauerwas’s 
view, liberal theology’s embrace of the first layer and liberal theology’s subsequent 
incoherence create its unfaithfulness. Liberal theology becomes unfaithful by embracing 
the pernicious hegemony of the liberal order that supplants Christian loyalty to the non-
violent particularity of Jesus with the moral-political order of liberalism as the 
mechanism for peace. Hauerwas’s most repeated concern is that liberal theology, as part 
of liberalism’s civilizing project, is “Constantinian.”160 
 In short, Constantinianism is “making the faith credible to the powers-that-be so 
that Christians might now have a share in those powers.”161 The Constantinian project is 																																																								
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possible for liberal theology because the Constantinian presupposition that “God 
is…available to anyone, without moral transformation and spiritual guidance” parallels 
the liberal assumption that knowledge is an abstract universal which construes 
“Christianity as a truth separable from truthful witness.”162 So for both Constantinianism 
and liberal theology, one can be a “Christian without training.”163 Christianity as such 
mimics political liberalism’s assertion that justice can be attained by procedure rather 
than by God’s justice, which for Hauerwas is Jesus and his reconciling work embodied 
by the church. Further coherence between the Constantinian project and political 																																																								
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liberalism undergirds the justification of Constantinianism as being “politically 
responsible.”164 Such legitimacy is based on a Christianized version of political 
liberalism, which fears that political chaos will erupt and that human freedom will be 
undercut without Christian involvement.165 
 The allure of responsibility and justification of chaos are difficult to abandon if 
one holds to similar assumptions typified by R. Niebuhr’s realist project. Parallel to 
liberal desacralization, he started with original sin as the “universal condition” of 
humanity and the one “empirically verifiable” doctrine of Christianity.166 Beginning as 
such furthered desacralization in two ways. First, he circumvented the biblical and 
Christian fact that one cannot know that one is a sinner apart from Jesus’s work. Second, 
Niebuhr’s empirical original sin eventually led to his claim that Jesus’s love ethic is 
impossible in the public sphere, to Niebuhr’s argument for democracy as the means for 
peace, to his critical support for national interests. So he fulfills liberal theology’s 
presupposition that its “fundamental task [is] to make America work.”167 Both Dorrien 
and Hauerwas note that despite Niebuhr’s sharp criticisms of liberal theology, his 
assumptions placed him in fundamental continuity with it. Like the social gospel, 
Niebuhr’s anthropology beginning with sin reflects liberal assumptions about death’s 
importance. In response, also similar to the social gospel, Niebuhr understood that the 
mission of Christianity is to transform society through social justice. Rather than Jesus, 
then, the liberal order serves as the peacemaker, either as an international community 
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(e.g., Kant, the social gospelers, and Dorrien) or the nation-state (e.g., Hegel and 
Niebuhr). Since liberal theology is more amenable to non-theological liberalism, the 
liberal order can use an accommodated version of Christianity to secure peace.168 
 Hauerwas calls Constantinianism liberal theology’s apologetic and socially 
transformative project, because liberal theology yokes Christianity with state power in 
order to “make history come out right.”169 However, as Hauerwas is quick to note, liberal 
unity and progress have not led to more peace. Instead, liberal theology has historically 
been guilty of significant participation in US colonialism.170 For a long time liberal 
theology has mistakenly conflated redemption with “progressive process” and US 
violence.171 Even Niebuhr, despite his deep criticism of naive progressivism, argued for a 
progressive realist project that critically supported the state through translating Christian 
categories into liberal categories. But in doing so he inadvertently made the US his 
church, which blinded him so that he ultimately capitulated to US interests. 
Constantinianism, then, is tantamount to taming Christianity with what Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer called “cheap grace.”172 
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 Hauerwas’s rejection of Constantinianism is predicated on his hierarchical and 
relational account of truth. For him, living in God’s reign is about “truth and illusion” 
rather than, as the social gospelers emphasized, about whether or not God’s kingdom is 
“realized and unrealized.”173 The same pattern of contrast goes for Niebuhr and 
Hauerwas. The former was framed by what could be realized, even though he despised 
idealist kingdom language. But for Hauerwas, Niebuhr mistakenly confused sin and 
relevance for what truly creates and shapes humanity, thereby undercutting the church’s 
witness to the world. Contrary to Niebuhr, Hauerwas maintains that one cannot know that 
one is a sinner until it is revealed by Jesus. Since the church knows Jesus, the world only 
knows it is in sin if the church lives as a faithful witness to the truth.174 
 Hauerwas’s ecclesial politics accordingly diverges from Niebuhr’s. The church’s 
embodiment of the truth, Hauerwas argues, challenges the US’s racial imagination, its 
capitalist mindset, and its foreign policy. Without embodying the distinctiveness and 
challenges of Christianity, US Christians become sentimental and cooperative US 
citizens in the pursuit of individual and national self-interests. The church, therefore, 
should not side with illusion by taking on the role of a “helpful, if sometimes 
complaining, prop for the state” as liberal theology does under the guise of gaining 
credibility, being effective, and/or achieving relevance.175 Instead, the church’s “first 
																																																								
SEM, 293, 478, 677; Dorrien, SS, 349-350; Hauerwas, AC, 40; Hauerwas, AN, 47 n. 22; Hauerwas, BH, 246 n. 4; Hauerwas, DF, 141-
142; Hauerwas, WGU, 137-139; Hauerwas, WW, chp. 3. 
173 Hauerwas, TT, 141. See also Hauerwas, AN, 108-110, 116-117, 120 n. 4, 196-197. 
174 Hauerwas, AC, 90-92; Dorrien, SEM, 677; Hauerwas, BH, 25; Hauerwas, AN, 123; Hauerwas, CC, 270-271 n. 9; Hauerwas, DF, 
23, 104; Hauerwas, DT, 214-215; Hauerwas, STT, 239; Hauerwas, AN, 42-43; Hauerwas, DF, 112; Hauerwas, PK, 100; Hauerwas and 
Willimon, RA, 28; Hauerwas, STT, 239-240; Hauerwas, SU, 67; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 12; Hauerwas, WW, 117; Hauerwas, “Why 
Truth Demands Truthfulness,” 304-305. 
175 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 38. See also ibid., 39-41; Hauerwas, AN, 5, 39; Hauerwas, STT, 194, 221-222; Hauerwas, VV, 100; 
Stanley Hauerwas in “Pragmatism and Democracy,” 427. 
	 62 
task” is to live truthfully together so that it can fulfill the “correlate,” confessional task of 
telling the world about its sin and the better hope of Jesus.176 
 
III. Dorrien’s Response to Hauerwas and Shift to Liberal Theology 
 Dorrien is nothing if not dialectical. This method produces a liberal theology that 
is simultaneously continuous and discontinuous with contemporary liberal theology. His 
dialectical position, therefore, makes possible a different engagement with Hauerwas and 
liberal theology than is the norm. I will begin by situating Dorrien’s work as a response 
to Hauerwas’s insights in both his constructive project and his critiques of liberal 
theology. In doing so, I complicate not only Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology 
insofar as it concerns Dorrien, but also complicate Dorrien’s dated critique of Hauerwas. 
These complications will initially show that Dorrien’s concern for faithfulness and 
Hauerwas’s concern for justice differ because of their rival evaluations of liberalism.177 
 In the complications are, however, more important agreements and disagreements 
that illuminate Dorrien’s concern for and understanding of truth. Hauerwas once 
applauded Dorrien for seeing that translation to achieve relevance “is no longer tenable 
and the issue finally is one of truth.”178 Nevertheless, as Dorrien notes, he and Hauerwas 
offer “alternative” trajectories for post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity in the US.179 
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Countermanding with equal vigor Hauerwas’s proclamation that liberal theology is 
incoherent, Dorrien declares that “the original idea of liberal theology is as relevant and 
coherent today as it was a hundred years ago.”180 Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s disagreement 
ultimately concerns their differences over truth. In contrast to Hauerwas’s hierarchy of 
truth, Dorrien maintains a plurality of truths in a mutually informing pattern. In order to 
do so, Dorrien recovers underdeveloped and lost aspects of liberal theology, and he 
creatively incorporates non-liberal sources into his liberal theology. 
 This creative recovery means that Dorrien is not at the center of Hauerwas’s 
critique of liberal theology. Yet Dorrien’s shift to contemporary liberal theology does not 
entirely elude Hauerwas’s critiques either. In contrast to Hauerwas’s argument that liberal 
theology has demythologized itself into irrelevance, Dorrien provides a re-mythologized 
vision through a mutual interplay of multiple truths. But between what Hauerwas 
critiques and what Dorrien supplies, there is enough agreement and difference that the 
calcified outer layers of normal discussion are cracked open. Through the crack, at the 
end of this chapter, we can move into deeper depths crucial to reach the heart of 
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Their different accounts of relational truth are 
rival understandings of reality, not simply differences over liberal re-mythologization or 
the church-world relation. 
Dorrien’s Agreement with and Critique of Hauerwas, and Complications Therein 
 Dorrien’s dialectical method roots both his appreciation and his critique of 
Hauerwas’s project. Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberal theology have not gone unheeded. 
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Dorrien dethrones and replaces liberal theology’s longstanding impulse to pursue success 
and to prioritize integration with the powers that be.  
 In a critical mode he effectively avoids some hallmarks of Constantinianism. He 
eschews the endeavor to control history as he maintains that the contemporary church is a 
“partial manifestation” of the eschatological kingdom.181 Like Hauerwas, Dorrien 
proclaims that “‘success’ is not a theological category,” and he critiques the concern for 
credibility that underwrites success.182 For the same reasons and with words very similar 
to Hauerwas, Dorrien critiques R. Niebuhr’s project of translating Christianity into the 
idioms of secular society. “If the meaning of Christian faith can be translated into secular 
terms, why bother with Christianity? Niebuhr’s strategy left progressive Christianity 
without enough to say or do in its own language, in its own way, and for its own 
reasons.”183 Like Hauerwas, Dorrien observes that Protestant US Christianity’s mainline 
withered dramatically as it was ordered by loyalties to nationalism and to relevance 
concerns as the assumed cultural Christendom declined. So Dorrien shares Hauerwas’s 
worry about US Christianity conflating itself with “liberal political arrangements.”184 For 
them, political relevance or social credibility ought not drive Christianity, lest it become 
unfaithful. The question is, how is one to be faithful?185 																																																								
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 Dorrien’s constructive answer first parallels and then breaks from Hauerwas. 
Instead of success and credibility, Dorrien argues that liberal theology should not only be 
“prophetic,” but also be “counter-cultural.”186 But rather than give up on liberal theology 
as Hauerwas advocates, Dorrien asserts that liberal theology must uphold counter-cultural 
values because the mission of “progressive Christianity” today “is to hold out for the 
possibility of a divine good that is too religious for our secular friends and even more 
alien to many American Christians.”187 This pattern of Dorrien paralleling and breaking 
from Hauerwas continues into issues on which the typical social justice versus 
faithfulness narrative dwells. However, the pattern also shows the poverty of that 
narrative insofar as it relates to Dorrien. On the basis of the social gospel’s kingdom 
theology, he has granted that, “as Hauerwas remarks, the church in the biblical 
understanding is a social ethic.”188 Dorrien then challenges Hauerwas to be more faithful 
based on the theological commonality Dorrien identifies. To proclaim that the church is a 
social ethic “cannot mean that the biblical command to create a just social order is 
relativized, since the ethic of the kingdom requires action that struggles for justice for the 
poor. In Scripture, the crucial sign of the presence of the kingdom is that justice is 
brought to the poor and oppressed.”189 Dorrien argues further for obedient witness to “the 
biblical imperative to pour yourself out for the hungry and satisfy the desires of the 
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afflicted.”190 These statements indicate Dorrien’s understanding of how to be faithful 
even as they serve his critique of Hauerwas.191 
 The issue of social justice is Dorrien’s first of three critiques directed at Hauerwas 
published in 1995 and 1997. Dorrien argued that Hauerwas’s “polemic against social 
justice politics [is] unbiblical and ethically unacceptable, and…he [has] wrongly 
disparaged the social ethical concern for the ‘right ordering of the world.’”192 The deeper, 
second criticism is that Hauerwas’s work creates “isolation” from “a moral responsibility 
to work with non-Christians to create a just social order in a pagan world.”193 The third 
critique underlies Dorrien’s charge of isolation. “Hauerwas’s version of a kingdom ethic” 
maintains a “sharp dichotomy” between church and world that unbiblically “strips 
Christianity of much of its social meaning.”194 
 These critiques reflect Dorrien’s continuing concerns. But his 1995 critique was 
overstated even then. Hauerwas affirmed that “the church must pursue societal justice”; 
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his concern was that social justice as abstraction would circumvent discipleship.195 For 
Hauerwas back then the issue of social justice was about priority. All proper calls to the 
world for justice are predicated on first a faithful community embodying God’s justice, 
which is a polity faithful to the politics of God’s kingdom. This framework Hauerwas has 
since solidified and developed by arguing that Jesus is God’s justice, that justice is 
righteousness-reconciliation, and that the church is the embodiment of Jesus’s reconciling 
work. Because of God’s reconciling Word to human beings, the latter can become friends 
of one another and of God. Thereby reconciliation serves the proleptic, partial 
embodiment of transfiguring theosis in contrast to a sinful world.196 
 There are still significant differences between Dorrien and Hauerwas here, in 
particular regarding the use of the prophets for supporting liberal justice. But Hauerwas’s 
biblical account of justice is not only relational, it is also solidaristic in the best way 
possible. Friendship is the increasing sharing with one another, and reconciliation for 
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 296; in PF Hauerwas is quoting Nicholas Lash, Believing in Three Ways in One God: A 
Reading of the Apostles’ Creed (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 111. Second, transfiguration can be 
connected theosis because those uses of transfiguration can be connected to time, to resurrection, to Pentecost, to new creation (or 
perfection), and to friendship with God elsewhere in Hauerwas’s work (BH, 183; PK, 99, 107; CET, 51; CDRO, 230; WoAp, chp. 12; 
WAD, 104-105). There is a distinction to make between transformation and transfiguration––the former a general category and the 
latter an ambitious change that is at the same time, transformation and more, a material change. Hauerwas is largely careful to keep 
the distinction as he opts for the word transformation throughout the corpus of his work, but there is some blurring of the boundaries. 
This matches well with his proclivity to stress, within the already/not-yet character of God’s kingdom, that God’s reign is present and 
changes humanity right now. It is not entirely opaque today, nor is it relegated to an intangible, future hope for the recreation of 
humanity at the end history. The result of God’s economy is that human time is “transfigured, rather than evade[d],” in the gift of 
God’s time (Hauerwas, PF, 99. Also see ibid., 105.). 
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friendship includes “living with” and “suffering with” the handicapped, the elderly, the 
infirm, and the poor.197 This much Dorrien could appreciate considering that his emphasis 
on solidarity informs and shifts his understanding of liberal justice. So the difference 
between Dorrien and Hauerwas is not the pursuit of justice. Even their disagreement over 
what justice is and how it is achieved is not so simple.198 
 Rather, on the level of social justice, the issue is their different evaluation of 
Christianity’s participation in political liberalism. For Hauerwas, forgiveness and 
friendship require love, truth, mutual vulnerability, time, remembrance, patience, 
constancy, and obedience. They make possible the difficult, confrontational work of 
reconciliation necessary to truly be friends in God’s peace; the alternative is to risk 
succumbing to the false appearance of friendship and to peace secured by violence and 
oppression. Hauerwas notes that the requirements and vision of reconciliation are 
similarly found in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. However, 
he concludes that such work appears “far too demanding,” and that remembrance is “a 
deeply illiberal idea.”199 Reconciliation exists for the common good and “resist[s] 																																																								
197 Hauerwas, AE, 233-234; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 74, 76, 82, 86, 195 n. 20; Hauerwas, WT, 213. For justice explicitly, see 
Hauerwas, BH, 281 n. 24; Hauerwas, WAD, 106, 115-116. For support of the rest of the sentence, see Hauerwas, BH, 179-187; 
Hauerwas, CDRO, chps. 8, 10, 14; Hauerwas, DF, chp. 11; Stanley Hauerwas and Jean Vanier, Living Gently in a Violent World: The 
Prophetic Witness of Weakness (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2008) (hereafter LGVW); Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: 
God, Medicine, and the Problem of Suffering (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990; repr. London: T&T Clark, 2004) (hereafter NS); 
Hauerwas, PF, 209-210; Hauerwas, PK, 90-91; Hauerwas, SP, chps. 3, 9-12; Hauerwas, STT, p. 10, chp. 8; Hauerwas, SU, p. 10, chp. 
12; Hauerwas, WT, chp. 11. 
198 Hauerwas, WAD, 101-102, 114; Dorrien, EDE, xi-xiii. Hauerwas’s relation to Dorrien is even more complex. Dorrien supports 
justice as “right order” (EDE, xii); however, Hauerwas does not believe that “inherent rights and justice as right order are…fully 
consistent with Scripture” (WAD, 108). Yet not only does Hauerwas largely leave the reader to infer his critique of justice as right 
order from his critique focused on Nicholas Wolterstorff’s sympathy for inherent rights (ibid., 112-113; Hauerwas, PF, 68). Hauerwas 
also admits more recently “that given Wolterstorff’s distinction between right-order accounts of rights and inherent rights [Hauerwas 
remain[s] firmly in the former category” (WT, 195). So it makes sense that Hauerwas is sympathetic to Dorrien’s distributive 
economics which has the practices and attention to detail that Hauerwas argues is necessary (Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 
420; Hauerwas, CC, 251 n. 32; Hauerwas, PF, 229-231). But contrary to Dorrien, Hauerwas rejects “using Scripture to underwrite a 
distributive vision of justice determined by the presumption that the best we can do is to secure a plethora of discordant private goods” 
(WAD, 102). However, Hauerwas focuses on the use of the Jewish prophets in that critique, but does not account for Dorrien’s 
drawing from the gospels (Dorrien SS, 357; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 14). 
199 Hauerwas, BH, 153-154. See also Hauerwas, CC, 252-253 n. 36; Hauerwas, WW, 229-234. On “illiberal idea,” Hauerwas is quoting 
Timothy Garton Ash, “Truth Confessions,” New York Review of Books, Jul. 17, 1997. 
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injustice” only through a true healing work rather than through the procedures of liberal 
justice.200 Hauerwas’s development here, as well as his more recent work that I will 
address later, meets Dorrien’s 1997 comment. He grants that Hauerwas’s work contains 
“considerable promise” for openness to “working with non-Christians to create a more 
just social order.”201 Thus there is warrant for Hauerwas’s gentle rejection of Dorrien’s 
critique of isolation.202 
 But as they both noted, “the question is…how” Christianity, Hauerwas 
emphasizing its “distinctiveness” and Dorrien stressing the connection to society, 
contributes to a just social order.203 Dorrien affirms the importance of love, 
remembrance, community, and stubbornness––the latter implying patience and time––to 
achieve justice. However, his project for politically realizing justice through liberalism 
co-inheres with liberal theology’s legacy. The social gospelers’ articulated Christian 
language in terms of morality and democracy in order to bridge the gap between 
Christian language and secular idioms. R. Niebuhr crossed the bridge and then destroyed 
it when he led a generation to reject the social gospelers’ idealistic moralizing. Dorrien 
wants to carefully reconstruct the bridge. He does not want to ignore Niebuhr’s insights 
about human sin, democracy, and equality. However, Dorrien also relativizes Niebuhr’s 
																																																								
200 Hauerwas, CET, 96.  See also ibid, 92-93; Hauerwas, PF, 60, 229-230. 
201 Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive Christianity,” 378 n. 1. See also Hauerwas, PF, 229 
and the last sentence of n. 28. 
202 For the requirements of friendship and forgiveness, see Hauerwas, BH, 140-146, 149-154; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 31, 38-39, 
41, 107-109, 138-148, 171-177; Hauerwas, CC, 83, 127-128, 252-253 n. 35 and n. 36; Hauerwas, CET, 91-94, 258-259; Hauerwas, 
DF, 44-45, 176; Hauerwas, PF, 68-71, 96-101, 104-105; Hauerwas, PK, 90-91, 103; Hauerwas, STT, 171, 247; Hauerwas, US, 90; 
Hauerwas, WAD, 94, 133. For reconciliation, see Hauerwas, AN, 78, 132, 135, 163, 166, 186, 192-198; Hauerwas, BH, 152-154; 
Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 87, 107-109; Hauerwas, CC, 33; Hauerwas, CET, 91-93, 96; Hauerwas, DF, pp. 52, 83-88, and chp. 6; 
Hauerwas, DT, 177; Hauerwas, PF, 105-106, 181-182; Hauerwas, PK, 87-91, 133, 142-151; Hauerwas, STT, 246; Hauerwas, WAD, 
chp. 4, pp. 54, 94; Hauerwas, WW, p. 45, chp. 7. For Hauerwas’s gentle rejection, see Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420. 
203 Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420; Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive 
Christianity,” 378 n. 1. 
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thin theology and nationalist politics with the social gospelers’ thicker, idealist 
understanding of Christianity’s moral presence in the local society and the international 
community for the common good. Accordingly, Dorrien’s affinity for the social 
gospelers’ understanding of morality maintains some translating of Christian ideals into 
public morality (“enough common moral ground to make an intelligible appeal to those 
who are not already converted”) as part of creating a just social order.204 
 So Dorrien is vulnerable to Hauerwas’s critique of liberal theology presuming the 
importance of morality. But remember Dorrien’s dialectical method. He is still attentive 
to the problems of invisibility, of functional atheism, and of capitulation to the status quo 
created by translation. The reason for his attention is not answerable in the bare fact that 
he and Hauerwas agree over the importance of the question about how Christianity 
should contribute to a just social order. Rather, they both notice that the question as a 
speech-act raises the deeper issue of truth. 
 Hauerwas argues that theological accommodation to modernist epistemology and 
progressive politics is dangerous even concerning those, like Dorrien, who emphasize 
society, the prophetic, economic justice, and equality. For Hauerwas, even critical 
accommodation “avoid[s] questions of truth” in order to achieve autonomy and political 
																																																								
204 Dorrien, RCG, 161. See also Gary Dorrien, review of The American Spiritual Culture: And the Invention of Jazz, Football and the 
Movies, by William Dean, American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2004): 120. A prime example of Dorrien’s 
emphasis on morality is his The Obama Question: A Progressive Perspective (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012) (hereafter 
OQ). For the paragraph, see Dorrien, EDE, xi-xii, xiv-xv, 142, 184; Dorrien, SS, 335, 365-368; Gary Dorrien, “Occupy the Future: 
Can a Protest Movement Find a Path to Economic Democracy?,” America, Mar. 12, 2012, 16; Dorrien, MALT, 2:chp. 2, esp. p. 111; 
Dorrien, SS, chp. 2, esp, pp. 42-43; Hauerwas, DF, 93-94, 97, and esp. 193-194 n. 18; Dorrien, MALT, 2:chp. 7; Dorrien, SEM, chp. 4; 
Dorrien, SS, chp. 3 and p. 343; Dorrien, SS, 280-281, 356-360; Dorrien, EDE, xii, 4-5, 51, 62-64, 134-137, 141-142, 169, 178-179, 
181-183, 271-274; Dorrien, MALT 2:457, 472, 481-482; Dorrien, SEM, 60, 228, 275, 288, 674-677; 680-683; Dorrien, SS, 143-145, 
343-344, 347-350, 375-376; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 14-15, 25-27; Gary 
Dorrien, “Society as the Subject of Redemption: the Relevance of the Social Gospel,” Tikkun, Nov./Dec. 2009. 
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expediency.205 He argues that truth was pushed aside in the pursuit of justice by 
theological movements from the social gospel to liberation theologies. The neglect of 
truth goes hand in hand with theological reduction or narrowness. The social gospel 
reduces Christianity to morality while liberation theology narrows Christianity to the 
oppressor-oppressed dynamic.206 																																																								
205 Hauerwas, AC, 90. See also Hauerwas, CET, 161; Hauerwas, WW, 2; Stanley Hauerwas, “The End of American Protestantism,” 
ABC Religion and Ethics, Jul. 2, 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/07/02/3794561.htm, in light of the whole article 
see especially the last few paragraphs. The argument of this article parallels, but should not be confused with “The End of 
Protestantism” in AE, 87-97. 
206 Hauerwas, BH, 60-62; Hauerwas, CC, 90, 233 n. 4, 234-235 n. 16; Hauerwas, STT, 19, 30-32; Stanley Hauerwas, Robin Lovin, and 
Emilie Townes, “Ethics in Our Time: A Conversation on Christian Social Witness,” Christian Century, Sept. 27, 2000; Hauerwas, 
review of Soul in Society, 420; Stanley Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological 
Concept,” Modern Theology 3, no. 1 (1986): 69-70, 75; Stanley Hauerwas, “The Ethicist as Theologian,” 412; Hauerwas, AC, 50-52, 
55; Hauerwas, CC, 90; Hauerwas, IGC, 171; Hauerwas, TT, 134; Hauerwas, WW, 212; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on 
Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological Concept,” 67-71, 74-75.  
 Hauerwas appreciates the connection between theology and politics by Gustavo Gutiérrez, José Segundo, and Jon Sobrino. 
Hauerwas is simply concerned with how to connect theology and politics, worrying for instance, about the potential conflation of 
Gutiérrez’s three types of liberation (liberation from oppression in politics/economics, in the individual’s psyche, and in relation, 
which is liberation from sin for relation with God and humanity) capitulating to political liberalism. That capitulation, which I will 
briefly note later, is linked for Hauerwas to his equally central and less qualified critique of liberation theology, that it is too narrow 
(which by the way, he also once leveled at political theology). However, there are of course qualifications concerning liberation 
theologies. Some of his criticisms of them, beginning with the issue of narrowness in terms of truth, have not always been on the 
mark, or were at least quickly proven wrong. Emilie Townes’s defense of liberation theology over truth in “Ethics in Our Time” also 
defends implicitly against Hauerwas’s claims in “The Ethicist as Theologian.” In the latter Hauerwas wrote: “The rhetoric of 
‘liberation theology’ often makes it appear that the goal of the Christian life is to free us of all limits. That theology’s proponents fail 
to discern that the gospel does not free us of all limits but rather provides us with the skills to embody our limits in nondestructive 
ways. ‘Liberation theology’ tends to become a theology without the cross. This kind of point is hard to make, of course, without 
appearing to be in bad faith, since the church has become the church of the strong” (412). That was in 1975, the very year that James 
Cone published God of the Oppressed, in which linking not homoousia but black experience to the cross was crucial to Cone’s 
arguments. But for the sake of argument, even if Dorrien was long ago correct, both in his interpretation of Cone as countermanding 
redemptive suffering in the cross and, in turn, Dorrien’s use of Juan Luis Segundo to correctively critique Cone, Dorrien would be the 
first in line now to note Cone’s recent The Cross and the Lynching Tree. Similarly, besides even Hauerwas’s acknowledgement of 
Gutiérrez’s development, some of Hauerwas’s criticisms of liberation theology are now quite dated concerning Gutiérrez. This much 
David Kamitsuka notes too as he defends Gutiérrez’s more mature work from Hauerwas’s earlier criticisms, and as Kamitsuka draws 
parallels between Gutiérrez’s and Hauerwas’s work on faithfulness and truth in their respective contexts. Arthur McGovern also 
clarifies the issue of truth concerning Gutiérrez in terms of praxis. Taking that a step further, Bretherton shows the similarity of 
Hauerwas’s emphasis on practical reasoning with Gutiérrez’s construal of orthopraxy, as well as those respective positions connected 
to orthodoxy. Given the importance of practical reasoning in an oppressive context, Hauerwas’s critique on the limitation of the 
liberation metaphor should be significantly qualified. But he does have a point for Kamitsuka, who agrees with Hauerwas’s concern 
about liberation as the only or primary metaphor. There are of course developments by those like Mary Grey who recognizes the 
limitation of liberation alone, and accordingly there has been more recent expansions or additions. So in terms of theology, the very 
best liberation theologians are not adequately described by many of Hauerwas’s dated critiques that may have been true at one point. 
However, Hauerwas and Dorrien’s largely old critiques still ring true concerning the theological milieu. For instance, Joerg Rieger 
admits that he and his co-authors lacked attention to churches in Beyond the Spirit of Empire. 
 Hauerwas, CC, 2, 233 n. 4; 234-235 n. 16; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as 
a Theological Concept,” 68-72, 75; James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury, 1975), 13-14, 120, 124-125, 133-135, 
176-177, 182-183 (but since many people do not have the 1975 edition, see James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed, rev. ed. 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), 12-13, 110, 114-115, 122-125, 162-163, 168); Dorrien, RCG, 114-115, 124; Dorrien, SEM, 411; 
James H. Cone, The Cross and the Lynching Tree (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011); Hauerwas, AC, 9-10, 172 n. 10; Gustavo 
Gutiérrez, The God of Life, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991); David G. Kamitsuka, Theology and 
Contemporary Culture: Liberation, Postliberal, and Revisionary Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chp. 5, 
esp. 153-154; Arthur F. McGovern, Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment (N.p.: Orbis Books, 1989; Eugene, 
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 99-100; Luke Bretherton, “Coming to Judgment: Methodological Reflections on the Relationship 
Between Ecclesiology, Ethnography, and Political Theory,” Modern Theology 28, no. 2 (2012): 173-175; Mary Grey, “The Journey is 
Always Home: Feminist Theology’s Journey from Liberation to Reconciliation,” in Movement or Moment?: Assessing Liberation 
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 Hauerwas’s contention concerning truth may seem to contradict Dorrien’s deep 
sympathy for the social gospelers’ thick morality and liberation theologies’ concerns. 
(The latter will be developed below.) But Dorrien also agrees that for a century liberal 
and liberation theologies, in general, have almost entirely pushed aside truth in favor of 
pursuing justice. He observes that “since the generation of Rauschenbusch and Mathews” 
liberal theology “has often downplayed the question of religious truth” in order to 
democratize and translate religious experience for the wholesale pursuit of justice.207 This 
shift has led liberal theology to lose its spiritual ground––the “confessional center” of its 
“transcendental, biblical voice”––and the “spiritual power” of its “spiritual conviction 
about God’s holy and gracious presence, the way of Christ, and the transformative 
mission of Christianity.”208 Liberal theology was already long on moral idealism and 
short on spiritual conviction before the waning of evangelical liberalism and personalism, 
and the waxing of process and liberation theologies in the 1960s and 70s. To make 
matters worse, the new theological configuration’s moral ideals did not, on the whole, 
sufficiently develop sacred myth’s truth as truth and its spiritual conviction in a way that 
would preach well in the US churches, on the whole. Rather, the neglect of truth and 
spiritual conviction had a concomitant narrowness that “reduce[d] Christian ethics to 
political or ideological causes.”209 As a result “progressive Christianity has not had 																																																								
Theology Forty Years after Medellín, ed. Patrick Claffey and Joe Egan (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 159; Joerg Rieger, Series 
Editor’s Preface to Jung Mo Sung, The Subject, Capitalism, and Religion: Horizons of Hope in Complex Societies (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), xi; Nestor Miguez, Joerg Reiger, and Jung Mo Sung, Beyond the Spirit of Empire: Theology and Politics 
in a New Key (London: SCM Press, 2009). 
207 Dorrien, SS, 373. See also ibid., 360-362; Dorrien, EDE, 360-361; Dorrien MALT 2:551; Gary Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” review of 
Reinventing Liberal Christianity, by Theo Hobson, Commonweal, Oct. 11, 2013, 27. 
208 Dorrien, SS, 373; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477-478. See also Gary Dorrien, “From World War to Cold War, 
Liberalism to Liberationism,” Christian Century, Jun. 16-23, 1999, 653-654. 
209 Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 27. See also Dorrien, RCG, 118-120. There, interestingly enough, Dorrien’s charge of narrowness to 
ideology and sectarianism directed at Segundo could also extend to Hauerwas. In contrast to both Segundo’s narrowness and 
sectarianism, Dorrien defends Gutiérrez from both charges (Dorrien, RCG, 122). 
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enough to say or do in its own language, in its own way, and for its own reasons.”210 
Dorrien concludes, then, that the century-long project has been detrimental to liberal 
theology, especially in contemporary society where belief in Jesus is no longer assumed. 
In other words, progressive Christianity has ironically isolated itself from the church and 
from society.211 
																																																								
210 Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 27. See also Dorrien, SS, 366-367, 373. 
211 Dorrien, MALT, 3:p. 8 and chp. 9; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology”; Dorrien, MALT, 3:2, 8, 523, 529, 538; Dorrien, SS, 361; 
Dorrien, WTM, 191-199; Dorrien, SS, 247; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 472-473; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of 
Liberal Theology,” 13, 17, 20-21; Dorrien, MALT, 2:551; Dorrien, SS, 373; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 478. The 
concluding sentence of the paragraph is an extension of Hauerwas’s reversal of the isolationist critique, which can also be seen in 
Dorrien’s own work. Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420; Dorrien, SS, 360-367. 
Dorrien does give a qualification that explicitly recognizes the first generation and implicitly later developments: “With the 
partial exception of feminist theology, none of [the liberationist and postmodernist] movements gave much attention at first to the 
problems of interpreting myth and the sacred” (Dorrien, WTM, 197). Prior to that claim and partly in contradiction to it, Dorrien not 
only summarizes a chapter on Gutiérrez as him “ultimately preoccupied with the recollection of Christ in the spiritual struggles of the 
exploited” (RCG, 126). Dorrien also spends time on the importance of scripture for James Cone as he emerged from his Barthianism 
(SS, 243-245), which Dorrien prefaces briefly with Cone’s The Spirituals and the Blues (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1991). Dorrien then 
concludes that chapter with a pitch for liberative liberal theology by way of the same first-wave feminists of liberal theology that he 
pointed to in the quote above, and by way of a quote of Gutiérrez that parallels Dorrien’s summary of him in the quote above (SS, 263-
281).  
There are a few points to note here. First, Dorrien’s argument would have been enriched if he had reckoned with Gustavo 
Gutiérrez’s The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1990); however, I 
have not been able to find Dorrien ever mentioning it, much less engaging it. Dorrien’s Reconstructing the Common Good may be 
excused since it was published in the same year by Orbis as Gutiérrez’s English translation was published by Orbis. But Dorrien’s 
Soul in Society, that notes the languishing of truth and takes a cue from Gutiérrez on reviving the social gospel in US Christianity 
(360), does not quite follow through on Gutiérrez’s account of truth. 
Second, as I will show later, Dorrien’s perspectivism is too broad for the contextual-communal confines of Cone’s work on 
scripture and economics, even after he shrugged off sympathy for Barthian revelation (SS, 244, 248; KRHS, 402-409; RCG, 161-164; 
EDE, 308-309). On the issue of black theology and liberation here, I suspect that Dorrien falls much in line with J. Deotis Roberts 
since Dorrien’s account of Robert’s own position and of his agreement with Cone hits so many of Dorrien’s hallmarks that will be 
addressed in this chapter and the next (MALT, 2:166-172). That account may qualify the quote from Dorrien above about no “attention 
at first…to…myth and the sacred.” However, to what extent Roberts is formally a liberationist is not quite clear, and in fact perhaps 
not quite the case, since “Roberts identified with theological liberalism” whereas “the black theology movement of the 1970s and 
beyond mostly did not” (ibid., 173). So in some respect on the issue of true sacred myth, Dorrien seems to be judging black liberation 
theologies on his own terms rather than theirs. While in The Spirituals and the Blues Cone accepts the historical separation of the 
spirituals and the blues in terms of pre- and post-civil war consciousness respectively without quite bringing the spirituals to the 
present, and while he differentiates the spirituals and the blues in terms of sacred and “secular spiritual[s]” respectively, they are 
theologically linked by what is functionally a kind of embodied personalism (100). That is, in the face of oppression, both “affirm the 
somebodiness of black people, and they preserve the worth of black humanity through ritual and drama” (ibid., 105). That 
“experience” is not only “the Truth” (ibid., 106); the experience is an experience of the truth, of its sustaining and transforming power, 
even if the latter is delayed. Such experience is not simply similar to how Dorrien understands myth, it is how Dorrien understands 
humanity’s encounter with God’s Spirit moving mysteriously––not always seen or even strictly in reference to scripture, although the 
latter is normative for Dorrien (WTM, 238-239). So in Dorrien’s terms that I will define and use later, the spirituals and the blues 
correlate respectively with the evangelical (gospel faith) and modernist (Enlightenment rationality) heritages of liberal theology. But 
whereas Dorrien already had the benefit of the social gospelers’ fusing the two heritages, Cone had to construct his Martin-Malcom 
duality after he cleared the ground for black resources, like the spirituals and the blues, from the incursion of white sources. In effect, 
on Dorrien’s terms, Cone continued his work on the basis of living the sacred myth.  
Third, more recently, work such as Bryan N. Massinagle’s Racial Justice and the Catholic Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 
2010) is not only marked by Gutiérrez’s and Cone’s influence, but also stresses the importance of both the black experiential truth and 
theological––including even liturgical and doctrinal––truth (chps. 2-3). However, at the same time, the fact that Massingale’s book 
was ground-breaking for US Catholicism does indicate how little an affect liberation theology has had in many US churches. So as I 
noted earlier in terms of both Hauerwas and Dorrien, they may have once been and may still be more correct than not about the 
theological milieu. But there are individuals who break the mold at the very least, and there has been some important development. 
Dorrien may even contribute further to the latter with his forthcoming second volume on the black social gospel, since it will give a 
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 How can Dorrien assume the importance of a thick morality and deeply critique it 
at the same time? Again the answer is a dialectic. Vital for Dorrien “is whether or not 
progressive Christians have a passionate, clear, convictional spirit. The question cuts two 
ways, in terms of spiritual conviction and the ethical imperative of struggling for social 
justice, but they go together, each being indispensable to the other.”212 The issue for 
Dorrien is to recover liberal theology’s “spiritual conviction,” its spiritual ground in 
truth.213 Here his agreement with Hauerwas concerning the importance of truth turns into 
a complicated disagreement over the ancient question, what is the truth? 
Truth in Perspectivism and Plurality 
 Dorrien once described his understanding of truth as “perspectivist and pluralist” 
rather than either “absolutist” or “relativist.”214 The latter two are opposing extremes. 
Absolutism maintains that “universal truths” can be perceived and have purchase on the 
perceiver apart from any “historical or cultural context.”215 Relativism rejects 
absolutism’s universal truths, and it holds that truths are limited to “the particular 
assumptions and contexts from which they derive.”216 Perspectivism drives in-between 
absolutism and relativism. Positively, perspectivism affirms the importance of both 
universal truth socio-historical contexts. Negatively, perspectivism qualifies the 
absolutists’ anthropological hubris and “relativizes the relativizers” ironic universal claim 
about relativity.217 																																																								
full-orbed portrait of Martin Luther King, Jr. The account would be much more complete and detailed than either Dorrien gave in 
SEM or MALT, 3. 
212 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22. See also ibid., 21; “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal 
Necessity,” 49, 55. 
213 Dorrien, MALT, 3:538. See also Dorrien, SS, 373. 
214 Dorrien, SS, 17. 
215 Ibid., 17. 
216 Ibid., 17. 
217 Ibid., 17. See also Dorrien, RCG, 161. 
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 Dorrien has not revisited perspectivism as a term since 1995, but his successive 
work employs a perspectivist framework that can be described as a relational non-
foundationalism. So like Hauerwas, Dorrien gives a relational account of truth. In fact, 
Dorrien claims that Hauerwas holds to perspectivism, or as Hauerwas calls it, a “soft-
perspectivism.”218 But there are two complications in terms of their relation to one 
another over perspectivism/non-foundationalism.219 
 First, Dorrien’s perspectivism/non-foundationalism places him partly out of the 
realm of Hauerwas’s critiques of liberal theology and philosophical liberalism, which 
have been directed largely at foundationalism. Part of Dorrien’s perspectivism/non-
foundationalism, I show below, is informed by Hegel and Karl Barth. But despite my 
occasional injection of Hegel above, Hauerwas largely avoids explicit engagement with 
the post-Kantians, rarely mentions Hegel in particular, and attributes as much 
significance to Kant as possible. Dorrien acknowledges that Kant is vital. Dorrien also 
admits that “of the five main traditions of German liberal theology...Hegel has been the 
smallest, by far, in the United States.”220 So Hauerwas’s critiques are not necessarily 
misguided considering his US audience. Nevertheless, Dorrien contends that Hegel 
provided the philosophical ground, directly or indirectly, for the greatest developments in 
the following centuries. Dorrien further argues that Hegel not only fulfills and supersedes 
Kant, but also that Hegel is more promising for liberalism than Schleiermacher because 
																																																								
218 Hauerwas, WwW, 294. Hauerwas is quoting James Wm. McClendon and James M. Smith, Convictions: Defusing Religious 
Relativism (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 6-7. However, it is worth noting that “soft-perspectivism” as a 
term is not used in the most recent version: James Wm. McClendon and James M. Smith, Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism, 
rev. ed. (N.p.: Trinity Press International, 1994; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 9. See also Dorrien, SS, 18; Hauerwas, 
IGC, chp. 2. 
219 Dorrien, EDE, x-xii, 258, 303; Dorrien, KRHS, 12, 272, 565-567; Dorrien, MALT, 3:2-8; Dorrien, SEM, 674; Dorrien, WTM, 198. 
220 Gary Dorrien, review of Liberal Theology: A Radical Vision, by Peter C. Hodgson, Journal of Religion 88, no. 4 (2008): 541. 
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Hegel reclaimed speculative reasoning to develop accounts of reason, social subjectivity, 
and a dynamic, panentheist Geist.221 
 Hauerwas misses Dorrien’s argument because, from Dorrien’s position, Hauerwas 
commits Karl Barth’s mistake of focusing on Schleiermacher but not taking seriously 
enough the Hegelian vein of liberal theology. Accordingly, Hauerwas critically accepts 
George Lindbeck’s characterization of theological liberalism as “experiential-
expressivist,” while Dorrien rejects that formulation as too narrow.222 So, from Dorrien’s 
position, Hauerwas does not fully appreciate social subjectivity within liberalism. 
Liberalism and liberal theology is not always individualist. But since the post-Kantians 
are both indebted to Kant and break from Kant, some critiques of Kant can be viable 
critiques of the post-Kantians. To that critical end and to put Hauerwas and Dorrien in 
more interactive conversation, below I will on occasion extend lines of critique from 
Hauerwas’s criticisms noted above without belaboring the point.223 
 Second, Dorrien claimed that his and Hauerwas’s perspectivist positions differed 
since Dorrien is “open-ended,” vulnerable to “outside criticism,” whereas Hauerwas is 
not.224 I will address Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas later. Here Dorrien’s openness is the 
concern. Dorrien uses the term “spiritual center” to describe a cluster of convictions that 																																																								
221 Hauerwas, BH, 118-119, 231 n. 21; Hauerwas, CSCH, 144-145; Hauerwas, DF, 22-25; Hauerwas, STT, 30-34; Hauerwas, SU, 118-
119; Hauerwas, WGU, p. 154, chp. 8; Hauerwas, WW, 228-229, 232-234; Hauerwas, AE, 128; Hauerwas, STT, 30; Hauerwas, WGU, 
37-38; Hauerwas, WT, 59; Dorrien, KRHS, 12, 17-19, 74, 159-160, 177, 181-184, 187-188. Although I am focusing on Dorrien, I am 
not trying to imply that, in contemporary liberal theology, Dorrien is unique in eschewing Kant’s rational foundationalism for a more 
historically and contextually constructed, pragmatic subjectivity. Dorrien, MALT, 3:3, 8; Hauerwas, AC, 31-33; Hauerwas, WW, 97. 
222 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
1984), 17-18; Hauerwas, AN, 2-3; William H. Willimon and Stanley Hauerwas, Preaching to Strangers: Evangelism in Today’s World 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 8 (hereafter PS); Hauerwas, STT, 239; Hauerwas, SU, 118; Dorrien, MALT, 3:531-
534. This is not to say that Schleiermacher and experience are not important for Dorrien, just that Dorrien’s normative position is in a 
more Hegelian frame––or at least stresses it in his recovery. Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, KRHS, 437; Gary Dorrien, The 
Democratic Socialist Vision (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 3-4, 19, 31-32, 41-42 (hereafter DSV); Gary Dorrien, 
“Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47, 49. 
223 Dorrien, KRHS, 74, 501-502; Hauerwas, STT, 29-34. 
224 Dorrien, SS, 18. 
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“provide…whatever sense of meaning, coherence, or direction one possesses.”225 His 
spiritual center is “a gospel-centered theology of personal spirit” that is attentive to 
liberation.226 This center is built on a plurality of truths. Both are framed by Dorrien’s 
account of liberal theology as a relational dialectic, so I begin with the dialectic. It 
establishes that, for Dorrien, the relations between multiple truths are much more mutual 
and therefore flatter than Hauerwas’s hierarchy of truth.227 
The Two Heritages of Liberal Theology, and Dorrien’s Relational Dialectic 
 Recall that liberal theology mediates between the two poles of over-belief and 
disbelief by internalizing sacred and the secular resources in a mutually informing 
interplay. Somewhat following convention, Dorrien categorizes these two resources as 
“two heritages.”228 Broadly construed the first heritage is “evangelical,” focusing on 
transcendence, and the second is “modernist,” focusing on immanence.229 The 
evangelical heritage’s role is to keep liberal theology Christian. Evangelical “affirm[s] a 
personal transcendent God, the authority of Christian experience, the divinity of Christ, 
the need of personal redemption, and the importance of Christian missions.”230 The 
modernist heritage corresponds to the secular worldview that began in the middle 
																																																								
225 Dorrien, MALT, 3:274; Dorrien, WTM, 134. The citation is Dorrien describing Langdon Gilkey; however, Dorrien is appreciative of 
Gilkey, and Dorrien uses “spiritual center” in the same way elsewhere. Dorrien, KRHS, 105; Dorrien, SEM, 364; Dorrien, SS, 280; 
Dorrien, WTM, 230. 
226 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 21. See also ibid., 22; Dorrien, MALT, 3:8, 538-539; Dorrien, “Ideality, 
Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 55-56; Dorrien, “The Lure of 
Love Divine.” 
227 For Dorrien’s openness as the concern, see Dorrien, RCG, 161. 
228 Dorrien, MALT, 2:10. See also ibid., 11-20; 531-534; Dorrien, EDE, 356; Dorrien, WTM, 58-71; Dorrien, “American Liberal 
Theology,” 477; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 53; Dorrien, “Modernisms in Theology,” 212-220; 
Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 4-5. 
229 Dorrien, MALT, 2:10-11. Others have called these categories “transcendental” and “naturalist,” but the issue is still the same (ibid., 
13). 
230 Ibid., 11. 
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enlightenment. Modernist “emphasize[s] the authority of modern knowledge, affirm[s] 
the continuity between reason and revelation, champion[s] the values of humanistic 
individualism and democracy, and usually distrust[s] metaphysical reason.”231 
 For Dorrien, the two heritages allows liberal theology to retain Christian belief 
and reconfigure it according to “a modern philosophical and/or scientific worldview that 
satisfies modern tests of credible belief.”232 That way, Dorrien argues, the best of liberal 
theology answers “challenges to belief and deal[s] with them as creatively and faithfully 
as possible.”233 But recall Hauerwas’s contention that liberal theology and Dorrien in 
particular are trapped in a “double mind.”234 Dorrien admits that there is a dialectical 
tension between the evangelical concern for “essential continuity with the historic 
Christian tradition” and modernist “discontinuit[y].”235 So if one is to be faithful to both 
seemingly contradictory heritages, how should they be related? Dorrien argues that 
historically both “broad theological tendencies” (heritages) in liberal theology were built 
on the union of faith with human freedom (human reason and experience).236 And both 
heritages articulated the fusion in both secular and sacred terms that mixed both 
heritages. Dorrien’s own work follows suit. He resolves the tension between the two 
																																																								
231 Ibid., 10-11. The modernist heritage, which Dorrien also calls the “enlightenment heritage,” is rooted specifically in the middle to 
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232 Dorrien, MALT, 2:15. 
233 Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 51. See for instance Dorrien, SS, 372, 375. 
234 Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420. 
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heritages by situating them in mutual interrelation rather than in opposition. As much as 
liberal theology pulls from divergent worldviews, it does so through its own 
consciousness––the second layer axiom in the definition of liberal theology––that takes 
ownership of the gospel, reason, and experience for its own vision.237  
 That is Dorrien displaying the historical and theological acumen for which he is 
rightly, deeply respected. Yet since Dorrien has been received as an historian, his own 
constructive interrelation of the heritages goes largely unnoticed. Accordingly, the 
significant value and originality of his work has been missed. Dorrien’s dialectical 
proclivity united with his historical bent has indeed produced very good historical works. 
But they are also the ground for his constructive theological contribution that goes 
beyond the limits of historiography. Dorrien’s historical narratives of liberal theology’s 
relational dialectic are for guiding the present. He critically evaluates and recovers the 
promising aspects of the two heritages that sometime go unseen today.238  
																																																								
237 Dorrien, MALT, 2:11-20, 531-534; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 49; Dorrien, “The Crisis and 
Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 5. 
238 For respect paid to Dorrien, see below. For the rest of paragraph, see Dorrien, WTM, 9; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, 
and Liberal Necessity,” 51; Evans, Liberalism without Illusions, 121; Dorrien, WTM, 9. Dorrien’s critical recovery is similar to the 
Hauerwas’s observation about Charles Taylor and Oliver O’Donovan as doing “project[s] of retrieval and ‘re-membering’” for 
constructive work today (WW, 203). As for Dorrien’s voice, sometimes his critical historical retrieval can be quite subtle or is most 
clear in the preface of a volume or at the end of a volume or article. But retrieval is nonetheless shot through all of his work––like his 
focus on evaluating a figure’s position in light of liberationist concerns (race, gender, etc.). Dorrien, DSV, x; Dorrien, EDE essentially 
in its entirety; Dorrien, KRHS, ix, 3, 12-13, 542-549, 567; Dorrien, RCG, 13-15; Dorrien, SS, 19-20; Gary Dorrien, The Barthian 
Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology without Weapons (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 10, 165-166, 192-196 
(hereafter BRMT); Gary Dorrien, The New Abolition: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Black Social Gospel (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
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Hauerwas’s attention to Dorrien’s work, see Hauerwas, BH, 233 n. 33; Hauerwas, WW, 17 n. 9; Hauerwas, WGU, 53 n. 27, 150 n. 22, 
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 Dorrien’s mediation, then, has a somewhat different shape than mediation in 
contemporary liberal theology on the whole. On the one hand, the root of the tension 
between the evangelical and modernist heritages concerns Christian intelligibility. 
Dorrien’s dialectical mediation between the heritages is precisely about being intelligible 
in the modern society at least partly on its terms. On the other hand, Dorrien is attempting 
to be faithful to the Christian truth of liberal theology in a context where contemporary 
liberal theology has languished precisely because crucial aspects of its past have been 
proportionally underplayed and forgotten, in particular Hegel and the evangelical heritage 
respectively.239  
 Within the frame of the two heritages united by a relational dialectic, I argue next, 
can be found what truths that Dorrien holds to, how each heritage supplies truth that are 
mutually informing for him, and what truths he incorporates that are outside the 
conventional bounds of liberal theology. The idealist concepts of spiritual truth, 
apophatic truth, re-mythologized truth, and relational truth from the modernist heritage 
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contribute to both the evangelical heritage’s and Dorrien’s spiritual and social idealism. 
Much of those truths can be attributed to the post-Kantians, but Dorrien also incorporates 
Barth. The evangelical heritage maintains not only the truth of God’s kingdom, but also 
the heritage is the site where liberal theology historically and Dorrien presently fuse the 
two heritages. That truth and fusion Dorrien attributes to the social gospel, which is very 
dear to him. Yet he also incorporates liberation theology in such a manner that I argue is 
initially a hierarchy of truth. Ultimately, however, his perspectivism leads him to situate 
liberative truth in mutuality with the social gospel. 
The Modernist Heritage, Apophatic Monism, and Relational Truth 
 Kant’s transcendental, subjective idealism with objective and realist elements laid 
the ground for the post-Kantians’ objective, absolute, social, and transcendental religious 
idealisms that creatively configured religious experience, reason, and the divine. This 
post-Kantian version of the modernist heritage helped reconfigure the evangelical 
heritage into an idealist and social spirituality.240 
 Historically, liberal theology incorporated the modernist focus on reason and 
experience to the degree that eventually reason and experience were at least raised up to 
the level of scriptural authority and external authority was largely rejected. Doing so gave 
liberal theology not only more credibility in the eyes of liberalism, but also flexibility not 
allowed within the bounds of Christian tradition. The post-Kantians were crucial to the 
project, and for Dorrien, Hegel played a central role. Hegel’s rationalist method 
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recovered truth in a way that both valued and went beyond the theological limitations of 
“picture thinking,” the facade of sensuous particularity that cannot sufficiently grasp 
universal truth.241 “Spiritual reality,” instead, “is the land of true explanation”; it is where 
humanity as spirit comes to know that Spirit (God) is love.242 In that framework are four 
truths vital to Dorrien which are worth explicitly noting now. Spiritual reality, or the 
category of spirit, is itself true because it describes three other truths: the (1) relation 
between God and humanity illuminates that (2) God is Spirit, and that (3) humanity is 
spirit. These truths of S/spirit are summed up in the term monism, the category of spirit is 
“a single underlying reality” to everything.243 Chapter two will focus on Spirit, spirit, and 
the character of their relation. Here the question, how Hegel could employ speculative 
reason to construct a monist account, requires some explanation considering Kant’s 
legacy and Dorrien’s critical sympathy for them. Out of the latter stems two of Dorrien’s 
truths and then a broader, relational account of truth.244 
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 Hegel’s formula of Spirit relating to spirit is predicated on a form of reasoning 
called intellectual intuition, “a source of metaphysical knowledge about eternal forms.”245 
Dorrien grants that Kant was an enemy to both intellectual intuition and monism because 
he rejected that one can know the noumena and he privileged that “sensible intuition” can 
still access the phenomena.246 But Dorrien also argues that Kant, in the second and third 
critiques, still “appeared to authorize an understanding of appearances, sensibility, things-
in-themselves, understanding, nature, and freedom as aspects of a single underlying 
reality.”247 This “opened the door” to “a Kantian basis for apophatic monism.”248 In this 
framework of granting and sublating Kant for an apophatic monism are two truths, first a 
negation and second a construction. 
 The first truth for Dorrien is what I will call an “apophatic reserve”: human views 
of the world and human knowledge of God are relativized and even negated on the basis 
of God’s ineffable mystery.249 This reserve cuts between Kant and Hegel. Like any 
apophatic theology, for Dorrien, human finitude cannot fully apprehend, much less 
comprehend, the infinite expanse of God. That truth of humanity’s incapacity in 
Dorrien’s apophaticism is the product of his liberal starting point, the axiomatic 
conviction that privileges human reason and experience over-against a thick and positive 
account of revelation. This assumption may appear Kantian, but Dorrien also wants to 
avoid the foundationalism of Kant’s rationality and the metaphysical limitations of his 
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two-worlds framework. So Dorrien expresses his apophaticism in line with the early 
Hegel’s emphasis on negation in his dialectic. But rather than adopting a conventional 
left-wing or right-wing Hegelianism, Dorrien argues for theology’s importance as he 
mines the “critical principle that subverts its own pretensions to systemic completion.”250 
For Dorrien’s normative position “the negation of the negation” does not produce a full-
orbed, positive account of Spirit, as in God.251 Otherwise Dorrien would succumb to a 
number of problems found in Hegel, chief among them being the later Hegel’s over-
realization of mystery that is absolute Spirit. In other words, a violation of divine mystery 
is “idolatry” for Dorrien.252 
 To avoid idolatry Dorrien takes his perspectivism seriously, incorporating a 
source that is outside the conventional bounds of liberal theology. Barth’s non-
foundationalist, evangelical, and apophatic position––which Dorrien argues is more 
Hegelian than Barth admitted––Dorrien joins with his development of Hegel’s legacy in 
an apophatic reserve. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien appreciates Barth precisely for what 
Dorrien would call postmodern anti-foundationalism: Barth’s rejection of any method 
and any epistemology that over determines the truth. But whereas Hauerwas argues that 
Barth holds together both the apophatic and cataphatic in Jesus’s particularity, Dorrien 
merges his apophatic reserve with Barth’s rejection of method born from their resistance 
to “reduc[ing] God to an element of a system.”253 What can be said is that “revelation”––																																																								
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using the word as lightly as a liberal informed by Barthian would––is a “negation for a 
negation.”254 The presence of God’s Word reveals the Word’s hiddenness that disabuses 
humanity’s idolatrous presumptions: that humanity can definitively associate the Word 
with any single, fleshy point, and that humanity can definitively speak in any way about 
divine mystery other than that it is ultimately ineffable mystery known only “in and 
through the movement of Spirit.”255 Or in another frame, Dorrien accepts Hegel’s account 
of “relational Spirit” because it maintains the relation between God and humanity without 
tying God’s self to the framework of being.256 So Dorrien creatively employs Barth in 
order to avoid idolatry. But in order to secure the ineffability of divine mystery, Dorrien 
holds to an apophatic reserve that pre-empts, and thereby relativizes or sometimes 
negates, cataphatic claims about God.257 
 Can Dorrien then say anything constructively positive about God? Yes, in the 
second, constructive truth. Within Dorrien’s apophatic reserve, he affirms the importance 
of “metaphysical audacity” since “faith is a form of daring.”258 Even though Dorrien is 
for “radical immanence,” his understanding of it is not without spiritual and divine 
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transcendent remainders that desacralization denies.259 To this end, Dorrien, like Paul 
Tillich and R. Niebuhr, argues for the value of myth in contrast to many of their liberal 
forbears. Dorrien’s book on reason, truth, and myth, The Word as True Myth, culminated 
with him arguing for truth transcendent (or abstract in Hauerwas’s terms) made known in 
mythic imagination through intellectual intuition, immanence, and the Word as Spirit. In 
that frame Dorrien incorporates into his spiritual center a personalist-Hegelian version of 
a long-held staple in liberal theology, the evangelical heritage’s constructed account of 
personal Spirit. Rather than the particularity of Jesus, Dorrien emphasizes the Word in 
order to attribute a personally relational character to Spirit that humanity knows in the 
mode of spirit. Instead of affirming the hypostatic union, Dorrien reformulates Barthian 
Logos Christology into a Spirit Christology of true myth that fits with modern experience 
and reason. Jesus was “divine” insomuch as he was directed and empowered by the 
Spirit, while Jesus himself was not the incarnation as understood in the creeds.260 Hence, 
Dorrien uses the missional title “Christ,” rather than the name Jesus, for referring to the 
Word qua Spirit––the ideal of “the kingdom bringing Spirit”––active in human history.261 
 Chapter two will address further the issue of personal Spirit, which has been 
largely ignored by contemporary liberal theology. But for now, two initial conclusions 
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can be drawn from Dorrien’s dialectic of apophatic reserve and metaphysical audacity. 
First, with his reserve wiping clear the theological slate and his metaphysical audacity 
supplying the new content of monism, Dorrien’s thought fits within the narrative of the 
modernist heritage liberating the evangelical heritage from over-belief. In some respects, 
then, Dorrien appears to parallel demythologization. Second, however, Dorrien offers a 
re-mythologization. Hauerwas’s rejection of liberal theology’s desacralizing trend is 
warranted as a critique of the liberal legacy. But his critique does not extend quite so 
easily to Dorrien’s recovery of myth and sacred transcendence. So their difference here is 
actually about what kind of sacralization Hauerwas and Dorrien affirm in response to 
desacralization. 
 Dorrien’s privileging of myth attempts to fill the gap between abstract truth and 
concrete particularity, between “meaning” and “event” in a way that is both historical and 
unique to faith.262 But his use of “Christ” rather than Jesus is a telling substitution.263 
Hauerwas opposes approaching Jesus through an abstraction often called Christology, 
much less a universalism of “some univocal Being” or “generalized spirit” that reflects a 
generalized religious or moral sensibility as with Kant and Hegel.264 To extend another 
critique Hauerwas has made of others, that generalized sensibility is produced by the 
private “meaning we give it,” which Hauerwas pejoratively calls spirituality.265 However, 
Dorrien is not dismayed about spirituality on his terms because it describes the truth of 
not only monist Spirit, but also Spirit in a panentheist frame. Crucial to that spirituality is 																																																								
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an account of speculative reason grounded in relational truth. That account is F. W. J. 
Schelling and Hegel’s socialized development of intellectual intuition.266 
 “Schelling and Hegel…threw the door” that Kant cracked “wide open” to 
“apophatic monism,” Dorrien argues, by socializing intellectual intuition for speculative 
reason and absolute idealism.267 Schelling and Hegel turned intellectual intuition into a 
method of reflecting on one in relations to others (subject-object) as part of “one see[ing] 
all of nature acting through one’s self” and “knowing one’s identity with[in] the universe 
as a whole.”268 This method and the two quotes are vital to Dorrien’s spiritual center and 
truth about Spirit. The emphasis on interrelation in “nature acting through one’s self” 
corresponds with Dorrien’s claim that “anything that I think or do is ultimately God 
thinking and acting through me.”269 Then through that interrelated permeation one 
apprehends one’s self “within the whole.”270 The “whole” here is two-fold: the whole that 
is everything in relation and ultimately that whole in Spirit (Whole), the noumenal 
content of “revealed religion and speculative reason.”271 In this acceptance of 
contingency, not only does “one grasp…the unity of universal and particular, the ideal 
and the real.”272 One ultimately comes to recognize her or his “absolute dependence” on 
Spirit, who is “the dynamic inter-subjective in itself.”273 So through relation Dorrien’s 
																																																								
266 Although monist, panentheist Spirit is not quite explicitly stated in Dorrien’s earlier work, it is there in Dorrien, WTM, 239. 
267 Dorrien, KRHS, 74. See also ibid., 535-536. 
268 Ibid., 536. See also ibid., 167-177, 181-182, 194, 257. 
269 Ibid., 536. 
270 Ibid. See also Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46, 49. 
271 Dorrien, KRHS, 194. See also ibid., 536; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49. 
272 Dorrien, KRHS, 536. 
273 Ibid., 12, 217. 
	 89 
theology moves from “I know myself” to the truth of “God transcendent,” who is “the 
eternally self-identical, the absolute ‘I AM.’”274 
 Here Dorrien has given an account of truth about Spirit that is apprehended 
relationally. With Hegel, for Dorrien the Spirit is panentheist, “irreducibly dynamic and 
relational.”275 But to hold onto his apophatic reserve in accordance with intellectual 
intuition, Dorrien maintains an “intuition of God as the holy unknowable mystery of the 
world.”276 This allusion to consciousness, however, might appear to give merely private 
meaning, as Hauerwas points out in terms of spirituality. That may be the case, yet 
Dorrien’s dialectic mode escapes at least some aspects of private meaning. His apophatic 
reserve is also based on the Spirit’s dynamism and relation that both makes known and is 
made known in the truth of the Word’s hiddenness. This relational turn, even in the 
negative, still mirrors Hegel’s privileging of intellectual intuition and speculative reason 
that moved from thinking in picture to apprehending Spirit in relation to human spirit. So 
through a framework of relational truth Dorrien comes to a vision of monist Spirit in a 
panentheist frame but without what he sees as Hegel’s baggage.277 
 There is one more advance by the modernist heritage vital to Dorrien’s merging 
of the two heritages. Schelling’s and Hegel’s idealist theory of social subjectivity also 
created a social awareness that helped establish the ground for social idealism. The fruit 
of their social awareness was later combined with gospel ideals by the evangelical 
heritage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The social gospelers’ fusion 
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created the ground-breaking insight of social salvation realized in their social mission to 
transform society. Social structures had recently been ‘discovered,’ but many, especially 
predatory capitalism, were in need of redemption since they were neither just nor 
peaceable. The social gospelers reasoned that “if evil is socialized,” then “salvation must 
be socialized” as well.278 One’s socialization towards God and the kingdom, which is a 
“commonwealth of co-operative service,” orients one towards humanity with a 
structurally transformative vision of the common good where all are equal and free.279 
The social gospelers, then, sought to actualize idealist, social truth in human relations.280 
 So the spiritual and social contributions of the modernist heritage reflect 
Dorrien’s summation of the Kantian and post-Kantian work as “mapping the 
epistemological and spiritual ground of freedom and imagining a cosmopolitan 
commonwealth of freedom.”281  
The Evangelical Heritage, Fusing the Two Heritages, and Liberation 
 Although the spiritual idealism of Hegel’s Spirit is important for Dorrien, it is not 
sufficient to account for liberal theology’s spirituality. The evangelical heritage is crucial 
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to liberal theology, and to Dorrien in particular, even with experience and reason 
relativizing biblical authority and negating Christian tradition’s authority. 
 Theologically, liberal theology needs its evangelical heritage in order to be 
faithful to Christian truth. Soon after Dorrien delineates his perspectivist understanding of 
truth, he writes that his “religious perspective is founded upon the way of Christ and the 
reality of Christ’s kingdom-bringing Spirit.”282 For him, “social gospel is ultimately 
precious…because it recovers the fullness of the spiritual reality and ethic of the kingdom 
of Christ” that has and will come.283 Without evangelical truth such as this, liberal 
theology has become unmoored from what grounds and animates it.284 
 Methodologically, liberal theology’s second layer is only possible with both 
heritages. But simply construing the evangelical heritage as one of two poles cuts short 
the importance of the evangelical heritage and the social gospel. Historically, the 
evangelical heritage “sustain[ed] the original merger” of the two heritages “that gave rise 
to liberal theology” and “made liberal Christianity compelling to millions.”285 In more 
recent terms, the social gospel is Dorrien’s exemplar for unifying the modernist and 
evangelical heritages. The social gospelers “fused” modernist and evangelical heritages 
in the “spiritual power” of “spiritual conviction” to create the largest movement in the 
history of US liberal theology.286 The social gospelers articulation of social salvation was 
																																																								
282 Dorrien, SS, 19. 
283 Ibid. See also, Dorrien, RET, 11. For this point related to faithfulness within Dorrien’s overlap with and critique of Hauerwas, see 
Dorrien, SS, 374-375. 
284 Dorrien, RET, 4; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, SS, 373, 375-376; Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477-478. 
285 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 4-5. 
286 Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 477. See also ibid., 478; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, SEM, 60; Dorrien, “Liberal 
Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 53. In terms of “evagelistic and pietistic”––like revivals––Hauerwas agrees with 
Dorrien (BH, 234-235 n. 1). 
	 92 
derived from the modernist insight about social structures and from a sense of mission 
given by the “transcendental, biblical voice.”287 
 The social gospelers could sustain the merger because they were as much pastoral 
and activist as they were intellectual. The social gospelers’ massive theological 
movement arose in parallel to the development of sociology and socialist communes, but 
the movement itself was birthed from the pulpit’s response to social turmoil. The white 
social gospel addressed primarily the ongoing class warfare, instigated by the then rising 
global capitalism, and to a much lesser extent racism and patriarchy than did the black 
social gospel and first-wave feminism. The trajectory from biblical-ethical preaching to 
movement exemplifies Dorrien’s claim that “whenever liberal theology finds a large 
audience, it speaks a gospel of personal faith in biblical terms.”288 With that spiritual 
ground the social gospelers’ pastoral community organizing achieved significant political 
advances and a lasting legacy to match.289 
 Just such kinds of spiritual ground and pastoral activity are crucial, Dorrien 
argues, for “liberal Christianity...to regain its public voice.”290 He can see that the 
evangelical heritage has long been overlooked because faithfulness guides his normative 
understanding of liberal theology. His “normative” definition of liberal theology requires 
a critical emphasis to keep liberal theology from losing its theological content.291 
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However, as opposed to Dorrien’s historical definition of liberal theology, he has not 
fully articulated his own normative definition of liberal theology. If he were to, it would 
look something like this. Liberal theology “unit[es]... the sacred and the secular” in a 
“relational” dialectic, such that the sacred and secular mutually shape each other, 
positively and critically, for a progressive and “critically constructive” transformation of 
society.292 Liberal theology as such is faith continually evolving by and for two ends: to 
take into account the contemporary world-view and to work for the transformation of 
society in some measure. In order to evolve and transform, liberal theology integrates 
itself into liberal philosophy and politics.293 
 But such integration is dialectical for Dorrien. He refuses to allow liberalism to 
overrun theology and ethics. His resistance occurs in two ways other than his insistence 
on the evangelical heritage vis-à-vis the social gospel. The first is his apophatic reserve. 
Dorrien grants that mediation is how liberal theology is “friendly to something called ‘the 
modern world-view.’”294 However, with “Barth’s voice in [Dorrien’s] head,” Dorrien’s 
apophatic reserve qualifies the extent to which he holds to a world-view.295 The second is 
ethics. Liberalism is critiqued on ethical grounds in order to arrive at social 
transformation in line with theological ideals. The social gospelers’ ideas of social 
salvation and political activity to achieve it took root. Dorrien’s own politically inclined 
spiritual center is a “gospel-centered” personalist faith found in the progressive liberal 
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theologies of both the social gospel that worked for economic equality and the Civil 
Rights movement of the 1960s that fought for political liberation.296 
 Political liberation raises another truth. Despite Dorrien’s broad critique of 
liberation theology noted above, he proclaims a truthful insight about God because of 
liberation theology. “God is the partisan, liberating power of the oppressed in their 
struggle for justice.”297 This truth decisively constitutes Dorrien’s spiritual center. But 
how does liberative truth fit in his project?298 
 Born from his attention to outside criticism, his privileging of liberation theology 
creates an initial hierarchy of truth. He argues that liberal theology should become a 
subset of liberation theology. His normative position on liberalism and liberal theology 
shift accordingly. While he opts for justice as “right order,” he also questions the veracity 
of a “universal theory of justice” since “oppression is multifaceted, concrete, and 
particular.”299 His insistence on liberation and justice in concrete particularity configures 
the church’s mission. It “is called in the Spirit to prefigure a new society and emancipate 
the poor and oppressed.”300 In these ways the truth of liberation theology keeps Dorrien 
plumbing the theological and political depths of what it means to be attentive to the 
flourishing of all.301 
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 The shift to a hierarchy of liberationist truth has a significant implication for 
liberal theology’s method of mediation. On the one hand, liberal theology’s method of 
meditation has led, and arguably still could lead, to an insufficiently critical embrace of 
the status quo. On the other hand, the mediating method can also move in the other 
direction by placing liberal theology under liberative truth. Liberal theology must stay 
true to the truth of liberation experience precisely because experiences of oppression are 
“not what liberal theology has been about” on the whole.302 In this latter framework, for 
Dorrien, contemporary social gospelers move in the direction of the antebellum 
abolitionists who were too fiery about slavery to be socially acceptable by the status quo. 
This shift forms some of Dorrien’s deepest political ideals, which lie somewhere between 
progressive and radical.303 
 Part of the reason why Dorrien lies in between progressive and radical is because 
the liberation hierarchy of truth is only initially a hierarchy. Like Dorrien’s merging of 
the modernist and evangelical heritages, his method to join liberation and liberal 
theologies is also deeply dialectical. As far back as 1990, Dorrien argued that liberation 
theology lacks the social gospelers’ necessary, broad “moral discourse” of economic 
democracy (sometimes called democratic socialism), which is “larger and more inclusive 
than the discourses of countercultural vanguards.”304 So Dorrien once proclaimed: 																																																								
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“liberation theology needs to be shaped, informed, and limited by the theology of the 
Social Gospel”; “liberation theology needs a praxis of democratic socialism.”305 Recently 
Dorrien has reiterated that same line of argument in terms of “Christian socialism,” 
particularly “guild socialism,” with the implication of the social gospel and its economic 
democracy.306 What Dorrien is doing here can be reconciled by his “open-ended” 
perspectivism, blurring the boundaries between liberal and liberationist.307 He opts for 
hybridity, a liberative liberal, that comports with how Dorrien understands one of his 
heroes, Martin Luther King, Jr. King was in many ways both the culmination of 
American Protestant liberalism and a representative of liberative work. He was a black 
church pastor, a social activist, and a liberal, personalist theologian who incorporated the 
social gospel, pacifism, and to a degree R. Niebuhr. Dorrien’s own constructive project is 
																																																								
already “identify themselves with the socialist tradition,” and thereby “they transform this tradition through their commitment and 
criticism” (ibid., 171-72). 
 I will address economic democracy in chapter two. But some clarity may be helpful here since Dorrien has referred to 
economic democracy as democratic socialism, “market socialism,” and “democratic empowerment” (DSV, 164; RCG, vii, 15). Long 
ago Dorrien was adamant that “socialism” in democratic socialism should not be given up: “it must be used and redeemed” (DSV, 1). 
However, the fact that economic democracy no longer seems prevalent is because economic democracy, under the title democratic 
socialism, was incorrectly deemed to be “discredited” by the fall of communism, even though economic democracy was very much a 
part of theological liberalism (Dorrien, SEM, 5). Over time Dorrien has shifted from the use of democratic socialism as a term. More 
recently, for instance, Dorrien has distanced himself from the term “socialism” because the ideology is “dubious and unitary,” which 
are the exact opposite of what is needed (EDE, 141). But despite rhetorical shifts, the substance of what Dorrien has been arguing for 
is still largely the same. From his early work to his contemporary work, he argues for democratic socialism/economic democracy’s 
recovery and relevance and against its discredited evaluation by neconservatives and realists. Dorrien, DSV, esp. p. x; Gary Dorrien, 
review of A Future of Socialism? Political theology and the “Triumph of Capitalism,” by Harold Wells, The Journal of Religion 78, 
no. 1 (1998): 155-156; Dorrien, SEM, 624-626, 674-675, 683-684; Dorrien, RCG, esp. 12; Dorrien, SS, 292. In addition to those 
sources (DSV, EDE, and SEM in particular), see also articles on the recovery and relevance of economic democracy: Gary Dorrien, “A 
Case for Economic Democracy,” Tikkun, May/Jun. 2009, 36-37, 75; Gary Dorrien, “Beyond State and Market: Christianity and the 
Future of Economic Democracy,” Cross Currents, Summer 1995, 184-185, 188-202; Gary Dorrien,“Commonwealth Economics: 
Christian Socialism as Tradition and Problem,” Tikkun, Jan./Feb. 2010, 48-51, 75; Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility 
of Real, Healthy Change,” 138-145; Gary Dorrien, “Financial Collapse: Lessons from the Social Gospel,” Christian Century, Dec. 30, 
2008, 28-29; Gary Dorrien, “No Common Good?: Moral Community,” Christian Century, Apr. 19, 2011, 24-25; Gary Dorrien, 
“Liberal Socialism and the Legacy of the Social Gospel,” Cross Currents, Fall 1989, 340, 347, 349-354. 
305 Dorrien, RCG, 144, 164. See also ibid., 10-11, 30, 47, 109-113, 140-143, 145, 157-159, 161-163; Dorrien, “Beyond State and 
Market,” 187. 
306 Dorrien, EDE, 309. See also ibid., 133-137, 140-141. 
307 Dorrien, SS, 18. See also ibid., 280-281, 360, 375; Dorrien, EDE, 169, 298; Dorrien, RCG, 161, 174-175; Dorrien, “Liberal 
Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 52, 55-56; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 23. Dorrien has 
also sought to develop similarities between the social gospel, liberation theology, and political theology (RCG, 10, 107, 141, 158-
159). In particular, Dorrien has raised repeatedly Gustavo Gutiérrez’s positive evaluation of the social gospel, and initially Jürgen 
Moltmann’s observation that Walter Rauschenbusch “represented the most instructive precedent for a North American theology of 
praxis” (Dorrien, RCG, 10. Also see Dorrien, SS, 6, 360.). 
	 97 
largely in direct continuity with King. The social gospel and liberation are not only 
related, they are fused together.308 
 The embrace of diverse, marginalized voices and the emphasis of liberation are 
“the new sine qua non of progressive theology.”309 However, Dorrien’s concern for truth 
makes him unusual in contemporary liberal theology. Dorrien fuses the modernist and 
evangelical heritages partly through his complex definition of liberal theology that 
recovers under-recognized theological work from the past, and partly through his 
perspectivism open to figures and traditions that have been historically outside of 
conventional liberal theology. Dorrien’s work, then, moves him somewhat out of 
Hauerwas’s critical spotlight set on liberal theology. Like Hauerwas, Dorrien holds to 
truth known in relation. But they differ over what those truths are and how they are 
related. Where Hauerwas has an account of truth that is hierarchical and relational 
stemming from the particularity of Jesus, Dorrien places truth mutually related in Spirit 
qualified by an apophatic reserve rooted in human finitude. Even when Dorrien has a 
kind of hierarchy of truth, it is ultimately part of his perspectivism rather than an 
abrogation of it.310 
																																																								
308 Dorrien, EDE, xiv; Dorrien, NA, x; Dorrien, MALT, 3:143-161; Dorrien, SEM, 391-396; Dorrien, SS, 280-281; Dorrien, RCG, 42, 
162, 171-175. Of course Dorrien is aware of, for instance, James Cone’s distinction between Martin and Malcom (Dorrien, MALT 
3:163-167; Dorrien, SEM, 396-411, esp. 410; Dorrien, SS, 236-245, 250). I do not have the space to delineate the following, but it is 
worth noting: the fusion should be understood as a “plurality of consciousnesses” in a complex layering that maintains the social 
gospel-liberation dialectic instead of a monolithic whole or a simplistically incorrect version of Hegel’s dialectic as thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis. For “plurality of consciousnesses,” see Dorrien, SS, 18-19. Dorrien is quoting Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of 
Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 6; Mikhail Bakhtin, The 
Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist and trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1981). See also Dorrien, KRHS, 205-206. Dorrien’s complexity here should be appreciated for two reasons. First, it implicitly 
acknowledges space in liberation theology for those who are not in liberal theology. Second, the issue of relating the heritages and 
truths is even more complex, perhaps even dialectics within dialectics. The modernist heritage is crucial too. The personalist advance 
on Spirit and spirit recovers “a robust sense of divine presence” that Dorrien leverages in support of “movements that lift up the poor 
and oppressed and that contribute to the flourishing of all people and creation” (ibid., 3. See also ibid., 390-393.). 
309 Dorrien, MALT, 3:529. See also Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology, 472; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal 
Theology,” 12, 20.  
310 Dorrien, RCG, 161, 175.  
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IV. Complications: From Liberation and World to Truth and Reality 
 There are issues to address which are more complicated than Dorrien indicates in 
his 1995 claim that his “open-ended” perspectivism to “outside criticism,” specifically 
liberation theology, differs from Hauerwas’s closed off perspectivism.311 Dorrien’s 
critique of Hauerwas goes hand in hand with Dorrien’s proclamation that “the insistence 
on dichotomizing the world between Christians and pagans marks the essential difference 
in spirit between Hauerwas’s theology and [Dorrien’s] progressive social Christianity.”312 
Their alternatives for a US, post-Christendom, Protestant Christianity, in Dorrien’s 
account, differ because his position on God’s kingdom “takes more from [Walter] 
Rauschenbusch than Hauerwas” and is “inspired and shaped by liberationists movements 
that Hauerwas spurns.”313 For Dorrien, “to believe in the reality of the indwelling 
kingdom of Christ does not require that one regard the rest of the world as unregenerate 
or deprived of grace.”314 But to that position Hauerwas “gives short shrift to those who 
press him,” calling it “‘a liberal question…. You’re worried about non-Christians because 
you’re a liberal.”315 
 While I do not doubt Dorrien’s summary of their conversation in the last quote, 
Hauerwas at his best has a more interesting relationship with liberation theology and a 
more complex account of the world. I will address those complications to initially show 
that the liberation-world connection is not exactly what Dorrien made of it in 1995. He 
																																																								
311 Dorrien, SS, 18. 
312 Ibid., 359. 
313 Ibid., 360. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid., 360-361. 
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overstated his case when he declared that “Hauerwas spurns” liberation theology.316 And 
by using that mistake as proof of Hauerwas’s “dichotomizing between Christian and 
pagans,” Dorrien reversed the fact that Hauerwas’s appreciation of liberation theology is 
complicated when liberation is joined to the world.317 These interpretive problems are 
also partly the result of Hauerwas’s polemical rhetoric and silence. As a consequence of 
Dorrien’s reversal and Hauerwas’s language, in 1995 Dorrien was at best correct by half 
concerning Hauerwas’s account of the church-world distinction.  
 Those initial problems obscure a more significant issue. Hauerwas’s account of 
truth not only underwrites his church-world distinction, but also his account of truth is his 
account of reality. That pattern is the same for Dorrien as well, but they disagree over 
truth in either a hierarchical arrangement or a mutual arrangement. Their differing 
accounts of truth indicate rival positions over the nature of reality because Hauerwas and 
Dorrien differ over what is truly significant. 
Liberation, Church, and World 
 Hauerwas’s lop-sided engagement with liberation theology is exemplified by his 
critical article on Gutiérrez in 1986 and by his appreciative endnote on Jon Sobrino in 
1981. Although that lop-sidedness is problematic, it is not a dismissal of liberation 
theology as Dorrien claimed in 1995. Rather, Hauerwas’s appreciation for liberation 
theology is not often easily accessible. One could have the wrong impression that he has 
largely nothing to say on a slew of social issues based on Dorrien’s summaries of 
																																																								
316 Ibid., 360. 
317 Ibid., 359; Hauerwas and Quirk, DT, 213-214. 
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Hauerwas, the selections of The Hauerwas Reader, and even some of Hauerwas’s books 
by his own admittance. Hauerwas’s habit of “silence through presence,” and therein 
participatory listening, contributes to the possibility of misimpression.318 The endeavor to 
listen there is not only consistent with his emphasis on relational reconciliation, but also 
there is wisdom since, for instance, “gender is tricky for Hauerwas––and at his best, 
Stanley knows that.”319 However, his attempt at silence, thankfully, has not been entirely 
successful prior to and even more so after 1995.320 
 There is consistent and specific evidence in Hauerwas’s own work for his 
sympathy with liberation theology––“that [they] share far more in common than [they] 
differ”––besides his stated general appreciation for it on the whole and for specific 
liberation theologians in particular.321 From subtly to explicitly, he has consistently 
shown that integral to his work is the common good and solidarity. In one of his two 
recent chapters on poverty, he connects the common good and solidarity with the poor 
through Pope Francis’s call for the church to “the option for the poor” and to become 
																																																								
318 Hauerwas, WW, 195. See also Hauerwas, AC, 152 and its appendix, esp. p. 159, by David Toole; Hauerwas, PF, 229; Hauerwas, 
STT, 189. 
319 Amy Laura Hall quoted in Mark Oppenheimer, “For God, Not Country: The Un-American Theology of Stanley Hauerwas,” Lingua 
Franca, Sept, 2001. Dorrien also employs the quote in SEM, 486. 
320 Hauerwas, CC, 233 n. 4; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological Concept.” 
Hauerwas has had to work against his lopsidedness. For instance, in 2004––again in a footnote––he notes his sympathy for liberation 
theology by reminding his audience about his particular appreciation for Gutiérrez in the 1996 preface to After Christendom? 
(Hauerwas, AC, 9-10; Hauerwas, PF, 220 n. 9).  
 As for The Hauerwas Reader, the editors admit that the volume has “nothing on issues of race, gender, or the environment” 
for which they then suggest readings that were not included (10 and n. 12). But the reader does have a chapter on homosexuality (chp. 
25), a short discussion on Malcom X and whiteness (218-219), occasional reliance on liberation theology (410 n. 23, 436, 601-602 n. 
8), and summaries of his other work on liberation theology (“Selected Annotated Bibliography”). As for Hauerwas himself, he and 
Willimon admit that they did not make clear in Resident Aliens their “kn[owledge] from firsthand experience that the black church had 
long known how to be resident aliens in a racist world” (“A Reply”). 
321 Hauerwas, BH, 258 n. 20. See also Hauerwas, AC, 9-10 (Preface to the 1996 edition); Hauerwas, BH, 228 n. 43, 229 n. 12; 
Hauerwas, CC, 233 n. 4, 234 n. 16; Hauerwas, PF, 220 n. 9; Hauerwas, WwW, 258. It is worth pointing out that Hauerwas could be 
construed as a kind of liberationist from liberalism. See John B. Thompson, The Ecclesiology of Stanley Hauerwas: A Christian 
Theology of Liberation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); De La Torre, Latina/o Social Ethics, 127 n. 11. But what I think is more 
interesting is interpreting other, more constructive avenues of Hauerwas’s work along liberationist lines. He has functionally shown a 
preferential option for the mentally ‘handicapped’ among the issues of the common good and solidarity (DF, 185-186; WT, 203). 
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poor with the poor.322 That ecclesial account is not only prefigured by Hauerwas’s work 
in 1983, but also correlates with his more recent accounts of his normative politics. He 
advocates for a deliberative “democracy…that refuses to silence the voice of the poor” 
and for “justice” that “imitates the divine partisanship on behalf of the poor, the widow, 
and the orphan.”323 That affirmation of the preferential option for the poor in all but name 
includes “God’s unrelenting desire to liberate us from sin.”324 Hauerwas is also attentive 
to, and at times parallels, other liberation theologies. Although Hauerwas’s work is not 
visibly marked by eco-feminism or queer theology, he has written one chapter on ecology 
against “anthropocentrism,” another on liturgical formation provoked by a group of nuns, 
and two chapters on homosexual people––one of which showed the immense value of 
friendship with them.325 He has provided one popular article in favor of the black power 
movement, two chapters about racial reconciliation, and two chapters about a martyred 
“saint of the church,” Martin Luther King, Jr.326 Hauerwas has also described Cesar 
Chavez as a “hero.”327 Against European colonialism and the US liberal extension of it, 
he has affirmed communal self-determination by oppressed communities (African 
Americans, Native Americans, and women), which is probably surprising to many 
																																																								
322 Hauerwas, WT, 226-228. See also Hauerwas, SU, chp. 12 (reprinted Hauerwas, CDRO, chp. 10). Hauerwas developed some of the 
earlier theme of becoming poor in PK, 104-105. 
323 Hauerwas, SU, 10; Hauerwas, WAD, 106. 
324 Hauerwas, WAD, 106. For another affirmation of the preferential option for the poor in all but name, see Hauerwas, TT, 134. For 
that, implicitly liberation from sin, and explicitly life in the kingdom––in Hauerwas’s theopolitics––see Hauerwas, US, chp. 7. 
325 Hauerwas, IGC, 188. See also ibid., chp. 12; Hauerwas, DF, chp. 8; Hauerwas, PF, chp. 6; Hauerwas, STT, chp. 6. 
326 Hauerwas, WW, 232. See also Hauerwas, BH, chp. 9; Hauerwas, CDRO, chp. 4; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 7; Hauerwas, WW, chp. 14; 
Stanley Hauerwas, “The Ethics of Black Power,” Augustana Observer, Feb. 5, 1969. See also Hauerwas, BH, 234 n. 37; Hauerwas, 
CC, 252-253 n. 36, 272 n. 15; Hauerwas, CET, 214; Hauerwas, WwW, 184 (for King’s martyrdom), 258. In fact, Hauerwas got in 
trouble at his first academic appointment for his “‘activism’ on behalf of the African American students”––his advocating for at least 
one African American on the all white faculty and administration––because those students “needed someone besides [Hauerwas], a 
white guy, to talk through the challenges of being an African American” (HC, 80). This ‘activism’ corresponds with Hauerwas’s 
affirmation of the distinctiveness of “being black”: “to be ‘black’ is to be part of a history that should be cherished and enhanced” (SP, 
213). 
327 Hauerwas, CET, 214. 
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considering he repeated rejects notions of autonomy as self-determination. He not only 
has no “objection to feminine imagery for God,” but also has made occasional remarks 
that uphold women’s ordination.328 Further but still occasionally, Hauerwas has made 
remarks that reject the domination of women, that question his white privilege because of 
Malcolm X, that critically highlight the sin of racism, that pay attention to the racism of 
racial categorization itself, that advocate pacifist involvement in countermanding African 
American enslavement and its legacy, and that lambaste Native American genocide by 
US empire.329 
 Although those chapters and remarks are proportionally few for a long academic 
career, they are not off-hand. Dorrien once recalled in class a conversation he had with 
Hauerwas. Hauerwas made a sympathetic observation about the plight of African 
Americans in the US, and Dorrien replied that Hauerwas needed to actually publish it. I 
do not know if Dorrien’s urging was the cause for Hauerwas to put it in writing, but 
Hauerwas did publish his point. “I marvel at the miracle that African Americans do not 
each day have to refrain from killing a white person. …[which is] a testimony of the 
depth of God’s love that has and continues to sustain them.”330 God’s sustaining love, 
Hauerwas continues, is the hope of reconciliation without violence between “children of 
slaves” and “children of slaveholders.”331  
																																																								
328 Hauerwas, WW, 29. See also Dorrien, SEM, 478; Hauerwas, HC, 212, 214, 229, 255, 279. 
329 Hauerwas, AC, 53-54; Hauerwas, AN, 196; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, chp. 5; Hauerwas, CET, 15; Hauerwas, PF, 209; 
Hauerwas, PK, 90-91; Hauerwas, VV, chp. 12; Hauerwas, WAD, 140-146; Hauerwas, AC, chp. 6, esp. p. 136; Hauerwas, BH, 222 n. 
25; Hauerwas, CC, 83, 145, 252-253 n. 36; Hauerwas, CET, 29; Hauerwas, DF, 137; Hauerwas, IGC, 59, 166; Hauerwas, TT, 97; 
Hauerwas, US, 90; Hauerwas, WAD, xvii, 33 n. 33, 120 n. 13; Hauerwas, WW, 195. These sorts of statements by Hauerwas affirm 
Linda Woodhead’s estimation that his “unsystematic theology” is indeed “responsive” to and “develops” in relation to context and 
particularity. Linda Woodhead, “Can Women Love Stanley Hauerwas?: Pursuing an Embodied Theology,” in Faithfulness and 
Fortitude, 187. 
330 Hauerwas, BH, 153. 
331 Ibid. 
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 So perhaps even with Dorrien’s input, his point of conflict with Hauerwas over 
liberation theology has a lot less to do with liberation than Dorrien presupposed in 1995. 
Instead, their disagreement has a lot more to do with Hauerwas’s suspicion of 
liberalism’s impact on liberation theology. Hauerwas finds that liberation as a category is 
too abstract, that liberation in some forms is too similar to Kantian autonomy, and that 
liberation is too often articulated in the Constantinian terms of liberal justice. Indeed, 
when marginalized voices are connected to the world as liberal society, Hauerwas’s 
relation to liberation theology is overridden and Dorrien’s critical account of Hauerwas’s 
position is incomplete.332 
																																																								
332 Hauerwas, AC, 50-55; Hauerwas, BH, 61-62; Hauerwas, CET, p. 29, chp. 8; Hauerwas, DF, 2-3, 191 n. 10; Hauerwas and 
Willimon, RA, 37, 80, 88, 152-153, 167; Hauerwas, TT, 134, 232-233 n. 1; Hauerwas, WT, 200, 202-203; Hauerwas and Willimon, “A 
Reply”; “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 245; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ 
as a Theological Concept,” 69-76; Hauerwas, DT, 214; Hauerwas, “Failure of Communication or A Case of Uncomprehending 
Feminism,” 234. 
 In terms of a history of social ethics, Hauerwas and Dorrien have a very different way of interpreting the relation between 
social ethics as a discipline (social gospel, R. Niebuhr, etc.) and liberation theology. Dorrien sees the liberationists developments as 
“disruptions” to be included within social ethics and, in turn, liberation shapes the discipline (Dorrien, SEM, chp. 6, pp. 4, 674). 
However, Hauerwas sees a sharp distinction between them (“with the possible exception of Rauschenbusch and Yoder”) and, in turn, 
chastises the discipline (BH, 68, 234 n. 37). His rejection of uniting liberalism and liberation theology explains his other criticisms of 
the latter. Liberationist appropriation of liberalism is internally conflictual because liberalism inscribes the problems, such as freedom 
and equality as an ends unto themselves, that both the best liberation theologians and Hauerwas aim to overcome (Hauerwas, TT, 232-
233 n. 1; Hauerwas, “Some Theological Reflections on Gutierrez’s Use of ‘Liberation’ as a Theological Concept,” 69-70; Hauerwas, 
“Where Would I Be Without Friends?,” 328). Hauerwas has argued the same in another key: “the social policies determined by 
liberalism,” which were aimed “to ensure that the Holocaust never happens again,” “ironically undercut the particularity of the claims 
necessary to remember the Holocaust rightly” (AN, 12-13). But again, some of Hauerwas’s criticisms are dated, or at least not all 
encompassing. Besides Dorrien’s argument that Gutiérrez has eschewed Constantinianim (RCG, 124), Dorrien raises that Míguez 
Bonino critiques liberal theology and the social gospelers’ for their abstraction (RCG, 152). 
 So it would be immensely beneficial to the reception of Hauerwas’s work if he made his sympathy for liberation theology 
more explicit and accessible all at once, such as a chapter, rather than implied citation or brief preface, devoted to reflecting on how 
his relation to liberation theologies has shifted and not shifted since his appreciative endnote on Jon Sobrino and his critical article on 
Gutiérrez. Considering Hauerwas’s appreciation for Sobrino’s Christological focus, then Hauerwas would presumably be interested in 
Sobrino’s more recent work on Jesus and his kingdom, and perhaps be interested even De La Torre’s The Politics of Jesús. There have 
also been interesting shifts and expansions in liberation theology. Decades ago Dorrien noted that Juan Luis Segundo and Gutiérrez 
have taken seriously the critique of Constantinianism. So has Cornel West. I expect that Hauerwas would find interesting parallels 
with and would be quite critical of Leonard Boff's recent book on virtues. There is another interesting tension. If Hauerwas’s students 
represent development of Hauerwas’s work, as he claims, then it is worth noting not only Daniel Bell, Jr., whose account is suffering 
unto death for some liberationists such as Ivan Petrella, but also worth raising is D. Stephen Long. The latter, although Petrella 
intentionally overlooks him, gives an account of liberation theology that is longer and more explicitly appreciative than Hauerwas 
while still similarly critical at times. Petrella raises the importance of historical projects, which fell by the wayside as Latin American 
liberation theologians focused on theology. Hauerwas’s position might appreciate the critique insomuch as the aim to historical and 
concrete, but he would reject Petrella’s solution: for theologians to become invisible theologians in other disciplines. Obviously, then, 
some of the same themes are at issue, but the milieu has shifted enough to make possible a sufficiently different discussion. So in 
some ways, what I am pointing towards is not unlike, and actually would be helpful in meeting, Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman’s call 
to Hauerwas for a more explicit engagement with race and racism for radical democracy. In fact, meeting Woodard-Lehman’s call 
would still be helpful, even though Hauerwas has not only since again addressed racial reconciliation and King but also much earlier 
affirmed black power as Michael S. Northcott reminds us. Despite Johnathan Tran’s defense of Hauerwas’s silence from Woodard-
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 For instance, Linda Woodhead argues that Hauerwas misses much of sociology 
and feminism in particular because his theology frustratingly looks at the church and the 
world each within their own “homogenizing discourse.”333 Yet even then it was not true 
that Hauerwas wholly neglected sociology or feminism. In 1981, he maintained that “the 
influence of some of the work in sociology of religion and knowledge is beginning to 
have a fruitful effect on the kind of work that is done in New Testament ethics.”334 
Despite Hauerwas’s concern about the metaphor of liberation, in 1988 he wrote that 
“most of the charges made against male-dominated culture are both fair and just.”335 But 
he could be weak on the issue of gender. So in response to Woodhead, Hauerwas 
confessed his earlier failures to understand feminism and affirmed her critique that his 
work should pay more attention to women in the church. This confession and affirmation 
suggests that the hermeneutic-of-mostly-silence for participatory listening may be a more 
significant factor in his engagement with gender than the issue of homogeneity.336 
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333 Woodhead, “Can Women Love Stanley Hauerwas?,” 183. For similar feminist critiques of Hauerwas, see Albrecht’s The 
Character of Our Communities, “Myself and Other Characters,” and review of In Good Company; Elizabeth M. Bounds, Coming 
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 However, the link between homogenization and liberal society is more complex. 
On the one hand, what Woodhead calls homogenization is in fact Hauerwas’s hierarchy 
of truth ordering historical, social, and political work. Within that hierarchical frame, 
Hauerwas’s response to Woodhead and in his work elsewhere show his openness to the 
contributions that the world can bring to the church. So there is a complex relation 
between the world and the church. On the other hand, Hauerwas’s response to Woodhead 
uses the phrase “world of liars” to emphasize the importance of truth telling and 
nonviolence.337 That “sharp dichotomy” between the church and the world seems to 
confirm, from a perspective like Dorrien’s, Woodhead’s critique of homogeneity in 
Hauerwas’s church-world distinction.338 Hauerwas has further contributed to such 
readings when, from time to time he has privileged provocative polemics. Even after 
Dorrien made his 1995 critique, Hauerwas claimed that “Christianity is unintelligible 
without enemies.”339 Lines like that only reinforce an overly simple understanding of his 
church-world construction. But it does not represent Hauerwas at his theological best.340 
 So what is Hauerwas’s nuanced account of the world? It is inseparable from his 
accounts of creation, privation, and ecclesiology. The world and the church describe 
creatures in “God’s creation” differentiated by “loyalty” and agency: whether human 
creatures are turned toward either sin or holiness.341 The world is those creatures who 
“reject Christ” by a disobedient perversion, refusing to love God by turning God’s given 
																																																								
337 Hauerwas, “Where would I be without Friends?,” 330. 
338 Dorrien, SEM, 486. See also ibid., 487; Dorrien, SS, 359. 
339 Hauerwas, STT, 196. For a similar statement but further detailed and with less rhetorical fireworks, see Hauerwas, PK, 196. 
340 Hauerwas, CET, 12; Hauerwas, CC, 91-92, 95-97, 105, 237 n. 44; Hauerwas, CET, 11-12; Hauerwas, STT, 58; Hauerwas, SU, 30; 
Hauerwas, WGU, 212; Hauerwas, “Where would I be without Friends?,” 327-329. 
341  Hauerwas, CC, 247 n. 8; Hauerwas, DT, 183-184. For more on loyalty, see Hauerwas, AN, 7-8, 15; Hauerwas, CC, 92; Hauerwas, 
DF, 132-134, 137, 152, 154-155; Hauerwas, US, 123. 
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“creative gifts” to humanity against God.342 And “the result of sin” is “the violence that 
grips” the world.343 The church is those creatures who confess Jesus, and in seeking to 
imitate him, those creatures become heirs and heiresses of his kingdom. Accordingly, to 
live faithfully is to live non-violently in peace, which is “what the world can be.”344 
Hauerwas has summarized this world-church distinction as “not an ontological 
difference, but rather a difference of agency,” a “duality without dualism.”345 But here 
Hauerwas’s articulation of that framework becomes complicated, forking into two but 
connected lines of argument that become two accounts of the church-world relation. One 
avoids an ontological dualism while the other appears to raise a different kind of dualism. 
In 1995 Dorrien missed the former and feared the latter like so many other famous 
critiques of Hauerwas.346 
 From Dorrien’s 1995 position, Hauerwas’s world-church framework appeared to 
create a dualism in terms of the world as totally depraved today and doomed to perdition, 
the church as unique today since it is perfected eschatologically, and Hauerwas’s 
ecclesial isolation as a flippant concern for the world. However, in 1995 and 2009 
Dorrien overlooked Hauerwas’s 1983 normative rejection of the world as totally 
depraved, of the church as perfected, and of the “enmity” between them wherein the 
																																																								
342 Hauerwas, CC, 247 n. 8; Hauerwas, CET, 48. See also Hauerwas, AC, 36-37; Hauerwas, BH, 194; Hauerwas, CC, 105; Hauerwas, 
CET, 49; Hauerwas, DT, 176; Hauerwas, NS, 79; Hauerwas, PF, 171-172, 182; Hauerwas, PK, 100-101; Hauerwas, STT, 111; 
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343 Hauerwas, WAD, xii. 
344 Ibid., xiii. See also ibid., xii; Hauerwas, DF, 137; Hauerwas, DT, 183-184; Hauerwas, PK, 102; Hauerwas, US, 122. 
345 Hauerwas, WAD, xii-xiii. See also Hauerwas, PK, 100-102; Hauerwas, SU, 157. Hauerwas’s quote is itself a quote of John Howard 
Yoder, The Christian Witness to the State (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 2002), 31. But the same sort of framework can be found in 
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York: Harper and Row, 1956), 26. 
346 Hauerwas, AC, 36-37; Hauerwas, CET, 39, 60-61; Hauerwas, PK, 76-95. The final conclusion to this project will address how 
Hauerwas equivocates on the issue of the world through his many, inconsistent uses of it.  
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church retreats from or overtakes the world.347 But Hauerwas not only continues that line 
of thought when he shows an openness to non-Christians in 1998. Before his account of 
all creation as “sinsick” in 2000 that was hinted at in 1992, 1993, and 1998, in the early 
80s he complicated the very idea of the world as separable from any human creature.348 
Buried in a 1981 endnote, Hauerwas writes that “Christian judgment of the world is 
always self-referential, as we can never forget that the world is not ‘out there’ but in 
us.”349 Or in other words, as he writes upfront in 1983, “the world is those aspects of our 
individual and social lives where we live untruthfully by continuing to rely on violence to 
bring order.”350 Christians can be disobedient just like other creatures. So the difference 
of agency seems to be framed by covenant. The disobedient creatures who confess Jesus 
are being unfaithful.351 
 But in order to confess and be faithful to Jesus, Hauerwas’s account can slide into 
a kind of solidified duality “between Christians and pagans.”352 Rather than ontological 
dualism, the duality is a dichotomy between traditioned communities that culminates in 
the disparate politics of Christians and pagans. At the beginning of the 1980s Hauerwas’s 
account of the church began with emphasizing the uniting of story and character for the 
church to form a disciple in the “narrative traditions” of a particular community, an 
																																																								
347 Hauerwas, PK, 101. See also Hauerwas, CC, 92; Hauerwas, STT, chp. 7; Hauerwas, SU, 41 n. 22; Hauerwas, WwW, chp. 20; 
Dorrien, SEM, 486-487. 
348 Hauerwas, BH, chp. 13, esp. pp. 190, 195-199. See also Hauerwas, AN, 43-44; Hauerwas, STT, 72-73; Hauerwas, US, 81. Later in 
2004, Hauerwas argues that “nothing is more important for the world than for Christians to learn to confess our sins” (PF, 25). 
349 Hauerwas, CC, 247 n. 8. See also Hauerwas, PK, 101 for a similar line. 
350 Hauerwas, PK, 101. See also Hauerwas, DT, 144. 
351 Dorrien, SS, 359-360; Hauerwas, STT, 58; Hauerwas, CC, 92-93; Hauerwas, TT, 219 n. 47; Hauerwas, PK, 100. 
352 Dorrien, SS, 359. For an instance where loyalty to God means self-critique sliding into traditioned community dualism, see 
Hauerwas, DT, 78. 
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“institutional space,” distinct from but still in the world.353 As that church peaceably 
embodies its distinctively traditioned space, the church illuminates that the world is 
“divided” and displays that Christianity is true to the world.354 Over the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, Hauerwas closed the respective gaps between story and particular 
community and between virtue and particular tradition. In the 80s Hauerwas argued that 
the church, in a relational account of embodied truth, is the truthful story of salvation 
history found in Israel, in Jesus, and in the new creation. In doing so Hauerwas further 
solidified the separation of the church and the nations. He preached that, from Jesus and 
Pentecost, the church’s witness of peaceable alterity to the violent nations is a proleptic 
reversal of disobedient Babel and of the successive fragmentation. The church thereby 
continues the particular mission of the Abrahamic covenant to be “a light to the 
nations.”355 In the 90s Hauerwas emphasized all the more the importance of particular 
“traditions” for virtue in order to undo the weaponizing of virtue serving the nation-
state’s violence.356 But similar to Hauerwas’s separation of the church and the nations, 
his stress on particular traditions has the consequence of splitting pagan and Christian 
virtues. Pagan courage, as articulated by Aristotle, “faces death with indifference” in 																																																								
353 Hauerwas, CC, 92, 96. See also ibid., 91-96; Hauerwas, PK, 102. Good character and good virtue are of course tied together, all of 
which Hauerwas argues are achieved through skill derived by training from a “master craftsman,” directed by the community, and 
listening to its story (CC, 115. See also ibid., 95, 116-119.). 
354 Hauerwas, CC, 91-92. See also ibid., 93-94, 106. 
355 Hauerwas, CET, 50. I recognize, as editors to the The Hauerwas Reader note, that this chapter “signals a significant shift for 
Hauerwas in the mid-1980s, distancing him from formal appeals to the notion of narrative (or, for that matter, character) and 
emphasizing the material specification of the Christian narrative in the lived experience of the church. Hauerwas reminds us that, 
philosophically speaking, narrative does not refer, people do” (HR, 142). But as I show above, that shift is more of a development 
rather than a complete break. For whatever inconsistencies Hauerwas might have, he maintains a thematic continuity, with some of the 
same points between CC, chp. 5 and CET, chp. 2. Much later in 2013, Hauerwas gives a description of tradition that parallels the 
Abrahamic covenant noted above: “the beginning of a tradition consists in authority being bestowed on certain texts and people” (AE, 
115 n. 43). 
356 Editors, HR, 289. See also Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 150. What Hauerwas began earlier (CET, 264-265), as the editors of The 
Hauerwas Reader note concerning CAV, chp. 9, Hauerwas later works “to distance himself from the increasing popularity of an 
ethical theory known as ‘virtue ethics’” by arguing “that ‘virtue ethics’ is not enough—that virtues can only be adequately inculcated 
and displayed within traditions of moral inquiry” (HR, 289). But this does not mean that Hauerwas gave up working on virtues.  For 
more recent instances, see AE, chp. 9; HC, 284; IGC, 160; PF, 15, 153, 156-158, 181-182; STT, 236; SU, 46; WGU, 239 n. 80. 
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battle since one “sees no other good.”357 Christian courage, as articulated by Aquinas, “is 
martyrdom.”358 Pagan and Christian accounts of courage differ––in fact, “the world of the 
courageous Christian is different from the world of the courageous pagan”––since they 
maintain “differing visions of the good that exceeds the good of life itself.”359 Over the 
course of the 90s and 2000s, Hauerwas suggests that the pattern of different visions and 
their different virtues extends to two traditions: the church’s life in concrete 
particularities and political liberalism’s abstracting, warping, and supplanting of the 
virtues of “concrete traditions.”360 So for Hauerwas the question is to whom is one 
“loyal”?361 Is one’s loyalty to God’s peaceable kingdom and the community that 
embodies it, or is one loyal to “people and institutions” (“the world”) that assert the 
necessity of self-securing violence?362 For Hauerwas, “of course,” the answer is “the 
church…that community that rightly commands our loyalty in a manner that relativizes 
all other loyalties.”363 So one can see that Hauerwas is susceptible to Dorrien’s 1995 
critique of “dichotomizing…between Christians and pagans.”364 
 However, Dorrien’s focus on the church-world distinction missed two important 
issues. The first is a basic tension in service of asking how the world might understand 
the truth rather than be bound by illusion. Hauerwas proclaims that the world should 
																																																								
357 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 160. See also ibid., 151-156. 
358 Ibid., 160. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 156-162. 
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361 Hauerwas, AN, 129. 
362 Ibid. See also ibid., 128, 198; Hauerwas, DF, 152. 
363 Hauerwas, SU, 31. See also Hauerwas, AC, 36-37. 
364 Dorrien, SS, 359. For Babel and Pentecost, see Hauerwas, CET, 47-54, 60-62. 
	 110 
“place [itself] under the discipline of Christians who are trying to learn how to live 
peaceably.”365 But that seems to conflict with Hauerwas’s breaking down the world-
church separation. Resources in Hauerwas’s work might resolve the tension, such as his 
consistent concern of the world/violence within Christians, or his position of “ultimate 
realism” which I note below, or his account of creation which I address more in the next 
chapter.366 The final conclusion to this project returns to the church-world relation 
because my constructive critique differs from Dorrien’s in light of what will be covered 
in chapters two through four. 
 Yet, to focus here on the church-world framework or on resolving directly the 
tension misses a second, fundamental issue indicated by Hauerwas and Charles Pinches’s 
claim that “the world of the courageous Christian is different from the world of the 
courageous pagan” in relation to violence.367 The hierarchy of truth that Hauerwas 
maintains is either obediently received and then orders lives according to God’s peaceful 
“aeon” or is disobediently rejected and then rises the world’s violent “aeon.”368 Yet for 
Hauerwas “there is only one true history…God’s peaceable kingdom. Christians can 
admit no ultimate dualism between God’s history and the world’s history.”369 This 
																																																								
365 Hauerwas, DF, 5. 
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assertion of one history and rejection of dualism expresses what Hauerwas calls “ultimate 
realism.”370 Rather than the church living in a “fantasy or illusion,” instead he asserts that 
“the so-called world-as-it-really-is is itself fantastic” since the world asserts its autonomy 
from “the resurrection of Jesus [that] is the absolute center of history.”371 Dorrien 
recognized this framework all too briefly in 2009, minus an explicit note about a 
hierarchy of truth. He mentioned that Hauerwas’s pacifism rooted in God’s peaceable 
kingdom is quite different than “the social order of ubiquitous violence described by [R.] 
Niebuhr and other social ethicists that liberalism sought to manage.”372 That difference is 
less about a church-world distinction and more about two very different views of reality, 
or as Dorrien notes for Hauerwas, which account describes “the real world.”373 Similarly, 
Dorrien and Hauerwas’s disagreement over the church and world is predicated on their 
different understandings of the nature of reality because they differ about what is truly 
significant. What is truly significant for them depends on what they argue is truly 
determinative of humanity, what ultimately creates and shapes humanity’s relational 
existence. So in other words, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differing positions on relational 
truth are actually rival accounts of reality.374 
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True Reality  
 For Hauerwas, what is truly determinative of humanity is that Jesus as 
autobasileia is the truth, and that humanity’s new agency emerges from within God’s 
kingdom. Liberalism is significant only insofar as the church in the US is more beholden 
to the liberal assumption of violence than to practices that embody Jesus’s nonviolence. 
However, this hierarchy of truth has been misinterpreted in light of contemporary forces 
in human existence. Some have argued that Hauerwas’s stress on the church’s alterity 
indicates that he is over determined by his rejection of liberalism. Hauerwas’s account of 
the church as an “alternative” to political liberalism is indeed about setting the church in 
continuity with God’s “cosmic” kingdom and against political liberalism.375 But it is 
somewhat misleading to say, even though Hauerwas often does, that he portrays Jesus 
and the church as alternatives to liberalism. The converse is the case.376 
 For Hauerwas, the Christian confession that “God, not humanity, is the ultimate 
determiner of human history” is a universal, “metaphysical claim about the way things 
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are.”377 Jesus, in his particularity, is of utmost significance because he is the truth that is 
“more determinative” than any other truth.378 The actual alternative has always been sin, 
the perverting of humanity through the fearful lie of human autonomy as an alternative to 
God’s sovereignty. In Hauerwas’s words: “grace is a more profound word than sin.”379 
This complicates Dorrien’s 1995 critique that, contrary to Hauerwas, one need not 
“regard the rest of the world as unregenerate or deprived of grace.”380 For Hauerwas, 
because Jesus determines and works “with the grain of the universe,” “our sins cannot 
determine God’s will for our lives,” “justice is deeper than injustice,” and “forgiveness is 
a more determinative reality than punishment.”381 The church can, therefore, proleptically 
live in the nonviolent, eschatological peace of God rather than live determined by 
liberalism’s political order and its violence. In the face of illusion the church reveals the 
truth that the world is still God’s and that it remains “bounded by God’s goodness” 
despite sin.382 
 So Hauerwas’s position is that “the ultimate sign [of] our salvation comes only 
when we cease trying to interpret Jesus’s story in the light of our history, and instead we 
interpret ourselves in light of his.”383 But what then of Dorrien’s 1995 critique that 
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Hauerwas’s perspectivism is “quasi-sectarian” rather than “open-ended”?384 Hauerwas’s 
account of hierarchical truth is complex and open, not monolithic.385 He argues that 
theology as the “‘queen’ of the sciences” requires an openness and humility, including 
that “theology has to learn from other disciplines.”386 He allows for “antecedent 
moralities,” meaning moralities that one’s cultural context holds.387 Even before 1995 he 
affirmed an account of “the self…constituted by many different roles and stories.”388 So 
rather than Jesus extracting the church from society, the question is how Jesus orders the 
church’s navigation of a complex milieu. The answer for Hauerwas is, of course, the 
faithful witness of embodying Jesus makes Jesus known in everyday relations. 
 Hauerwas’s account of truth in hierarchy and relations is, then, his account of 
reality. In contrast, Dorrien dethrones a hierarchy of truth. What determines human 
existence is a multiplicity of forces that are mutually related. Although they are qualified 
by an apophatic reserve, the reserve actually re-institutes the mutuality. 
 Dorrien assumes two basic truths found in line with his perspectivism that shape 
his understanding of reality. The first is that in the “world…everything is relative because 
everything is related.”389 I contended above that Dorrien’s mediating dialectic places 
truths in a mutually determinative relationship to one another. This “relational” dialectic 
rejects “Kant’s dichotomy between pure and practical reason,” but assumes that Christian 
truth and society are generally on the same plane when it comes to shaping one’s 																																																								
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subjectivity.390 Theology asserts the importance of gospel truth. But theology must also 
be open to and engage modern knowledge in order to reflect on what is known and 
imaginable. Through the gospel and open reflection one can more readily participate in 
the movement of personal and panentheist Spirit within which all humanity relates to 
itself.391 
 This account of reality as mutual relationality frames and propels Dorrien into a 
host of different kinds of human interrelations such as ecology, economics, interfaith 
dialogue, and discussions between science and religion. Dorrien supports, for instance, 
John Cobb Jr.’s “mutual transformation” as a model for holding together process 
theology’s sense of cosmological and ecological interrelatedness within an emphasis on 
liberation theologies and interfaith dialogue.392 But for Dorrien, social justice largely 
guides the forms of human interrelation. He asserts that the “best sign” of living in the 
mystery of universal, personal Spirit’s love is “a passion for social justice and the 
flourishing of life.”393 His progressive theology of justice works against oppressive 
injustice in order to work towards what people and their relations should become.394 
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Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 50, 54; Gary Dorrien, “The Lure and Necessity of Process Theology,” Cross Currents, 
Summer 2008, 327-335; Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 187-193. 
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 Dorrien might then reflect Hauerwas’s summation of “Christian Realism” as 
stated by Robin Lovin: “in the end truth about God must be consistent with every other 
kind of truth we can know.”395 However, this consistency is not the case for Dorrien. For 
him, “worldviews are relative, limited, fallible, passing, and thus not really the point.”396 
Rather, “the incomprehensible Spirit of the Whole” will eschatologically transfigure “our 
[incomplete] strivings to live into the truth and advance the flourishing of life.”397 This 
eschatological variation on Dorrien’s apophatic reserve keeps him from “tak[ing] any of 
[his] worldviewing or activism too seriously, especially the battle of isms.”398 Thus, his 
apophatic reserve’s relativizing of the relativist perspective qualifies his mutual relation 
between Christianity and society. 
 Such a qualification might indicate a truth that orders all others, a kind of 
hierarchy in the negative. But there is more to what the reserve does. Remember that the 
specific basis for his reserve is both the limitations of human experience and reason and 
the relational apprehension of the Word’s hiddenness. These mean that Dorrien’s reserve 
is itself perspectival. The reserve is about the relativity of his position, that his 
perspective is absolutely relative and that it is inherently relational. So he must be open to 
others in order to broaden his perspective. The apophatic reserve, therefore, reinforces the 
importance of mutual relationality. Thereby it serves implicitly as a description of reality 
“where everything is relative because everything is related.”399 
																																																								
395 Hauerwas, WW, 48. 
396 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 270. 
397 Ibid. See also ibid., 244. 
398 Ibid., 270. 
399 For the quote, see Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 263. For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, SS, 17-19; Dorrien, WTM, 
239. This framework explains why, in 1995, Dorrien blasts Hauerwas’s “Christian––non-Christian dichotomy…as a way of speaking 
about non-Christians that smacks of religious arrogance” (SS, 359. See also ibid., 18.). 
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 But what about Dorrien’s metaphysical audacity, his re-mythologizing of Christ’s 
kingdom in Spirit? Although an account of Spirit inherently stresses relationality, does 
not simply the idea of Spirit undercut the claim that “everything is relative” in respect to 
objective, absolute, and universal truth?400 The answer depends on which relation that 
one is referencing.401 
 Dorrien’s normative theological position, by his own admission, is one position 
within liberal theology. Right after he calls for recovering a theology of personal Spirit 
and outlines his own spiritual center, he then writes, “more important than any particular 
proposal is whether or not progressive Christians have a passionate, clear, convictional 
spirit.”402 Relativizing his own theological position comports with not only his definition 
of liberal theology united by method rather than doctrine, but also his perspectivism in an 
apophatic reserve. “Only a healthy pluralism in philosophy and rhetorical forms can free 
theology to do the work of locating the correspondence between human word and divine 
truth.”403 
 So might Dorrien’s relativizing of his own position “make relativism a new 
monism”?404 Hauerwas rejects just such a postmodern enterprise. But Dorrien is not that 
postmodern. Paralleling Hauerwas’s concern about liberalism in the university, Dorrien 
argues that “trying to convince deconstructionists that theology is a legitimate academic 
enterprise” has distracted, if not cut off, liberal theology from its evangelical heritage.405 
																																																								
400 Dorrien, KRHS, 567. See also Dorrien, WTM, 183-186, 191-192; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49. 
401 Dorrien, MALT, 2:538-539; Dorrien, SS, 19; Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 49, 55-56. 
402 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22. See also Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal 
Necessity,” 49. 
403 Dorrien, “The ‘Postmodern’ Barth?,” 339. 
404 Hauerwas, WGU, 225. 
405 Dorrien, “American Liberal Theology,” 478. See also Hauerwas, CET, 221-223; Hauerwas, DF, 13-15; Hauerwas, STT, 204-217; 
Hauerwas, SU, 12-32, 48, 165-186. 
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That critique is about what conviction liberal theology should have. His normative 
theological position for liberal theology is that “it…should be a clear and convicting 
word about following Jesus and worshipping God as the divine Spirit of love without 
having to believe any particular thing on the basis of external authority.”406 This quote 
exemplifies Dorrien’s metaphysical audacity.407 
 Dorrien may then appear in a dialectical bind between his position and his 
conviction. At worst, as essential as Dorrien’s described conviction is to his position, his 
conviction is not simply filtered through but perhaps always subject to his apophatic 
reserve. Yet there is more if we are to take Dorrien’s conviction seriously. In the quote 
about his conviction is a small but crucial hint that, to use Rowan Williams’s words, 
Dorrien and Hauerwas disagree not only over “reality as it is” but also, more 
fundamentally, “the truth which encompasses it.”408 That is, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s 
different understandings about the nature of reality are shaped by rival understandings of 
some-‘thing’ besides the human forces that determine human existence. As a speech-act, 
Dorrien’s account of Jesus and loving Spirit above subtly implies that Spirit shapes 
human relations. Divine creating, the other half of determination, can be identified in 
terms of the source of life that for Dorrien, I explicitly but briefly showed above, links 
divine transcendence and divine determination. Hauerwas’s account of God’s particular 
grace, that is Jesus, is explicit about determining humanity. So the issue is how Dorrien 																																																								
406 Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 56. 
407 For Dorrien’s eschewal of postmodern relativism, see Dorrien, KRHS, 272; Dorrien, SS, 17-19. 
408 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), 124 (hereafter OCT). See also Hauerwas, “Why Truth 
Demands Truthfulness,” 304-305. Technically the quote is out of context, but it is directly applicable. “The grammar of our talk about 
the Holy Spirit…is the grammar of ‘spirituality’ in the fullest sense of the emasculated word, the grammar of the interplay in the 
human self between the given and the future, between reality as it is and the truth which encompasses it” (Williams, OCT, 124). For 
Williams’s account of the Holy Spirit and of spirituality––both connected to Jesus––see Williams, OCT, 120, 125-126; Rowan 
Williams, Open to Judgment: Sermons and Addresses (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1994), 267-268 (hereafter OJ). 
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and Hauerwas account for the fact that “human reality exists…within God’s reality”: that 
“we are contingent beings whose meaning and significance is determined by something, 
something other than ourselves.”409 The next chapter will focus on their difference over 
the divine determination of humanity and the differences that stem from it. 
V. Conclusion 
 I have shown that Hauerwas and Dorrien aim to be faithful to their relational 
accounts of truth. Yet their differences over truth create differences over how to be 
faithful to it. Hauerwas rejects liberal theology’s three layers because he privileges Jesus 
in his particularity as the truth who is known in particular relations. This relational 
account of hierarchical truth contrasts sharply with Dorrien’s account of multiple truths in 
mutual relation. These differences explain their differing evaluations of and responses to 
liberalism and liberal theology. However, what truth(s) Hauerwas and Dorrien focus on 
are often overlooked in terms of truth, while their differences over faithfulness are 
discussed in terms of liberation theology and the church-world relation. I addressed the 
latter issues to show not only that are they more complicated in Hauerwas’s work, but 
also that such considerations are insufficient for understanding the difference between 
Hauerwas and Dorrien. Instead, undergirding Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s differences over 
the church-world relation are their differing accounts of truth that imply rival 
understandings of reality. 
 However, even their difference over reality only begins to introduce but does not 
quite reach the heart their disagreements or theologies. Chapter two will show that at the 
																																																								
409 Hauerwas, PF, 86; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 67. 
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heart of their theologies and their disagreements are the issues of divine sovereignty, 
human subjectivity, and human agency. There I show how divine sovereignty creates and 
shapes human subjectivity, and in turn, how that shapes human agency in intra-human 
relations. Dorrien focuses on Spirit, human spirit, and love. Hauerwas emphasizes Jesus, 
the triune creator, human creaturehood, and God’s particular grace. From Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s differences on those points, chapter three will argue, issue forth rival 
accounts of political sovereignty and participation with it.410
																																																								
410 Long, Speaking of God, 267. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s Disagreement:  
Divine Sovereignty and Human Subjectivity and Agency 
 Chapter one concluded that Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement over the 
church-world distinction presupposes a more basic difference: the relational nature of 
reality informed by a hierarchy of truth for Hauerwas or a democratized plurality of truths 
for Dorrien. I briefly noted then that these differences over reality and truth are created 
and shaped by an even deeper difference. Dorrien emphasizes love and Hauerwas stresses 
gift within their respective frameworks of the Spirit’s universality and Jesus’s trinitarian 
particularity. These different emphases, I will argue, characterize their rival accounts of 
divine sovereignty creating and shaping human subjectivity and agency, and in turn, 
intra-human relations. Their different positions here mark the heart of both their 
theologies and their disagreements with one another. 
I. Divine Sovereignty 
 Divine sovereignty is theology’s term for God’s supreme authority understood in 
two vectors. First, God determines––created and continues to shape––humanity. Second, 
humanity does not, at least fundamentally, create and shape God. This vector is 
undergirded by the recognition of partly human finitude but ultimately divine freedom. 
God is not a being or created, nor is anything necessary other than God for God to ‘be’ 
God. I endeavor in the first half of this chapter is to show that crucial to Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s projects is how they construe the relation between God’s supreme authority 
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and human agency. To show this importance and to narrow the scope of inquiry, it is 
worth stipulating five ways of understanding divine sovereignty.411  
 The first issue of divine sovereignty is Dorrien and Hauerwas’s affirmation of 
divine freedom. Yet Dorrien may not succeed where Hauerwas does on divine freedom, I 
will argue, precisely because of their respective construals of love and gift. However, 
divine freedom will be more integrated into my argument below rather than be the 
primary focus. This is because divine freedom is less prominent in their thought than 
divine sovereignty in terms of God’s sovereign agency in relation to humanity. So I will 
focus most on the latter. 
 The second understanding of divine sovereignty is divine lordship. Dorrien and 
Hauerwas’s kingdom theologies hold that God is the Lord over the cosmos. Despite 
lordship being the conventional description of divine sovereignty, lordship qua lordship is 
not the focus here. Instead, I follow Dorrien and Hauerwas. My focus is their re-
																																																								
411 The reason why I must make the argument concerning the importance of divine sovereignty is that Dorrien and Hauerwas largely 
assume both vectors of divine sovereignty; however, they do not explicitly develop a robust account of the doctrine of divine 
sovereignty itself in proportion to the rest of their work. That curious combination of divine sovereignty as both essential and rare is 
not uncommon in recent, mainstream US systematic theology and ethics. For instance, “an aura of neglect hovers over the theological 
notion of providence; and yet in fact many of the clearest voices in contemporary theology make the doctrine central to their work.” 
See Philip Ziegler and Francesca Murphy’s introduction to The Providence of God: Deus Habet Consilium, ed. Francesa Aran Murphy 
and Philip G. Ziegler (London; T&T Clark, 2009), 1. The same neglect can be said of divine sovereignty in general, as does James S. 
Spiegel, The Benefits of Providence: A New Look at Divine Sovereignty (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2005), 9. The centrality of divine 
sovereignty can also be found in less doctrinally systematic or discussions, like political theology. See for examples: Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, Sovereignty: God, State, and Self (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Antonio González, God’s Reign and the End of Empires, 
ed. Rafael Luciani, trans. Joseph V. Owens (Miami: Convivium, 2012). Divine sovereignty in contemporary US systematics is most 
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not let the reformed terms of their debate set my project. See for examples: Paul Helm, The Providence of God (Downers Grove, IL: 
InverVarsity Press, 1993); Dennis W. Jowers, ed., Four Views on Divine Providence (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011). Others 
address sovereignty, directly or indirectly, through the issues of process, immutability, impassibility, and/or providence. But in the 
milieu of recent, mainstream US systematic theology and ethics, there are only a handful of recent volumes dedicated to the doctrines 
of divine impassibility or providence, with the latter often in terms of the doctrine of creation but sometimes in terms of the Word. See 
D. Stephen Long and George Kalantzis, eds., The Sovereignty of God Debate (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2009); Thomas G. Weinandy, 
Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000); Hugh J. McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012); Alexander S. Jensen, Divine Providence and Human Agency: Trinity, Creation, 
and Freedom (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014); Darren M. Kennedy, Providence and Personalism: Karl Barth in Conversation with 
Austin Farrer, John MacMurray, and Vincent Brümmer (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2011); Terry J. Wright, Providence Made 
Flesh: Divine Presence as a Framework for a Theology of Providence (Milton Keynes, England: Paternoster Theological 
Monographs, 2009). A list of works on divine sovereignty would balloon if one were to cite historical and biblical theology; however, 
I will forgo doing so in the interests of space and scope. 
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description of lordship, to varying degrees, in trajectories other than as God ‘lording 
over’ creation.412 
 Their re-descriptions occur in points three and four, which are, respectively, 
God’s creative work and divine providence. In the former, God is sovereign as the one 
who is the source of creation and who brought creation into existence. In the latter, 
providence, God continues to sustain creation and to oversee creation’s development. 
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas have a transcendent and immanent, creative and redemptive 
understanding of divine sovereignty. They refuse to make God subject to ontology while 
they emphasize God’s sovereign work as undergirding the existence of the cosmos and 
overseeing the transformative growth of humanity. But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ 
about the details. Although Dorrien and Hauerwas will make appeals to grace and love 
respectively, for the most part Dorrien stresses Spirit and love, while Hauerwas 
emphasizes Jesus and particular grace. Those differences are the focus of what follows 
about Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s understanding of divine sovereignty. 
 Fifth, divine sovereignty determines both human subjectivity, in terms of 
ontology (e.g., nature and creaturehood), and human agency. Both Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s accounts of human subjectivity revolve around relations among human 
																																																								
412 I also emphasize re-descriptions of lordship because of, on the one hand, my own sympathies for feminist insight. On the other 
hand, I agree with Dorrien who “do[es] not accept the verdict that Christian kingdom language or Christianity itself is unredeemable 
for feminism” (SS, 19). For instance, Dorrien defines “the Kingdom of God” in terms “commonwealth” and “kin-dom”––the latter two 
Dorrien uses as synonyms (Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 25). Commonwealth recovers the 
social gospelers, and kin-dom attends to Ada María Isasi-Díaz, the late mujerista theologian. While Dorrien fits better than Hauerwas 
with the feminist reconfiguration of God’s kingdom, I will show that Hauerwas construes Jesus’s non-violent peacemaking as re-
defining lordship itself. That re-definition and Dorrien’s own position, I will note, at least implicitly parallel ecofeminists’ constant 
emphasis on a metaphor of care. Even though ecofeminists tend to identify God with the Earth in order to avoid a hierarchical 
relationships of dominating abuse and anthropocentrism, maternal earth-care can be a kind of cultivation to characterization of God’s 
sovereign agency. So the issue of cultivation that will be focused on in my main argument. Horstkoetter, “Getting Back to Idolatry 
Critique,” 89-93; Ada María Isasi-Díaz, Mujerista Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), 166 n. 9; Aruna Gnanadason, 
Listen to the Women!: Listen to the Earth! (Geneva, Switzerland: World Council of Churches Publications, 2005), 96-103; Aruna 
Gnanadason, “Yes, Creator God, Transform the Earth!: The Earth as God’s Body in an Age of Environmental Violence,” Ecumenical 
Review 57, no. 2 (2005). 
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beings because God’s sovereign relating to humanity in turn shapes human relations. 
Both Dorrien and Hauerwas understand the divine relation to humanity in terms of love 
and grace. But, again, Dorrien focuses on love and Hauerwas on particular grace.  
 In the next few sections, I will explicate Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s latent 
understandings of divine sovereignty framed in terms of God’s creating and shaping 
relation to humanity. I show how those understandings are characterized by Dorrien’s 
and Hauerwas’s respective emphases on love and particular grace. But first, the 
distinctiveness of Dorrien’s position cannot be sufficiently appreciated without noting the 
middle to late twentieth-century shift in liberal theology. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s life 
and assassination marked respectively the climax and collapse of two of liberal 
theology’s three wings: the social gospel, which carried on evangelical liberalism, and 
personalism, which provided the metaphysical backing for the social gospel. Process 
theology, the third wing and heiress to the Chicago school, was all that was left. That puts 
into relief Dorrien’s critique of Whiteheadian process theology ultimately construing God 
as the highest and most exemplary being or “creative process,” but still as “subject” to 
process nonetheless.413 So when faced with a choice of giving up God’s goodness (love), 
omniscience, omnipotence, or immutability/impassibility, process theology often gives 
up the latter implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, despite the distinction between “God’s 
primordial nature” as immutable and “God’s consequent nature” as mutable.414 While 
Dorrien does not directly address impassibility or omniscience in his constructive work 
																																																								
413 Dorrien, MALT, 3: 63-65; Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine,” 43. See also Dorrien, MALT 3:75-76, 87, 352, 538; Dorrien, 
“Dialectics of Difference,” 269; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 16. 
414 Dorrien, MALT, 3:65, 248. See also ibid., 64, 73, 75-76, 78-79, 85, 193, 198-199, 233, 249, 352. While those citations support the 
text above, in them one can also see the distinctions and complexities of various figures in process theology besides simply Alfred 
North Whitehead. Some process theologians give up goodness or omnipotence as a solution to theodicy (ibid., 130-131, 234-238). The 
same issues of divine finitude and mutability can be said of some personalists (Dorrien, MALT, 2:319-320). 
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directly and nor will I do below either, he nevertheless breaks from process because of 
divine freedom. It is crucial, then, to establish the importance of divine sovereignty in 
Dorrien’s position and to show how he develops it with his account of loving Spirit. The 
development of his position provides the ground for the subsequent, more direct 
engagement between him and Hauerwas on God’s sovereignty and creation. I explicate 
Hauerwas on divine sovereignty partly because his reliance on it needs to be supported, 
but also partly because divine sovereignty’s character of gift has been under-recognized. 
Gift is a significant golden thread in Hauerwas’s unsystematic web. The triune God is the 
one who gives particular gifts; human existence starts with gift; human creatures exist 
through gift-giving; and gift runs accordingly to the end of Hauerwas’s ethics. Only then 
can I proceed to a more thorough account of their understandings about human 
subjectivity and agency in terms of intra-human relations as they are framed by 
humanity’s relation to divine sovereignty.415 
II. Dorrien on Divine Sovereignty 
 Dorrien’s account of gospel-centered personal Spirit (God) relating to spirit 
(humanity) is predicated on the sovereignty of love, the universality of Spirit, and the 
universal category of spirit. Most of these issues were raised in chapter one, but they 
were only briefly noted. They were not explicitly brought together, nor were they framed 
by sovereignty. I argue here that Dorrien’s articulation of panentheist, personal Spirit as 
																																																								
415 For the rise of process theology, see Dorrien, MALT, 3:5-6, 8, 29, 133, 145, 149-154, 158, 514; Dorrien, SEM, 323; Dorrien, “The 
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Cartwright, review of Hauerwas: A (Very) Critical Introduction, by Nicholas M. Healy, Christian Century, Jul. 9, 2014, 39; 
Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar, 70, 126, 218, 237-238; Wells, Transforming Fate into Destiny, 2, 91, 156-157, 174-175. 
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love is the source of existence and shapes it. The following is a brief stipulative overview 
of Dorrien’s framework before I develop it. 
 The Spirit is not a being nor is it subject to process. Spirit is the source of 
existence, and Spirit works within historical process because underneath all existence is 
the category of spirit. With the Spirit as source of and its activity in human spirit, there 
are three aspects to ontology: being, nonbeing, and becoming. The Spirit’s oversight of 
these aspects is part of how the Spirit is sovereign. Spirit is the creative source of being, 
Spirit is greater than the void of nonbeing, and Spirit guides human becoming through the 
dialectic of being and nonbeing. This ontological typology and account of the Spirit’s 
sovereignty are not possible without an account of love. Being is made possible by love. 
Here love is the Spirit’s openness to difference from itself, that is human beings and their 
autonomy. Love has no exact corollary to nonbeing itself; however, love is in the Spirit’s 
creative work between being and nonbeing to guide human becoming. Love is the Spirit’s 
caring endeavor undergirding humanity’s development. Spirit calls humanity to love on 
the one hand, and on the other hand Spirit affirms human autonomy rather than violates 
it. In light of human autonomy, loving Spirit begins by laboring impersonally within the 
consciousness of humanity. Impersonally here means a non-personal presence. The 
Spirit’s impersonal work in human consciousness is how human beings apprehend that, 
nonetheless, their autonomous nature involves existing in mutual relations. Humanity can 
then realize that its development towards freedom is achieved through relations 
transformed by living in love’s openness and care. This pattern is typified by the Spirit’s 
personal, spiritual work in Jesus. Finally, then, humanity can begin to see its absolute 
dependence on personal Spirit. So love is essential to the Spirit’s sovereignty and 
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humanity’s developing existence. Love is openness both to others and to their autonomy. 
Love is also caring work for them to achieve free flourishing through the development of 
autonomy-in-relation to others. 
 Now to support my claim about the sovereignty of Spirit-love in Dorrien’s 
theology and to show the details of Dorrien’s framework. I begin with his understanding 
of divine freedom in terms of creative, universal Spirit. This places God above process 
while still the source of being. Dorrien can hold such a position because he understands 
the Spirit in both personal and impersonal terms: as love (personal) and universal 
(impersonal). This is also the ground for God working in process to transform it. 
However, Dorrien’s understanding of nature and grace ultimately places love before 
grace in order to make room for human autonomy, a point which will contrast sharply 
with Hauerwas. I then note that a spiritual perichoresis between divine Spirit and human 
spirit undergirds Dorrien’s understanding of transformation. Divine Spirit is sovereign, 
for Dorrien, because its universality and its creative love are the source of humanity and 
its means of transformation. In light of all this, then I can return to the issue of divine 
freedom. 
Divine Freedom, Creativity, and the Apophatic Turn 
 Dorrien combines gospel, process, and personal Spirit for a kind of panentheist 
God who ‘exists’ in an “immanent transcendence,” always related to the world, but with a 
mysterious transcendent “more.”416 That framework is an account of divine sovereignty 
because, informed by two divergent schools of thought, Dorrien joins immanence and 
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transcendence with divine creativity and freedom. On the one hand, Whiteheadian 
process theology’s emphasis on the creativity of God and the development of matter 
affects Dorrien’s view of immanence. On the other hand, Barth’s rejection of human 
attempts to control God affects transcendence. Dorrien’s dialecticism is not evenly 
weighted here. Although process theology has outlived all other schools in liberal 
theology, Dorrien is not a fully-fledged process theologian because he ultimately leans 
toward Barth’s stress on transcendence (divine freedom) over process theology’s 
reductionary emphasis on immanence. God is transcendent “power” over “being,” that is 
life or existence, and over “nonbeing,” that is both death/nihil and potential.417 Yet, 
Dorrien’s affirmation of divine transcendent power and his rejection of God “subjected to 
process” are why Dorrien can maintain divine immanence active in process.418 God is the 
creative source of being and is creatively at work in-between being and nonbeing for 
humanity’s “becoming.”419  
 This account of God’s sovereign transcendence undergirds issues raised in chapter 
one. Dorrien’s critique of God’s participation in process being subject to ontology or 
process is the ground upon which Dorrien simultaneously embraces and relativizes the 
modern world view. Chapter one also noted that Dorrien attributes his apophatic reserve 
to Barth’s influence. But Dorrien can still incorporate process because his monism 
																																																								
417 Dorrien, MALT, 3:520; Dorrien, WTM, 229, 238; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269; Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine.”  
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269-270; Dorrien, “The Lure and Necessity of Process Theology,” 318; Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine,” 43; Dorrien, “The Crisis 
and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 14-16; Dorrien, “Theology in a Liberal, Post-Kantian, Postmodern Spirit,” 45. 
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describes God as “the ultimate ground of all categories, not merely all that is excellent or 
surpassing.”420 This indicates that ultimately undergirding Dorrien’s apophaticism is a 
complex fusion. He combines Barth’s understanding of divine freedom and the early 
Hegel’s construal of Geist that privileges negation. However, there is also tension in that 
Barth-Hegel fusion. Although Dorrien asserts divine freedom, his normative accounts 
have not addressed an implicit necessity of divine relation to humanity in accounts of 
panentheist monism. But the issue of necessity can only be addressed in light of answers 
to other questions. How exactly is Spirit creatively the source of and involved in process 
but not subject to it? And how is human subjectivity understood and incorporated?421 
Love and Spirit; Personal and Impersonal 
 Dorrien has yet to give his own robust and detailed account of Spirit. But he has 
indirectly through his historical work on and his normative appeals to Nels F. S. Ferré. 
Dorrien’s descriptions of both his normative position and Ferré’s work track not only 
theme for theme, but often even word for word. So here I delineate their position often 
through Ferré but still connected to Dorrien. However, there is some difficulty in 
delineating what is to come. Dorrien rightly describes that “Ferré's academic works were 
long on spinning concepts out of concepts.”422 Dorrien’s historical interpretation of Ferré 
is clearer but it and Dorrien’s brief, normative appeals to Ferré still follow the conceptual 
pattern. That propensity combined with––and in fact due to––their apophatic reserve can 
lead to some rather abstractly vague accounts. What “metaphysical audacity” that can be 																																																								
420 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 269-270. 
421 Ibid., 270; Dorrien, KRHS, 12-13, 500-502; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47, 49. 
422 Dorrien, MALT, 3:46. 
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articulated is limited by “apprehending…indirectly,” by seeing “through a glass 
darkly.”423 So the following must be faithful to their idealist language of S/spirit. For 
them loving Spirit, personal and impersonal, is how God is universally and creatively 
sovereign over and through process. I begin with love and then address S/spirit, personal 
Spirit, and impersonal Spirit. These connected issues together form an account of the 
Spirit’s sovereignty and the ground for its relation to humanity.424 
 In Ferré’s parlance, “God is sovereign love.”425 “Love is ultimate” because, as 
agape, divine “love is a self-existing and self-directed form of energy” that is both the 
																																																								
423 Dorrien, MALT, 1:377-378; Dorrien, MALT, 2:306; Dorrien, SS, 17; Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, “Idealism, Divine Reality, and 
Realism,” 46. Of course the quote about glass is Dorrien quoting 1st Corinthians 13:12 (SS, 17). 
424 Dorrien, MALT 3:39-57, 538; Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 188; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 49; 
Dorrien, “Making Liberal Theology Metaphysical,” 243; Dorrien, “Theology of Spirit,” esp. 4; for Dorrien matching Ferré word for 
word, see below; Nels F. S. Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 261 n. 19. 
 Depending on whether one is reading the earlier or later Ferré, or at least in the way Dorrien summarizes Ferré’s thought, 
the ultimates of love and Spirit appear to be privileged over the other in some ways. The early Ferré stressed that God is love, but 
Ferré also held that God is love should also be understood as God is Spirit (Dorrien, MALT, 3:45). However, the later Ferré focused on 
more the universality of spirit and Spirit, in which he included love. That blazed a trail upon which Dorrien’s Spirit-Christology 
travels. I follow this developmental flow in my main argument. But in reference to Ferré’s earlier development, I include Ferré’s later 
work as support in reference to love partly because I need to compress Ferré’s position and partly because Dorrien finds Ferré’s later 
work so alluring. Ferré’s The Universal Word “was a revelation to [Dorrien]. It renewed [Dorrien’s] suppressed conviction that a 
liberal Logos theology can be the basis for a compelling theology of universal faith and world religions” (Dorrien, “Response to Ralph 
Ahlberg,” 188). But they are even more similar than Dorrien lets on. In order to see Ferré and Dorrien’s striking similarity, I have 
italicized the repeated words in the quotes below. But even many of non-repeated words have, as the reader will see soon, can be quite 
similar. Dorrien summarizes “Ferré’s usual themes” as: “God is creative and personal Spirit, motivated by love; the incarnate Word is 
the God of personal love and the all-inclusive Spirit; love is the final meaning of spirit and the personal; the spirit of cooperation must 
replace all forms of individualism and authoritarianism; creation is a pedagogical process that stretches into eternity; eternity is the life 
of divine love; being is not the best ultimate, either as substance or process; theology must move beyond the categories of substance 
and process; and spirit is the most inclusive and universal ultimate” (Dorrien, MALT, 3:54; “Theology of Spirit,” 26; “Making Liberal 
Theology Metaphysical,” 243). For Dorrien’s normative theological position: “Instead of privileging the categories of being or 
process, one might privilege the fluid, dynamic, and yet ultimate concept of spirit, and within that concept the categories of personality 
and love, interpreting experiences of the Holy as expressions of universal Spirit” in MALT, 3:538-539 is preceded by an appeal to 
Ferré and begins a brief account that Dorrien has truncated elsewhere. “God is creative and personal Spirit, motivated by love; Jesus is 
divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in him; love is the final meaning of spirit and the personal; evil is the lack and 
nihilating negation of the flourishing of life; a passion for social justice and the flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the 
divine light; spirit is the most inclusive and universal ultimate; eternity is the life of divine love” (“Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and 
Liberal Necessity,” 55). Dorrien also restates his theology as: “God is creative and personal Spirit, the transcendent holy mystery of 
love divine; Jesus is divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in him; love is God’s very self in action, the lure of feeling and 
ultimate meaning of spirit; evil is the lack and nihilating negation of the flourishing of life; a passion for social justice and the 
flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the divine light; spirit is the most inclusive and universal ultimate; eternity is the life of 
divine love” (Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22). 
 There are others who maintain similar themes as Ferré’s variation on Hegelian personalism, like Douglas Clyde Macintosh, 
Andrews Seth Pringle-Pattison, and William Temple. The relation between Ferré and the Boston Personalist school is more 
complicated because the latter, in Ferré’s judgment, often privileged spiritual personality rather than personal spirit, as will be 
addressed later. Dorrien, MALT, 2:237-256, 307; Gary Dorrien, “Imagining Empirical Theology: D. C. Macintosh, Epistemological 
Realism, and the Chicago School of Naturalistic Empiricism,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2003); Dorrien, 
KRHS, 386-393, 425-426; Dorrien, “Hegelian Spirit in Question,” 9-11; Dorrien, DSV, 33, 42-43. 
425 Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 219; Dorrien, MALT, 3:46. 
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source of other’s distinction and the unconditional orientation toward the other.426 This 
initial understanding of love is about God in se and pro nobis. For Ferré, “God is love” 
because God is known in God’s “personal,” “creative,” and transformative love.427 This 
outgoing love begins with divine love as “the ‘category of categories.’”428 Divine love 
unifies the category of personality, which is “purpose or meaning,” with the category of 
spirit, which undergirds “being and nonbeing.”429 Love’s injection of purpose into the 
relation of being-nonbeing creates a directed form of becoming, a new existence. So the 
sovereignty of divine love is twofold. First, love is about openness for and to the other. 
That is, love recognizes the distinction between subject and object, and love is the subject 
open to the object. From this follows, in terms of the Spirit’s openness to being, the 
difference of being itself. Second, love is caring work for the other’s flourishing. From 
this follows, in terms of the Spirit’s care for being, the development of being 
(becoming).430 
 Throughout the different variations of personalism, personality is “centered on the 
metaphysical primacy of consciousness.”431 However, Dorrien opts for Ferré’s minority 
position within personalism that rejects the primacy of personality. Ferré does so partly 
because “two personalities can[not] occupy the same place at the same time either in 
																																																								
426 Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 17; Dorrien, MALT, 3:44. See also Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 65-67; 
Nels F. S. Ferré, The Universal Word: A Theology for a Universal Faith (London: Collins, 1970), 49, 64, 110, 121, 136, 140, 146-147, 
160-166; Dorrien, MALT, 3:40-43. 
427 Dorrien, MALT, 3:44-45. 
428 Ibid., 44. 
429 Ibid., 46. See also ibid., 44-45; Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 17; Ferré, The Universal Word, 125. 
430 Dorrien, MALT, 3:45-46; Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 22-24, 54, 63-76, 116-117; Ferré, The Universal Word, 110, 
152-153, 161-163, 373; Ferré, The Christian Understanding of God, 32; Ferré, The Universal Word, 116, 153, 160-162, 166. 
431 Dorrien, MALT, 3:11. See also Dorrien, MALT, 2:305, 308. Personality can be difficult to define further in part because it was made 
intentionally broad: “A movement person to the end, [Albert C.] Knudson was willing to define personalism broadly enough to 
include realist-leaning theists like Georgia Harkness in the movement” (Dorrien, MALT, 2:353). Edgar S. Brightman offered a 
succinct definition of personality: “a self-conscious unity of self-experience; a person is a conscious unity” (ibid., 323). For a more 
detailed account, in terms of “individuality,” “consciousness,” “will,” and “self-control,” see Ibid., 325. 
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physical or in psychic space.”432 But this issue implies a further problem. When he asserts 
that “God is not even a thinking and acting substance,” Ferré is rejecting “a ‘separate 
Personality’ concept of God modeled on the supreme being of classical theism.”433 So for 
Ferré, the primacy of personality is still bound by the limits of “substantialist 
metaphysics,” despite claims to the contrary––some correct and some not––by the Boston 
school personalists.434 To avoid these problems of personality, Ferré construes love in 
terms of personal, which is “self-conscious, nonspatial purpose.”435 The immediate 
difference between personal and personality is “adjectiv[e]” and noun, respectively.436 If 
personal was not “qualitative” but instead quantitative, it would still be bound to some of 
the same substantive baggage of personality that would limit the extent to which 
panentheist Spirit permeates being.437 So what “quantitati[ve]” non-spatial, non-thing is 
personal modifying?438 Ferré and Dorrien need something else to make love a 
thoroughgoing universal, to stress the interrelatedness within the Whole, to strengthen 
their account of process, and to avoid anthropomorphizing or limiting God to radical 
immanence.439 
 For Ferré and Dorrien the answer is monism: God is Spirit and the general 
category of spirit. The Spirit is the most basic form of divine reality, Spirit is the source 
of existence, and the category of spirit encapsulates the whole of reality. There are three, 
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related implications in this framework. First, Spirit is universal as “the ultimately 
inclusive ultimate.”440 Second, the ultimate ground of each human being is ultimately 
spirit, not material being. Third, Spirit relates to humanity in spirit. Ferré rejects 
idealism’s conventional “subject-object relation.”441 He argues instead for “Subject-
subjectobject and Subject-subjectobject relations” that are “in one dimension identical” as 
S/spirit, “and in the other distinct” as Spirit and spirit.442 
 Divine Spirit and human spirit as such is effectively what I will call the 
“similarity of spirit.” By similarity of spirit I mean that, on the level of spirit not being, 
God and humanity are equalized in terms of type, spirit, but are distinguished in terms of 
capacity or ‘existence’ (infinite Spirit-finite spirit), origination (Spirit the source of 
spirit), and “nonsubstantial personal awareness.”443 This framework shares affinities with 
both analogy and univocity of being without being wholly either because the category of 
spirit is not being but rather the ineffable, monistic ground of everything. One can see the 
similarity and dissimilarity of analogy within the differentiation of capacity/existence and 
origination. In fact, I presume that Dorrien would want to argue for greater dissimilarity 
since he “take[s] for granted that [his] concepts do not correspond univocally to divine 
reality or any reality.”444 Dorrien appears to take that reserve a step further as he does 
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443 Ferré, The Universal Word, 181. See also ibid., 55-56, 116, 134-135, 140, 148-153, 170, 252, 285; Dorrien, WTM, 239. 
444 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46. 
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with his readings of Barth rejecting analogy of being and opting for “dialectical 
reasoning” to the end of his life.445 Framed by the latter, recall that Dorrien’s apophatic 
reserve qualifies but does not keep him from re-mythologization. He gives of an account 
of God and humanity as divine Spirit and human spirit in those terms precisely because 
they are incomplete concerning the fullness that is God and humanity. Can something 
then be said? There is a correlation between God and humanity that is, for the same 
reason, not adequately described by the univocity of being. The level of spirit is supposed 
to be about the relationship between God and humanity that is rooted in a panentheist 
monism, that is partially realized now in human consciousness, and that will be fully 
actualized non-spatially in the eschaton on the level of spirit. But that account of 
relational “coinherence” between divine Spirit and human spirit situates both as a 
fundamentally similar type (or in Hegelian terms, “essence,” and in Ferré’s “the essence 
of sameness”) on the level of spirit in order to delineate a “contrapletal” panentheism in 
monist Spirit.446 I will return soon to the issue of Spirit-spirit’s coinherence and human 
development therein.447 
 For now Ferré and Dorrien join the two ultimates, love and Spirit. Ferré claims 
that “God…is Spirit. The form of Spirit is personal; the content of Spirit is Love.”448 To 
say that “God is Spirit” is a claim that everything is included in the Spirit’s infinite 
expanse.449 “Personal” emphasizes the distinctive relational nature of Spirit and avoids 																																																								
445 Dorrien, KRHS, 470. See also ibid., 471-472, 566; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47. 
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449 Ferré, The Universal Word, chp. 5. 
	 135 
some vague notion of Spirit.450 “Love” makes distinctions on the levels of spirit and 
being.451 There is human spirit and human being because love recognizes the difference 
between divine Spirit and humans as spirit and being. But also, implicitly, love is a sense 
of caring for difference as different and for its development.452  
 When it comes to universal and personal Spirit relating to spirit, love as caring 
recognizes a crucial fact. There can be interpenetrative unity between Spirit and spirit on 
the level of spirit, but not on the levels of personality or substance because, again, 
multiple personalities or substances cannot exist in the same space. To avoid Spirit 
overriding the psychic space of human spirit, Ferré’s solution is not only Spirit as 
personal. Divine Spirit is also “present impersonally or semi-personally in man’s moral 
urges and the workings of conscience” (e.g., intellectual intuition) in order to protect 
spirit’s distinctive difference and its autonomy from overbearing Spirit.453 So God is 
present personally to humanity as loving Spirit and present impersonally in humanity as 
impersonal Spirit directed by love. This “contrapletal” framework is how love, even 
though it is personal, can be universally present.454 
 Dorrien’s normative accounts emphasize personal Spirit because it is the heart of 
Spirit. But even though Dorrien himself never explicitly employs the framework of 
impersonal Spirit, it is still necessary to his normative position for a number of reasons. 
Here it is worth noting that Dorrien matches Ferré’s construal of impersonal Spirit and 
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the autonomy of spirit’s difference. On the one hand, Dorrien describes the ground of 
intellectual intuition as “anything that I think or do is ultimately God thinking and acting 
through me.”455 On the other hand, Dorrien seeks to maintain humanity’s autonomous 
subjectivity in a dialectical relation with humanity’s absolute dependence on panentheist, 
loving Spirit who is over being and nonbeing.456 
Humanity’s Dependence and Autonomy;  
the Spirit’s Apophatic Grace and Cataphatic Love 
 Dorrien has long held to an epistemology of God’s universal accessibility to 
humanity through spirit’s experience of love and its rational reflection on it. Dorrien does 
so to keep divine sovereignty from overriding human autonomy. This has led him to 
ultimately emphasize love over grace to the point that grace, gift, or any other synonym 
rarely makes an appearance in Dorrien’s constructive theology. He privileges love and 
down plays grace for three reasons.457 
 First, Dorrien’s opting for universal accessibility to God leads to rejecting 
cataphatic revelation in Barth. Dorrien notes Barth’s understanding that “truth is grace” 
means that truth is only known through grace.458 Dorrien also recognizes the problem 
Barth saw in idealism: “If theology is to remain grounded in God’s revelation, then the 
idealist is going to have to dampen his ardor for a generally accessible truth, and to join 
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forces with the realist.”459 But Dorrien’s answer is to emphasize idealism’s universalism 
and reasoning rather than to accept a full-blown realism or Barth’s cataphatic articulation 
of grace. Humanity perceives its “absolute dependence” on God through socialized 
intellectual intuition and speculative reason, not so much through receiving cataphatic 
grace from an external authority.460 So in Dorrien’s constructive theology, humanity’s 
intellectual intuition and speculative reason apprehend that the nature of God is personal 
Spirit and love. Dorrien appears, then, to do away with grace. Yet, there is still room for 
Barth’s emphasis on grace in an apophatic frame. 
 Second, Spirit’s universality and humanity’s finitude makes grace largely a 
spiritual and ontological reality that proceeds from an epistemology about the spiritual 
reality of divine love. Years before his publications on Ferré, in 1997 Dorrien used 
Barth’s apophaticism and theology of the Word to construct a Spirit Christology. The 
Spirit is both hidden and universally known through its gracious work of spiritual self-
revelation and transformative love in one’s mind and the concrete world. This 
constructive account emphasized many of Dorrien’s later hallmarks. The 1997 difference 
is that Dorrien actually wrestled with the issue of grace.461  
 Grace appeared to ground his constructive theology because of his debt to Barth’s 
apophaticism. However, like Ferré, Dorrien also had reservations about Barthian grace. 
Barth’s truth-grace relation led to “a rather contrived and reductionist definition of myth” 
as “biblical ‘saga,’” in contrast with “monist mythologies of other religions and 																																																								
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philosophies.”462 Instead, similar to Ferré, for Dorrien grace is necessary because of 
human finitude and God’s transcendence. But grace as such is largely an apophatic 
‘revelation’ about the mystery of God’s hiddenness. Dorrien recently expressed his 
apophatic reserve in terms of grace: “Even if one begins with the given reality of God, 
the truth about God’s reality is not given.”463 Rather, grace illuminates in human 
consciousness the hiddenness of God, the transcendent ineffability of Spirit. But recall 
that Dorrien’s apophatic reserve does not negate “metaphysical audacity.”464 In 1997 he 
stresses that God is Spirit truly known only on the level of spirit. Dorrien characterizes 
that Spirit later in terms of personal, loving Spirit. So in love the Spirit is open to human 
spirit. Therefore, the net effect of an apophatic grace and cataphatic love makes grace a 
product of love.465 
  This production of grace by love can be seen even in Dorrien’s explicit 
articulation of grace in the positive. Love is “life-giving.”466 Grace as such is one 
component of the Spirit’s universal love, which grounds Dorrien’s fight for justice and 
human flourishing. Such love and grace are also the reason why Dorrien proclaims that 
“we are not in control. It is not up to us to fulfill God’s will for the world. In drawing 
closer to God we are thrown into work that allows others to share in the harvest, and that 
is enough.”467 So in love the Spirit cares for human spirit by nurturing humanity’s 
																																																								
462 Ibid., 236. 
463 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47. 
464 Ibid., 46. 
465 Dorrien, WTM, 235-236, 238-239, esp. 236 and 239; Dorrien, MALT, 3:538-539. 
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development in love. Grace, therefore, issues forth from love, the Spirit’s universal 
openness and care. 
 Third, for Dorrien, if love is to be “life-giving” for human development, then 
grace is shaped by human autonomy. Dorrien seeks to protect human autonomy from 
overbearing divine sovereignty in a way that overlaps with Ferré’s contention that Spirit 
relates impersonally to spirit. Dorrien contends that R. Niebuhr undercuts the liberation 
brought by autonomy because his stress on divine grace and sovereignty over determines 
humanity. In contrast, Dorrien’s understanding that “God is the lure of love divine” 
parallels his summary of Alfred North Whitehead: “God lures us to make creative, life-
enhancing choices, but God does not negate our freedom to make choices.”468 Emphasis 
on the “lure of love” and “choices” might not seem consistent with an account of grace, 
but the space for the freedom to choose is Ferré’s account of grace. Ferré construes divine 
grace as “God withdraws” God’s personal presence to be present only impersonally in 
humanity so that humanity can use its “God-given capacity” to make choices.469 If Spirit 
were personally present in spirit, that would compete for the psychic space in human 
consciousness.470 
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Spirit Christology as Spiritual Perichoresis,  
and a Return to Divine Freedom 
 How then do Spirit and spirit relate? On the basis of the universality of both Spirit 
and the category of spirit, Ferré supercharged the relation between loving Spirit and spirit 
into a relation of interpenetration transforming spirit. The Spirit as personal and 
impersonal works on all levels of love––agape, eros, and altruism––and unites them 
together. This unity initially brings the human spirit’s erotic and altruistic love in line 
with Spirit’s agape, but the result exceeds the initial conclusion. A “Spirit-coinherence,” 
the “interpenetration of Spirit and spirit,” makes a new existence in human spirit: “co-
subjects” with Spirit as modeled by the adoptionist “picture” of Christ.471 The 
“coinherence,” the “perichoresis” of Spirit and spirit in spirit, is a theology of spiritual 
transformation in continuity with intellectual intuition about Spirit.472 In other words, this 
perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is a “spiritual” perichoresis because the perichoresis of 
Spirit and spirit is at the heart of Ferré’s description of Christian spirituality.473 The 
perichoresis of Spirit and spirit is Ferré’s understanding of the incarnation in contrast to 
what he judges are Chalcedon’s idolatrous problems of substance and Hegel’s 
overbearing Spirit.474 
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 Dorrien’s Spirit Christology is in fundamental agreement with Ferré’s framework 
above. The ultimacy of Spirit and its love of all is the “universal Word,” which is 
“normative truth” for Ferré and Dorrien; indeed, the universal Word is at the heart of 
Dorrien’s Spirit Christology.475 In particular, Dorrien affirms Ferré’s account of spiritual 
coinherence and his apophatic concern about Chalcedonian ‘idolatry’ obscuring the truth 
of Spirit, when Dorrien writes “Jesus is divine by virtue of the fullness of God’s Spirit in 
him.”476 That is the heart of Dorrien’s Spirit Christology. What can be said about “the 
triune mystery who has power over the void,” is that “the presence of Christ’s Spirit calls 
for ongoing transformation in the form of life-giving works of love. The Word becomes 
true myth in order to redeem all history through ongoing transformations of the human 
spirit.”477 So both Ferré and Dorrien develop a similar pneumatology of sovereign love 
that creatively relates Spirit and human spirit. Ferré and Dorrien’s goal is also similar: the 
transformation of humanity into a new existence like Christ, despite how incomplete 
humanity’s faithful work may be. “God is the lure of love divine for creative 
transformation and the flourishing of life.”478 Specifically, since Dorrien’s theology seeks 
to be faithful to the truth and since that is about living in the Spirit as Christ did, “a 
passion for social justice and the flourishing of life is the best sign of living in the divine 
																																																								
475 Dorrien, MALT, 3:54. See also ibid., 538-539; Dorrien, WTM, 239; Dorrien, “Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 188; Ferré, The 
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476 Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmoderinty, and Liberal Necessity,” 55; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 
22. See also Dorrien, MALT, 3:538-539; Dorrien, WTM, 238; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47; Dorrien, 
“Response to Ralph Ahlberg,” 188. 
477 Dorrien, WTM, 229, 238; Dorrien, “The ‘Postmodern' Barth?,” 342. 
478 Dorrien, “The Lure of Love Divine,” 43. 
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light” of sovereign love.479 But that raises the issue of intra-human relations in love to be 
taken up later.480 
 With spiritual perichoresis as a capstone to the whole framework of S/spirit and 
love, an issue concerning divine freedom can be raised in full. For the latter, trouble 
occurs in his cataphatic account of S/spirits’ interrelationality and love. To construe God 
as Spirit and humanity as spirit assumes an inherent connection between Spirit and spirit 
and between spirit and spirit from the beginning. Without that connectivity, God is not 
Spirit or the Whole, humanity is not spirit in the whole and Whole, and so the category of 
spirit is not itself. Love is crucial here since it makes the distinction between Spirit and 
spirit, and in turn, love establishes a panentheism rather than a pantheism. But even in 
that distinction, love is an internal distinction on the level of spirit. Love cannot achieve 
an articulation of what grace in its negative inflection does: divine freedom. “If God is 
not free from us in some way that makes God’s power transcend the world, God cannot 
be free from us in our suffering and mortality. God cannot sustain life beyond death if 
God’s transcendence does not include power over nonbeing.”481 But in that apophatic 
framework is also an implicit characterization of divine freedom, here specifically 
election, analogous to what political liberalism calls negative freedom. While such a 
claim may seem tenuous in light of only the quote, my claim is one specific way of 
developing Dorrien’s deep sympathy for the larger apophatic vision of Meister Eckhart, 
																																																								
479 Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal Necessity,” 55; Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 
22. See also Dorrien, MALT, 3:538-539; Dorrien, WTM, 238; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine 
Commonwealth,” 25-26. 
480 Dorrien, MALT, 3:56; Dorrien, SS, 375; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 26; 
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who “refused to apply the names of the Father, Son, and Spirit to the ‘God above 
God.’”482 For instance, Dorrien still holds to thrust of those two quotes above, even 
though the first was in 1997 and the second was in 2009; however, other points 
surrounding Dorrien’s position seems to have changed. Whereas in 1997 he held to 
“triune mystery who has power over the void,” by 2014 he asserted that “all thinking 
about God is inadequate, a mere pointer to transcendent mystery. …Even if one begins 
with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.”483 The latter 
quote explains why, in 2009, Dorrien overlooked Karl Rahner’s dictum that the economic 
Trinity is the immanent Trinity and vice versa in order to include Rahner in the list of 
“apophatic mystics” crowned by Eckhart. 484 Yet it is one thing to maintain an apophatic 
emphasis. It something else entirely to privilege apophaticism in such a manner that 
undoes an account of the Trinity and to employ a metaphysical audacity that over time 
replaces the Trinity with “creative and personal Spirit, the transcendent holy mystery of 
love divine.” 485 In other words, Dorrien’s construal of grace in the negative sets forth an 
apophatic account of divine freedom. Such ineffable mystery he supplements then with a 
cataphatic account of experiencing loving Spirit. The latter account he affirms 
unabashedly in terms of agency pro nobis but more tentatively in terms of in se because 
of divine freedom in the negative––the mystery of “I AM.” 486  																																																								
482 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 260. See also ibid., 261. 
483 Dorrien, WTM, 229; Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 47. See also Dorrien, WTM, 5, 231-233, 236-239.  
484 Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 260. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (N.p. Herder and Herder, 1970; repr. 
New York: Continuum, 2001), 22, 46, 50-51, 99-100. There is further difference between Dorrien and those who follow Rahner. In 
terms of gift and for soteriological ends, Catherine LaCunga employs Rahner’s understanding that the immanent and economic Trinity 
are the same. Chapter two addressed Dorrien on grace, and I will return to it below. Catherine Mowry La Cunga, God for Us: The 
Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), chp. 7, esp. pp. 210-213. 
485 Dorrien, “The Crisis and Necessity of Liberal Theology,” 22. See also Dorrien, “Liberal Method, Postmodernity, and Liberal 
Necessity,” 55. 
486 Dorrien, “Ideality, Divine Reality, and Realism,” 46, 49. Although I do not think Dorrien sees problems where I do, I believe that I 
have truthfully described Dorrien’s position. But if his normative position has not shifted, at least his publication record has shifted 
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Response from Hauerwas’s Position 
 Hauerwas has not explicitly addressed Spirit Christologies, has rarely addressed 
personalism, and has only once mentioned Ferré. But a response can be derived from 
what he has written about love. Hauerwas emphasizes love’s priority in the sense that 
God is love, that God commands humanity to love, and that humanity is oriented to God 
by love characterizing friendship and ordering the virtues. But Hauerwas rejects most 
approaches to the primacy of love. They produce a vague, if not sentimentalized, notion 
of love without truth because they often abstract love from its particular triune and 
“cruciform” definition in order to maintain the human individual’s autonomous 
agency.487 There is persuasive evidence that Dorrien’s emphasis on truth seeks to avoid 
sentimentalizing love, but there is warrant for a potentially devastating response by 
Hauerwas on his terms. As chapter one showed, abstraction creates Christological 
problems. Hauerwas argues that “love, justice, or some other monistic principle as all-
determining for ethical rationality and judgment” reductively replaces particularity with 
																																																								
from Spirit/monism with still a trinitarian configuration––in such as his The Word as True Myth and his review of Jesus, Humanity 
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generic universality.488 That replacing is a “spirituality” which ultimately supplants Jesus 
with self-creation for self-interests under the guise of human experience.489 Dorrien’s 
Spirit Christology would then be a problematically “weak Christology” in Hauerwas’s 
view.490 But for Hauerwas, “Jesus is not the teacher of love; rather, he is the the herald of 
the Kingdom whose life makes possible a new way of existence.”491 
 That allusion to Jesus as the autobasileia is not the same as spiritual coinherence. 
Yet the new life that he gives is one of love since, for Hauerwas, “Jesus’s Lordship is 
exercised as a rule of love that prohibits the killing of the neighbor.”492 That “love is 
deeper and more profound than the evil we find in the world.”493 Then how might 
Hauerwas’s position be better distinguished from Dorrien’s account of love? One might 
continue to try in terms of abstraction and particularity since Hauerwas articulates love as 
friendship and stresses the “concrete fleshy” particularity of Jesus as constitutive of 
Christian love.494 But the details make differentiating Dorrien and Hauerwas more 
complex. For Hauerwas, Jesus’s love is a self-“dispossessed,” “nonviolent apprehension” 
in openness to all that shows the truth of God’s gracious openness to and care for the 																																																								
488 Hauerwas, IGC, 172. See also Hauerwas, DT, 174-175; Hauerwas, VV, 120; Hauerwas, WT, 25. 
489 Hauerwas, STT, 118. See also ibid., 117; Hauerwas, AE, 179-180; Hauerwas, DT, 178; Hauerwas, US, 86-88; Hauerwas, VV, 31-33, 
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494 Hauerwas, US, 87. See also ibid., 88; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 44-48, 105-106; Stanley Hauerwas, Cross-Shattered Christ: 
Meditations on the Seven Last Words (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2004), 87-88 (hereafter CSC); Hauerwas, PK, 90-91; Hauerwas, VV, 
115-117. Ronald Stone’s more recent but dated criticism missed Hauerwas’s point about the importance of love and it in particularity. 
Ronald Stone, Prophetic Realism: Beyond Militarism and Pacifism in an Age of Terror (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 130. 
	 146 
other.495 That description of love simultaneously shares with Dorrien a similar 
characterization of love and indicates another difference alongside the issue of 
particularity. Hauerwas argues that love should not only be intimately connected with 
truth, but also with gift. Love requires the concepts of truth and gift in order to be 
intelligible. For the relation between love and gift: “love is a gift.”496 Accordingly, I will 
contend that love proceeds from gift for Hauerwas, in contrast to Dorrien’s account of 
gift proceeding from love.497 
III. Hauerwas on Divine Sovereignty 
 Hauerwas claims that he has not “abandoned the central Christian contention of 
the priority of God’s grace.”498 Hauerwas also “ha[s] no intention of qualifying the 
necessity of God’s grace for the beginning, living, and end of the Christian life.”499 Those 
quotes raise this chapter’s thesis, that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s respective 
positions and their differences is divine sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency. 
So it is instructive to show their differences in light of their similarity over the 
relationship between God’s sovereignty and human existence. In Dorrien’s position 
above, God’s determination of humanity occurs in two relational forms. God as the 
source of being asserts in less traditional terms that ultimately God is the creator of 
human subjects. God also determines humanity by God’s impersonal relation indirectly 
shaping humanity towards the goals of transforming humanity and of humanity 																																																								
495 Hauerwas, PK, 81, 91. See also ibid., 85-89, 105, 144-146. 
496 Hauerwas, WwW, 140. See also Hauerwas, VV, 114, 117. 
497 Hauerwas, AE, 117-118; Hauerwas, VV, 114, 118, 120. 
498 Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
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perceiving personal Spirit. A similar point about the relationship of God’s sovereignty 
and humanity is at the heart of Hauerwas’s work. Hauerwas’s claim, that “the triune God 
is the origin and ultimate goal of all things,” is much like Dorrien’s way of framing the 
broadest relationship of God and humanity.500 But Dorrien and Hauerwas differ over 
significant details. Dorrien’s non-Chalcedonian Spirit Christology is grounded in the 
universality of spirit and sovereignty of love. For Hauerwas, Jesus-autobasileia reveals 
that the triune Creator, through the divine economy of particular grace, creatively 
determines the cosmos as creation and redemptively transforms human creatures together 
into friends of God. In turn, Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s different characterizations of 
divine sovereignty, I show later, shape different understandings of intra-human relations. 
These differences, linked together, issue forth dramatically divergent responses to 
political sovereignty in the next chapter.501 
 Here I will begin by contrasting Dorrien’s ultimates of Spirit and love with the 
heart of Hauerwas’s portrayal of divine sovereignty in Jesus and in gift. Then I will 
demonstrate Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s differences on how Jesus reveals God, how Jesus 
relates to creation, how God is free, how Hauerwas rejects the nature and grace 
distinction, how God’s relationship to humanity shows God’s sovereignty, and how 
Hauerwas understands the goal of God’s relating to humanity. By addressing those 
issues, I conclude, the heart of Hauerwas’s work is a theology of the trinitarian God who, 
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as gracious creator, positively determines humans to be creatures that are redemptively 
shaped in the particularity of God’s gracious work past, present, and future.502 
The Particularity of Jesus, Gift Preceding Love 
 Whereas Dorrien personalizes the generalized universality of Spirit, for 
Hauerwas, Jesus in the particularity of his life, death, and resurrection fully reveals the 
distinctiveness of God’s sovereignty. God rules and redeems in Jesus on a “cosmic” 
scale.503 For Hauerwas, Jesus’s life and work as the autobasileia is God’s distinctively 
particular but still universal invitation for humanity to participate in God’s kingdom. 
Because Jesus the autobasileia is the truth, the living God incarnate, he reveals “to us 
how God would be sovereign.”504 Humanity comes to understand in Jesus that humanity 
is determined by gift instead of death, since “our existence and the existence of the 
universe itself is a gift” from the “Lord of the universe” upon whom all creation 
depends.505 Further, the cosmic character of Jesus’s lordship “totally reconfigured” what 
kingship means in contrast to and over-against sovereignty predicated on the fear of 
chaos and death.506 Divine kingship is sovereign not by coercion or violence, but through 
the gift of Jesus’s self-dispossessed openness to those considered outsiders or enemies 
“because God has valued ... all life.”507 The cosmic character of Christ’s revelation makes 
the rule universal and it redefines sovereignty. 
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 Dorrien’s understandings of the creative, universal Spirit and the sovereign love 
are no less than cosmic. But how he gives that account is based on the correlation 
between the primacy of love as openness and an epistemology of God’s universal 
accessibility to humanity. This ground leads Dorrien to construe gift predicated on love. 
Hauerwas, however, makes love a function of gift because Jesus’s kenotic openness is a 
gift, because love is the Holy Spirit’s gift, and because humanity’s learning how to love 
is accordingly dependent on having been given it and reciprocating it in a particular 
community. The difference on the relation of love and grace may seem to be nothing 
more than a chicken versus egg dichotomy. But this disagreement undergirds other 
differences to follow.508 
The Sovereignty of God’s Particular Grace Framing Creation and Divine Freedom  
 Contrary to Dorrien, Hauerwas has consistently rejected any natural theology not 
beginning with the particularity of Jesus. Hauerwas does so because he argues from the 
primacy of Jesus’s lordship over creation to a trinitarian basis of creation. Against 
abstraction, Hauerwas refuses to “separate” both creation and human knowledge of it 
from “Christ’s lordship”: “the cross determines the meaning of history”; “Jesus is the 
resurrected Lord of all creation”; “in Christ’s bodily resurrection nature and history are 
made forever inseparable.”509 With Jesus as Hauerwas’s focus, he maintains that Jesus is 
indicative of the Christian confession that there is no creation apart from the triune 
creator. The alternative, which results from abstracting God as creator from Jesus, is a 
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theistic or deistic divinity that causes the natural world. God as such is then used to 
“underwrite an autonomous realm of morality separate from Christ’s lordship.”510 In that 
case, nature names what can exist independently of God. But Hauerwas’s understanding 
of particular grace resists this for two reasons.511 
 First, Hauerwas’s theology of God’s cosmic politics is a graced creational 
theology rather than Dorrien’s more natural-spiritual theology of love. Hauerwas rejects 
the nature-grace distinction insomuch as he understands the sovereignty of Jesus as lord-
creator in terms of gift-giving. Simply put, “life” both “belongs to God” and is “God’s 
free gift.”512 Grace is, therefore, clearly determinative of ‘nature’ for Hauerwas; the 
issues are why and how. He rejects the modern bifurcation of “human knowledge of 
God” as either “from ‘the bottom up’ ... [or from] ‘the top down’” because that created an 
“ahistorical” split between ‘nature’ and grace.513 Instead the two can only be understood 
in “mutual interpenetration,” based on the “analogical and historical ordered uses of 
language by which God’s relation to God’s creation is articulated.”514 So Hauerwas and 
Dorrien both have an account of “mutual interpenetration” or perichoresis respectively. 
But whereas Dorrien frames the elevation of being (nature) into spirit (‘supernatural’) 
through love, for Hauerwas both ‘nature’ and revealed grace are “set within the purview 
of God’s ‘grace-full’ dominion.”515 That is, Jesus reveals that God’s sovereign work of 
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creating a world with a God-given eschatological telos is just as much a gift as God’s 
sovereign redeeming of creation. So instead of the ‘nature and grace’ distinction, 
Hauerwas writes in terms of creation and God’s cosmic kingdom, for God generated 
creation in grace and continues to relate to it in grace.516 
 Second, Hauerwas’s understanding of divine freedom is found in the gracious 
character of God’s determinative reign. Hauerwas argues that creation is dependent on 
the triune God by siding with a Thomistic-Barthian account of divine freedom and 
rejection of method on a cataphatic basis, rather than an apophatic basis as in Dorrien’s 
apophatic reserve. Hauerwas’s cataphatic basis is the link between God acting out of 
divine freedom and that act as fundamentally gift. God freely gives God’s self, and 
thereby gives creation, because kenotic giving open to difference is a given extension of 
the triune life. Through God’s self-gift, God freely gives and determines “time and 
space” (e.g., “creatio ex nihilo”), which includes humanity and “human history.”517 God 
cannot be “judged by an external standard to God” (e.g., method).518 Instead, “life is 
God’s” gift, and life is redeemed in the gift of God’s kingdom-time, not in attempts of 
human self-creation like at Babel that refuse God’s gifts.519 For Hauerwas, then, divine 
sovereignty is God’s free and gracious rule that determines and redeems creation, 																																																								
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revealed in a cosmic politics of particular grace. This gift established creation, saved the 
world in Jesus, and continues to work salvation in human history. Hauerwas’s 
understanding of the God-human relation relies on this account of particular grace. 
Accordingly, his configuration of the God-human relation contrasts sharply with Dorrien 
and Ferré’s account of the interpenetration of Spirit and spirit.520 
Human Creatures and Agency, Divine Sovereignty 
 as Gardener, and the Trinitarian Economy 
 Dorrien and Hauerwas both configure divine sovereignty over creation in terms 
other than lordship, but their configurations differ from each other. Hauerwas 
understands lordship in terms of divine creating and a particular kind of “providential 
care” that embraces the difference in substance by maintaining the creator-creature 
dynamic.521 Since “God is Creator, eternal Lord of all,” human existence and contingency 
are a result of being creatures––dependent subjects––growing within the gift of God’s 
story and time.522 That emphasis on God as creator is one way of situating the creator-
creature relation in divine sovereignty. But both the relation and sovereignty cannot be 
separated from particular grace. Human beings are “contingently constituted” as God’s 
creatures because Jesus’s lordship is realized as gift.523 The importance of particular 
grace is seen in the relativization of human aspirations. Creaturehood extends to all 
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humans; anything less is “bondage.”524 Or said another way: “any account of agency that 
excludes the givens of our life, which often come in the forms of gifts, is insufficient.”525 
 Hauerwas’s description of humanity’s creaturehood presupposes an account of 
greater distinction than similarity between God and humanity. Hauerwas describes as true 
“the…profound inequality” between God’s “infinite” sovereignty and “God’s flawed, 
finite creatures.”526 So on the one hand, Hauerwas’s rejection of the univocity of being 
can be understood as similar to Dorrien’s contention that God is over both being and 
nonbeing. On the other hand, Hauerwas’s account of human creaturehood subordinates 
humanity to God more fully than Dorrien’s dialectic in the similarity of spirit. Yet the 
inequality and subordination of creature to creator does not disparage or undermine 
creation’s difference. Creaturehood is a good for it is God’s way of accepting humanity’s 
God-given “otherness.”527 
 Hauerwas’s emphasis on God’s gift of otherness in terms of creaturehood 
indicates God’s creative grace. Creative grace is just as much a gift as God’s redemptive 
grace because both kinds of grace are fused in Jesus, in whom God draws close to 
humanity as self-gift. Gift in the form of particular intimacy marks a major difference 
from Dorrien position on divine gifts as God’s personal withdrawal in order to give space 
for human choice and as God’s work as luring humanity to make choices for flourishing. 
This difference of relation is reflected accordingly in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s 
understandings of divine sovereignty. Dorrien eschews any account of divine sovereignty 
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that overwhelms human autonomy. But for Hauerwas, such conceptions of autonomy 
result in “serving any powers but the true one” and rejecting “loyalty to the truth” 
inherent in creaturehood.528 Even God’s disrupting of Babel was a gift so that humanity 
could realize its creaturehood. Might that example of gift look like God ‘lording’ over 
humanity? Perhaps from Dorrien’s position. Yet for Hauerwas, divine intervention is 
God’s gift for cultivating humanity.529 
 Hauerwas holds that “Jesus has totally reconfigured kingship” by inverting the 
established power structures and that he has reconfigured politics by establishing his 
alternative.530 Since Jesus’s reconfiguration was achieved through the gift of his kenotic 
“care” for humanity, Hauerwas maintains that lordship is not the only metaphor for God 
as sovereign creator.531 In fact, an “almost exclusive concentration on kingship and rule” 
is problematically narrow.532 In order that “images of God’s care of and love for 
creation” will reshape the images of “‘kingship’ and ‘rule,’” Hauerwas suggests 
“horticultural images and descriptions as gardening and vine dressing,” as well as “ the 
profoundly central pastoral image of shepherding.”533 Admittedly he rarely writes 
explicitly about God as a gardener or shepherd. But easily complementing themes like 
gardener or shepherd, Hauerwas consistently emphasizes human development under 
divinely directed friendship. God’s given direction and time makes possible friendship 
among human creatures, and humanity’s obedient friendships fulfill its God-given telos 
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to become friends of God. Thus, for human creatures to be is to be under the gift that is 
God’s caring rule.534 
 For Hauerwas, the doctrine of creation is one way that Christianity describes God 
as “pure act, an eternally performing God” who created creation and continues to relate to 
creation.535 But describing God as such is inseparable from an account of the Trinity. 
That emphasis on the Trinity provides a crucial contrast not just to Dorrien’s account of 
Spirit since, for Hauerwas, Trinity means that God is not “generalized spirit,” even as 
personal Spirit.536 Dorrien’s emphasis on the sovereignty of love before grace is reversed 
by Hauerwas, for love is defined in terms of “self-giving.”537 In other words, the fact that 
friendship with God is the Good depends on the fact that God’s gifts stem from the 
Trinity.538 
 Recall how Dorrien creatively appropriates Barth in order to assert that “even if 
one begins with the given reality of God, the truth about God’s reality is not given.”539 
Hauerwas takes note of Barth’s apophatic inclination, but within that there is for 
Hauerwas a cataphatic basis by way of seeing speech-acts in the traditional ordo 
cognoscendi. The gift of Jesus, pointed to and supported by the gift of the Holy Spirit, 
reveals the triune giver. The truth of the incarnation and of the Holy Spirit (missio) is an 
invitation to friendship that reveals the triune God whose internal life is “self-giving” 
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(processio).540 That is, the different trinitarian persons embrace and maintain distinction-
in-unity through loving self-gift and reciprocating in kind.541 
 The Trinity’s difference-in-relational unity is, in turn, the source of God’s 
establishing and accepting creaturely difference. Since the triune economy is one of 
eternal “overacceptance” and “reincorporation,” the economy is one of “overflowing 
plenitude” without end.542 Proceeding from that abundance is the gift of creation’s 
difference. God then extends further gifts to creation as an invitation for a positive 
response from creation to participate in the triune life. Jesus’s resurrection overcoming 
death showed “God’s refusal to accept the loss of any difference” both in se and pro 
nobis.543 So the triune economy of difference and unity in gracious relation is, for 
Hauerwas, the way God establishes, sustains, and redeems creation.544 																																																								
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 The issue of particularity notwithstanding, Dorrien could affirm much about such 
trinitarian difference since love establishes difference. In fact, Trinity is the image of 
love-difference in unity for Ferré. The disagreement between them and Hauerwas arises 
out of their differing accounts on the God-human relation in terms of love or gift 
respectively. When this difference is set within how God accounts for humanity’s 
subjectivity and agency, the flashpoint is the concern about God overriding human 
autonomy in Ferré’s and Dorrien’s terms, or coercively consuming humanity in 
Hauerwas’s terms.545 
 Remember that for Ferré and Dorrien, Spirit is personal but it graciously 
withdraws its personal aspect and relates impersonally to spirit in order to affirm the 
autonomy of spirit (difference). This construal of grace as negative freedom is ordered by 
the Spirit’s love of the openness and care for humanity. The Spirit’s openness and care is 
manifest in its personal work with and impersonal work in human consciousness and 
relations so as to transform human communities into images of God’s love.  
 On those terms, Hauerwas’s understanding that the Trinity joins ‘personal’ and 
universal in a way that affirms differences such as human freedom without the need to 
construe God impersonally. For Hauerwas, the triune distinction between the persons in 
relation is both the source of difference and the reason why difference is peaceably 
present rather than coercively consumed in God. Accordingly, Hauerwas has emphasized 
triune difference because the positive relationality between triune persons reveals how 
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God acts in unity. But mostly Hauerwas emphasizes the triune economy in relation to 
human agency.546 
 God hospitably makes room for human participation through the church, a 
community of recipients of grace who reciprocate it with one another in friendship. Gift 
for intimacy, then, is the life blood of God’s economy. But also consider the ways that 
God’s invitation to “shar[e]…God’s very life as Trinity” makes humans creatures free in 
the process of transforming them into friends of God.547 Humanity is free when it is 
“constituted by more determinative practices of” God’s “peace,” love, and truth, rather 
than the world’s violence and lies.548 From the gift of divine forgiveness, humanity learns 
to forgive and live peaceably within God’s forgiving work. In that work “wrongs” and 
“resentments” cease to determine the identities of individual humans, communities, and 
all of human history.549 Such forgiveness and human agency is under the gift of not only 
God’s direction but also God’s time, which I will take up soon.550 
A Response from Dorrien’s Position 
 Dorrien’s deep sympathy for process and ecofeminism could affirm Hauerwas’s 
horticultural understanding of divine sovereignty. There is also warrant for some overlap 
between Hauerwas and Dorrien on participation in the triune life. For Dorrien, both 
intellectual intuition and the pursuit of justice participate with the Spirit; and he has 
called God “triune mystery” on a rare occasion, even though he may have since left 																																																								
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Trinity behind.551 Yet there still remains a sharp contrast between Hauerwas on the Holy 
Spirit and Dorrien on the Spirit. Hauerwas’s emphasis on Jesus’s particularity not only 
shapes a pneumatology that “point[s] to Jesus.”552 The Holy Spirit is also present today 
“so that Jesus might continue to be present with us.”553 In contradistinction to that 
Christological pneumatology, Dorrien’s prioritization of the Spirit construes “the way of 
Christ” in terms of “Christ’s kingdom-bringing Spirit.”554 Dorrien further maintains that 
it is the Spirit present today, ordered by sovereign love, that works for transformation. 
The framework of Spirit relating to spirit has an inherent, positive openness to both 
autonomous spirit and the Spirit’s work in the world. This framework thereby opens 
attention to the interrelatedness of humanity and to its the transformation. So from 
Dorrien’s perspective, Hauerwas’s emphasis on particularity is an exclusive claim that 
drives a church-world distinction and that, in turn, eschews a constructive relationship 
between church and world.555 
IV. From Divine Sovereignty to Intra-Human Relations 
 In order to complete my argument about divine sovereignty and human 
subjectivity and agency in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions and disagreement, I will 
show how they understand that God’s determining of humanity is realized within intra-
human relations. Dorrien and Hauerwas have a deep sense of humanity’s interrelatedness 
that creates and shapes human subjectivity and agency. But they differ on the character of 
human interrelatedness because of its dependence on and relation to divine sovereignty. I 
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will argue that Dorrien sees a dialectic in human subjectivity, which I call “autonomy-in-
relation.” Human spirit is autonomous, but also a human spirit is interrelated with other 
human spirits within the Whole. I delineate the dialectic as a metaphysical account at 
work in humanity’s material existence. I then argue that Hauerwas’s account of human 
subjectivity and agency is determined by the gifts of God’s time and tempo. In order for 
human creatures to be representative witnesses of God, God gives time and direction that 
requires humanity’s patience and obedience. That divine determination and human 
contingency are necessary for human creatures to develop their interrelated mutuality into 
friendship. 
 The immediate material differences in their understandings of human subjectivity 
and agency are as follows. Dorrien’s democratic political economy is a framework of 
interrelation that serves the liberative equality necessary for flourishing in freedom. For 
Hauerwas, human freedom occurs in and serves friendship. These differences in their 
political arrangements fit their differing accounts of divine sovereignty. Dorrien’s love, 
his openness and care, for the mutual and free flourishing of human spirits matches his 
understanding of loving Spirit uniting all while ensuring spirit’s autonomy. For 
Hauerwas, the triune God’s gracious, cosmic politics orders and develops friendship in 
human creatures so that they may become friends of one another and of God.  
V. Dorrien on Human Subjectivity and Agency as Autonomy-in-Relation 
 The beginning of this chapter established that Dorrien understands human 
subjectivity as autonomous spirit in relation to personal Spirit. The complexities of that 
personalist-Hegelian position, focused this time on human subjectivity and agency, are 
worth a short exploration in order to frame in terms of spirit and love the subsequent 
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account of Dorrien’s position on intra-human relations informed by sovereign love. What 
can be derived from the Spirit’s relation to spirit is a framework of human subjectivity 
and agency where autonomy and relation are not only connected, they are essential to one 
another. 
 The Spirit’s life-giving love is the source of, and respect for, human autonomy. 
The latter humanity apprehends and achieves on the basis of loving relationships attentive 
to autonomy. But even if human autonomy is its own end in one way, it is not originally 
self-generating. Here Dorrien’s apophaticism employs two forms of reason. The first, in 
the terms of Paul Tillich and Ferré, is “‘ecstatic reason,’ the eschatological, mystical 
experience of being grasped by the unconditional.”556 This sense of human finitude in 
relation to ineffable mystery is why Dorrien, like Ferré, frames “the personal and moral 
in terms of spiritual aliveness.”557 The concept of personality would over-define human 
consciousness and Spirit as well as control their relation. But the human as personal spirit 
acknowledges a ‘space’ for the spiritual presence of transcendence “immersed in world 
process” and the creative possibilities therein.558 Therein, on the one hand, “[hu]man as 
spirit is basically the capacity for freedom.”559 That is, “freedom is self-determination, 
the power to become a self through finite choices” in both “concrete realities” and 
“imagined realities.”560 But on the other hand, one’s “openness to Spirit becomes 
sensitivity to the world.”561 Accordingly, the personalist variation of Hegelian spirit is 
related to human development in light of a second form of reason, the framework of 
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Hegel’s socialized intellectual intuition. Through one’s own free choices in relation to 
another, a person develops from an isolated self-consciousness (“spiritual personality”) to 
a distinctive person in loving relation (“personal spirit”) toward the whole.562 The latter, 
“personal spirit,” is both “the image of God” and the telos of humanity.563  
That conclusion raises two issues. First, the conclusion is what Ferré called 
“unimunity.” 564 He merged “unity” and “community” to describe “the richest possible 
variety of difference” “perfectly coinhering” within the multidimensionality of Spirit; 
Spirit, in turn, “penetrates and partakes of all personal entities.”565 This unimunity is love, 
“where the self is always fully included but never at the expense of the other.”566 
Unimunity as such is just as much about the common good and a new community as 
unimunity is about the image of God and the telos of humanity. Second, unimunity 
confirms the importance of divine sovereignty. The process of realizing freedom through 
relation allows one to ultimately perceive that one’s autonomy is in absolute dependence 
on the Spirit’s life-giving love.567  
Dorrien does not give a metaphysical account of human as spirit, as spirit relating 
to spirit, nor such a metaphysics connected to material existence. However, essential to 
Dorrien’s account of intra-human agency is not only self-determination and choice, as I 
will show below. But also in parallel to Ferré’s account of unimunity, Dorrien’s employs 
John Cobb’s work on “mutual transformation” for the common good in racial, national, 
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imperial, economic, environmental, and interfaith issues. 568 To address these emphases 
of both autonomy and relation, I will develop what I call a framework of autonomy-in-
relation: both the recognition of the inherent autonomy in each person and the work to 
achieve their autonomy depend on relations attentive to human autonomy and to 
communities within the Whole. When it comes to Dorrien’s work, autonomy-in-relation 
is present in humanity’s concrete reality shaped by the Spirit’s love. Thereby Dorrien’s 
political economy for the common good charges through the door opened by Ferré and 
their forbearers: Kant, Hegel, and the social gospelers.569 
The Common Good: Free, Equal Self-Determination in Free, Equal Choice  
 Dorrien holds to human autonomy and agency in terms of freedom as equal self-
determination through the free and equal capacity to choose. Freedom as such is a 
common good, and to achieve it, individual rights are “foundational.”570 That is the 
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political fruit of Kantian autonomy which Dorrien assumes within his social gospeler call 
for “a democratic transformation” to economic democracy.571  
For him, “democracy has to do with the character of relationships constructed on 
the principles of freedom and equality.”572 Yet rampant economic and social inequality 
makes impossible equal self-determination through free and equal choices. So Dorrien 
argues for his liberal interpretation of the common good, stating that “the principle of 
equality is central, and [that] there is no equality of individual opportunity without 
approximate equality of condition.”573 Key to achieving the latter is Dorrien’s vision of 
economic democracy. It “is about giving substance to the principle of self-determination 
for all people. It extends this principle across all sectors of social existence, including 
racial and sexual justice, and refuses wars of empire and aggression, forging a common 
ground for social justice movements.”574 That makes economic democracy, Dorrien 
proclaims, “the system most compatible with human freedom.”575 Freedom gives 
economic democracy the logical ground to be about self-determination and therefore 
choice.576 
 The point of economic democracy is to pragmatically realize choices that are 
broader and more substantive than offered by banal capitalism. Economic democracy 
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itself is an alternative choice to “neoclassical theory [that] promises but does not deliver” 
on “choices for workers.”577 Critically, both kinds of choice together apply “a brake on 
human greed and domination” by resisting the exploitation of the worker.578 Positively, 
both choices together not only make possible, but are also themselves the kind of 
“creative, life-enhancing choices” which “God lures us to make.”579 The principle of 
equal self-determination through free and equal choices is a common good; self-
determination and choices in equality are necessary for each individual to freely 
flourish.580 
The Common Good: Together 
 But as the issue of democracy indicates, the principle of choice is “co-constitutive 
of the self’s being.”581 Drawing from Gregory Baum, Dorrien maintains that “each person 
needs others to become oneself; every person comes to be through dialogue and 
communion with others.”582 The same can be said for the common good, it “emerges 
through discussion and struggle.”583 When both choice and relation are transposed into 
the frame of democracy, “robust democracies”––which are themselves relational––“seek 
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to maximize freedom and equality for all people.”584 Dorrien’s vision of economic 
democracy follows accordingly. As if to fulfill Ferré’s emphasis on concrete and 
imagined realities, Dorrien maintains that economic democracy’s “imagining [of] new 
forms of social and economic organization…is fundamentally about creating concrete 
and viable new democratic choices.”585 So freedom is gained by autonomous persons 
(spirit) in and through mutual, “deliberative” relation with other, immediate autonomous 
persons (spirit) and the broader, social whole.586 That is autonomy-in-relation, a version 
of Hegel’s socialized intellectual intuition where the focus is human subjectivity and 
agency in community and for freedom. But Ferré’s frame helps better illuminate two 
important points about spirit relating to spirit within Dorrien’s work.587 
 First, recall that unimunity is about love as the recognizing of and caring for 
distinction within the whole. In accordance with autonomy, Dorrien’s attention to love 
means recognizing (openness) and securing (care) the human dignity of free self-
determination and choice for all. Dignity as such must accordingly be secured politically 
and economically, even though dignity is a position about what is natural to human 
consciousness. But love’s emphasis on the individual also has a social dimension. 
Dorrien situates self-determination for the liberation of the marginalized within the larger 
whole of the common good. He argues that a “decentralized,” economic democracy puts 
into practice the liberal principle of equality, which he correlates with proleptically 
																																																								
584 Dorrien, EDE, 281. 
585 Ibid., 179. 
586 Dorrien, OQ, 221. 
587 Ferré, The Universal Word, 168. 
	 167 
realizing the biblical vision of the eschatological banquet.588 Dorrien fights for liberative 
common good because he, like other social gospelers and personalists, sees other 
individual persons and communities within the Whole. That fight and recognition is 
socialized intellectual intuition in response to the Spirit’s agape at work. Like 
Rauschenbusch, R. Niebuhr, and many other liberal theologians and ethicists, Dorrien 
understands love as the force that calls humanity to recognize the dignity of all persons, 
to fight for their recognition, and to sustain those in that struggle. So the Spirit’s love in 
openness and care shapes Dorrien’s understanding of human relations in mutual 
recognition.589 
 Second, aspects of this autonomy-in-relation framework are directly related to 
economic democracy. Dorrien’s economic politics of inter-connective subsidiarity is, I 
claim, effectively spirit relating to spirit. In terms of intellectual intuition as an 
interrelated whole of reality, economic democracy collectively situates individuals within 
the whole. Or this framework stated in economic terms, economic democracy unites 
collectivism and freedom for the common good. That re-statement is precisely how Ferré 
frames economics in terms of unimunity for the common good. How does this break from 
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Hegel? Rather than Hegel’s account of the greater good depending on a slaughter-
“altar,” Dorrien holds to the common good.590 There is no self-determination and 
liberation without mutual interrelation creating an “approximate equality of condition.”591 
 Economic democracy is autonomy-in-relation that achieves the common good of 
liberative equality for freedom. Economic democracy privileges the principle of equality 
by fusing co-working and co-owning in cooperatives. What is necessary, Dorrien argues, 
is democratic transformation achieved through democratization and localization of 
investment and power in the community, in the workplace, and in the banking structure. 
He maintains a special focus on unionization and production since community enterprises 
and worker ownership usually take the shape of local cooperatives, union movements, 
and economic rights. As for the “mutual fund or public bank enterprises” of social 
ownership and investment, Dorrien has always put forward Sweden’s Meidner Plan.592 
But he also includes cooperative firms or networks, like Mondragon, and state owned 
banks, like North Dakota’s state bank.593 
Multiple Levels: Local and Global 
 The emphasis on communities such as local cooperatives, unions, and worker-
owned corporations also assumes relations among communities in their local, societal, 
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and global contexts. So autonomy-in-relation must accordingly expand, or scale up, to 
include communities and their relations. Or as stipulated earlier, human communities are 
within the Whole (everything-in-relation within Spirit). Otherwise, the autonomy-in-
relation framework would parallel “a religion that lacks…a sense of the Spirit of the 
whole,” which “does not interest” Dorrien.594 And going hand in hand with a vision of 
the Whole is the pursuit of social and economic justice. So justice endeavors for the 
common good expand accordingly. How Dorrien does so is in the link between economy 
and ecology.  
 Dorrien’s vision of economic democracy, focused on the community for the 
common good, cannot be separated from economic democracy’s service to ecotheology. 
His work for democratic transformation is partly to resist the “turbo capitalism” that 
consumes people and natural resources as if they are in infinite supply.595 The ecological 
turn is key to understanding Dorrien’s concept of subjectivity. Ecology maintains Kant’s 
international scope by expanding and further characterizes Hegel’s horizon of 
interconnectivity between spirit and spirit. This multivalent horizon of humanity’s global 
reality develops autonomy-in-relation. To transpose it into an ecological frame, the 
common good of equal relations qualifies free choice when private ownership is placed 
over against equal self-determination.596 
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 Eschewing the anthropocentrism of the self-determined subject, ecotheology 
begins with the principle that to value life means recognizing the finitude and 
interconnectedness of reality. In unchecked global capitalism, most of humanity loses 
finite, natural resources for the unsustainable benefit of a select “few” who act as if “the 
destructive aspects of its activity [are] somebody else’s problem.”597 This greed is 
economically driven. But that structural evil is “at war not only with the world’s natural 
ecology.”598 It also fragments the global and local “social ecology.”599 In the effort to 
commodify cheap labor on a global scale, international and local relationships are subject 
to capitalist colonialism rather than the common good.600 
 To address global capitalism, Christianity “must offer a new myth of healing, 
relationality and embodiment that counters the bad myth of sovereignty and domination 
sustained by the perpetrators of the worldwide ecological crisis––ourselves.”601 
Generally, in liberalism’s terms, oppressive determination is an external force that 
violates the autonomy of human subjectivity. But the turn to ecology illuminates that 
oppression countermands a larger, social vision of the common good that the gospel 
Spirit calls Christians to work toward. The common good requires all voices, but 
oppression undercuts the common good by silencing people and communities with an 
externally determining framework. Although some aspects of the common good builds on 
Kant’s anthropology, for Dorrien, self-determination is part of achieving liberation for 
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the common good. This implies that the common good is communal and, in turn, 
relational. How can that be since self-determination is often construed as an individual’s 
act? Self-determination is also dependent on relationships between individuals who 
positively and negatively determine one another in their local environment. Self-
determination, then, is best understood not only as attending to an individual, but also to 
liberating a community’s collective voice. The latter is the necessary first step towards a 
“cooperative commonwealth.”602 Or in Ferré’s terms, unimunity liberates marginalized 
communities. The freedom and distinctiveness of the other in loving relation to another 
are realized through and bounded by the Spirit’s love.603 
VI. Hauerwas on Human Subjectivity as Interrelated Agency 
 Like Dorrien, Hauerwas holds that human subjectivity is found in relations. They 
both further stress mutual recognition for human flourishing in the common good, in 
history, and in God’s kingdom. Those affinities are partly due to Hauerwas sharing some 
common interests with Hegel’s emphases on history, teleology, and social subjectivity as 
mutual relations in-and-for freedom. At the same time, Hauerwas sharply diverges from 
this common ground because of his emphases on creaturehood, God-given time, and 
friendship. Within these similarities and differences, I will argue that Hauerwas 
emphasizes intra-human friendship framed by his account of God’s sovereignty. I begin 
by briefly establishing that human creatures are to be, for Hauerwas, representative 
witnesses of the creator through intra-human friendship. To this end, Hauerwas argues, 
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God gives time necessary for human creatures to learn how to be friends through 
obedience and patience to God’s timing. These themes, I show, mark a significant 
divergence from Hegel and Dorrien. That disagreement also exposes another, significant 
difference. For Hauerwas, friendship, not freedom, is the point of humanity. So Hauerwas 
situates human freedom as a necessary component of friendship, but freedom is 
reconfigured by friendship. Freedom is not the end result of friendship. 
Human Subjectivity as Creatures and Human Agency as Friends in God’s Time 
 Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s alternative conceptions of the relation of divine and 
human agency follow from variant ideas of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity. 
Dorrien’s Spirit relates to and transforms spirit in love. For Hauerwas, Jesus the 
autobasileia reveals that God’s particular grace determines the world’s being as creation 
and redemptively transforms the world as creatures through participation in God’s 
economy. In that account of humanity’s subjectivity as creatures, the general framework 
for Hauerwas’s understanding of human agency is friendship. Describing that framework 
as such emphasizes the often implicit themes of creaturehood and friendship in 
Hauerwas’s emphasis on the necessity of faithful embodiment in the church’s 
representative witness. There is, however, one more vital subtext that over time has 
occasionally become more visible in the sprawl of Hauerwas’s work: the triune economy 
of gift. Since I developed it earlier, here the issue is how, for Hauerwas, the triune God’s 
gifts determine human creatures for intra-human friendship. The triune God gives the 
human creatures the time for obedience and patience in accordance with God’s timing. 
After delineating the difference between Hauerwas, Hegel, and Dorrien on time, I show 
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how Hauerwas understands human freedom within friendship cultivated by obedience 
and patience. Such friendship is representative witness.604 
Human Subjectivity as Human Agency in the Gift of God’s  
Apocalyptic and Eschatological Time 
  
To develop how human representation in friendship is dependent on receiving 
God’s gifts, Hauerwas connects witness and friendship to human participation within the 
triune economy. He does so by emphasizing the economy in time rather than in a 
“timeless model.”605 Time is a particularly important issue for Hauerwas because “sheer 
contingency” without a telos “has rendered the notion of God’s rule more or less 
unintelligible.”606 To recover God’s rule in terms of time, Hauerwas employs Rowan 
Williams’s characterization of God’s gracious work as a performance that takes time like 
any music or theatrical play.607  
 Human performance in God’s play frames human participation in the triune 
economy, which in turn determines humanity’s interrelated subjectivity. Human creatures 
as representative performers move to the “gift” of God’s tempo.608 Specifically, human 
agents act through virtues in accordance with the time-filled, community told story of 
God’s work. This framework is how human creatures have room to actively participate in 
the triune economy, and thereby have agency in becoming friends of one another and of 
God. But the virtues must be learned; discipleship is process. So God gives the time 
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necessary for people to learn the virtue-filled, skilled craft of embodying peace by 
practicing under a master’s instruction. The virtues of obedience and patience are 
especially vital since human creatures participate in God’s play by moving to God’s 
tempo that “takes time” rather than by human creatures creating their own performance 
or timing.609 Thereby obedience and patience are virtues by which humanity receives and 
responds to God’s gifts of forgiveness and peace.610 
 Hauerwas’s account above offends not one but two aspects of both liberalism and 
liberal theology. First, just as Dorrien critiques R. Niebuhr, Dorrien would presumably 
worry that Hauerwas’s account of divine sovereignty and human “submission” to it 
overruns human autonomy.611 I will return soon to Hauerwas’s account of obedience 
because not only is it more complex than it may seem, but also because what contributes 
to its intricacy is another complex difference between Dorrien and Hauerwas.612  
 Second, obedience to the triune God also offends liberalism’s abstract universals 
that dismiss ‘picture thinking’ for generalized ideals to be progressively achieved. Yet, 
crucial to Hegel and Dorrien are accounts of teleology and progress that initially seem to 
operate like Hauerwas’s sense of human agency within God’s time. But for Hauerwas not 
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only is the perfecting of humanity framed as ecclesial friends on a “journey” of character 
development towards a particular theological end.613 Such maturation also occurs in 
God’s apocalyptic-eschatological time, rather than Hegel’s progressive-teleological 
vision or Dorrien’s progressive-eschatological orientation. 
 Hegel’s progressive Spirit makes time thoroughly teleological, but also, in 
Dorrien’s estimation, dangerously all-encompassing. Hauerwas’s critique of 
“metanarrative” is probably the closest he comes to paralleling Dorrien’s critique of 
Hegel.614 But unlike Dorrien, Hauerwas explicitly rejects Hegelian “presumptions that 
each tradition must share with all other traditions some final rational state.”615 Hauerwas 
also seems to reject Hegel’s teleology since it replaces eschatology with “continuous, or 
even progressive, process.”616 In contrast, Hauerwas’s appreciation of telos is more or 
less Thomistic.617 The God-given telos of all people in relation to God is to be “friends 
with God,” which is achieved by the God-given telos of intra-human relations, to be 
“friends with one another.”618 Those teloi are revealed in the incarnate and resurrected 
Jesus who “embodied” “God’s ‘grace-full’ dominion.”619 The church as human creatures 
“serving one another” in turn “serve[s]” the more immediate end of witness to “the 
kingdom of God.”620 
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 Dorrien is, however, more theologically complicated. Particularly important for 
Dorrien is the social gospelers’ hope for the eschatological kingdom progressively 
realized in their time, to one degree or another, through human cooperation with God. 
But Dorrien also breaks with their, for the most part, politically naive postmillennialism. 
Their overreaching moral rhetoric overemphasized the realization of the kingdom, and 
overestimated their work in realizing it. More careful social gospelers, like 
Rauschenbusch, recognized an apocalyptic aspect to the kingdom but also saw that “the 
perfection of the kingdom was reserved for a future epoch.”621 Dorrien similarly holds 
that human work is superseded by the Spirit’s work of completely actualizing the 
eschatological banquet in some sort of eschaton. One might construe such a vision in 
Hegelian terms of Absolute Spirit. Even if that is correct, the theological source is not 
directly Hegel. Dorrien’s embrace of Barthian apophaticism and his resistance to 
“control” history make room for some measure of transformative revelation in the new 
creation.622 But Barth is only one element within Dorrien’s much larger framework. His 
definition of liberal theology, his sympathies for transcendence in immanence, and his 
normative account of Spirit eschew a cataphatic, apocalyptic in-breaking in the 
present.623 
 Hauerwas agrees with Dorrien that God’s kingdom is already present but not yet 
fully realized. Hauerwas also argues for a transcendent “eschatological orientation” over 
an immanent yet “incomplete telos” in order to oppose liberal theology “assuming the 																																																								
621 Dorrien, SEM, 92. See also ibid., 91. 
622 Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 26. See also Dorrien, SS, 375. 
623 Dorrien, EDE, xiv-xv, 12, 14-15, 21; Dorrien, SEM, 44, 86-87, 674-676; Dorrien, SS, 19; Dorrien, WTM, 21; Dorrien, SEM, 30, 60, 
73-79; Dorrien, “Dialectics of Difference,” 270; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 25-
26; Dorrien, KRHS, 4-5; Dorrien, WTM, 239. 
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responsibility (which is clearly not theirs but God’s) of ensuring that the story comes out 
right.”624 But unlike Dorrien, for Hauerwas redemption from “self-deception…must 
come to us externally.”625 In other words, Hauerwas’s frequent argument against human 
agents attempting to control history arises from his emphasis on apocalypse in the 
present. Apocalypse reveals, Hauerwas proclaims, both “the way the world is meant to 
be” and “a time that makes all things new” in history rather than a “point outside history 
where we can secure a place to anchor our moral convictions.”626 The cross shows that 
God’s loving patience endures “our frightened and prideful refusal to worship a crucified 
savior,” while through the resurrection “the very destiny of the cosmos is determined.”627 
The conclusion of the cross and resurrection together is that Jesus’s apocalyptic 
(re)ordering of (disobedient) creation historicizes it within the story of divine history. So 
not only does Hauerwas emphasize that creation is irreducibly material and thereby 
social, as opposed to the position in which “our ability to be spirit––that is, to be more 
than our physical or biological nature––is exactly what is necessary for us to historic.”628 
Hauerwas also argues against human history reduced to a “seamless web of casual 
relations” that cannot truly change since God’s material creation has “an end” in being 
created anew that is “inaugurated” by Jesus and that is proleptically realized “at 
Pentecost.”629 Apocalypse, therefore, is the salvific revelation of and embodiment of 
																																																								
624 Hauerwas, PF, 96-97. Emphasis original. 
625 Hauerwas, WW, 166. Lest the context of the citation seems too dependent on contingency of intra-humans relations, for the 
connection of the church to an apocalyptic, ultimate realism frame, see also Hauerwas, DF, 108-110, 112-115. 
626 Hauerwas, DT, 6; Hauerwas, PK, 62, 85. See also Hauerwas, DF, chp. 5; Hauerwas, DT, 113; Hauerwas, US, 137. 
627 Hauerwas, DT, 98; Hauerwas, US, 53. See also ibid., 52. 
628 Hauerwas, PK, 35. See also ibid., 36-37, 157 n. 1; Hauerwas, AE, 183; Hauerwas, STT, 84-89; Hauerwas, WAD, 125-132; 
Hauerwas, WT, 203-206. 
629 Hauerwas, CET, 51; Hauerwas, DF, 109, 200 n. 44; Hauerwas, US, 52. See also Hauerwas, BH, 151; Hauerwas, WAD, 130-133. 
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God’s kingdom, predicated on God as the redeeming creator revealed in Jesus’s patient 
work.630 
Freedom and Interrelated Mutuality within Friendship 
 So for Hauerwas, God orders human existence by putting it in step with God’s 
particular work and timing. How does that ordering extend to intra-human relations? A 
helpful entrance to answering that question is addressing part of the next question. How 
does Hauerwas’s answer differ from Dorrien’s Hegelian informed position that 
emphasizes humanity’s free agency achieved through choice and mutual relations? An 
answer to the latter question may seem initially obvious since obedience to the triune 
God’s time countermands human autonomy and abstract universals. But the issues are 
more complex because Hauerwas holds to an account of mutual recognition between 
human beings. 
 Throughout Hauerwas’s work he appears to sympathize with what would be 
Hegel’s account of mutual recognition. The whole section of The Peaceable Kingdom 
titled “Freedom as the Presence of the Other” more or less relies on mutual recognition 
and a kind of double negation between subject and object (“other”) within community for 
character development.631 With that framework, Hauerwas’s description of love, “the 																																																								
630 Hauerwas, CDRO, 342-343; Hauerwas, CET, 48-51; Hauerwas, DF, 26 (with 200 n. 44), 108-109; Hauerwas, DT, 32, 86-88; 
Hauerwas, PK, 26-29; Hauerwas, STT, 259; Hauerwas, CET, 93-96; Hauerwas, DF, 112-113, 133-134; Hauerwas, PK, 83, 85, 88-91; 
Hauerwas, STT, chp. 20; Hauerwas, US, 71-72, 120-121. 
631 Hauerwas, PK, 44-46. Hauerwas then extends mutual recognition and double negation to address sin: self-deception, distrust, and 
violence that stem from “unbelief” (ibid., 46-49). Later Hauerwas addresses God’s response in terms of double negation: “Raising 
Jesus from the grave, God rejects our rejection” and “God uses our sin to offer us a new life, free from the fear that fuels violence,” to 
which Christianity witnesses (US, 122). That gives the appearance of leaning on Hegel’s account of double negation, which 
necessitates evil because the negative-as-foil enables growth and which turns that negating conflict into a positive position (Dorrien, 
KRHS, 205-206, 229). But Hauerwas at his articulate best does not hold to double negation since he maintains that evil is privation 
(DT, 176). God’s response is always a positive contribution––not a theodicy that rationalizes evil––because God always is and doing 
the good. Specifically in responding to sin, God still does the good, full stop. That is in spite of sin rather than re-interpret sin under 
Hegel’s progressive-teleological rubric (ibid., 85). 
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nonviolent apprehension of the other as other,” is similar in some respects to Rowan 
Williams’s embrace of Gillian Rose’s Hegelian account of mutual recognition.632 Once 
Hauerwas even employed Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in order to delineate 
Christianity’s political position as the “peasant” (non-Constantinian) rather than the 
“master” (Constantinian).633 Mutual recognition also appears in Hauerwas’s more recent 
work. He appropriates Williams’s argument that justice requires recognizing the other 
and listening to their voice as the triune “God sees us.”634 In continuity with accounts in 
The Peaceable Kingdom (1983) and After Christendom? (1991), Hauerwas even 
characterizes human agency as mutual recognition within the frame of God’s time 
(2004). Constitutive to the patience of obedient performance is the dispossessive opening 
of one’s self to another through attentive listening. This “repentant attention” is 
constituted by “reverence toward one another and receptivity to God.”635 Repentant 
attention––which is Hauerwas quoting Williams––appears awfully similar to mutual 
recognition and potentially absolute dependence.636 
 But there are major differences between Hauerwas’s view and an Hegelian view 
of recognition that significantly qualify their similar affinities, even if Hauerwas was or is 
an unacknowledged Hegelian in any strict sense. In “Freedom as the Presence of the 
Other” and the following section, Hauerwas emphasizes calling into question the 
																																																								
632 Hauerwas, PK, 91. Williams’s position on mutual recognition will be covered in chapter four and the final conclusion in terms of 
politics and the imago trinitatis, respectively. I will not be raising Rose because, against Alexander Sider’s argument for uniting Rose 
and Yoder, Hauerwas finds that employing Rose on patience and holiness does not comport with remembering “scars” and 
maintaining difference (AE, 154-155). The latter two are not the case for Williams, although I will focus on the importance of 
difference in his work. J. Alexander Sider, To See History Doxologically: History and Holiness in John Howard Yoder's Ecclesiology 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2011), 205. 
633 Hauerwas, DF, 105. 
634 Hauerwas, STT, 35. See also ibid., 36. 
635 Hauerwas, PF, 100. 
636 Hauerwas, AC, 54; Hauerwas, PK, 27, 81, 86-87; Hauerwas, PF, 100-102, 107; Williams, OJ, 200. 
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idolatrous self-deception of autonomy (sin) by the truth-telling church under God’s 
sovereign gifts.637 This indicates a break from Hegel. Hauerwas’s understanding of 
mutual recognition, in terms of repentant attention, is not about the turn towards 
interiority for achieving autonomy, as in Hegel’s development of consciousness. Rather, 
for Hauerwas, “mutual recognition” is between the particularities of bodies.638 
Accordingly, Hauerwas frames repentant attention in a public language of virtues in order 
to avoid “self-invention.”639 Obedience requires the skills of listening to and receiving 
from others; patience coheres with the play’s tempo and the other actors rather than 
violate them by attempting to satisfy one’s impatience. Obedience and patience, then, are 
active rather than passive, and they are ordered towards one another outwardly instead of 
inwardly. Obedience, patience, and openness to the other are not only markers of God’s 
time; they are vital to the gift of God’s pedagogy that forms a community into a “long-
haul” “apocalyptic people” living God’s peace.640 
																																																								
637 Hauerwas, PK, 45, 48. 
638 Hauerwas, AE, 183. In Hauerwas’s most extensive but still brief engagement with personalism, his emphasis on bodies breaks from 
personalism’s emphasis on personality (WT, 199-203). My argument concerning Dorrien in this chapter should at least question that 
he fits so easily within Hauerwas’s critique. Worth noting here is that Williams’s account of communicative bodies and rights is 
appreciatively delineated by Hauerwas after his critical engagement with personalism (WT, 203-206). 
639 Hauerwas, PF, 100. 
640 For the quote, see Hauerwas, DT, 55. For the paragraph, see Dorrien, KRHS, 188-189; Hauerwas, PK, 37; Hauerwas, PF, 100, 104, 
107. The reason for conceding the possibility that Hauerwas was or is a Hegelian in a strict sense––for the sake of argument––is partly 
because of the following. Stout argues that Hauerwas’s ecclesiology is effectively a sittlichkeit, an ethical community (Democracy and 
Tradition, 160). There is warrant for Stout’s insight, aside from Hauerwas’s strong and consistent emphasis on the church’s 
peacemaking as faithfulness to God and as witness to the world. Very earlier in Hauerwas’s work, his account of the common good 
was dependent on “politics as a moral concept” (VV, 236). That differed from “political realism” because the latter, “by denying the 
‘moralistic abuse’ failed to appreciate the real morality of the political as the creation of the common good” (ibid.). A number of years 
after that quote, shortly after critiquing Kant, Hauerwas describes agency as “locat[ing his] action within an ongoing history and 
within a community of language users” (PK, 41-42). Later Hauerwas unites virtues (ethical life) with friendship (community) as he 
rejects the privatization of virtues in order to contribute to the church on the issue of sexuality (STT, 117-121): “friendship is at the 
heart of [his] understanding of the moral life”; “an ethic of virtues…is unintelligible without friendship”; “friendship…names the 
relationship by which we become good”; “friendship...is a moral enterprise” (ibid., 108, 116). Even Hauerwas’s more recent work on 
the triune economy and God’s time appears to presuppose an ecclesiology of decentered subjects that is ethical to the extent that they 
are decentered by their faithfulness to and precise speech about the triune God’s time (see the juxtaposition between BH, 110 and 120-
122; also see STT, 150-151). In other words and in a positive inflection: “The ongoing performance of the church is God's life in the 
world, exactly to the extent that the church's own performance is of one piece with a trinitarian grammar that bespeaks a life of 
‘mutual inclusion’” (PF, 103). But besides what I address in the body of the text, there is further warrant for seeing Hauerwas as not 
so limited to Hegel. As Hauerwas stated in an interview: “I am often called a communitarian, but I think that is a mistaken description. 
I am not for a rediscovery of community as an end in itself. Such a rediscovery can be as dangerous as it can be good. Rather, I try to 
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 That obedience is, for Hauerwas, nothing short of freeing. But even then he is not 
so easily distinguished from Hegel and Dorrien, since in Dorrien’s accounts, they 
maintain in their own way an emphasis on obedience as the source of freedom. Dorrien 
stresses that Hegel’s politics was one of duty. In Dorrien’s own project, he calls for 
“stubborn types” who, as briefly characterized in chapter one and showed above, are 
being obedient witnesses in their proclamation of and work for the Spirit’s liberative 
vision.641 So how might then Hauerwas’s understanding of human subjectivity be further 
distinguished from Hegel’s and Dorrien’s?642 
 The answer is Hauerwas’s account of freedom and mutuality in friendship. For 
Hegel and Dorrien, freedom is achieved through autonomy-in-mutuality. But for 
Hauerwas, freedom is realized in the contingent mutuality of human friendships and in 
the cultivating determination of God’s invitation for friendship with humanity. Hauerwas 
not only rejects construing human freedom as self-grounded autonomy because of 
humanity’s contingency and creaturehood. He also countermands freedom as the right to 
choose since he opposes freedom “an end in itself.”643 That is, “the language of choice 
[is] facile” for Christianity because “Christian freedom” is about being given the “power” 
to act within a specific, already given narrative and under “direction from a master.”644 
So freedom is a “gift,” and it is for much more than equality necessary for all to pursue 
																																																								
help myself and others rediscover what it might mean if the church constituted our primary loyalty” (DT, 184). That loyalty is of 
course not an end in itself but a means to loyalty to God and thereby friendship with God. 
641 Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 25-27; Gary Dorrien, “Turbo Capitalism, 
Economic Crisis, and Economic Democracy,” Anglican Theological Review 92, no. 4 (2010); 666-667. For more on “stubborn types,” 
see Dorrien, EDE, 184; Dorrien, “Occupy the Future,” 16. 
642 Hauerwas, CC, 131; Dorrien, KRHS, 208. 
643 Hauerwas, PK, 8. Emphasis original. See also Hauerwas, CC, 79-83, 130; Hauerwas, IGC, 131-132, 202; Hauerwas, STT, 148-151. 
644 Hauerwas, CC, 115, 131; Hauerwas, WW, 115. See also Hauerwas, CC, 130, 147; Hauerwas, CET, 103; Hauerwas, CSCH, 148; 
Hauerwas, TT, 108. 
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their self-interests.645 In sharp contrast to an account of autonomy-in-mutuality, the 
humility of creaturehood and of relational dispossession are gifts of friendship that are 
truly freeing. Thereby interrelated mutuality comes by friendship, and interrelated 
subjectivity makes freedom for friendship.646 
 Dorrien might respond that solidarity and equality are still deeply similar to 
dispossession. He would be correct to a significant degree since friendship shares life 
with others, a “living with” that includes “suffering with.”647 But this politics of 
friendship is countermanded by racial “classification,” an inherently racist division that 
separates human friends in God’s “new creation.”648 The interrelatedness of friendship 
and the rejection of division Hauerwas extends to the church catholic when he assumes 
the importance of “Africa and Asia” for the US’s “reception of the gospel.”649 Thereby 
the church’s diasporic existence dispossess any privileged status for US Christianity.650 
 What, then, is Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference? The gift of friendship for 
human relations. Although gift is present in Dorrien’s work and friendships support his 
writing, he lacks his own normative account of human agency with the union of gift and 
friendship. For Hauerwas, “agency rides on the back of friendship.”651 Friendship, in 
effect, is another name for humanity living together in the peaceful triune economy. This 
																																																								
645 Hauerwas, CC, 131. See also Hauerwas, PK, 9; Hauerwas, STT, 198. 
646 Hauerwas, AC, 53-54; Hauerwas, CC, 131; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 79-80; Hauerwas, STT, 198-199; Hauerwas, AC, 54; 
Hauerwas, PK, 81, 86-87; Hauerwas, TT, 108; Hauerwas, US, chp. 11. The issue of virtue further differentiates Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s respective frameworks of freedom-through-contingency-for-autonomy and freedom-in-contingency. Kant opted for 
human dignity qua the autonomous subject knowing the good––in continuity with Pelagius––over and against Aristotelian virtue 
where the good qua virtues is given (Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 531; Hauerwas, VV, 31). Construing Dorrien for Kantian human dignity and 
Hauerwas for Aristotelian virtue is a clear dividing line but all too neat. As I have endeavored to show, a less neat but far more 
accurate differentiation is: Dorrien as a post-Kantian with a Hegelian stripe and a Barthian inflection; Hauerwas as a Barthian with a 
Thomist stripe. Here the issue is how Hauerwas does not have a Hegelian stripe. 
647 Hauerwas, AE, 233-234; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 74, 76, 82, 86, and 195 n. 20; Hauerwas, WT, 213. See also Hauerwas and 
Pinches, CAV, 46-48; Hauerwas, CC, 22; Hauerwas, PK, 91; Hauerwas, STT, 87-88, 143-144; Hauerwas, WwW, 282-283. 
648 Hauerwas, CDRO, 98-99. See also Hauerwas, WAD, 120 n. 13. 
649 Hauerwas, CDRO, 325. 
650 Hauerwas, WAD, 146, 149. 
651 The quote is from a conversation with Hauerwas. 
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divine economy not only makes human creatures into friends of God by the gift of time 
necessary for humanity to participate in God’s life. The human participants themselves 
are also transformed into friends of each other, because together they embody Jesus’s 
story of befriending humanity through his kenotic self-gift. To be friends together is to 
give as Jesus gave and receive one another as gifts of God. As such friendship expands 
and develops, permeating and forming reality in accordance with the gracious truth of 
God’s love that is Jesus and his work of forgiveness.652 
 So Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s difference here is their respective emphases and 
how they relate them. Dorrien stresses equality because freedom is how humanity 
flourishes, but flourishing is difficult to think about in a world rife with deadly injustice 
that creates inequality. It is love that brought Dorrien to the fight for equality, and it is 
love that keeps him in the fight. However, Hauerwas sees the gift of friendship as the 
beginning and end of what it means to be human. He frames freedom in relation to truth 
which is a gift of friendship. And he argues for actually living in friendship as the first 
task of Christianity. So out of love Dorrien seeks transformation for equality, choice, and 
ultimately free flourishing. Hauerwas argues that the practices of friendship, such as 
reconciliation, are transformative. 
 Those differences create different accounts of the common good and of the 
politics to realize it. In 1995 Dorrien blasted Hauerwas, claiming that “he calls for a 
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social Christianity that renounces moral responsibility for the common good” because he 
refuses “to accept responsibility for the right ordering of society.”653 By contrast, Dorrien 
opts for justice as “right order” and John Stuart Mills’s stress on equality, because 
Dorrien’s moral direction is taken from Christianity’s love for the common good and 
from his assumption that “the principles of freedom and equality” are constitutive to the 
common good.654 Hauerwas has a retort. The common good cannot be grounded in 
abstract ideals such as freedom and equality, which are in fact “common interests”––“the 
sum of our individual interests”––that liberalism misinterprets as “goods in common.”655 
But this critique goes hand in hand with the fact that, contrary to Dorrien’s criticism, 
Hauerwas has been for the common good since at least 1970.656 
 For Hauerwas, the common good is found in the time-filled process of mutual 
“discovery,” of discussion and friendship.657 So working towards the common good is a 
journey in community, truth-telling, and hope, which requires patience and stubbornness 
																																																								
653 Dorrien, SS, 358. 
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in the parlance of Hauerwas and Dorrien respectively. However, Hauerwas’s contention 
that justice is confessional healing is simultaneously more precarious and assured than 
Dorrien’s firm ground in human rights and his hope for progress through justice. Truth is 
essential to humanity’s pursuit of God’s peace, but truth is not always readily available. It 
is only found by positioning oneself with, by exposing oneself to, and by caring for 
others rather than securing oneself over them. Since human creatures are social beings 
determined by one another, what it means to be a human being is to be in a vulnerable 
position.658 
 Here then are two forms of human equality. The first is creaturehood. The mutual 
friendship of equal creatures and gift-giving grounds Hauerwas’s work on the elderly, 
children, medical ethics, disabilities, and death.659 The second is the vulnerability of 
creatureliness.660 Humanity has a penchant for power plays in which one party is 
invulnerable and oppresses the already vulnerable. When one person, in their self-
righteousness, asserts a dictatorial authority over another in order to force the oppressive 
submission of the perceived offender, vulnerability is used to legitimate asymmetrical 
power plays. Hauerwas works against these asymmetrical relations through his 
constructive vision of mutual vulnerability. All parties, even the “wronged,” “confront 
one another as sinners,” and therefore they “share” in the “need to be and have been 
forgiven.”661 That account of mutual, “radical subordination” may seem like a platitude, 
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or worse a way of legitimizing an oppressive status quo.662 However, the recognition of 
sin and the need of forgiveness are how, he argues, Christianity can face the horrors of its 
anti-Semitic past and can work towards reconciliation “between Christians and Jews.”663 
Given that the church does not secure God’s peace through violence but rather shows 
God’s peace through truth and forgiveness, the work to embody God’s peace may appear 
tenuous and risky at best. Indeed, the Christian life is ambitious. It is only knowable and 
possible when one is “incorporated into a community constituted by the stories of God” 
that practices kingdom virtues.664 Yet Hauerwas is all the more confident. The 
embodying of God’s peace and justice is not only possible, it is the church’s mission and 
is creation’s reality because the triune God is sovereign.665 
VII. Conclusion 
 I have argued that at the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies are an 
account of divine sovereignty. However, they still sharply differ on divine sovereignty. 
Dorrien incorporates an account of grace according to the primacy of the Spirit’s 
universality and love. Hauerwas assumes an account of love ordered by the particularity 
of triune grace. These different accounts of divine sovereignty are intimately linked to 
their different descriptions of human subjectivity and agency responding to God and to 
other human spirits or creatures. For Dorrien, love orients autonomous spirit in a creative 
relation to autonomous spirit in accordance with his understanding of creative 
interpenetration between ineffable Spirit and autonomous spirit in love. For Hauerwas, 																																																								
662 Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 148. Hauerwas is referencing Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, chp. 9. For elsewhere Hauerwas employs 
Yoder’s radical subordination, see CC, 70-71; STT, 171. 
663 Hauerwas, CET, 94. 
664 Hauerwas, DF, 137. See also Hauerwas, AN, 42-44; Hauerwas, DF, 112. 
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creaturehood and friendship are the way things are for humanity because the triune 
creator gives particular gifts for friendship. These different accounts support their 
different political realities. Dorrien argues for economic, liberative, and ecological justice 
in order to secure equality, freedom, and the common good from his beginning point in 
love. Hauerwas maintains the primacy of friendship and obedient patience within a 
community that moves to God’s tempo. In that framework is found freedom, but the 
beginning, middle, and end is friendship. 
 One might be tempted to turn to the church-world distinction at this point. 
However, doing that now would fall back into overlooking the complexity of Dorrien’s 
and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Dorrien’s 1995 critique of Hauerwas’s “dichotomizing the 
world between Christian and pagans” was built on the accusation that Hauerwas eschews 
the common good.666 But Hauerwas’s concern for the common good complicates 
Dorrien’s assertion that how they understand the church-world distinction separates them. 
A better diagnosis is to locate their differences about how reality is made of intra-human 
relations created and shaped in light of God’s sovereign, participatory agency. The next 
chapter shows that their different accounts of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity 
and agency issue forth in rival accounts of political sovereignty. One might be tempted to 
summarize such different accounts of theological and political sovereignty as a church-
world distinction. However, that again could easily be a misleading generalization. 
Although the issue is specifically the modern nation-state, I conclude with Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s similar turn to radical democracy for the common good. Any narrative of the 
church-world distinction must be significantly qualified by Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s 
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disagreement over reality as determinative interrelation concerning particular institutions. 
A better account of their difference is how the relation between divine sovereignty and 
intra-human relations is positively realized or negatively undercut by the modern nation-
state’s claim to sovereignty.
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CHAPTER 3  
Integration or Hegemony:  
God’s Sovereignty and the Modern Nation-State’s Sovereignty 
 Previous chapters argued that Dorrien and Hauerwas’s concerns for faithfulness 
presuppose truth and reality, which assume, in turn, an account of divine sovereignty. 
Their disagreements are rooted in differences about the character of divine sovereignty 
and about human subjectivity and agency. These deep differences, I contend here, issue 
forth in strikingly divergent positions about the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. 
Dorrien integrates his account of the Spirit and Christian agency with the state, while 
Hauerwas rejects the state’s sovereignty as hegemonic.667 
 I spend the bulk of this chapter on Hauerwas’s position partly because he has 
written much more about the nature of the modern state than Dorrien and partly because I 
offer a constructive development of Hauerwas’s position on state sovereignty. By 
political or state sovereignty, I mean the modern state’s claims to both its own 
autonomous sphere (politics) and its final authority for governing its citizens and lands. 
Such claims include not only the state’s monopoly on legal violence and the state’s 
enforcement of its boundaries, but also the state’s pursuit of autonomous power to secure 
its claims. The state’s claims and its pursuit of them are necessary, asserts political 
liberalism, because of the state’s mission to keep the peace and to secure national and 
individual interests. I problematize this legitimization, particularly on the issue of the 
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state’s pursuit of self-serving power, in light of Hauerwas’s position and my development 
of it. 
 My development serves two further points. First, I aim to show that the trajectory 
of Hauerwas’s work takes him even further from Dorrien. Both their positions on 
political sovereignty are interrelated with their respective understandings of divine 
sovereignty. Dorrien’s conception of divine sovereignty is not, but Hauerwas’s can be, 
understood apart from the sovereignty of political liberalism’s modern nation-state. As a 
consequence, Hauerwas is able to and does reject the legitimacy of the state’s 
sovereignty, whereas Dorrien cannot or would not want to.  
 Second, by splitting them on the issue of political sovereignty, I can conclude 
where the end of chapter one began: Dorrien and Hauerwas are fractured over the issue of 
sovereignty. Two vectors, divine and political sovereignties, are at work here based on 
chapters two and three respectively. Dorrien’s theology––loving Spirit interrelates with 
spirit in a way that transforms the world––is inherently open to perceiving the sovereign 
state as a constructive force for positive transformation. Hauerwas’s theology of 
particular grace sees the hegemonic state as humanity’s disobedient attempt to rival God. 
Hauerwas’s rejection assumes a better hope: Jesus is the truth of the triune God who is 
sovereign through gift-giving. The theological projects of integration with or rejection of 
the state’s sovereignty are not independent phenomena. They are instead different 
responses to the state’s pressure to conform. Dorrien opts for liberalism’s subtle 
supplanting of Christianity, while Hauerwas rejects the hegemony of liberalism’s 
policing of Christianity. 
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 These differing theological and political positions within the two vectors are the 
source of their theopolitical fracture made evident in issues like the church-world 
distinction. Yet, I end with hope rather than despair. I emphasize the two vectors in order 
to highlight their importance and then to undercut them. The vectors and the different 
responses to them, in their current manifestations, obscure the surplus of political thought 
in Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theopolitical positions. The fullness and similarities of their 
constructive works are only visible within a horizon wider than what the status quo 
discussion centered on political sovereignty. Necessary, then, is work that opens up a 
horizon within which their discussion can relax in an unconfined space, and through 
which the promise of their thought can be explored in a fresh discussion. The next 
chapter shows that Rowan Williams provides just such a horizon. 
I. Dorrien’s Divine Sovereignty Integrated with  
the Sovereignty of the Modern Nation-State 
 Chapters one and two addressed Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement over 
how to characterize the relational nature of reality because of their differences over the 
God-human relation, intra-human relations, and the connection between the two. These 
relations––indirectly the God-human relation and directly reality and intra-human 
relations––underlie Dorrien’s definition and contextualization of liberal theology. 
Through the modern heritage, the modern world is more or less as determinative as the 
evangelical heritage. But that dialectic only covers the internal workings of liberal 
theology. Dorrien also contextualizes “the founding of modern theology [as] an aspect” 
of philosophical, political, and economic liberalism.668 Philosophical liberalism set the 																																																								
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concepts of autonomy and human dignity for everyone. Political liberalism sought to 
ensure autonomy and dignity through equal freedom, human rights, and tolerance. 
Economic liberalism attempted to establish autonomy through private ownership rather 
than political equality. Dorrien fits within just such a narrative, except for his emphasis 
on political equality over private ownership since private ownership undermines equal 
freedom. Like the social gospelers, Dorrien argues for economic democracy because 
equality through democracy is already an ideal in political liberalism. Implicitly, then, 
they assume an account of political sovereignty.669 
 But how are divine sovereignty and political sovereignty interrelated for Dorrien? 
He has yet to give an answer. However, considering his claims that unity is on the level 
of spirit, that the world is interrelated, and that liberal theology is part of liberalism’s 
project, Dorrien must have an understanding of how divine and political sovereignty 
together form a liberal subjectivity. Chapter two already addressed subjectivity by 
equating Dorrien’s co-operative economics with his understanding of spirit relating to 
spirit. I argued so in terms of autonomy-in-relation for freedom. That human subjectivity-
agency for equal freedom in politics and economics is achieved through liberal justice 
ordered by the need for liberation. But as chapter one argued, justice is not the totality of 
Dorrien’s concerns. For him, liberation comes about by not only raising oppressed voices 
and concomitant deep socioeconomic analysis, but also by those informing his union of 
theological morality and political liberalism. Yet that union is still hazy in terms of divine 
and political sovereignties. So how are those interrelated for Dorrien? Dorrien’s account 
of a gospel-centered personal Spirit, I will argue, operates within Rauschenbusch’s 
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configuration of the kingdom, state, and church. Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration 
allows for a sometimes critical but fundamentally complementary interaction between 
God’s sovereignty and political liberalism’s sovereignty in order to produce social 
transformation. This framework is why Dorrien is correct to note that “in its short term 
politics the social gospel was a theology of the state.”670 So it should not be a surprise 
that, accordingly, loving Spirit’s transformative work in intra-human relations is achieved 
through the political sovereignty of the modern nation-state. 
Dorrien Assumes Rauschenbusch’s Kingdom-Church-State Configuration 
 Some context is required before explaining Rauschenbusch’s tripartite 
configuration since Dorrien is fundamentally an updated social gospeler. He critiques 
more subtly and lists more frankly the social gospelers’ faults to a greater extent than 
even the (in)famous critiques by R. Niebuhr. Yet Dorrien observes that Christian Realism 
was a reaction to the social gospel which, unlike the social gospel, “inspired no hymns 
and built no lasting institutions.”671 By contrast, the social gospel, a 50 year movement 
and “a third Great Awakening,” “produced a greater progressive religious legacy than 
any generation before or after it.”672 The social gospelers, not Niebuhr, “paved the way 
for everything else in social ethics”; the social gospel, not Christian Realism, was “the 
greatest surge of social justice activism ever waged by the mainline churches in this 
country.”673 The concerns of the social gospel’s kingdom vision were broad: “peace, 
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social justice, cooperative relations, healthy families, international order, and the spirit of 
Jesus.”674 All but family are core foci in Dorrien’s constructive work, and he often gives 
similar answers as the social gospelers. In fact, Dorrien participated in the National 
Council of Churches’s most recent update and expansion of the “The Social Creed of the 
Churches” (1908 and 1932), the social gospelers’ famous ecumenical document that 
made their vision of a Christianized social order into a platform of concrete, social 
goals.675 
 Dorrien is deeply indebted to Rauschenbusch in particular. Dorrien asserts that 
Rauschenbusch was the “greatest social gospeler.”676 He “provided the movement’s most 
powerful case for” a theology of social salvation.677 According to Dorrien, 
Rauschenbusch “represents…the kind of idealism that is needed today, because he 
struggled unfailingly to promote and fulfill the ends of attainable justice in a fallen 
world.”678 The issues of idealism (kingdom) and of justice exemplify how and why 
Dorrien assumes Rauschenbusch’s tripartite configuration of kingdom, church, and state. 
 Constitutive to that configuration is Rauschenbusch’s multi-layered understanding 
of God’s kingdom. Rauschenbusch privileged the kingdom as a spiritual reality in which 
God is ultimate, “the common basis of all our life.”679 The kingdom was “initiated” in 
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Jesus’s “personality,” a new human personality of hope and love in line with “his 
consciousness of God.”680 Within the kingdom as “commonwealth of co-operative 
service,” humanity could be organized together, into a “world-wide consciousness” of 
“solidarity,” for the common good.681 The character of the kingdom, for Rauschenbusch, 
was a multi-faceted composite. He recovered previous understandings of the kingdom: 
“the kingdom of heaven,” the kingdom as “the inner life of the spirit,” the kingdom 
indistinguishable from the church, the kingdom outside the “existing work of the church,” 
and the kingdom identifiable with the parousia.682 Then he combined those facets of the 
kingdom with “the apocalyptic aspect of the kingdom hope and the kingdom as an 
ongoing ethical project” for both personal and social salvation.683 All of these are 
hallmarks of Dorrien’s spirituality and ethics, most of which I have noted already. 
 Dorrien’s theology and politics of loving, universal Spirit fit with how 
Rauschenbusch conceives of the kingdom permeating the church and state in their 
separate roles. Rauschenbusch’s social gospel answers “the central ethical question” of 
“how to exercise power in a morally responsible way” since the kingdom pervades social 
structures and empowers them in a just direction.684 The details, however, make all the 
difference. In Rauschenbusch’s tripartite structure, the kingdom, as “the master fact,” 
informs both the church and state in their respective and distinct roles.685 The “Kingdom 
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of God is not a concept nor an ideal merely, but a historical force. It is a vital and 
organizing energy now at work in humanity. Its capacity to save the social order depends 
on its pervasive presence within the social organism.”686 However, he rejected what he 
saw as an over identification between the kingdom and church. The kingdom is “not 
confined within the limits of the Church and its activities” because the church’s role is 
“fellowship for worship” and the kingdom’s is “fellowship of righteousness,” the 
“fellowship of justice, equality, and love.”687 The kingdom actually empowers and saves, 
but the church’s mission is to push for a spiritual and moral vision of the kingdom in 
individuals and society, respectively.688 As for the church-state relation, there can be 
cooperation between church and state because society and state are not “hostile to 
Christianity.”689 At the same time, there is also separation between the church and state 
because of their different roles. The church works to achieve its mission as a “diffused 
force” for “justice and mercy,” but the church does not enact justice because justice is the 
purview of the state.690 
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 Fitting this tripartite configuration, for Dorrien, love transforms all on the basis of 
Spirit-love permeating all. This fit is best seen in light of how Dorrien’s theology of the 
Spirit’s transformative love aligns within Rauschenbusch’s construal of the church as a 
prophetic handmaiden witnessing to the state. Rauschenbusch frequently appealed to the 
“law of love and service,” but he was often vague, or at least indirect, on exactly what is 
love.691 From his various descriptions of love, he characterizes it as self-gift and self-
sacrifice within a social framework where love is recognition of value in the other, is 
orientation of care to the other, and is solidarity with the other. What Rauschenbusch then 
repeatedly stressed is that love is an equalizing force that “creates fellowship.”692 
Dorrien’s views are largely the same. Martin Luther King, Jr. was the religious figure 
who grabbed Dorrien’s attention and seared “self-sacrificing love” into him.693 But he 
discovered a home in the social gospel because, he argues, King drew from 
Rauschenbusch. As Dorrien dug deeper, he found Rauschenbusch’s Christianity and the 
Social Crisis as energizing as the Civil Rights movement. Dorrien is of course attentive 
to feminist concerns about kingdom language and self-sacrificing love, but the kingdom 
vision and its love for the liberative justice of equality is still at the center of his work. On 
this basis of Spirit-love permeating and transforming all, Dorrien engages the political 
status quo in order to realize its role as the guarantor of justice. Like Rauschenbusch, 
Dorrien’s kingdom theology is permeated by a Hegelian account of Spirit interrelated 
with the world in a way that transforms the world. This allows for Dorrien, like 
Rauschenbusch, to be more positive than Hauerwas towards the state and its justice, and 
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more basically civil society. But Dorrien’s positive outlook is best seen framed by 
critique about the Spirit and state’s interrelation merged with Dorrien’s own critique of 
the social gospelers.694 
Complications and Internal Critique 
 Rauschenbusch’s argument for redeeming US society attempted to avoid 
conflating the Christianized society with the church by distinguishing between political 
(state) and religious (church) spheres. Although Dorrien judges that Rauschenbusch 
“equate[d] the kingdom with a particular socioeconomic system,” his attempt to avoid 
conflation is crucial for Dorrien since “to absolutize or univocally identify the kingdom 
of God with any relative construction is demonic.”695 But for someone like Hauerwas, 
Rauschenbusch’s political-religious distinction assumes a disturbing relation between the 
kingdom and state. The church’s role is to press the state towards the kingdom ethic, but 
the church itself does not exactly mediate the relationship between the state and kingdom. 
Rauschenbusch resisted the framework of medieval Christendom, in which the church 
supposedly “ruled and guided” society.696 Instead, he saw that the kingdom, like Hegel’s 
Geist, “realizes itself” in “the family, the industrial organization of society, and the 
State.”697 The state is to be under and forcibly uphold the “law of service” or “law of 
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Christ”; in this way, the state is also “a Christian community” but not a church.698 These 
definitional roles for the church and state imply that both have access to and are 
empowered by the kingdom. Whether or not the state must act according to an ecclesial 
vision is debatable because the state as a democracy is “Christianized” already.699 
Whether or not the state must go through the church is far more clear: not the church but 
the state secures democratic justice in the political and economic spheres. While that 
implication of Rauschenbusch’s distinction may still appear innocuous, or simply 
Hegelian, the ramifications were bloody and oppressive.700 
 For the social gospelers in their time, their success in their Manifest Destiny to 
democratize––to “intervene,” “liberate,” and “civilize”––the world was simply proof that 
Christianity was influencing the humanity towards a better future.701 However, Dorrien 
argues that the term “Christianization” was problematic and is “inappropriate today,” 
particularly in light of US imperialism.702 The social gospelers’ mission of Christianizing 
and their equation of US democracy with the kingdom inflated the narcissism of 
American exceptionalism. It also supported the related colonial endeavor of Manifest 
Destiny. The extension of US Anglo-Saxon sovereignty westward over the North 
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American continent and beyond was legitimated not only by the conflation of national 
interests with kingdom interests. The social gospelers also served the US’s colonizing 
endeavors by “baptiz[ing]” them in terms of spreading the morality of the Christian spirit 
that is democratic.703 So as Dorrien observes even in Rauschenbusch, the social gospelers 
conflated “‘Christianize,’ ‘moralize,’ ‘humanize,’ and ‘democratize.’”704 That 
exemplifies Dorrien’s agreement with both Niebuhr and Hauerwas. The social gospelers 
on the whole over-identified God’s kingdom with the US order. The social gospelers 
were often “sentimental, moralistic, idealistic, and politically naive.”705 Dorrien even 
grants that Rauschenbusch’s “optimistic temperament led him to overestimate the degree 
to which U.S. Society had already become democratized.”706 In fact, Dorrien’s critiques 
of the social gospel are more frank, exhaustive, and excoriating than most of the 
criticisms mounted by Niebuhr and Hauerwas.707 
Theology Supplying a Moral Vision that Informs State Justice 
 But even with those significant reservations, Dorrien appears to still embrace 
Rauschenbusch’s configuration itself. Dorrien maintains that politics “has a relation to 
redemption—the healing of life and the world (Hebrew tikkun)—only through its 
connection to social justice.”708 Of course “social justice” is in continuity with 																																																								
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Rauschenbusch’s role of the state in relation to the kingdom. But “only through” is 
equally important, indicating Dorrien’s qualified continuity with Rauschenbusch. The 
social gospel still has purchase for how to understand Christianity’s involvement. 
However, the social gospel must be recovered with care and attention to criticisms made 
against it by liberation theology. This adjustment is possible since the “corrective” to 
Rauschenbusch’s “optimistic temperament,” Dorrien argues, “was present in 
Rauschenbusch’s work.”709 So the Christianizing rhetoric should not obscure what 
positive meaning that still remains accessible today. For Dorrien, the social gospel’s 
persistent value is a compelling vision of social redemption of the kingdom Spirit that 
works to transform structures from within. A vision is always essential. It moves people 
by a spiritual conviction that orients them towards a greater future. Vision is the fuel to 
sustain the slow, difficult work for change. If there was one thing that the social gospel 
had, it was vision of the beloved community connected to social justice.710 
 In particular for Dorrien, the social gospel’s spirituality of a kingdom-
commonwealth provided “a vision of economic democracy that is as relevant and 
necessary today as it was a century ago.”711 This vision, its moral call, and/or its 
economic solution show up in nearly all of Dorrien’s books. These emphases, when 
combined with his “only through” qualification, suggest a vision of a robust civil society 
and far more limited state.712 Yet the state is still crucial. How the vision, morality, and 
economics support present action is particularly illuminated in his 2012 pitch for the 
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necessity of progressive liberals’ role in re-electing President Obama and shaping his 
second term. Michael Harrington died too soon to be the needed strong, progressive flank 
for the centrist president Bill Clinton. Similarly, Obama’s centrism needs someone like 
Harrington as well for the same reason: to keep Obama looking towards progressive 
goals rather than giving into extortion. So Dorrien challenged progressive liberals not to 
give up on Obama as some already had. That was the aim of Dorrien’s The Obama 
Question. Therein he rarely notes faith; it is presupposed and translated into another 
register. Morality is the ground upon which he makes his appeal to further realize social 
justice in politics and democratic justice in the economy. Therefore, The Obama Question 
implements the project of US Protestant liberalism’s performative role, to inject morality 
into the soul of society in order to realize justice within the state’s sphere.713 
 How the kingdom, church, and state are ordered matters. The kingdom is the 
ideal, and the church does not stand over the state. This framework, looking back, is in 
accordance with Dorrien’s commitment to idealism, his rejection of Hauerwas’s church-
state distinction, Dorrien’s presupposition of truths in plurality, and his dedication to a 
relational dialectic in reality. But important here is political sovereignty. Christianity 
proclaims truth, a prophetic word of love, informed by the eschatological banquet that 
offers a political vision of equality and liberative justice. The realization of this vision is 
achieved, albeit limited and incomplete, in the state’s sphere by the work of the Spirit. 
Those roles for Christianity and the state are why Dorrien is both concerned about 
Christianity maintaining its spiritual center and generally oriented positively towards 
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state sovereignty. Without a spiritual center attentive to the Spirit’s work, there can be no 
positive vision to inform the state nor ground to critique the state. 
A Response from Hauerwas’s Position 
 In the past Hauerwas granted “that liberalism has, sometimes almost in spite of 
itself, some beneficial results.”714 He also appreciates Rauschenbusch and Dorrien’s 
emphasis on the kingdom and on truth. But towards Dorrien’s position there are a slew of 
criticisms that emerge from Hauerwas’s work. On the particular point of the church’s 
relation to the state, Hauerwas’s primary concern is whether or not the church is “capable 
of saying no to the state.”715 Dorrien’s appeal to the social gospel’s emphasis on morality 
resists R. Niebuhr’s deeper acceptance of translation but does not yet overcome the 
problems of Constantinianism, privatization, and translation. That capitulation, Hauerwas 
would presumably contend, is because Dorrien argues for integration on the basis of 
compatibility with and service to US democracy. Like Rauschenbusch and R. Niebuhr, 
Dorrien argues that Christianity’s ideal of love shares the values of democracy, especially 
equality. Since both democracy and equality are necessary for justice and peace in the 
face of sin, the promotion of democracy is a good. From their assumptions and point of 
view, Hauerwas concedes that “the modern nation state is an extraordinary invention for 
peace since at least it limits the number of warring factions on this limited globe.”716 
Nevertheless, Hauerwas rejects that political liberalism can bring “world peace.”717 
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Liberal democracy does not truly unify the US, rather liberal democracy is used to justify 
a US empire. In the latter, unity is compelled by the “fear of death” and by the 
commitment to use violence (war) in order to secure self-interests.718 These unifying 
forces and imperial designs are not anomalies; they go hand in hand with what Hauerwas 
identifies as essentials in US liberal democracy. Liberalism’s autonomous anthropology 
(the “common citizen”) denies external authorities in the name of equality.719 
Liberalism’s politics of desire, under the guise of tolerance, has a thin conception of the 
good at best. Liberalism’s values, like autonomy and self-interest, police Christianity by 
privatizing faith and forming the church into a liberal democracy and capitalist 
economy.720 
 Fundamental to Hauerwas’s break from political liberalism is the nature of 
politics related to the sovereignty of God. Hauerwas rejects the assumption that “all 
politics presupposes violence,” which underlies the necessity of democracy for R. 
Niebuhr and Dorrien.721 Instead, “God created all that is with a desire to be nonviolent” 
and Jesus transforms the meaning of politics.722 Hauerwas frames Christian ethics 
accordingly. He refuses to “begin with [the] assumption” “that the subject of Christian 
ethics in America is America.”723 Instead, he begins “with the claim that the most 
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determinative political loyalty for Christians is the church.”724 That Christian citizenship 
is always first found in God’s reign for reasons ranging from God’s sovereignty, as 
chapter two delineated, to the church’s mission to be a social ethic in order to be a 
faithful witness of Jesus, as chapter one noted.725 
 But as chapter one noted as well, Dorrien affirms to one degree or another 
Hauerwas’s emphasis on counter-cultural witness. Hauerwas also grants Dorrien’s 
assumption that God’s kingdom is more determinative than the church. So what marks 
their difference here? Hauerwas’s self-described position of “theocrat” makes liberals 
“nervous.”726 The nervousness is not simply derived from “‘Jesus is Lord’…[as] a 
determinative political claim.”727 The implication of that claim does not grant the state its 
own “autonomous” sphere.728 But that autonomy is precisely what the state claims and 
pursues. For Hauerwas, then, humanity’s pursuit of autonomy opposes divine sovereignty 
by raising against it humanity’s own autonomous, hegemonic corollary and “most 
nefarious brand of tribalism––the omnipotent state.”729 Under the guise of peace-making, 
the modern nation-state jealously undercuts Christian citizenship as part of the state’s 
attempt to secure its own autonomous power from divine sovereignty. Accordingly, not 
only has “modern politics...rendered the notion of God’s rule more or less 
unintelligible.”730 For, as Hauerwas observes, Christians “have lost the ‘sources,’ the 
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practices, necessary to sustain our conviction that God is the origination and end of our 
existence.”731 But also replacing that loss and conviction is “the idolatry most convenient 
to us”: “the presumed primacy of the nation-state.”732 
II. Hauerwas Against the Hegemony of  
the Modern Nation-State’s Sovereignty 
 Chapter one framed Hauerwas’s argument about liberalism policing Christianity 
in terms of subtle supplanting and negating exclusion. From above one can see that 
functionally Dorrien works within the supplanting frame in order to avoid Christianity’s 
exclusion from politics. But Hauerwas illuminates the depth to which Dorrien’s approach 
is built on accepting the modern nation-state’s sovereignty. Hauerwas rejects both 
supplanting and excluding because they are two prongs of the same hegemonic project. 
Dorrien argues against US imperialism, but Hauerwas’s focus on loyalty to Jesus is 
predicated on the more basic disagreement. The sovereignty of liberalism’s modern 
nation-state conflicts with Jesus’s sovereignty. Since chapter two and above already 
covered Jesus’s sovereignty, here I focus on the modern nation-state’s attempt to 
undercut and replace divine sovereignty. In lieu of God’s sovereign gifts, the state 
attempts to secure its self-interests over and through death in the guise of protecting the 
individual’s peaceful pursuit of one’s self-interests.733  
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In effect, the liberal state creates to the very problem that it claims to solve, which 
in turn, legitimizes the state. To differentiate people in terms of self-interested desires 
dissolves relations between “friends” so that only “strangers” in pursuit of their 
individual self-interests are left.734 But for political liberalism, such fragmentation 
threatens to actualize Thomas Hobbes’s fear of political chaos. So liberalism’s political 
order asserts that it must be strong enough to at least ensure the primacy and fullness of 
autonomy against chaos. This presumed necessity, in turn, ironically establishes 
homogeneity and hegemony. The confluence of liberalism’s universal anthropology, 
autonomy, and strong unity means that liberal unity depends on accounting for 
everything on liberal terms in order to ensure autonomy. That accounting establishes a 
social homogeneity through a political hegemony. Some liberals, Hegel in particular 
Hauerwas notes, acknowledge that gaining more freedom coincides with an equal rise in 
national “homogeneity” that suppresses the sources of difference––other social groups––
in the name of brokering difference.735 This hegemonic homogeneity is, in turn, part of an 
attempt to secure autonomy. In the name of unity, political liberalism aims to “create an 
independence against contingency” through a regulatory strategy, “a mastery” of all 
through a “panoptic practice” that orders and polices everything on liberal terms.736 So 
liberalism relies on a hegemonic homogeneity to achieve autonomy. Liberal unity 
depends on cooperation by individuals under the principle of autonomy. The many 
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individuals need to conform to autonomy (homogeneity), and in turn they must support 
what it takes to secure autonomy (hegemony). Thus the framework of homogeneity 
necessitating hegemony serves to legitimate the autonomy of political sovereignty.737 
However, Hauerwas rejects the autonomy of political sovereignty and its 
legitimating narrative of the wars of religion, the presumed specter of religious violence 
that threatens homogeneity. He also criticizes its legitimizing claims of efficiency, among 
other critiques that I will address later. But rather than simply reiterate his criticisms of 
the autonomy of political sovereignty, the wars of religion, and the claim of efficiency, I 
will place them within the frame of the French political concepts of raison d’être (reason 
for being) and raison d’état (reason of state). Raison d’être and raison d’état illuminate 
the yet unnoticed developmental continuity in Hauerwas’s work. I will contend that this 
development has resulted in overturning the state’s self-justification for hegemonic 
sovereignty. A latent aspect of Hauerwas’s thought can be expounded by using raison 
d’être and raison d’état to emphasize the underlying continuity of monopolizing 
sovereignty between the early and contemporary modern state-nation. This argument 
contributes to understanding Hauerwas by connecting together his robust rejection of the 
wars of religion and his limited criticism of state efficiency.738 
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Explaining Hauerwas’s Critique of the State’s Legitimacy 
 through Raison d’être and Raison d’état 
 Hauerwas’s account of political liberalism draws on Thomas Hobbes. From 
Hobbes onward, death is the “determinative” measurement for the “meaning” of life 
because death is the ultimate limit to be overcome by liberal politics.739 The state, 
accordingly, seeks to “control” death in an ironic attempt to self-transcend human 
nature.740 The control of death is achieved through a biopolitics that regulates and 
violently enforces who lives and dies. One might construe biopolitical control as one of 
many missions of the modern nation-state. But for Hauerwas such control is at the heart 
of the modern nation-state’s reason for being. A primary, if not the primary, characteristic 
of state sovereignty and its function is a “monopoly on violence” within its borders in 
order to police death for securing peace.741 So for Hauerwas, the fear of death and the 
monopoly over violence together are employed to justify the state’s sovereign power. 
 A tradition in French political theory can help to interpret and develop 
Hauerwas’s claim. Officially from around the time and through the work of Cardinal 
Richelieu on (1585-1642), the state’s raison d’être (reason for being) and raison d’état 
(reason of state) have been understood to be mutually informing. Raison d’être outlines 
the state’s mission and responsibilities, such as keeping the peace and controlling death 
respectively. Raison d’état is a claim that the state has its own basic, autonomous 
interests, such as power and securing it. Those interests have their own, self-grounding 
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form of reason that is not based in divine reason and that is more specific than a 
generalized natural reason. So in short, raison d’état is about delineating that sphere of 
human relations called politics, and that it is autonomous with its own interests and 
reason.742 
 Political liberalism’s conventional narrative often more implicitly than explicitly 
maintains that, as Richelieu assumed, the state’s raison d’être requires raison d’état. The 
modern state’s mission is to create and sustain the peace for the flourishing of 
liberalism’s aspirations (raison d’être). Yet the state cannot enforce its raison d’être 
without first attaining the power to do so. The state must therefore seek the necessary and 
autonomous power to police (raison d’état). Hauerwas has also described that liberal 
construction in 1984 in all but name and in 1988 when he explicitly used the French 
terms: “the state’s raison d’état depends on its raison d’être.”743 But Hauerwas 
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countermands that narrative. Raison d’état not only preceded the modern nation-state’s 
mission. The state’s raison d’être of peacemaking is used to legitimate the tautology of 
raison d’état, the state’s autonomous power and seeking more of it. Hauerwas makes 
three moves to note here. First, the modern nation-state’s policing for peace includes “a 
bureaucracy that is more intrusive than the most absolute monarch,” which is 
“legitimated by its promise to be efficient and effective” for securing the self-interests of 
its citizens.744 Second, Hauerwas moved from presupposing that “Christians need to 
develop a theory of political authority” to the converse by agreeing with John Howard 
Yoder’s view that the state and its authority simply exist as a fact of reality.745 But even 
in this change, Hauerwas still questions the legitimacy of the modern nation-state’s 
mission to produce “‘peace and security’ promised by” state “power.”746 That suspicion 
overlaps with his point on efficiency since he notes that “the first responsibility of the 
president of the United States is to protect the United State’s self-interest.”747 Third, 
Hauerwas has long rejected liberalism’s separation of disciplines into their own 
autonomous spheres of reason, which is reflected in the autonomy of the state and its 
raison d’état. He explicitly rejected a “self-validating,” “autonomous created order…to 
legitimate the state as an end in itself.”748 The points of efficiency and autonomy I will 																																																								
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748 Hauerwas, CET, 16. See also Hauerwas, “Epilogue: A Pacifist Response,” 173-177. For brief note about the separation of 
disciplines, see Hauerwas, STT, 148. Hauerwas’s third point is worth quoting: “the very idea that there exists an economic sphere 
distinct from the political is the creation of modernity and derives from the same sources as the notions of sovereignty so elemental to 
the nature of the modern state” (AC, 48. See also ibid., 17.). Here Hauerwas closely summarizes Giddens, The Nation-State and 
Violence, 150. To write as much relies upon Giddens’s earlier account of state sovereignty in chapter 4 that assumes reason of state 
(ibid., 93-103, 113). 
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take up later in terms of autonomous exception. But for now, between the three points 
Hauerwas undercuts important aspects of raison d’état.749 
 More recently Hauerwas effectively overturns the liberal configuration that the 
state’s raison d’être to secure national interests requires the self-interested power of 
raison d’état. Even though Hauerwas does not explicitly argue the reversal in so many 
words, he does so by following Michel Foucault’s work on power and others’ on the 
state’s commitment to war. Hauerwas describes that the state’s ‘neutral’ position of 
determining who lives and dies for peace (raison d’être) is to ensure freedom as self-
interest. That framework, Hauerwas argues, is little more than a biopolitics for securing 
state power through the same power dynamics “manifested in war” (raison d’état).750 																																																								
749 For Richelieu, see Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 85; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 100; Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in 
Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2001), 118; The Political 
Testament of Cardinal Richelieu, chp. 3. For an example of someone arguing that raison d’être requires raison d’état in political 
liberalism, see Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative, and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chps. 
7-8. For Hauerwas on the elements of the tautology in one way or another, see Hauerwas, AN, 185; Hauerwas, DF, 127, 222 n. 27; 
Hauerwas, DT, 186; Hauerwas, STT, 180; Hauerwas, WW, 51. For a summary of the tautology of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty, 
see William T. Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State,” Modern 
Theology 11, no. 4 (1995): 414; Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20-21; 
Stephen G. Engelmann, Imagining Interest in Political Thought: Origins of Economic Rationality (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2003), 78; Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, chp. 10, pp. 285-290, and in particular pp. 375, 378: “governmental 
reason delineated the state as both its principle and its objective, as both its foundation and its aim,” and “the state as always being its 
own end”; Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 95; Hauerwas, BH, 226 n. 31; Charles Tilly, “War Making 
and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 171-172.  
One might see a parallel between my argument concerning Hauerwas and the infamous critical description of “grandiose 
tautology,” as describing the reality of raison d’état masked by raison d’être in all but name, by Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social 
System, ed. Fatima Kastner, Richard Nobles, David Schiff, and Rosamund Ziegert, and trans. Kalus A. Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford 
Univeristy Press, 2004), 370-371. What differentiates my argument from Luhmann’s is his focus on the tautology of liberal law in a 
binary that is broken by raison d’état (ibid., 185). Accordingly, he only touches on raison d’état by name, choosing instead to focus 
on the state and the law mutual parasitic relation as a tautology (ibid., 370-371). By contrast, Hauerwas once described the tautology–
–the state as “an end in itself”––in reference to the US; however, his description was limited to the Enlightenment with the exclusion 
of Europe (CC, 247-248 n. 9). 
750 Hauerwas, AE, 124. See also Hauerwas, AC, 33-34; Hauerwas, DF, 145; Hauerwas, WW, 57; “Hauerwas on Hauerwas and the 
Law,” 249-250. In AE, 124, Hauerwas is quoting Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1975-76, ed. Mauero Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 16. Hauerwas employs both 
Carl von Clausewitz’s claim, that “war is the continuation of politics by another means,” and Foucoult’s “inversion” of it, that 
“politics is the continuation of war by other means,” in order to illuminate the “silent war” of politics (Hauerwas, AE, 121, 123-124, 
128; Hauerwas, WAD, 47-51; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 87; Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 15-16).  
 Michael S. Northcott’s and my developments of the Hauerwas-Foucault connection show that David Baer is incorrect in 
his estimation that Hauerwas’s pacifism and eschewal of theory “duck the question of political power all together.” James King gives 
a similarly limited account on Hauerwas’s critique of the state. Among some of the problems in Baer’s and King’s critiques has to do 
with their only partial readings of Hauerwas. They either simply overlook Hauerwas’s turn to Sheldon Wolin and A. D. Lindsay, or 
neglect to notice that Hauerwas’s turn to them is nothing new. It can be dated at least as far back as 1970. Instead of attempting to 
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This ‘turn’ countermands the liberal narrative, exposing that the state’s raison d’être is 
predicated on the state’s tautological raison d’état.751 
 But rather than delineate Hauerwas’s use of Foucault, Hauerwas’s critique of the 
wars of religion is a more faithful and clearer way to show his implicit reversal of the 
modern nation-state’s narrative of raison d’être requiring raison d’état. Unlike Foucault, 
Hauerwas’s critical view of the modern nation-state is always related to the state’s 
policing of Christianity. He also does not set out “to develop a theory of political 
authority.”752 Instead, he develops his turn in his arguments about the modern nation-state 
as historically formed out of and as continuing to be unified by self-interested war. So 
Hauerwas ‘backs into’ reversing political liberalism’s raison d’être-raison d’état 
narrative by engaging historiography on the wars of religion narrative and by critiquing 
political liberalism’s use of the narrative to police Christianity.753 
 Both Dorrien and Hauerwas agree that liberalism understands itself as a response 
to the narrative of the early-modern European wars of religion. The conventional story 
goes that 16th and 17th century Europe erupted into religious wars following the 
																																																								
supply a theology of the powers (exousiology), a trinitarian theology of relations in mutuality, love, gift, and plenitude to undergird 
radical democracy. What then is needed for an exousiology of the hegemonic state other than that it perverts relations and the common 
good? Northcott, “Reading Hauerwas in the Cornbelt”; H. David Baer, Recovering Christian Realism: Just War Theory as a Political 
Ethic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 9; James King, “Theologizing the State: What Hauerwas Could Have Learned From 
Yoder,” International Journal of Public Theology 8, no. 3 (2014); Hauerwas’s “Politics, Vision, and the Common Good” (1970) was 
reprinted in VV (1974), see esp. 224-225, 236 n. 31, 239. Also see Stanley Hauerwas, “The Ethicist as Theologian,” 411. 
751 Hauerwas, DF, 137-139, 150; Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, chp. 10 and pp. 290, 354. After quoting from Foucault’s 
“Governmentality” (95) about the modern nation-state having no concern for the common good but for securing the self-interests of 
citizens, Hauerwas then writes: “‘Governmentality’ does not mean that the state is any less inclined to go to war, but that wars fought 
by such states, as Hegel says, become ends in themselves. That is, war having no end other than itself becomes the reason for the state 
to exist” (Hauerwas, BH, 226 n. 31). 
752 Hauerwas, DF, 132. 
753 Hauerwas, AC, chp. 2, esp. pp. 64-68; Hauerwas, AE, chp. 7; Hauerwas, SU, 59-65, 170; Hauerwas, AE,  chp. 7; Hauerwas and 
Willimon, RA, 33-35; Hauerwas, SU, 63; Hauerwas, WAD, xvi, 6-11, 47-51, 57-58; Hauerwas, WwW, 134; Hauerwas, “Epilogue: A 
Pacifist Response,” 176-177. While Foucault’s point on the specific relation between war and politics is important to Hauerwas, other 
reasons for not developing it here are that it is too dense to sufficiently elaborate on it directly in the space I have here, and that it is 
less explicitly prevalent than Hauerwas’s increasing focus on the wars of religion. On the latter, although Hauerwas notes Foucault’s 
“Governmentality,” it is effectively a brief summary of Security, Territory, Population but without the explicit and sustained focus on 
raison d’état found in the latter (Hauerwas, BH, 226 n. 31). Accordingly, Hauerwas’s minimal engagement with raison d’état, 
explicitly or implicitly, does not address its history or Foucault’s lengthier work on it. But doing so would have been helpful since, 
even though Foucault’s primary concern is the genealogy of state power, he touched on––at the same time actually––both the wars of 
religion and the relation between raison d’être and raison d’état (Security, Territory, Population, chps. 8-11). 
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Reformation. With Protestants and Catholics at each others’ throats, Europe was thrown 
into political chaos and the presumed foundations of reality were overturned. Established 
hierarchies, their claim to authority in revealed, objective truths, and even revelation 
itself were called into question. In the light of ‘reason,’ the scandal of violence between 
Christian traditions suggested that traditions and their appeals to revelation were 
subjective and irrational rather than objective and rational. Pre-modern religious truth 
was eventually deemed to be largely fideistic assertion. Religion itself was declared a 
destabilizing force in society because of its proclivity to demand loyalty and attempt to 
convert adherents from other religious traditions. So the liberal narrative runs that the 
wars of religion revealed that religion is inherently violent and a danger to society 
because it is exclusionary, partisan, and irrational passion. Christendom, then, could not 
keep the peace. But conveniently, starting with the peace of Westphalia (1648), 
liberalism claimed that it could make and keep the peace through the autonomous nation-
state privileging the autonomous subject, especially her or his reason and experience, 
while excluding the irrational and oppressive external church authorities from public life. 
In the aftermath of the wars of religion, major figures in liberalism argued that crucial to 
peace-making is the political, universal freedom of the individual supported by a strong 
state sovereignty to ensure freedom. In order to maintain the peace for the arbitrary 
pursuit of self-interest over and against a primordial, chaotic force like religion (raison 
d’être), the newly created nation-state demanded loyalty to its claim of “administrative 
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monopoly” (raison d’état) over its boundaries and the use of violence within to ensure its 
neutral and objective policing of the public square.754  
 Leaning on William Cavanaugh and others, Hauerwas argues that the wars of 
religion narrative is essentially a historical fiction that is “anything but innocent,” despite 
its prevalence in political liberalism historically and today.755 The ‘wars of religion’ were 
not the impetus for the rise of the modern nation-state to save Europe from chaos. Rather, 
the violent conflicts attributed to religion were more so the “birth pangs” of the modern 
nation-state as it redefined its sovereignty by solidifying state power and eclipsing 
ecclesial power.756 The state’s solidifying and eclipsing are exercises of raison d’état. 
The narrative is fundamental to the state’s raison d’être because the narrative 
“legitimates the power of the nation-state in the West to wage war” and “to save us from 
the violence of religion.”757 Liberalism contends that the “secular orders are” universal, 
rational, and “inherently peaceful” while religion is partisan, irrational, and divisive 
rather than peaceful.758 The liberal order can therefore bring peace if it has the power to 
																																																								
754 For the quote, see Hauerwas, AC, 34. The quote of Hauerwas is him quoting Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, 121. See also 
Hauerwas, AC, 33; Hauerwas, AE, 129, 132; Hauerwas, DF, 134; Hauerwas, IGC, 200-201; Hauerwas, SU, 63; Hauerwas, WW, 57; 
Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 166-169; Cathal J. Nolan, The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000-
1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization, vol. 2, L-Z (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 857-858. 
 For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, KRHS, 4, 110-111; Hauerwas, AE, 129-132; Hauerwas, SU, 62-63; Hauerwas, 
WAD, 8-11, 58; Hauerwas, WwW, 90-91. Some of those citations by Hauerwas note the connection between the wars of religion and 
the category of religion. The latter will be addressed later. Also, in those citations, Hauerwas draws upon a number of figures, but in 
particular is Cavanaugh. For some pages relevant to the argument above in addition to what is addressed below, see Cavanaugh, The 
Myth of Religious Violence, 17-54, 124-141, 194-225; Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, chp. 1; Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong 
Enough to Consume the House,” 397-398. 
755 Hauerwas, AE, 132. See also ibid., 130-131; Hauerwas, SU, 62-63; Hauerwas, WwW, 90; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious 
Violence, 123-180. For another who has followed Cavanaugh, see Smith, Weird John Brown, 44-46. For arguments that parallel much 
of to some of Cavanaugh’s work respectively, see Richard Bessel, Violence: A Modern Obsession (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015); 
Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 163 n. 14. 
756 Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 166; Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, 22; Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong Enough 
to Consume the House,” 398; Hauerwas, SU, 63; Hauerwas, WW, 109 n. 5. See also Hauerwas, AE, chp. 7; Hauerwas, IGC, 201; 
Hauerwas, WW, 100. For those who dismiss Cavanaugh’s detailed account (The Myth of Religious Violence, chp. 3), one does not 
need to look far for historical support, present even in historical encyclopedias. Cathal J. Nolan, The Age of Wars of Religion, 1000-
1650: An Encyclopedia of Global Warfare and Civilization, vol. 1, A-K (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), xlviii-xlix, 239.  
757 Hauerwas, AE, 132. 
758 Ibid. See also ibid., 126-127, 129; Hauerwas, WwW, 90-91. 
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enforce its moral-political order. However, Hauerwas argues the converse against the 
modern nation-state’s self-legitimating claim that it created a peaceful order over 
medieval chaos and continues to limit the Hobbesian state of nature. The modern nation-
state arose and continues to exist in order for leaders to control a population and 
economy, in particular go to war for self-interest, without the interference of ecclesial 
oversight or mediation. Such self-interest, especially the pursuit of autonomy and 
autonomous power, is tautological by definition. Irony then abounds when that tautology 
is justified by its liberal determined raison d’être, for “the state defends us from threats 
which it itself creates.”759 
 So the wars of religion narrative masks that the liberal narrative of raison d’être 
requires raison d’état is wrong. Not only did the state’s securing of its strength 
historically precede it securing anything else. That historical insight also uncovers an 
ideological commitment. The state’s self-interested raison d’état employs raison d’être 
in order to support the larger, self-justifying narrative: that the state’s reason for being as 
peacemaker requires the state to secure its self-interested power for policing. However, as 
much as raison d’être and raison d’état are helpful interpretations of Hauerwas’s work, 
there is more to them and more in Hauerwas’s criticism of the modern nation-state than 
so far has been realized even in his recent publications. I will develop Hauerwas’s work 
																																																								
759 For the quote, see William T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 1998), 9. For the rest of the paragraph, see Lettres, instrustructions diplomatiques et papiers d’état du Cardinal de 
Richelieu, vol. 3, 1628-1630, ed. M. Avenel (Paris, 1863), 179-182 is mostly translated by William F. Church, “Richelieu: A Program 
for a King,” in The Impact of Absolutism on France: National Experience Under Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV, ed. W. F. Church 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969), 30-31; Meinecke, Machiavellism, 188-190; Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the 
Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), 60-63, 120; Matthew S. Weinert, 
Democratic Sovereignty: Authority, Legitimacy, and State in a Globalizing Age (New York: University College London Press, 2007), 
65-67; Hauerwas, AE, chp. 7; Hauerwas, AN, 148; Hauerwas, PF, 207-208; Hauerwas, WAD, 47-51; Hauerwas, WwW, 134. This 
parallels Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 110-121, 135-136, 150-185, 242-243. 
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through the relation of raison d’être and raison d’état to clarify a future step in his 
critiques that fundamentally question political liberalism. Those French political concepts 
are not simply political theory; they have a history that goes hand in hand with the 
development of the modern state to today.760 
Bobbitt’s Discontinuity on Raison d’être and Raison d’état 
 Hauerwas leans on Philip Bobbitt’s work in two major ways. First, Hauerwas has 
absorbed Bobbitt’s thesis that “the modern state came into” being through coercion and 
war-making for self-interest.761 This helps flesh out Hauerwas’s account of the wars of 
religion and maintains in some ways continuity with the present. But Bobbitt’s thesis 
notwithstanding, in substance Bobbitt downplays that the nation-state never turned from 
its roots in pursuing self-interested power. This problem occurs in his categories for the 
different evolutions of the modern state. 
 Second, Hauerwas employs Bobbitt’s distinction between the state-nation (1776-
1870) and its successor, the nation-state (1861-1991). In the state-nation, the state 
musters “a national, ethnocultural group to act on behalf of the state,” with the example 
being Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) rallying the French.762 But in the nation-state, 
“the state [is] for benefit[ing] the nation it governs.”763 The state-nation and nation-state 
distinction is important and helpful. So are Bobbitt’s other, chronologically preceding 
																																																								
760 John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army, 1610-1715 (New York, NY: Cambridge University, 1997), 30-31, 215, 
596-609; Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 139-144; Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 150-156; Hauerwas, AE, chp. 7; 
Hauerwas, “Epilogue: A Pacifist Response,” 174-177. 
761 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York, NY: Knopf, 2002), xxv. See also ibid., 
96, 174; Hauerwas, AE, 122-123; Hauerwas, WAD, 25-26 n. 17. 
762 Hauerwas, AE, 123; Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 146. 
763 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 146; Hauerwas, AE, 123. 
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categories of the state: the princely state (1494-1572), the kingly state (1567-1651), and 
the territorial state (1649-1789). However, Bobbitt is less helpful when he implicitly 
relegates the various forms of reason of state to the early modern age of the princely state 
(ragione di stato), the kingly state (raison d’état), and the territorial state (Staats 
raison).764 
 This historical relegation of reason of state, I will show, creates a rupture between 
the early modern state and the contemporary nation-state. Bobbitt’s historical account 
only pays lip service rather than robustly develops the fact that the transition from kingly 
state to territorial state to state-nation to nation-state did not mean that the power 
dynamics and the state’s self-serving legitimation of its sovereignty were changed in a 
fundamental way. Raison d’état is not only a political doctrine of sovereignty crucial to 
the rise of the early modern state’s birth through self-interested war. But also, by paying 
only lip service, he overlooks that raison d’état remains vital to the modern nation-
state.765 
 My break here from Bobbitt begins my development of Hauerwas’s thought 
beyond Bobbitt. Hauerwas sides with Foucault’s contention that “politics is the 
continuation of war by other means” to overcome Bobbitt’s view that “war simply 
‘is.’”766 But whenever Hauerwas appeals to Foucault’s work, Hauerwas does not include 
Foucault’s treatment on raison d’état. Perhaps this is because, like Bobbitt, Foucault 
																																																								
764 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 75-143, 346. I use Staats raison for consistency with Bobbitt, rather than other common spellings, 
Staatsraison or Staatsräison. 
765 Hauerwas once noted that he was “impressed…by Anthony Giddens’s account of the discontinuity in the change from the 
absolutist to the modern nation-state” (WW, 94 n. 7. See also Hauerwas, AC, 33-34; Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, chp. 4, 
esp. p. 121.). I do not aim to conflate historical differences, but to show amidst them a line of continuity concerning state power. There 
is warrant for that much even in Giddens since he writes: “France expanded in a relative stable way across the centuries from the Île 
de France, and it [is] surely not accidental that the most powerful and centralized absolutist state is also the one which the lineages of 
modern nationalism can most easily be discerned” (ibid., 119). Giddens’s example is the French state’s endeavor, particularly 
Richelieu’s, to make Parisian French the language of the country, which I will address in a later note (ibid.). 
766 Hauerwas, AE, 123-124. See also Hauerwas, WAD, xi. 
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describes political liberalism in the nineteenth as breaking from raison d’état. Yet unlike 
Bobbitt, Foucault robustly argues that raison d’état still subtly continues today. It was not 
only fragmented and diffused into aspects of the state’s sovereign mechanisms over civil 
society, but also part of that process was developed by the rise of a political economy 
birthed from the principles of raison d’état. I will, however, leave the link between 
raison d’état and political economy for another time. I also have to leave a historical 
genealogy of raison d’état from its roots in antiquity and medieval Europe to today for 
another time. Instead, after addressing Bobbitt, I will show how focusing on raison d’état 
deepens Hauerwas’s critique of the past and present modern state without Bobbitt’s 
problems.767 
 Bobbitt carefully distinguishes, chronologically and ideologically, between 
ragione di stato associated with Italian “princely states,” raison d’état with French 
“kingly states,” and Staats raison with German “territorial states.”768 Ragione di stato, he 
summarizes as, “rational, unprincipled justification for the self-aggrandizement of the 
State.”769 Ragione di stato “distinguish[es] the state code of behavior from the moral code 
of the prince (such as deceit or treachery) when the state takes on the role of the prince 
																																																								
767 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, ed. Arnold I. Davidson and trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 318-319 (For a similar account that follows Foucault leaving behind raison d’état, 
see Bell, Liberation Theology After the End of History, 23-29, 38 n. 66.); Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, chp. 13, esp. p. 
354; Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 14. 
 My development here will put Hauerwas on the political side of some early feminists, the Jansenist nuns a Port-Royal-des-
Champs Abbey, insofar as they rejected the divine right of kings and the reason of state on the basis of divine sovereignty and, for that 
witness they were summarily thrown out onto the street through collusion of Louis XIV and Pope Clement XI. Although the 
Jansenists did so because of their theology, and so does Hauerwas, their doctrinal similarities and dissimilarities are more complex. 
Dale K. Van Kley, Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Constitution, 1560-1791 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1996), pp. 11-12, chp. 1; Daniella Kostroun, Feminism, Absolutism, and Jansenism: Louis XIV and the Port-Royal 
Nuns (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 14-15, chps. 3-7, and pp. 239-246; Paul Kléber Monod, The Power of 
Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 6-7, chps. 3-6. 
768 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 83-143. 
769 Ibid., 108. 
	 220 
and the prince is relieved of his moral obligations as an individual.”770 Raison d’état, he 
summarizes as, “a parallel justification [to ragione di stato] through the personification of 
the state, and [raison d’état] leveraged the imperatives of this justification to impose 
obligations on the dynastic ruler.”771 Accordingly, raison d’état represented “a reason 
invoked on behalf of a king justifying his acts as being those imposed on him by the State 
(such as aid to Protestant princes by a Catholic king); it identifies the king with the State 
when he takes on the role of the state.”772 Similarly, the shift from kingly state to 
territorial state was concurrent with a shift from raison d’état to Staats raison. The kingly 
state’s raison d’état was a constitutional imposition on the “monarch-as-embodiment of 
sovereignty.”773 In the territorial state, reason of state shifted to the “monarch as minister 
of sovereignty.”774 There “Staats raison is the rationale given on behalf of the State, an 
imperative that compels its strategic designs (such as the seizure of a proximate province 
for geostrategic designs). It identifies the state with the country, the land.”775 
 I whole heartedly affirm Bobbitt’s attention to historical details, but there are 
problems in his account. He grants a general fluidity and progressive accumulation in 
history that his Hegelian historical classification is too rigid to accommodate. 
Nonetheless, and counter to Hauerwas’s project, Bobbitt’s categories and historical 
																																																								
770 Ibid., 136. 
771 Ibid., 108. 
772 Ibid., 136. 
773 Ibid., 143. 
774 Ibid. See also Poggi, The Development of the Modern State, 68-77. 
775 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 135-136. For an historical account of reason of state in the Anglo-British tradition, see Poole, 
Reason of State. 
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narrative lend an implicit affirmation of liberalism’s raison d’être-raison d’état narrative 
through two steps that actually break historical continuity.776 
 First, Bobbitt’s strict emphasis on the discontinuities among the Italian, French, 
and German versions of reason of state underplays an important overlap between raison 
d’état and Staats raison. Bobbitt clearly notes that both are constitutional and deeply 
ambitious. However, less clear, and at best only partially noted, is that both raison d’état 
and Staats raison are imposed upon the monarch/minister by the “constitutional orders”; 
both are the ground for realpolitik domestic and foreign policies; and both are justified by 
the state’s raison d’être of “special responsibilities.”777 This basic continuity is crucial. It 
covers the historic period when, for example, the French state was developed through war 
and justified by raison d’état. By that manner of development, the state in turn 
established and partially secured essential characteristics that formed the modern French 
nation. The state’s role as such is in continuity with Hauerwas’s claim, through Bobbitt, 
that war formed the state preceding the nation. However, Bobbitt’s nuanced emphasis on 
distinguishing raison d’état and Staats raison is a form of classification that breaks 
important continuity. This downplays the importance of reason of state, and in turn serves 
a historical supersessionism in the next point.778 																																																								
776 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 827. One import of Bobbitt’s attention to historical details confirms that reason of state is closely 
aligned with absolutism, but still separable from it (Meinecke, Machiavellism, 134). As for the break against raison d’état, Bates 
argues for that too in terms of natural law (States of War, 215-216). However, even in Bates’s own narrative the autonomy and 
autonomous reason of the state, of the political, and of natural law are interrelated (ibid., 44-45, 91-92, 105, 221). In fact, it is the 
concurrent and later development of natural law with reason of state that justifies the autonomy of reason of state (ibid., 48, 50-51, 
221). Poole acknowledges Bobbitt’s historical framework (Reason of State, 3, 97-99, 168); however, without addressing Bobbitt’s 
break, Poole attempts to show the continuity (ibid., 128-130, 254-262). But whereas Poole starts with Hobbes, Kantorowicz has shown 
that “natural reason” and what would become “reason of state” are tied together even in the medieval period as the monarchy began to 
replace the church (The King’s Two Bodies, 255, 257). 
777 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 108. See also ibid., 109, 121, 133-136; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 109-111; Meinecke, 
Machiavellism, 167-168, 280-281. 
778 Hauerwas once noted that he was “impressed…by Anthony Giddens’s account of the discontinuity in the change from the 
absolutist to the modern nation-state” (WW, 94 n. 7. See also Hauerwas, AC, 33-34; Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, chp. 4, 
esp. p. 121.). I do not aim to conflate historical differences, but to show amidst them a line of continuity concerning state power. There 
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 Second, Bobbitt creates an oversimplified break between raison d’état and today. 
With reason of state fragmented, he gives an historical description of the kingly state and 
the territorial state replaced by the state-nation without an account of reason of state. This 
formula, on the one hand, serves a careful historical account that distances the territorial 
state from both the state-nation and nation-state. On the other hand, the formula and 
distance also serve Bobbitt’s normative understanding of the nation-state. It is one 
without an account of reason of state, even though some have noted that raison d’état 
undergirds modern “executive prerogative.”779 And in a somewhat similar fashion, 
Bobbitt’s Hegelian historiography allows that the princely state’s “balance of power” and 
the kingly state’s “ideological hegemony” were maintained in later state iterations.780 But 
that continuity is precisely what he pays lip service to concerning raison d’être. Instead, 
his account, for both the state-nation (historical account) and for the nation-state 
(normative account) above, replaces raison d’état-Staats raison with history identifying 
and shaping the state’s raison d’être. With the distance provided by changes over time, 
																																																								
is warrant for that much even in Giddens since he writes: “France expanded in a relative stable way across the centuries from the Île 
de France, and it [is] surely not accidental that the most powerful and centralized absolutist state is also the one which the lineages of 
modern nationalism can most easily be discerned” (ibid., 119). Giddens’s example is the French state’s endeavor, particularly 
Richelieu’s, to make Parisian French the language of the country (ibid.). This is a crucial point. While the Treaty of Verdun in 843 
established the kingdom of France (Francia Occidentalis) in the Île-de-France dutchy (the province today surrounding Paris), 
Richelieu and Louis XIV sought to solidify and expand that once a small, relativized kingdom among other ‘French provinces’ into 
what was effectively a nation for the states’s interests (Richelieu) and the glory called the grand siècle (Louis XIV). In order to 
solidify the monarch’s control, they built on Francis I’s 1539 Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts declared langue d’oïl––specifically the 
dialect of Paris and the Loire River valley, which eventually became modern French––to be the official language. That development 
was not only later heavily promoted by Richelieu, but was also vital for Louis XIV’s attempt to solidify early modern France under his 
bureaucracy and to support France’s colonial endeavors across the globe. For the development of the French language, see R. Anthony 
Lodge, French: From Dialect to Standard (New York: Routledge, 1993), 63, 71-78, 95-104, 120-135, esp. 135 and the following: 
159-160, 169-173, 178-185, 190, 192-195, 211. But contra Bobbitt’s emphasis on the originality of the state-nation, it is worth noting 
that Richelieu appropriates an already existing French nation for asserting the state’s autonomy. That appropriation for autonomy 
parallel previous French endeavors by Philip VI (1293-1350) and Philip IV (1268-1314), which Richelieu and Kantorowicz raise 
respectively. The difference is that Richelieu’s was more successful and long-lasting. See The Political Testament of Cardinal 
Richelieu, 123 or Testament Politique D’Armand du Plessis, Cardinal Duc de Richelieu (Amsterdam: Henri Desbordes..., 1688) 
Seconde Partie, Chapitre IX, Section VIII, pp. 187-188; Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 66 n. 52, 195, 229, 235-237 (esp. 237), 
247-262. 
779 Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 82, See also ibid., 83-84. 
780 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 279. See also ibid., 214-215. 
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the state’s reason for being is informed by the wisdom of hindsight and by the need to 
protect the present from recurring problems, rather than the state ideologically driven by 
justified self-interest. History, then at least indirectly, gives the state its mission. That is, 
unfortunately, another way of construing liberalism’s narrative of raison d’être leading to 
raison d’état.781 
 One of the nation-state’s chief responsibilities includes controlling the use of 
force for the “survival” of the state and its citizens, as Bobbitt asserts.782 Essential to this 
understanding of the state’s own sovereign power is its “monopoly” over legitimate 
violence and a policing of illegitimate violence.783 The question is not if one should see 
that raison d’être and raison d’état are still linked today. Rather, the question for 
contemporary liberals is whether to privilege state/national interest outright, like R. 
Niebuhr and Hegel, or to maintain the Kantian legacy by stressing the modification of the 
reason of state for universal human rights through the UN, like Dorrien. These 
differences notwithstanding, the basic ground is still the same. The liberal narrative treats 
the nation-state’s raison d’être as a security service to the nation that precedes, and 
																																																								
781 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 5-6, 173-175. For Bobbitt, “the State exists by virtue of its purposes, and among these are a drive 
for survival and freedom of action, which is strategy; for authority and legitimacy, which is law; for identity, which is history” (ibid., 
6. See also ibid., 204, 206-208, 216, 280, 334-336.). 
The irony here is palpable. Privileging history could be helpful considering Bobbitt’s argument that war formed the modern 
state. It is that formational account which Hauerwas employs most. However, Bobbitt’s emphasis on history supplants raison d’état-
Staats raison in both Bobbitt’s historical account and his normative understanding of the state. This supplanting exemplifies his larger 
break between the failures of the past and the potential of today. That runs against Hauerwas’s project. But continuity between the 
nation-state and kingly state’s power dynamics is, I believe, helpful for illuminating Hauerwas (AE, 120-136). Recovering the 
historical connection is vital not only for maintaining Bobbitt’s insights, but also for that connection establishing an alternative, a 
robust historical account about the world’s aeon from then to now. Without that alternative, Hauerwas opts to segue from critiquing 
Bobbitt to critiquing Kant on the basis that war just is (AE, 123-125). If Hauerwas bought into critiquing them on their terms, he 
would have implicitly bought into R. Niebuhr’s ahistorical existentialist account of human sin that Hauerwas connects to Kant (ibid., 
134). But Hauerwas rejects their ahistorical terms, opting to critique them in light of the wars of religion and the category of religion 
followed by a Yoderian eschatology (ibid., 130-131, 135-136). 
782 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 6. This is continued in his account of the market-state (ibid., 235-328). 
783 Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, 206. 
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thereby justifies, the state securing its own self-interested power through coercion and 
violence.784 
Developing Hauerwas’s Position through Autonomy,  
Exception, Raison d’être, and Raison d’état 
 One might then grant that raison d’être and raison d’état are at most mutually 
informing. Yet, the logic of raison d’état is more fundamental to political liberalism than 
it admits. Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben, Hauerwas, and others have exposed political 
liberalism’s failure to realize that law is not self-grounded on its own autonomous reason. 
Instead, liberal law stands upon a secularized theology of the sovereign who decides 
exceptions to law in light of necessities and interests. To add to their critiques of political 
liberalism, the continued presence of exceptions to the law shows that raison d’état is 
still crucial for the nation-state’s sovereignty and its biopolitics even in an international 
world with a UN.785 
																																																								
784 G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), §§ 321-340; Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, chp. 4; Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. 
Coate, and Kelly-Kate Pease, The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 6th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2010), lvi-lviii, 24, 
157, 211, 229-232, 369-371, 389-390. Engster implicitly acknowledges how issue of security justifies the state’s power even in his 
call to critically rethink legitimacy in order to break the connection from raison d’état (Divine Sovereignty, 201-202). In contrast 
Alfred Vagts argues that the US has tried to distance itself from raison d’état by the use of any other kind of justification that can be 
found. However, since raison d’état is about autonomous sovereign power and its interests legitimated by a peace-making and -
keeping mission, raison d’état is present in the US whenever the state's agents assert a sovereign action in the name of national 
interests, as noted by a range of scholars. Particularly damning is London Fell’s observation that reason of state is “influential in” the 
US’s Declaration of Independence. Alfred Vagts, “‘Reason of State’ in Amerika,” Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien 15 (1970); Hannah 
Arendt: The Last Interview and Other Conversations, ed. unknown (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2013), 114-116; Robert Jackson, 
Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations: From Anarchy to Cosmopolis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 45-
47; Nolan, The Age of Wars of Religion, 2:739; Ivan Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in 
France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 116, 146; Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, and Pease, The United Nations and Changing 
World Politics, lvi; Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, 233-242, esp. 239-240; Arthur S. Miller, “Constitutional Reason 
of State,” in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, 2nd ed., ed. Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst (New York: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2000), 649-650; Sotirios A. Barber, “Inherent Powers,” in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, 1370-1371; 
Louis Fisher, “Emergency Powers,” in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, 886-887; A. London Fell, Origins of Legislative 
Sovereignty and the Legislative State, vol. 6, American Tradition and Innovation with Contemporary Import and Foreground Book 1: 
Foundations (to Early 19th Century) (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 57. 
785 Patrick O. Gudridge, “Emergency, Legality, Sovereignty: Birmingham, 1963,” in Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality, ed. Austin 
Sarat (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 86.  
I am deeply wary of Schmitt because his work against the Weimar Republic is intellectually connected to his Nazi 
conversion and his support for Adolf Hitler’s despotism. However, I do take from him, in a very limited capacity, his insight about 
political liberalism hiding the fact that it requires a secularized sovereign, either as an individual or as a small number of individuals. 
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 The very nature of raison d’état is about making the state itself and its interests an 
exception to not only the rule of law, but also to other facets of life. Reason of state is the 
claim that the state has its own autonomous sphere and concomitant morality because the 
state’s basic interests are their own form of public rationality. Less recognized is that the 
state’s act of making itself an exception undergirds autonomy inherent in the reason of 
state. Richelieu’s raison d’état asserted a separation between the monarch’s personal 
morality and his public role. He did so to demand, as the monarch’s chief minister and 
confessor, that the monarch set aside his personal morality of Christian charity in order to 
act according to the morality of raison d’état. The latter can require personally immoral 
acts in order to secure justice and peace, but for the monarch to not act accordingly is 
actually to act immorally in the position of monarch. Richelieu and others argued as 
much under the guise of, broadly, the monarch’s God-given duty to secure the public 
																																																								
Schmitt is most famous for that insight, which is largely why I mention him. But he need not be the only one or the primary frame of 
reference. For instance, I will prepare soon the ground for noting later that reason of state was initially a quasi-religious and quasi-
secular version of the divine right of kings.  
Citations for Schmitt, Agamben, and others could be very long if I were to include the incredible amount of articles on 
them. So for brevity I will mostly note a selection of books: Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of 
Sovereignty to Proletarian Class Struggle, trans. Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014); Carl Schmitt, 
Legality and Legitimacy, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Schmitt, Political Theology, chps. 
1-3; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Giorgio 
Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Homo Sacer II, 2), trans. 
Lorenzo Chiesa with Matteo Mandarini (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. 1, Abhandlungen, part 3, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 887; Walter 
Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt and trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1968), 257; Walter Benjamin, The Origin 
of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (New York: Verso, 1998), 65-66; Michael Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter 
Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History,” trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso, 2005), 58, 126 n. 71; Bretherton, Resurrecting 
Democracy, chps. 6-8; Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004), pp. 60-64, 
chp. 5; Andrew W. Neal, “Goodbye War on Terror?: Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War, and Exceptionalism,” in 
Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal (Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); 
Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); 
Hauerwas, AE, 35 and n. 35, 69-71, 128-132; Hauerwas, WAD, 59; Hauerwas, WT, 172; Hauerwas, WwW, 49-51; “Hauerwas on 
Hauerwas and the Law,” 236, 244, and n. 64, 249-250; Kahn, Political Theology; Smith, Weird John Brown, pp. 48-49, 136, chp. 3. 
 Foucault could be included in the list above, but sufficiently delineating the reason why would take too long here. So I will 
simply note the following. Despite Agamben’s criticism of Foucault for overlooking exception, Foucault could be read as showing 
how exception becomes the norm––a permanent state of exception––through sovereign power wielding the law for exception. That 
much is precisely what Schmitt and Benjamin contend. For just such an argument, see Mika Ojakangas, “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-
Power: Agamben and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 2 (2005): 17-18. Hauerwas also makes his own Schmitt-Foucault connection 
through Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz, which illuminates the normalization of war (AE, 123-124, esp. 124 n. 15; WAD, 47-48). 
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interest and, narrowly, the monarch’s political responsibilities to his lords’ interests. The 
Cardinal’s Constantinian salve accordingly minimized theological interference by 
reducing Christian salvation to “attrition” instead of “contrition.”786 So Richelieu may 
appear to situate the monarch as simply responding to realities and necessities of ruling. 
But in truth Richelieu’s arguments were about exempting the French monarch’s violent 
domestic and foreign pursuits from the prevailing social morality, ecclesiastical 
influence, and political arrangements that obstructed the autonomy of state interests.787 
 Richelieu’s project is far from antiquated. The separation of private and public 
morality and its use to legitimate the state’s self-interested power are fundamental 
assumptions undergirding R. Niebuhr’s project. The private-public morality separation 
parallels his distinction between moral man’s selflessness and immoral society’s 
selfishness. The latter’s selfishness restricting reason may countermand Richelieu’s 
emphasis on ruling through reason. But in more significant continuity with Richelieu, 
Niebuhr’s account of the nation’s selfishness is its distinctive rationality not only inherent 
to the nation but also necessary for its unity and survival. In that society, for Niebuhr, 
only justice can be obtained. So Niebuhr’s realist solution accordingly privatized Jesus’s 
love ethic and accommodated US’s violent pursuit of national interests. Thus, even 
though Hauerwas attributes the separation of an ‘external’ “‘morality’…from economics 
																																																								
786 Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 90, 403. 
787 Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, ed. Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1997), 310-311; Bates, States of War, 45-51; Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 85-98, 475-513; Engelmann, Imagining 
Interest in Political Thought, 87; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, chp. 3; Meinecke, Machiavellism, 167-168; The Political Testament of 
Cardinal Richelieu, pp. 3-5, and part 2, chps. 1-3, 9-10. For Richelieu’s project worked out in the conflict between Louis XIV and the 
Companie due Saint Sacrement, see Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice, 23-25. 
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[and] politics” to Kant’s legacy, Hauerwas has been implicitly working against the logic 
of raison d’état for most of his career.788 
 Political liberalism assumes war would be an exception, an “aberration,” if the 
state is sovereign over violence, but Hauerwas has recently argued the reverse.789 In 
terms of raison d’état, the exceptional status of the state’s autonomous interests secured 
in violence makes war normal. With the state and war as such, they precede and override 
law. The early modern state’s rise was predicated on making it an exception in order to 
make war for self-interests. So, the formalization of war went hand in hand with the 
formation of the state. Ironically, that actually ensures war. War, the power to wage war, 
and the power over war are inherent in the politics of the modern nation-state, Hauerwas 
contends, is not an aberration.790  
 Initially, then, Hauerwas appears to undercut issue of exception and to limit 
himself to concerns only about war. But Hauerwas also employs Paul Kahn’s contention 
that war is fundamentally sacrificial, and thereby a form of sacred violence. Kahn asserts 
that in war “sovereignty shows itself as an end in itself,” and that a war, like the US ‘war 
on terror,’ cannot be bound by law.791 Law and humanitarian police actions follow the 
logic of sacrificial honor that intensifies violence, and the sacrificial character of war 
																																																								
788 For the quote, see Hauerwas, STT, 148. For the rest of the paragraph, see Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, introduction, 
and chps. 1-4, 8, 10; Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, chps. 2-4, 6-7; Dorrien, EDE, 33-34, 37-45; Dorrien, SEM, 250-
251, 266-269, 676-677, 680; Dorrien, SS, 347-350; Dorrien, "Realist Binaries and the Borders of Possibility”; Hauerwas, WAD, 23. 
 Of course the private-public distinction in terms of morality can be traced back to earlier figures than I have or Hauerwas 
develops, like to Machiavelli and Michel de Montaigne (Hauerwas, WAD, 8; Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, 310-311; 
Engelmann, Imagining Interest in Political Thought, 86-87). Hauerwas, applying Barth, notes a similar politics to Richelieu found in 
an English contemporary: Oliver “Cromwell’s…delusion Karl Barth calls ‘the syndrome of the two kingdoms’; Cromwell seems to 
suppose he can lead a decent life in private which in public follows ‘chance or laws of its own.’” Hauerwas, CET, 209; Karl Barth, 
Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, trans. Grover Foley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1979), 129-130. 
789 Hauerwas, AE, 121.  
790 Ibid., 121-124; Hauerwas, WAD, pp. xvi, 47-51, chp. 5. 
791 Paul W. Kahn, Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 150.  
	 228 
cannot but keep making exceptions to law. “Kahn suggests,” Hauerwas concludes, “that 
war is the way states sanctify their existence––an ironic result, given the widespread 
presumption that creation of the modern nation-state system was necessary to stop” the 
wars of religion.792 For Hauerwas, it is “war that makes clear that there is no higher value 
than the continued existence of the state,” or as Hauerwas employs Kahn, “war is about 
the existence of ‘the sovereign as an imagined transcendental value.’”793 
 An alternative expression of this irony is that the state’s raison d’état, as its own 
end, precedes the modern state’s raison d’être and its laws. From the early modern state 
born from war up through the contemporary nation-state, the modern state exists first as 
self-grounding power for realizing its own self-interests through war and others’ 
sacrifices in war. The irony of this is that the state created itself through exception, and 
therefore the state is ultimately beholden to its own exception and violence before it is 
bound by law. The state will always make exceptions for war and self-interested power 
that override law because the state’s violent autonomy precedes it mission of 
peacemaking by lawful ordering. That, for liberalism, construes war and raison d’état as 
the tail wagging the dog. But political liberalism’s attempts to enshrine the fundamental 
primacy of law misunderstands exception.794 
 The responsibilities, interests, and ultimately the sovereignty of raison d’état are 
undergirded by the state’s power as an exception to the mechanisms for peace that it 
																																																								
792 Hauerwas, AE, 129. Hauerwas also notes Paul W. Kahn’s Putting Liberalism in its Place (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 240 and surrounding pages for a similar thought (Hauerwas, AE, 34-36;“Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 249). 
793 For the quotes, see “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 249; Hauerwas, AE, 128-129; Kahn, Sacred Violence, 150. Also see 
“Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 250 for Hauerwas’s comment that Kahn and him are “quite similar.” For the rest of the 
paragraph, see Hauerwas, AE, 34-36, 69-71, 123-129, esp. 128-129 (for Hauerwas’s earlier work on war as sacrifice, see AN, 183-
185); Kahn, Sacred Violence, 148-149, 151-152; Hauerwas, WAD, p. 48, chp. 5. 
794 Hauerwas, AE, chp. 7; Hauerwas, WAD, pp. xv-xvi, 47-51, and chp. 5; Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice, 117, 130, 146; Berlin, The 
Proper Study of Mankind, 310-311; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. 
(New York: Basic Books, 2006), 254, 268, 325; Fatovic, Outside the Law, 32, 53-54. 
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ensures. The state can then declare an exception to mechanisms like law. Fundamental 
state interests, like policing power and a monopoly over violence in particular, are 
synonymous with what is necessary for the state to exist in light of its responsibilities 
(e.g., securing national interests and safety). Yet the sovereignty of the state makes the 
state an exception from what the state oversees––a non-democratic sovereignty to secure 
a democracy––despite appeals to rule by the people. In raison d’état “the sovereign 
power of the state could only be truly effective if it was separated from the form of 
government that enacted it.”795 
 One particularly clear instance of this separation, and in terms of efficiency, is 
found in the 1994 Supreme Court Case Waters v. Churchill. The case was about a former 
employee of a public hospital who was fired for criticizing her superior in a private 
conversation with another employee while taking a break at work. The Court vacated an 
earlier ruling in her favor because the court rejected that she could claim her First 
Amendment right of free speech. In continuity with precedent set by earlier Supreme 
Court decisions and with the majority of the other judges on the bench, Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion distinguished between the state as sovereign and state as 
employer. She asserted that, on the one hand, the state as sovereign does not limit First 
Amendment rights. But on the other hand, the state as employer “may under certain 
circumstances violate” public employees’ First Amendment rights for “the interest of the 
State…in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
																																																								
795 Bates, States of War, 46. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 47. 
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employees.”796 I expect Schmitt, Kahn, and others would note that the sovereign-
employer separation is an ironic exception instituted by jurisprudence. But more to the 
point, this exception is the raison d’état logic in two ways.797 
 First, the Supreme Court separates state power (employer) from the form of 
governance (democratic free speech) in order to secure the state’s effectiveness in terms 
of efficiency. Waters and others can be fired on the basis of their superior’s reasonable 
judgment without the due process of law in a liberal democracy. Thus jurisprudence 
hands itself over to bureaucracy for efficiency, which Hauerwas has critiqued.798 
 Second, while this separation of power and governance is shot through with 
exception, undergirding the separation itself is, ironically, an act of sovereignty masked 
by the category of employment. Under the guise of efficiency (raison d’état) to achieve 
the state’s mission (raison d’être), the state as employer can make an exceptional 
																																																								
796 Waters v. Churchill, 511 US 661, 668-669. Emphasis is mine, not O’Connor’s. See also ibid., 674-75; Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 142 (1983). As for other judges on the bench, David 
Souter notes that “though Justice O’Connor’s opinion speaks for just four Members of the Court, the reasonableness test it sets out is 
clearly the one that lower courts should apply” (Waters v. Churchill, p. 685, concurring opinion). Indeed, the precedent set and 
secured by Pickering v. Board of Education, Connick v. Myers, and Waters v. Churchill was employed in Horstkoetter v. Department 
of Public Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1271-1274 (1998). For the precedent and latter’s decision shaping other cases, see the examples of 
Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 998-999 (1999); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (1999); Bass v. Richards, 308 F. 
3d 1081, 1088-1089 (2002); Arndt v. Koby, 309 F.3d 1247, 1251-1252 (2002). And in case one understandably assumes my 
connection to Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety, I do not know that branch of the Horstkoetter family. I simply stumbled 
onto the case. 
797 Schmitt, Dictatorship, 9-10, 13-14. By Kahn’s estimation, even the votes by the justices are individual decisions that amount to a 
decision that is itself an exception (Political Theology, 90). Feldman, by partial contrast, may call such an exception a norm because 
of the Court’s affirmation of the executive branch (Leonard C. Feldman, “The Banality of Emergency: On the Time and Space of 
‘Political Necessity,’” in Sovereignty, Emergency, Legality, esp. pp. 159-160). I affirm both views if they are framed in terms of action 
and ideology normalized respectively. That distinguishing in order to unify is far from unusual by critics of the state of emergency. 
They see not only that the appeal to emergency in dire situations exposes a sovereign rather than the law as the ultimate. They also see 
through the initial shock of emergency situations as legitimating a continual endeavor (or norm) to avoid the law. Both are deep, 
intertwined ironies in political liberalism. The latter irony, such as the Court affirming exception, confirms the former irony in the 
executive branch. But what is particularly interesting about Kahn’s contention is in the implied reversal of how the branches work 
together, so often perceived of as legislation first, executive enforcement second, and judicial confirmation third. The reverse, 
structurally speaking, is that the action of the Court’s sovereign decisions is affirmed by the other two branches. So with the Court 
first, the distinction of action and ideology are perhaps not distinguishable. The Court’s action is a sovereign exception instituted as a 
norm. That reversal illuminates similar but obscured action-norms of other branches. For instance, the president has normalized 
prerogative to launch nuclear weapons at the push of a button (Kahn, Political Theology, 2). 
798 Waters v. Churchill, 669; Hauerwas, AC, 33-34, 64-66; Hauerwas, BH, 226 n. 31. Justice Antonin Scalia was the only one to reject 
skirting procedure (Waters v. Churchill, 686-694), but O’Connor replied that procedure does not ensure free speech (ibid., 669-671), 
citing the court’s ruling in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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sovereign decision (raison d’état) to limit the mission of state sovereignty (raison d’être) 
in order to ensure self-serving power in the interests of the state (raison d’état). 
 Both making the exception and limiting free speech for raison d’être are deep 
illiberal incoherencies within political liberalism, due to jurisprudence recognizing that 
power and decision-making-an-exception are the ultimate ground, not the law. 
Liberalism’s nation-state cites its mission of creating peace by ensuring rights in order for 
the state to appear as ordered (ordinata), legitimate power (potestas). However, when the 
mission for peace conflicts with the state’s raison d’état, then raison d’être is overruled 
for the state’s actual grounding in sheer, autonomous might (potentia absoluta), and its 
desire for more power. Thus, political liberalism’s narrative of raison d’être requiring 
raison d’état is actually the reverse. Raison d’état is a tautology that, to justify itself, 
employs a raison d’être.799 
 Up to now I have contended that, in French political terms, Hauerwas’s more 
recent work argues that raison d’état is legitimated by raison d’être. Despite the modern 
nation-state putting on airs of neutral objectivity for war, state warfare is instead 
ideologically driven by a pathological securing of its own self-interested power. This 
project is achieved further under the guise of protecting ‘public’ self-interests from “the 
fear of death,” and protecting the status quo for the greed and banal illusions of autonomy 
in capitalism.800 Such a project is nothing short of rejecting the politics of friendship and 
its source, the gifts of God’s sovereign agency, as outlined in chapter three. I have 
																																																								
799 Hauerwas finds US law “interesting” precisely because it does not have a “bottom,” but then follows with the next sentence “that 
is, it is a law without a bottom unless you think the Supreme Court is the bottom.” For Hauerwas, US law appears to be a tradition 
dependent form of practical reasoning, but he “worr[ies] that one of the dangers of liberalism as an ideology is how it can work to 
undermine the common law tradition.” What I have argued about concerning reason of state, I believe, gets to the heart of Hauerwas’s 
worry. For the quotes, see “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 236, 247. See also ibid., 239, 244-245. 
800 Hauerwas, PF, 208. See also ibid., 27-28, 207; Hauerwas, AE, 89-90; Hauerwas, WAD, xiv n. 10, 17, 24-25, 26 n. 20, 34, 48; 
Hauerwas, WwW, 134. This parallels Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, 152-179. 
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developed Hauerwas’s work by establishing his early engagement with raison d’état, by 
teasing out how he continued to reject raison d’état, and then by combining my 
constructive work on raison d’état with aspects of his criticisms of privatization, war, and 
efficiency. But for Hauerwas there is one more element to, broadly, the state’s hegemonic 
sovereignty and, narrowly, the wars of religion narrative. The state ‘created’ the category 
of religion in order for the state’s sovereignty to replace divine sovereignty.801 
The Category of Religion and State Sovereignty as Sacred 
 The rise of the modern nation-state through self-interested war is predicated on 
the concomitant creation of the decidedly non-neutral category of religion. Hauerwas, 
using Cavanaugh, describes the modern characterization of religion as some kind of 
“trans-historical” and “trans-cultural” private belief or spirituality “essentially distinct 
from public, secular rationality.”802 Construing ‘religion’ as such is deeply problematic. 
The category of religion is an abstract universal that separates faith from its particular 
language, content, and/or social existence. That separation, in turn, creates a broken 
definition of religion no matter how it is construed. When religion is defined by its 
substance in doctrines or practices, religion is too narrow to incorporate all faiths. The 
alternative is defining religion by its “function,” but doing so is too expansive because 
issues like “nationalism” could fit as well.803 These definitional problems indicate that an 
																																																								
801 Hauerwas, DF, 10. 
802 Hauerwas, AE 129; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 9. See also ibid., 19, 25, 28, 45, 50, 58-59; Hauerwas, WwW, 90. 
Perhaps this marks a change for Hauerwas since he once wrote: “The church is one political entity in our culture that is global, 
transnational, transcultural” (RA, 42). Recently Hauerwas has argued against the term “global Christianity” as studied by the academic 
anthropologists, but for the church catholic as witness and as mission in diaspora (WwW, 39-60; WAD, chps. 10, 12). 
803 Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 8. See also ibid., p. 6 and chp. 2, esp. pp. 57-58, 105-120. For problematizing of 
religion in terms of nationalism prior to Cavanaugh explicitly framing of substance and functionalism, see ibid., chp. 1, esp. pp. 23-24, 
31, 34-37, 47-48, 55-56. 
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alien framework is at play, rather than the category simply collecting together different 
faiths describing themselves.804 
 The religion category, Hauerwas and Cavanaugh contend, is determined by 
distorting liberal mechanisms that marginalize ecclesial influence in order to serve state 
power. Political liberalism’s social contract means that “the only entity with political 
standing is the individual,” and so the citizen-state relation precludes room for other 
socio-political entities.805 That policing already excludes faith from being recognized as a 
source of politics, but this strategic goal also goes hand in hand with disenfranchising 
faith communities. The issue is, then, what to do with faith. Since the wars of religion 
characterized faith as irrational, chaotic, and violent, faith cannot be allowed in public 
without restrictions. The generic category of religion is just such a fundamental 
restriction. ‘Religion’ re-defines faith as a belief relegated to one’s private life in order to 
keep faith away from significant discussions and actions in society. The privatization of 
faith and a strong state enforcement of an autonomous moral-political order, by liberal 
accounts, should keep the religious conflict at bay. But considering the actual histories of 
the category of ‘religion’ and of the ‘wars of religion,’ Hauerwas maintains not only “that 
any attempt to isolate ‘religion’ from any social, economic, and political realities cannot 
be sustained.”806 Those two ways of understanding ‘religion’ are instead part of an 
“attempt to legitimate state control of the church.”807 There is warrant for such a striking 
																																																								
804 Hauerwas, AE, 129-132, 180 and n. 9; Hauerwas, SU, 62-65; Hauerwas, AE, 71-77, 131, 180 and n. 9; Hauerwas, IGC, 202; 
Hauerwas, SU, 58-59; Hauerwas, WwW, 90-91; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, esp. pp. 57-58, 101-105, 120-122. 
805 Hauerwas, CC, 219. See also ibid., 83-84, 127, 130-131, 148-150, 158-162, 171. 
806 Hauerwas, AE, 131. Hauerwas’s point is left implicit in reference to Kant (AE, 124-128, 132, 134-135), but he has account of just 
such an attempt by Kant elsewhere, although towards a different end and without reference to the wars of religion or the category of 
religion (STT, 148-151). 
807 Hauerwas, AE, 131. 
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claim even when the state appears to take seriously the separation of church and state. 
Since religion is construed as nothing more than an individual’s private interest in the 
contemporary US, salvation has become accordingly “individualistic.”808 This reduction, 
Hauerwas argues, enables and supports coherence with market-values and “modern 
democratic presuppositions” of autonomy.809 The reduction and coherence have the effect 
of replacing discipleship as learning the “craft” of following Jesus from tradition and a 
masterful community.810 Consequently, liberalism’s abstract politics of the autonomous 
citizen-consumer supplants Christian particularity, formation by an ecclesial community, 
the supreme Good, and the theological and moral virtues that belong to Christianity’s 
distinctiveness and mission.811 
 State control through privatizing ‘religion’ not only exposes liberalism’s 
hegemonic attempt to police Christianity. The privatization of faith also creates a public 
gap for the state to fill with its own attempt to be divinely sovereign. To make matters 
worse, liberal theology is complicit in that endeavor. But how can that be? After all, 
																																																								
808 Hauerwas, AC, 96. See also ibid., 95, 97; Hauerwas, BH, 114-115; Hauerwas, IGC, 210. 
809 Hauerwas, AC, 102. See also ibid., 95-101; Hauerwas, AN, chp. 7; Hauerwas, IGC, 200, 210; Hauerwas, STT, 222-225. 
810 Hauerwas, AC, 102. See also ibid., 101, 103-108. 
811 Hauerwas, AE, 125-131, 180 n. 9; Hauerwas, IGC, 200-201; Hauerwas, SU, 60-65; Hauerwas, WAD, 8-9; Hauerwas, WwW, 90-91; 
Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, pp. 5-8, 59, 60, 69, 83-85, 90-92, 94, 96-122, and chps. 3-4; Cavanaugh, “A Fire Strong 
Enough to Consume the House,” 405-408; Hauerwas, IGC, p. 188 and chp. 13, esp. pp. 199-202, 210; Hauerwas, STT, 193; Hauerwas, 
SU, 60, 62-63; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 4; Hauerwas, AN, 124-125, 128, 181-182, 188; Hauerwas, WW, 116; 
Hauerwas, AC, chp. 3. 
 I do not intend to lose Cavanaugh’s subtlety here. The term religion has its roots in the latin religio, the name for “social 
obligations in Ancient Rome” and later “a concrete expression of a set of practices” like worship in Christianity (Hauerwas, AE 131; 
Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence, 62, See also ibid., 63-64, 67, 81.) But not only was religio not a word commonly used by 
the patristics, and even less by the medievals (ibid., 62-69). It was also certainly “not…a system of propositions or beliefs,” nor “a 
purely interior impulse secreted away in the human soul” that could be construed as “separable––even in theory––from political 
activity in Christendom” (ibid., 66, 68. Emphasis original.). The figures who contributed incremental breaks from the past in “the 
creation of the modern category of religion” were: Nicolas of Cusa (1401-1464), Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), Francisco Suárez 
(1548-1617), Guillaume Postel (1510-1581), Thomas Becon (1511-1567), John Calvin (1509-1564), and Lord Herbert of Cherbury 
(1583-1648) in particular who “had a profound influence Grotius, Descartes, and Locke” (ibid., 70, 75. See also ibid., 70-78). Then 
with Locke, religion become the term we recognize today (ibid., 78-85). But Locke’s importance also shows that the incremental 
development does not undermine that the contemporary category of religion is a modern invention for political ends. The creation of 
religion both from and against religio corresponds to Hauerwas’s statement: “the Enlightenment emerged from a reconsidered 
Christian heritage, but in order to take root, crystalized and ossified forms of that heritage had to be defeated” (DF, 198 n. 30). 
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Hauerwas notes that R. Niebuhr places state sovereignty in a subordinated position to 
divine sovereignty, even though both Niebuhr and John Courtney Murray argue that the 
state’s attempt to be neutral, that is secular, means there is room for divine sovereignty. 
However, through a rare appreciative use of Murray, Dorrien appears to agree with 
Hauerwas at least on concluding to a superficial plurality in a liberal society and on 
liberalism policing faith. Yet then Dorrien and Hauerwas differ.812 
 Dorrien finds liberative promise in the liberal emphasis on equality. So he argues, 
in terms of justice, for developing religious freedom to overcome superficial pluralism 
that ignores or suppresses real differences. Hauerwas eschews the nation-state’s 
categories of religion and religious freedom that demand privatization and translation. 
Those categories and demands distort the substance of Christian faith by shearing it from 
its socio-political constitution crucial to social salvation. The all too often result is that 
Christianity “becomes” tantamount to “a court religion held captive to the interests of a 
nation-state” and no longer “capable of calling into question ‘the public.’”813 
 Dorrien’s valuing of truth and giving up success for a prophetic stand, as noted in 
chapter one, are aimed at keeping Christianity from becoming a court religion. Yet 
Rauschenbusch’s role for the state in his tripartite structure and Dorrien’s qualification of 
that––the state’s involvement in redemption limited to justice––correlate with the sphere-
making of raison d’état. The monarch in the early modern state claimed access to God 
not limited to the confines of papal power precisely because raison d’état was initially a 
																																																								
812 Hauerwas, CC, 72, 246 n. 4; Hauerwas, WW, 55-56; Dorrien, EDE, 364. 
813 For the quotes, see Hauerwas, AC, 74; Hauerwas, WW, 116. For the rest of the paragraph, see Dorrien, EDE, 359-364; Hauerwas, 
IGC, chp. 13. 
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quasi-religious and quasi-secular development of the divine right of kings. The historical 
development of political liberalism, even some liberals admit, accordingly furthered the 
secularization of the divine right rather than “break decisively from” it.814 This continuity 
explains why, in contrast to Dorrien, Hauerwas undercuts the presupposition that the 
modern nation-state makes room for divine sovereignty. The state claims ownership over 
the keys to death since the state asserts “a monopoly on legitimate violence to save us 
from the violence of religion.”815 In effect, the state creates a sacral order “supplanting” 
alternative, authoritative sources like Jesus and the church.816 The state’s most significant 
raison d’être as sacred, neutrally objective peace-maker is a trumped up charge to justify 
the state’s raison d’état, the state as the ultimate authority, as the exception determining 
life and death through death. That emphasis on death is, Achille Mbembe argues, not so 
much a biopolitics but a “necropolitics.”817 In accepting this new sacred order, Christian 
loyalty is exchanged for what is tantamount to another, perverse kind of sacred, the 
necropolitics of the state that seeks to regulate and transcend death through unity in 
violence and rules. Thereby the gifts of God’s sovereignty, the gifts of creaturehood, true 
peace, and Christian witness, have been rejected and supplanted to support a self-
interested rival, human autonomy.818 
																																																								
814 Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 199. See also Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 508; Meinecke, Machiavellism, pp. 135, 355, 
and chp. 17; Strenski, Contesting Sacrifice, 116-117, 123, 147. 
815 Hauerwas, AE, 132. See also ibid., 131. 
816 Cavanaugh, Myth of Religious Violence, 113. See also ibid., 114-118, 120-121; Hauerwas, AC, 66; Hauerwas, AE, 131-132; 
Hauerwas, CET, 189 n. 30; Hauerwas, WAD, chp. 5; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 9-12.  
817 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture, 15, no. 1 (2003). 
818 Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 472-504; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 83-84, 198-199; Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious 
Violence, 4-5; Engster, Divine Sovereignty, 83-84, 196-199; Hauerwas, AC, 142-144; Hauerwas, DF, 150-151, 194-195 n. 22; 
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Michael Donelan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 176; Hauerwas, AC, 66-68, 71; Hauerwas, AE, 131; Hauerwas, CET, 182-
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Dorrien’s Presumable Suspicion 
 Hauerwas’s critique of state sovereignty is problematic on Dorrien’s terms, which 
value liberalism’s liberative potential because of its ideals and its historical success in 
realizing the ideals. His pragmatic streak further strengthens his objection to the isolation 
of the church and faith from liberal democracy. On those terms, Hauerwas’s rejection of 
an activist church is as overblown now as it was when Hauerwas first made the argument. 
It would be inconsistent for Dorrien not to judge that Hauerwas’s claim of a new agency 
still has yet to fully make good on relating to aspects of society that aim at fulfilling the 
liberative commands in the Bible. As much as solidarity is about living-with, even 
suffering with, solidarity is part of making sure all needs are met for liberation.819 
 In some respects, the above is an update of the church-world difference that 
Dorrien saw at the heart of their disagreement. But simply interpreting the issue of 
hegemonic sovereignty as such would be too simplistic. It is addressing human intra-
relations and thereby reality that underlies their disagreements over the church-world 
relation as Dorrien saw it. Hauerwas’s later work, then, seems even further isolated from 
a society where “politics is finally an arena of limited options.”820 Dorrien may grant that 
one could not work with a state so diametrically opposed to Christianity, but he does not 
hold to the same description of the state as Hauerwas. Dorrien appears to assume the wars 
of religion narrative, and he repeatedly claims that “the way beyond modernity is through 
it.”821 So I assume Dorrien would extend the same criticism to Hauerwas as Dorrien 
																																																								
819 Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 44-47; Dorrien, SS, 356-357, 371; Dorrien, “Unintended Aid”; Hauerwas and Willimon, “A Reply.” 
820 Hauerwas, DF, 10. 
821 Dorrien, WTM, 9. See also Dorrien, EDE, xii; Dorrien, KRHS, 4. 
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levels at Barth. He did not given enough credence “to the apologetic aspects of theology 
done as ‘faith seeking understanding.’”822 A sufficient enough commonality and some 
measure of translation are necessary for intelligible communication and the mutual 
endeavor of seeking the truth.  
 But earlier in Resident Aliens, Hauerwas and Willimon’s advocacy for a radical 
break, a “revolutionary ethics,” was already about a revolution from liberalism rather than 
a revolution within liberalism.823 Six years later, Hauerwas went further in an excoriating 
critique of Rauschenbusch and R. Niebuhr’s embrace of liberal democracy as justification 
for Constantinian power.824 Hauerwas still holds to rejecting procedural democracy, 
despite Stout’s 2004 critique of Hauerwas “as decidedly anti-democratic.”825 Dorrien pre-
empted Stout here too, criticizing Hauerwas and Yoder’s “Christian anarcho-pacifism” 
and its support from Yoder’s account of Jesus’s Lordship.826 Dorrien still maintains that 
Resident Aliens was “unintended aid” to injustice and oppression.827 I note, then, that my 
work on raison d’être and raison d’état only creates further distance between Dorrien 
and Hauerwas at the most basic level. That is if the discussion were simply left here. 
III. Conclusion: Fracture and Hope 
 Divine and political sovereignty and human subjectivity and agency are at the 
heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s disagreement. Their different understandings of the 
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two sovereignties at work exemplifies a deep fracture in the political voices of Christians 
in the US. Granted there are other facets of Christianity’s political voice, like the 
Evangelicals and Catholics that Dorrien and Hauerwas have addressed in varying 
degrees. But I agree with Dorrien’s assertion in 1995 that he and Hauerwas represent the 
two most promising, albeit divergent, options for a post-Christendom, Protestant 
Christianity in the US.828 
 For Dorrien, divine sovereignty and spiritual subjectivity work with and in the 
world to transform the world. But from Dorrien’s perspective, Hauerwas’s accounts of 
divine sovereignty, of humanity as creature-friends, and of liberal democracy set him in 
an isolating direction that is still potentially unbiblical. For Hauerwas, his understanding 
of divine sovereignty and human subjectivity fundamentally question the modern nation-
state’s sovereignty because Jesus is the truth of the triune God who is sovereign by gift-
giving. From Hauerwas’s perspective, Dorrien’s divine sovereignty and human 
subjectivity fundamentally integrate with state sovereignty. Hauerwas has not explicitly 
accused Dorrien of Constantinianism, but the social gospelers’ and R. Niebuhr’s forms of 
integration with state sovereignty is a major hallmark of Constantinianism. From 
Hauerwas’s position, then, it is difficult to see how Dorrien sufficiently avoids 
Constantinianism, even considering Dorrien’s arguments for a counter-cultural witness 
from the margins and a recovery of the evangelical heritage. This articulation of their 
differences stresses the theological vector of the two sovereignties at work covered in 
chapter three.  
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 In the Hauerwas section of this chapter, I raised the other vector: liberalism as a 
whole, and the liberal nation-state specifically, operating on them also contributes to their 
different responses to political sovereignty. Dorrien’s divine sovereignty fits with state 
sovereignty, but as a sometimes critical voice for the internal development of liberalism. 
This critical continuity occurs because liberal theology is part of the larger liberal project. 
Hauerwas’s project is not part of the liberal project. He questions the state’s mission of 
peacemaking and its reasons for doing so based on his better hope in Jesus’s sovereignty 
and in turn humanity’s new agency. As a result, Hauerwas illuminates the modern state’s 
sovereignty as intrinsically hegemonic, rather than hegemony as a symptomatic 
expression of US imperialism. 
 Hauerwas and Dorrien’s friendship and their generosity toward each other’s work 
are helpful. But how is the next generation of theological discussion not fated to repeat 
their categorical impasse? Is development beyond that impasse possible? Answering 
these questions is vital since Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s divergent trajectories seem to be 
moving further apart. As I have argued elsewhere, the theological roots of liberation 
theology have slowly given way to simply social solidarity and moral praxis. Hauerwas’s 
worry about the separation of theology and ethics is being further realized; and while 
Dorrien’s historical work has been recognized, his call for a spiritual center is largely 
overlooked. If this situation continues unabated, soon enough the faithfulness versus 
social justice narrative will become self-fulfilling as a solidified conflict forcing a false 
decision for US Christians.829 
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 Yet hope is still present. Hauerwas and Dorrien both maintain a vision of human 
relations more expansive than the state’s conceptions of politics. That political surplus is 
found in both of their arguments about achieving the common good through a 
decentralized politics of subsidiarity, localism, and radical democracy. Despite 
Hauerwas’s rejection of liberalism’s “procedural” democracy, he advocates for 
“deliberative democracy” in local communities so people with significant differences can 
discover the common good together.830 Hauerwas’s work on friendship, hospitality, and 
disability not only reflects the heart of l’Arche; he also raises them as exemplars in his 
discussion on radical democracy. Dorrien’s advocacy for breaking up the banks among 
other regulatory mechanisms constitute a socio-economic policy to be lobbied for in 
Washington D.C. But the larger issue of economic democracy is about a grass roots 
movement to “suit particular social and cultural contexts” in the expanding pluralism of 
US society.831 Additionally, while Dorrien’s vision is about co-operatives and worker-
owned enterprises, he also critically appreciates the Occupy movement and supports the 
churches’ involvement in it. Those two ‘prongs,’ of vision and activism, can be construed 
as forms of radical democracy in the framework of subsidiarity.832 
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 Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s political surplus is intelligible in their rejection of the 
self as self-constituted or self-determined. They maintain a positive understanding of 
multiple sources that determine the self. So there are multiple communities and narratives 
at work, although some may be more authoritative than others. Yet as much as their 
surplus countermands the sphere-making of raison d’état, their surplus is obscured by the 
terms of the discussion beholden to political sovereignty as it is, and more superficially, 
social justice versus faithfulness. So how can they be freed for complex space? How can 
communities be recognized as authoritative in a political sphere where the power of state 
sovereignty is predicated on the individualism of the social contract? The answer lies in 
Rowan Williams’s work on multi-layered, decentralized politics.
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CHAPTER 4 
Williams’s Political Horizon:  
With and Beyond Hauerwas and Dorrien 
 Rowan Williams advocates for state sovereignty, constituted by securing raison 
d’état hidden under the guise of procedural policing, to be transformed into supporting a 
decentralized, co-operative, and discussion-oriented politics. In his vision, the identity 
forming power of social groups and their concomitant traditions are recognized to be 
authoritative for the subject’s identity and to play an essential role in public life, 
including politics and the common good.  
 The transformation of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty is a tall order; however, 
there is significant warrant for doing so. Williams’s concerns are partly about recognizing 
the plurality of society that is suppressed by England’s monopolistic jurisprudence. I 
have similar concerns about the US context. The US government’s hegemonic 
sovereignty forms our imagination in a way that leaves us incapable of receiving and 
responding to the plurality of US society in an adequate and healthy manner. Consider 
the plight of the Native Americans, the chattel slavery of Africans, and the historical 
effects of those oppressions that are still real today for both groups. We are encountering 
similar problems today with other social groups. In particular, the xenophobic trumped-
up ‘specter’ of Islam and Shari’a law has stimulated unsuccessful and successful attempts 
to establish laws excluding the possibility of Shari’a in state jurisprudence.833 																																																								
833 For those who scoff at the idea of the transformation of state sovereignty, it as a current reality has been well recognized by 
political scientists beginning in the middle of the 1990s and has since produced a massive amount of discussion. The issue is primarily 
whether or not the state should go along with its ongoing transformation pushed by global capitalism, and less primarily its greater 
reception towards multiculturalism. For select examples, see Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Kanishka Jayasuriya, “Globalization, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From 
Political to Economic Constitutionalism,” Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory 8, no. 4 (2001); 
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 As much as there is warrant to transform the fundamental nature of state 
sovereignty for the common good, the central concern of my argument here is that 
Williams’s work provides a new horizon for the theological discussion. Specifically, I 
argue that his political horizon opens up the Hauerwas-Dorrien discussion, on the one 
hand, by meeting much of the political criticisms and surplus in their thought, and on the 
other hand, by going beyond them toward transforming state sovereignty without 
Constantinian presumptions. 
 Like Dorrien, I am wary of “giganticist analyses that sound radical but which 
strangle political agency.”834 I emphasize, therefore, the practical aspects of realizing 
Williams’s transformative vision. But in this chapter the most significant value of his 
thought is that it opens up our imagination. The situation of Hauerwas and Dorrien’s 
argument, not just the argument, is crucial. Williams illuminates the division over 
political sovereignty, and he shows how it need not be that way. He sketches a vision of 
state sovereignty that frees Hauerwas and Dorrien from the pressure of the state’s 
																																																								
Bobbitt, Shield of Achilles, chps. 9-13; Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, updated 
ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Roland Axtmann, “The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and 
Its Contemporary Transformation,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 3 (2004); Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly, eds., 
Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007); 
Raia Prokhovnik, Sovereignties: Contemporary Theory and Practice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Here I attend to a thick 
account of multiculturalism and briefly how its transformation of the state offers an alternative to both the nation-state as it has been 
understood and the market-state as political scientists prophesy. I am paralleling at points constructivist emphasis on ideas both 
broadly and specifically. For example, Wendt not only argues for the transformation of sovereignty. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy 
is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992). He also opts for 
radical democracy. See Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science 
Review 88, no. 2 (1994), 393. See also Weinert, Democratic Sovereignty; Tanja E. AAlberts, “The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel 
Governance Europe––A Constructivist Reading,” Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 1 (2004). But the issues of faiths and 
their corporate bodies are often missing in constructivist discussions on state sovereignty in the contemporary context. See Thomas J. 
Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Weinert, 
Democratic Sovereignty. So if this chapter is indeed constructivist, it is an outlier. 
834 Dorrien, “Economic Democracy and the Possibility of Real, Healthy Change,” 141. But at the same time, an audacious vision is 
essential. I am also wary that the critique of state sovereignty in chapter three and the transformative vision of it in this chapter can be 
co-opted. As Bartelson writes, “those of us who had spent so much intellectual labor deconstructing and historicizing sovereignty––
sometimes in the vain hope of escaping its hold over our political imagination––had there by inadvertently provided the rhetorical 
resources necessary for its governmentalization and restoration.” My difference from Bartelson is that an ‘escape’––his word, not 
mine––is possible precisely because it has already occurred. The triune God’s ordering of Christianity’s social ‘imagination’ is a 
concrete reality in faithful churches. That ecclesial embodiment’s concern for the cosmos, through instances like inter-faith dialogue, 
shows an alternative to the state’s homogenized sovereignty and provides the external pressure necessary to call for a state’s 
decentralized sovereignty. For the quote, see Jens Bartelson, Sovereignty as Symbolic Form (New York: Routledge, 2014), vi. 
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hegemonic sovereignty. The hegemonic issues of privatization and translation disappear 
in Williams’s decentralized, discussion-oriented politics, in which the social groups and 
their particular languages matter. This transformation alleviates the pressure state 
sovereignty contributes to the impasse and fracture in US Christianity. Indeed, 
Williams’s vision of transforming state sovereignty frees Hauerwas and Dorrien from 
their different responses to the constraints of a common assumption: the permanence of 
state sovereignty. By permanence of state sovereignty, I do not mean that state 
sovereignty does not shift. It seems to be transforming from a nation-state to a market-
state, as I will address. I also do not ignore the fact that Hauerwas and Dorrien critically 
engage the state, even opting for alternatives to it. Those critical shifts object to but do 
not unravel the state’s own pathological compulsion to secure its self-serving power 
through mechanisms like privatization and translation. What I mean by permanence is 
assuming rather than transforming the state’s own self-understanding and its mechanisms. 
The assumption of permanence is a weed that strangles their political surplus. But if we 
are freed from this presumption, we can act––as I believe Hauerwas and Dorrien want––
in a relational way to each other that is not beholden to hegemonic sovereignty, no matter 
if the state initially wants to co-operate or not. In such “ad hominem” practical reasoning 
we can realize where and how we can know one another differently.835 Hauerwas and 
Dorrien could be brought together in a fresh way through advocating for the 
transformation of state sovereignty in the process of proleptically realizing its new form. 
																																																								
835 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 36. Emphasis mine. 
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In short, we can live in “complex space,” and thereby call the state to catch up.836 So my 
interpretation of Williams’s new horizon has implications that can change the internal 
discussion of Christianity in the US and the nature of Christian work for the common 
good. 
 Williams opens, then, the possibility that the Dorrien-Hauerwas discussion can be 
freed from disagreements over political sovereignty’s status quo. But Williams’s work is 
not simply a pragmatic bridge through ethics. Ethics and theology are united. So the final 
conclusion not only shows that his political vision issues from his theological horizon, 
but also suggests that his theopolitical horizon critically develops crucial aspects of 
Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theopolitics. By addressing Williams’s challenge, the Dorrien-
Hauerwas discussion can be re-freshed for beginning to move beyond fracture. 
I. Williams’s Programmatic and Procedural Secularisms 
In 2008, then Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams gave a lecture on civil 
and religious jurisprudence at the Royal Courts of Justice in London. He primarily argued 
that monopolistic state jurisprudence ignores but should accommodate Shari’a law in a 
way similar to what the Jewish court system (Beth Din) already enjoys. The dominating 
response was a public uproar displaying anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiment with 
woefully uniformed opinions about Shari’a law and what Williams actually meant, much 
less why. The ‘Shari’a lecture’ continued his long standing engagement with secular 
political liberalism in England, by building on his knowledge of the English state 
																																																								
836 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 271. It is Milbank’s term 
“complex space” that I appreciate, in the same manner as Long: “Liberalism will close down any ‘complex space’ that exists outside 
of the ‘simple space’ liberalism creates” (The Goodness of God, 102). But I am reticent about other aspects of Milbank’s work, even 
in his chapter on complex space. For instance, I am not convinced by his analysis of liberation theology because it has always been 
more diverse than the Latin American Catholic theologians (The Word Made Strange, 270). 
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pluralists John Neville Figgis (1866-1919) in particular, as well as G. D. H. Cole (1889-
1959) and Harold J. Laski (1893-1950). The heart of Williams’s political thought lies in 
this engagement, not in the popular, mass media misunderstandings of his claims that 
were reported to the public.837 																																																								
837 Rowan Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective,” was initially published online at his Archbishop 
of Canterbury website, now archived here: http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1137/archbishops-lecture-
civil-and-religious-law-in-england-a-religious-perspective. His lecture has since been republished as “Civil and Religious Law in 
England: A Religious Perspective,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 10, no. 3 (2008); as “Appendix I: The Archbishop of Canterbury, The 
Rt Rev Dr. Rowan Williams, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective,” in Shari’a in the West, ed. Rex Ahdar 
and Nicholas Arony (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and as “Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious 
Perspective,” in Islam and English Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a, ed. Robin Griffith-Jones (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). Since Williams’s lecture was officially published first online, Shari’a in the West gives paragraph 
numbers for the reader to locate its physical publication of his lecture with his digital publication. Similarly when citing his lecture, I 
will use the paragraph number(s) denoted by ¶ or ¶¶ due to the awkward pluralization issue of para. The same goes for Nicholas 
Phillips’s (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers) sympathetic response to Williams’s lecture, published as “Appendix II: Equality Before 
the Law,” in Shari’a in the West. Phillips’s lecture “Equality before the Law” was also previously published here, National Archives, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131202164909/http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj_eq
uality_before_the_law_030708.pdf, and through Pro Bono in the LMC and London Muslim Centre in a formal pamphlet here, 
http://archive.eastlondonmosque.org.uk/archive/uploadedImage/pdf/LMC%20Lord%20Chief%20Justice%20booklet.pdf. 
 For Jewish courts, see Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 8; Nick Tarry, “Religious Courts already in 
Use,” BBC, Feb. 7, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7233040.stm; Clare Dyer, “Jewish Beth Din could be Archbishop’s 
Model,” Guardian, Feb. 8, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/feb/09/uk.religion2; Tariq Modood, “Within the Law,” 
Guardian, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/feb/15/withinthelaw; Frances Gibbs, “High Court Opens 
Way to Sharia Divorces; Devout Couples could Settle under Religious Laws Landmark Ruling Opens the Way to Divorce by 
Religious Courts,” Times, Feb. 1, 2013, pp. 1, 7. For two examples of UK Jewish courts, see London Beth Din (UK), 
http://www.theus.org.uk/londonbethdin, and Manchester Beth Din (UK), http://www.mbd.org.uk/site/page/beth-din. 
 For sources chronicling the uproar, most of which also explain and/or defend Williams, see Samia Bano, “In Pursuit of 
Religious and Legal Diversity: A Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the ‘Sharia Debate' in Britain,” Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 10, no. 3 (2008); Frederiek Depoortere, “Rowan Williams’s Shari’a Lecture: Law, Love, and the Legacy of the 
Enlightenment,” Political Theology 13, no. 4 (2012): 426; Robin Griffith-Jones, “The ‘Unavoidable’ Adoption of Shari’a Law––the 
Generation of a Media Storm,” in Islam and English Law, 12-14, 17-19; Mike Higton, “Rowan Williams and Sharia: Defending the 
Secular,” International Journal of Public Theology 2, no. 4 (2008); Vincent Lloyd, “Complex Space or Broken Middle? Milbank, 
Rose, and the Sharia Controversy,” Political Theology 10, no. 2 (2009): 227-228; John Milbank, “The Archbishop of Canterbury: The 
Man and Theology Behind the Shari’a Lecture,” in Shari’a in the West, 43-46; Tariq Modood, “Multicultural Citizenship and the 
Shari’a Controversy in Britain,” in Shari’a in the West, 39-40. 
 For the English state pluralists, see Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 32-35, 126-
135 (hereafter FPS). The same connection between Williams’s lecture and the English state pluralists is made by Jonathan Chaplin, 
“Legal Monism and Religious Pluralism: Rowan Williams on Religion, Loyalty and Law,” International Journal of Public Theology 
2, no. 4 (2008): 424-426 and Mark D. Chapman, “Rowan Williams’s Political Theology: Multiculturalism and Interactive Pluralism,” 
Journal of Anglican Studies 9, no. 1 (2011). There are of course other influential thinkers, female and male non-Christians, who are 
noted later. I emphasize Figgis among the English state pluralists because he has had by far the longest and strongest influence on 
Williams. See for instance, Rowan Williams, “Mankind, Nation, State,” in This Land and People: A Symposium on Christian and 
Welsh National Identity, ed. Paul Ballard and D. Huw Jones (Cardiff, England: Collegiate Centre of Theology, University College, 
1979), 121-122; Rowan Williams, “A Higher Responsibility,” by Paul Richardson, The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, 
May 8, 2008, http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/694/a-higher-responsibility-interview-with-paul-
richardson; Rowan Williams, “From Welfare State to Welfare Society – the Contribution of Faiths to Happiness and Wellbeing in a 
Plural Civil Society,” The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Nov. 5, 2008, 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1160/archbishops-lecture-celebrating-60th-anniversary-of-the-william-
temple-foundation; Rowan Williams, “Faith in the Public Square,”  The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Mar. 22, 2009, 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/817/faith-in-the-public-square-lecture-at-leicester-cathedral; Williams, 
FPS, 32, 49-52, 126. 
 For the English state pluralists’ texts, see Paul Q. Hirst, ed., The Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G. D. H. 
Cole, J. N. Figgis, and H. J. Laski (London: Routledge, 1989), which has an excellent introduction and readings from Figgis, 
Churches in the Modern State; G. D. H. Cole, Social Theory (London: Methuen & Co., 1920); Harold J. Laski, The Foundations of 
Sovereignty and Other Essays (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921). For more on political pluralism and/or the English state pluralists, and 
some with attention to the present, see Kung Chuan Hsiao, Political Pluralism: A Study in Contemporary Political Theory (London: 
K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1927); Cécile Laborde, Pluralist Thought and the State in Britain and France, 1900–25 (Basingstoke: 
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 In a more recent publication that mostly consists of lectures prior to the ‘Shari’a 
lecture,’ Williams defines secularism as “a functional, instrumentalist perspective, 
suspicious and uncomfortable about inaccessible dimensions.”838 Williams might then 
appear to reject political liberalism. But he is for it if framed as “the idea that political life 
can and should be a realm of creative engagement” for the common good.839 This 
definition of liberalism is aimed against reductive political accounts. The realm of 
creative engagement cannot be reduced to “a principle simply of democratic rights, nor of 
individual liberties.”840 The liberal state is secular in the sense that “loyalty to the state is 
not the same thing as religious belonging.”841 From this framework, Williams 
distinguishes two forms of secular political liberalism: “programmatic” and 
“procedural.”842 He rejects the programmatic understanding of liberalism, but he 
embraces the procedural. Programmatic liberalism follows after French secularism, 
which is characterized by sheer “functionality” and by the requirement of “clear public 
loyalty to the state.”843 Programmatic secularism, in a Kantian-like fashion, also reduces 
religious faith to “private convictions” or “choices,” construing the sacred as about more 
than what we might see and thus out of bounds.844 Faith can affect private morality, but if 
																																																								
Macmillan, 2000); David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); 
Marc Stears, Progressives, Pluralists, and the Problems of the State: Ideologies of Reform in the United States and Britain, 1909-1926 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 Elsewhere Williams also explicitly employs two constructive developments of the English state pluralists: David Nichols’s 
The Pluralist State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975) in Williams, FPS, 49-50 and Williams, “A Higher Responsibility”; and Mark 
Chapman’s two books, Blair’s Britain: A Christian Critique (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 2005) and Doing God: Religion 
and Public Policy in Brown's Britain (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 2008), in Williams, “From Welfare State to Welfare 
Society.” 
838 Williams, FPS, 15. Chapters one through six, eight, eleven, fourteen, nineteen through twenty-one, and twenty-three through 
twenty-six all predate the ‘Shari’a lecture.’ 
839 Ibid., 78. See also ibid., 3-4, 21, 80-83, 120-123. 
840 Ibid., 78. 
841 Ibid. 
842 Ibid., 2, 27. 
843 Ibid., 3, 5. See also ibid., 27, 38. 
844 Ibid., 3. See also ibid., 19-20, 26-27. 
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faith ever enters the public square, faith’s content must first be translated into secular 
concepts to divest faith of religious markers. In contrast, procedural secularism focuses 
on plurality. The state cannot give “advantage or preference to any one religious body 
over others,” nor may the state “requir[e] any specific public confessional allegiance 
from its servants.”845 Social bodies, not just individuals, are also emphasized in 
procedural secularism’s plurality. Social communities and their particular corporate 
nature are recognized as authoritatively constituting the individual subject and the local 
community. Such corporate plurality welcomes difference without privatization or 
translation. This is because the local communities are in direct discussion in public; they 
are not policed into the private sphere by a state that enforces a ‘neutral’ public 
language.846 
Williams’s differentiation between programmatic and procedural secularisms is 
crucial to his work for the transformation of sovereignty. I argue next that Williams’s 
critical analysis of programmatic secularism complements both Hauerwas’s critique of 
political liberalism as hegemonic and my development of that critique. Then I focus on 
Williams’s procedural secularism in order to show his transforming vision of the state. 
Only then can I show later how that vision offers a new horizon that parallels and opens 
the promise of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s political surplus without the limits of their 
impasse. 
																																																								
845 Ibid., 2. See also ibid., 20-21, 33. 
846 Ibid., 3, 18-21, 26-27, 31, 37-38, 58. 
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Programmatic Secularism’s Monopolistic Sovereignty 
 Williams’s account of programmatic secularism broadly corresponds to 
Hauerwas’s contention that political liberalism is hegemonic. Programmatic secularism’s 
aim is the “almost value-free atmosphere of public neutrality” in order to secure 
individual autonomy and peace.847 To achieve this end, programmatic secularism 
privileges the autonomous freedom and reason over and against external authorities like 
religion. However, Williams rejects not only just such an account of autonomy, but also 
the veracity of individual and state neutrality. Programmatic secularism creates a 
‘neutral’ public space under the auspices of a desire to create peace. Yet to do so requires 
the state to marginalize all rival authorities. The state does so through monopolizing 
public space, citizenship, and juridical mechanisms. This form of state-sovereignty 
demands that citizens “detach their perspectives and policies in social or political 
discussion from fundamental convictions that are not allowed to be mentioned or 
manifested in public.”848 However, this detachment is situated instead of neutral, and the 
state’s monopolization of public space and language is constraining rather than 
liberating.849 
 There is more to Williams’s description of programmatic secularism, which has 
more points of congruity between Hauerwas’s and Williams’s critiques of hegemony. For 
instance, Williams critiques the wars of religion narrative, the category of religion, and 
the use of them to legitimate procedural secularism for the same reasons as Hauerwas and 
Cavanaugh. But it is worth emphasizing how Williams’s view is distinct from 																																																								
847 Ibid., 27. See also ibid., 38-39. 
848 Ibid., 27. 
849 Ibid., 27, 38, 63-65, 68, 74, 88-89. 
	 251 
Hauerwas’s within their similar critiques of hegemony. I focus on first the influence of 
Roman sovereignty in relation to raison d’être and raison d’état. Then I highlight the 
importance of jurisprudence before concluding with the issue of pluralism.850 
 In order to illuminate the imperial nature of the modern state’s sovereignty, 
Williams raises the connection between Roman sovereignty and the modern state’s. The 
latter emerged through its own additions and subtractions to Roman sovereignty in order 
to support the state’s claim of autonomy under the auspices of serving its subjects 
autonomy.851 
 Following Figgis, Williams characterizes Rome’s imperial sovereignty as 
“intensely centralized” and as “systematically suspicious of private societies.”852 To 
achieve this Rome “imposed upon all nationalities an absolutely uniform culture, 
reinforced by a formidably organized army.”853 Rome’s aim of universal rule was 
achieved on the basis of “a higher law” than “local jurisdictions.”854 That “centralized 
system” was recovered shortly preceding and during the sixteenth century by monarchs 
seeking to become the “single source of all legality and jurisdiction” in order to be 
																																																								
850 Ibid., 37-44, 92, 302; Rowan Williams, “The Kingdoms of this World,” in “Symposium on William Cavanaugh’s The Myth of 
Religious Violence: Secular Roots of Modern Conflict,” Pro Ecclesia 20, no. 4 (2011); Rowan Williams, “Violence is an Unavoidable 
Part of Being Human: Where Does Our Brutality Come From?,” New Statesman, Jul. 31, 2015, 63; Rowan Williams, “Does it Make 
Sense to Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?,” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. Rowan Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 5-8; Rowan Williams, epilogue to Praying for England: Priestly Presence in 
Contemporary Culture, ed. Samuel Wells and Sara Coakley (London: Continuum, 2008), 176. 
851 Williams, FPS, 23-24, 28-32, 51-53, 64, 76-78; Williams, OCT, 268-269. If I were to give a historical genealogy of reason of state 
in chapter three, I would have also contended that the recovery of Roman law in the late medieval age was a crucial development for 
the later independence of state sovereignty in the rise of the early modern state. 
852 Williams, FPS, 51. 
853 Ibid., 51. 
854 Ibid., 77. This page and its surrounding pages are an important nuancing of Williams’s sympathetic critique of his own summary of 
Figgis’s “broad sweep of argument” (ibid., 52). 
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“inviolable, beyond challenge” or “appeal.”855 This form of sovereignty is the heritage 
upon which programmatic secularism is built. 
 State concerns about unification and an underlying fear indicate a fundamental 
acceptance of Rome-style sovereignty. Political unification is achieved by a supposedly 
universal, “timeless,” and “instrumental” autonomous rationality.856 By contrast, loyalties 
that tie citizens to alternative, historical communities are deemed sources of violent, 
irrational passions that create political chaos. So like the Roman Empire, programmatic 
secularism fears external loyalties and communities. Constructively, programmatic 
secularism also employs a monopolistic sovereignty like that of imperial Rome. The 
state’s mission, it claims, is to ensure an autonomous public order of autonomous 
individuals. But since external loyalties threaten social cohesion, programmatic 
secularism asserts that monopolistic sovereignty is necessary for peace. The wars of 
religion narrative exemplifies that irrational, violent, and competitive religion overthrew 
public order until the modern state made peace through claiming sole jurisdiction over its 
geographic boundaries.857 
 Williams puts questions to the narrative sequence that state’s mission requiring its 
autonomous power. The state’s reason for being is a justification for its self-serving 
“monopoly” on violence and for the demand “exclusive loyalty” over-against the 
communal bonds in other corporate groups.858 Specifically concerning faith, it is 
privatized. Historically rooted faith communities in particular contribute distinctive 
																																																								
855 Ibid., 51, 55, 77. See also ibid., 38, 52; Rowan Williams, “Liberation Theology and the Anglican Tradition,” in Politics and 
Theological Identity: Two Anglican Essays, by Rowan Williams and David Nicholls (London: Jubilee, 1984), 21-22. 
856 Williams, FPS, 27, 43. See also ibid., 37-39, 42, 44, 113, 294-295. 
857 Ibid., 26, 37-44, 51, 55, 62-65, 76-80, 101, 113, 120, 143, 292, 294-295, 302, 319. 
858 Ibid., 41, 43. See also ibid., 3, 37-40, 46, 55, 80, 302. 
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differences to the identities of persons and society, but programmatic secularism 
sequesters the communities from politics, economics, and society in order to make room 
for autonomous self-creation. By securing the private-public distinction over and against 
“‘alternative citizenship’... [like] the Christian community,” political liberalism “turns 
itself into a fixed and absolute thing, another pseudo-religion.”859 This ironic 
transformation into the state as “the sole source of legitimate common life” reflects 
Rome’s “absolute and universal” sacred sovereignty transcending any “local tradition” or 
governance.860 Programmatic secularism’s form of sovereignty excludes rivals in order to 
privilege the autonomous, self-interested subject. That pattern reflects the imperial and 
monopolistic designs of Roman sovereignty.861 
 Chapter three argued that the state’s ambition for hegemonic sovereignty 
undergirds its sacral order in relation to raison d’être and raison d’état. Williams, like 
Hauerwas, effectively overturns liberalism’s narrative of reason for being requiring reason 
of state, but without noting doing so in such terms. Above highlighted issues in 
Williams’s work that are specific, constitutive elements of the overturning. Programmatic 
secularism holds a pseudo-sacred sovereignty, enforces it through privatization, and 
justifies it by the wars of religion. Although those issues on their own are not sufficient to 
show the overturning, other parts of Williams’s work complete the overturning of the 
narrative of autonomous political reason grounding reason of state. He exposes the state’s 
use of exception and rejects its claims to autonomy, which are key characteristics of 
																																																								
859 Ibid., 79. See also ibid., 37. 
860 Ibid., 52, 77, 80. See also Williams, LI, 84. 
861 Ibid., 23, 26, 32-33, 38, 53, 74, 78-80, 84, 298-299; Rowan Williams, Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement 
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raison d’état in the modern nation-state. Williams notes that the state “claims the right to 
assess and on occasion overrule individual liberties” so the state can fulfill its mission 
against threats like terrorism.862 Yet in doing so the liberal state actually violates its 
mission of ensuring rights in order to secure its own sovereignty. Raison d’état 
undergirds exception with the state’s autonomy in its uniquely ‘natural’ reason. But 
Williams opposes that autonomy when he rejects its “ungrounded authority.”863  
 Williams objects in two ways that when joined undercut the logic of raison d’état. 
First, Williams rejects a state metaphysics (“Staatsmetaphysik”) because it makes “the 
state…a thing in itself.”864 Second, he disputes the state’s claim that its power is––as he 
and Karl Barth use the term––“potentia” as “pure might, defining its own ends.”865 This 
kind of power is illuminated when Williams makes his own connection of it to nuclear 
weapons. “The nuclear state…identifies its own Recht with eternal value and legitimacy, 
and regards itself as having in principle the authority to exterminate what threatens it––
not to resist, control, or discipline, but to exterminate.”866 The key words here are “state 
metaphysics,” “potentia,” and “own.” At the core of reason of state is the state’s own 
self-grounding, metaphysical rationality for the “eternal value and legitimacy” of the 
state’s potentia absoluta.867 
																																																								
862 Williams, FPS, 149. See also ibid., 32. 
863 For the quote, see ibid., 121. See also ibid., 31, 158. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, FPS, 60; Rowan Williams, Writing 
in the Dust: After September 11 (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2002), 34 (hereafter WD); Williams, FPS, 32, 37-38. 
864 Rowan Williams, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, ed. Mike Higton (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
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 Williams further countermands reason of state’s autonomy and all-encompassing 
nature with his alternative proposal to programmatic sovereignty. For him, “procedural 
secularism is the acceptance by state authority of something prior to it and irreducibly 
other to it” and “a theology of the state in functional terms” is “essential.”868 This 
rejection of a state metaphysics and assertion of state function supplies the ground for a 
“theological critique of a positivist view of sovereignty.”869 Williams asserts the 
sovereignty of Jesus, which relativizes any claims by reason of state.870 The state’s 
“sovereignty is not a claim to be the source of law,” but rather the state’s sovereign 
power ought to be “potestas…power defined in terms of the purposive capacity to serve 
and effect law.”871 
 The second issue of the state’s sovereignty is found in its jurisprudence as part of 
the state’s larger project. Williams argues that the modern state enforces a legal 
monopoly through the mechanisms of citizenship and jurisprudence in order to secure 
privatization and its sovereignty. Citizenship is how the programmatic state universally 
enforces its minimalist, autonomous anthropology and private-public distinction. For the 
sake of political unity, everyone is primarily determined by the minimal identity of the 
social contract. The social contract, in turn, resists the substantive recognition of 
																																																								
868 Williams, FPS, 33; Williams, WA, 166. Emphasis original. It is worth noting that Schmitt points to the English state pluralists 
Figgis, Coles, and Laski as alternatives to Staatsmetaphysik. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, expanded ed., trans. 
George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 40-45. 
869 Williams, WA, 166. In more recent work, Williams’s “suspicion of ‘positivist’ notions of political power”––reducible to a 
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Staats raison. Rowan Williams, “Forum Debate: Is Europe at Its End? - Sant’Egidio International Meeting of Prayer for Peace,” The 
Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Sept. 12, 2005, 
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meeting-of-prayer-for-peace. See also Rowan Williams, Dostoevsky: Language, Faith, and Fiction (Waco, TX: Baylor University 
Press, 2008), 19 (hereafter Dost); Williams, FPS, 80. 
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871 Williams, FPS, 60; Williams, WA, 161. See also Williams, FPS, 57, 61. 
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“additional level[s] of social belonging” that constitute the subject’s public life.872 
Privatizing other communities undermines their claims to public authority. Put more 
negatively, programmatic secularism’s form of “citizenship” creates a social space in 
which the state polices expression of any other social loyalties.873 That state’s 
sovereignty, much like Rome’s, at best becomes “in some sense a source of legitimacy 
for other social groups.”874  That is, they have no political legitimacy on their own.875 
 Although Williams’s emphasis on citizenship is similar to Hauerwas, Williams’s 
focus on jurisprudence is largely a different avenue than Hauerwas’s critique. At the 
intersection of citizenship, conflict, and a “monopoly of legitimate force” is the state’s 
jurisprudence as the single and definitive authority.876 Monopolizing jurisprudence may 
help bring order, but it also tends toward monopolizing the resolving social relationships 
in a juridical frame. The latter, making the state’s juridical justice the adjudication of the 
conflicting freedoms of individuals, undermines the social resources for reconciliation 
and peace-making outside the state. This monopolistic reduction to individual, juridical 
subjects involves the state in policing both relations within the internal life of corporate 
bodies and relations among communities. Ironically, this involvement occurs in spite of 
the state’s claims of neutrality and self-distancing from the private sphere.877 
																																																								
872 Williams, FPS, 39, 64. 
873 Ibid., 61. See also ibid., 79-80. 
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875 Ibid., 38-39, 80, 119-120. 
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877 Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 6; Williams, FPS, 18-19, 23-27, 61, 120-125, 132-133. Williams’s focus on 
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 Consider for instance Williams’s (in)famous ‘Shari’a lecture.’ As a speech-act it 
was an intercessory attempt, in his capacity as the most senior Archbishop of the English 
state church, to raise the importance of Shari’a law for Muslim life in England to English 
state jurists. He argued that the state’s monopoly on jurisprudence and its imposition of 
the public-private distinction excluded Muslims’ own communal resources in Shari’a law 
for mediating internal disputes from being legally recognized or accommodated. Lord 
Chief Justice Nicholas Phillips, “the most senior judge in England and Wales,” affirmed 
the use and legal acknowledgment of Shari’a as Williams suggested.878 However, 
constructive conversation after Williams’s infamous ‘Shari’a lecture’ was conducted in 
the state’s ideological categories. Interfaith discussion, even when calling for change, was 
oriented by the state’s terms. There could be public, legal accommodations in accordance 
with the state’s external pressure of privatization on the internal politics and public 
visibility of the Muslim community. Actual accommodations made to Muslims, from the 
state’s point of view even as argued by Phillips, are to individual citizens in pursuit of 
personal freedom. Accommodations are thereby directed to individual citizens of the 
realm. In turn, accommodations are granted indirectly at best to juridical bodies for 
arbitration such as the various Jewish law courts or various Muslim “councils.”879 But 
accommodations are not made directly to the alternative communities themselves as 																																																								
878 “Sharia Law ‘Could Have UK Role,’” BBC World News, Jul. 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7488790.stm. See also 
Phillips, “Equality Before the Law,” ¶¶ 32-48, esp. 40-43. A similar argument for supplementing English law has been made 
regarding Kurdish immigrants to the United Kingdom, see Latif Taş, “One State, Plural Options: Kurds in the UK,” Journal of Legal 
Pluralsim and Unofficial Law 45, no. 2 (2013). For the possibility of Shari’a compliant wills in the US, see Omar T. Mohammedi, 
“Sharia-Complaint Wills: Principles, Recognition, and Enforcement,” New York School Law Review 57, no. 2 (2012-2013). 
879 For a selection of Muslim councils, see the Birmingham Shari’a Council, http://www.centralmosque.org.uk/1/services; the Islamic 
Shari’a Council, http://www.islamic-sharia.org; the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, http://matribunal.com; the Muslim Law (Shariah) 
Council UK, http://www.shariahcouncil.org; and Sharia Council Midlands, http://shariahcouncil-midlands.co.uk. See also Griffith-
Jones, “The ‘Unavoidable’ Adoption of Shari’a Law,” 18-19; Bano, “In Pursuit of Religious and Legal Diversity,” 294-295; Abul 
Taher, “Revealed: UK’s First Official Sharia Courts,” Sunday Times, Sept. 14, 2008, 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/Migration/article235989.ece. 
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social bodies. Doing so would require the state to legally recognize alternative authorities 
outside of the state’s scope.880 
 The third issue of state sovereignty is its negative relation to pluralism. In parallel 
with Hauerwas and partially with Dorrien, for Williams the regime of programmatic 
secularism leads to a superficial and ultimately harmful pluralism. Pluralism in general, 
and multiculturalism in particular, are at odds with liberalism’s secularized sacred 
sovereignty. The state’s boundaries do not determine the boundaries of politics, Williams 
contends. However, the “‘totalizing’ spirit” of programmatic secularism’s state 
sovereignty falls into the “danger of behaving and speaking as if it is the only kind of 
human solidarity that really matters is that of the state.”881 Such hegemonic homogeneity 
“silenc[es] the other” and, ironically, fragments the subject and society as a whole.882 The 
state’s timeless (ahistorical) monopoly is a claim to its own autonomy realized in 
autonomous individuals pursuing arbitrary desire and in privatizing social relationships. 
These ideals and mechanism suppress difference by hiding the sources of identity. 
Corporate forms of life, like faith, are reduced to social clubs centered on individuals’ 
inconsequential, private opinions. Faith is thereby rendered “invisible” and/or 
																																																								
880 Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶¶ 4-8; Ayelet Shachar, “Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious 
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882 Williams, FPS, 33. See also ibid., 31-32, 102; Williams, LI, 86; Williams, OCT, 268. 
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“decorative” without significant meaning.883 Although this strategy of political liberalism 
has produced gains in equality, the strategy also “isolate[s] us further from each other” 
and frames relations in terms of competition.884 The US fixation on abstract rights makes 
“the fragmentation…even more acute.”885 The reduction not only harms citizens, it also 
eliminates the ground and sources crucial for robust discussions necessary to discover the 
common good among differences. The modern state thereby works against a broader, 
substantive vision of politics for the common good.886 
 The similarity between Williams and Hauerwas is clear. But Williams’s thought 
on procedural secularism does not so easily cohere with Hauerwas’s critique of the 
modern liberal state. Williams’s account of procedural secularism allows him to argue 
that “loyalty to the state is not the same thing as religious belonging: not that the state has 
no claims, but that it is a mistake to see those claims as beyond challenge in any 
imaginable circumstance.”887 That position for now, on Dorrien’s terms, seems more 
similar to Dorrien’s understanding of liberative, agapic Spirit working in the world than 
to Hauerwas’s accounts of the church-world distinction and the state’s sacral endeavor. 
So what kind of state does Williams have in mind? How can it be open to other loyalties 
rather than be monopolistic? 
Interactive Pluralism, Procedural Secularism, and Cooperative State Sovereignty 
 The state’s hegemonic sovereignty compromises other traditions by displacing the 
role of tradition in public discourse. As immigration and Islam rise in social prominence, 																																																								
883 Williams, FPS, 102. See also ibid., 120. 
884 Williams, LI, 85. See also Williams, OCT, 242-243, 268. 
885 Williams, LI, 84. 
886 Williams, FPS, 26, 30, 32-33, 37-38, 61, 64, 80, 82, 99-100, 104, 298; Williams, OCT, 268; Williams, FPS, pp. 26-27, chps. 3-4 
(esp. p. 42), pp. 65, 94, 298, and chps. 24-25; Williams, LI, 80-81.  
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the nation-state is at a crossroads that affects its future shape. It can entrench its 
sovereignty by expanding its ‘war on terror.’ The state can develop into a market-state in 
the service of global capitalism. Or the state can change by listening to and by providing 
space for distinctive traditions in public on their terms. Williams opts for a robust version 
of the third, where change is achieved by and pluralism is realized in listening to 
distinctive traditions in their particular languages. This discursive politics can transform 
state sovereignty into serving a cooperative and truly pluralist society. Williams calls this 
form of society “interactive pluralism.”888 For him, “the sphere of public and political 
negotiation flourishes only in the context of larger commitments and visions” rather than 
by privatizing and rejecting them.889 In that vision of interactive pluralism, political life 
hinges on the interrelatedness in an Hegelian account of “mutual recognition,” beginning 
with the “acknowledgement that someone else’s welfare is actually constitutive of my 
own.”890 So on the one hand, mutual recognition illuminates differences and grounds a 
pluralistic politics of discussion for Williams. On the other hand, his position is 
distinguished by a “loosening of monopoly” that shifts loyalty from to “a sovereign 
authority” to loyalty for discussion-in-difference, especially among the neighbors and 
among the corporate communities that both constitute one’s identity.891 Thus, operating 																																																								
888 Ibid., 61, 81. See also ibid., 71-72, 80, 104-108, 128. Williams’s normative account of interactive pluralism is informed by his own 
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889 Williams FPS, 35. See also ibid., 53, 301. 
890 Ibid., 161-163; Williams, LI, 77; Williams, WA, 70. Emphasis original. See also Williams, FPS, 90, 117, 122-123, 157-159, 167-
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Sage Publications, 2013). 
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in this short summary are two different but connected relations of mutual recognition, 
interactive pluralism itself and its relation to state sovereignty, that I will develop now.892 
 For Williams, mutual recognition requires fundamentally acknowledging crucial, 
substantial differences. Corporate bodies authoritatively determine the person and 
participate in shaping society. These communities are not only different than one another; 
they also exist prior to and alongside liberalism’s political apparatus. But difference and 
mutual recognition are undercut by the hegemonic mechanisms of political liberalism in 
the name of overcoming potentially fragmenting difference. The distinction between 
Williams’s “more-than-liberal” option and political liberalism then becomes quite 
sharp.893 Interactive pluralism recovers the possibility of acknowledging different 
corporate communities and their role of authoritative role crucial for the common good. 
In contrast, the common good is subverted by a thin pluralism or blasé multiculturalism 
constituted by the primacy of individual self-interest, the state’s superficial 
accommodations to plurality, and the global capitalism’s commodification of plurality.894 
 While listening to other traditions on their terms constructively emphasizes their 
corporate nature, together they also have a critical edge. They break open the pseudo-
sacredness and autonomy of state sovereignty. Williams maintains theological arguments 
about the necessity of Christianity reclaiming its corporate nature for itself. But that 
Christian end also serves a common good. Corporate “religious identity” is “one of the 																																																								
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most potent allies possible for genuine pluralism.”895 In the face of an ahistorical and 
universal rationality, an emphasis on religious communities de-sacralizes the state and 
opens room for true pluralism. The corporate nature of Christianity shows that there are 
other “source[s] of legitimate common life,” like “intermediate institutions, guilds, 
unions, churches, ethnic groups, all sorts of civil associations.”896 In effect, Williams 
maps a vision of local to global relations intersecting through the subject and thereby 
determining it. This subjectivity does not reduce to individuality; it merely emphasizes 
the irreducible social constitution of subjects in a broader political frame. Williams’s 
vision of interactive pluralism requires a politics with more flexibility and permeable 
boundaries than “any specific state.”897 
 Interactive pluralism provokes, then, a tricky question suppressed by the 
liberalism’s autonomous anthropology and the state’s monopolization of sovereignty. 
How should society be united and the state be organized if we recognize other 
authoritative communities besides the state? Williams’s answer is twofold. The first 
develops a politics of interactive discussion in mutual recognition. The second forms the 
state in accordance to that politics.898 																																																								
895 Williams, FPS, 95. 
896 Ibid., 80. See also ibid., 50. 
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 Difference-in-relation, for Williams, can only be negotiated in concrete, 
interactive discussion, which is absolutely necessary to determine the common good. In 
contrast to political liberalism, interactive pluralism’s mutual recognition does not 
assume a substantive conception of rationality (“apodictic” reasoning) in order to enter 
into conversation.899 That would render impossible any recognition between 
incommensurable positions only overcome by “the priority of force.”900 Instead, Williams 
opts for, in all but name, Charles Taylor’s “ad hominem” practical reasoning.901 Though 
some might maintain the need for a common culture or heritage, the “conversation” 
between people is already held “in common” despite vastly different cultural or historical 
differences.902 Not just plurality, but also social intimacy, hospitality, and cooperation 
make possible discussion for discovering and working towards the common good. In the 
conversation among distinctive difference can occur “the breakthrough into a recognition 
of common goods, things we can only value or enjoy together.”903 
 Mutual recognition also presupposes that each person and each group possess “the 
freedom to be themselves” with each group holding a concomitant vision of the common 
good.904 Williams stresses accordingly that individual and corporate equality, with 
attention to the interests of particular corporate bodies, is vital for mutual recognition and 
negotiation. He calls “covenantal mutuality” these mutually interactive relations taking 
place inside a co-operative agreement.905 In this agreement, all parties “promise that no-																																																								
899 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 36. 
900 Williams, FPS, 295. See also ibid., 75, 88. 
901 Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, 36. Emphasis mine. See also Williams, FPS, 121, 296-297; Williams, LI, 58, 86. 
902 Williams, LI, 81. See also ibid., 58; Williams, OCT, 240-241. 
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one’s interest is written out of the social script and––crucially––that a long-term 
perspective on social needs is being taken for granted.”906 This mutual relation makes 
critical discourse possible. Williams’s framework allows for more than individual 
interests to play a significant role in shaping society. But corporate or individual interests 
cannot be recognized or negotiated without discussion.907 
 The importance of maintaining communal discussion is, for Williams, “a kind of 
moral interest” constitutive to the state.908 So does he recapitulate reason of state? No. In 
his words, the state “cannot in any simple sense have goals of its own, goals that are 
potentially in competition with those of its constituent communities.”909 Or in terms of 
reason of state, the state’s self-interested assertion of self-grounded autonomy, its 
demand of singular loyalty, and its pursuit of centralized power are eliminated because 
the state’s role in procedural secularism is formed by Williams’s account of mutual 
recognition. That is, corporate bodies can be in direct discussion with one another 
because “state authority” recognizes “something prior to it and irreducibly other to it.”910 
Following the English state pluralists, Williams distinguishes two levels in the complex 
space of society’s political arrangement. “‘First-level’ associations” are “self-regulating” 
and “relatively unreconstructed forms of belonging” that appear in everyday life, such as 
faith communities, “trade unions, …co-operative societies, professional guilds,” “ethnic 
groups,” etc.911 But individually they do not “occup[y] the whole political and social 
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territory.”912 Neither does the second-level, the state. It is “a particular cluster of” the 
first-level associations “agreed on a legal structure” that “provides the stable climate for 
all first-level communities to flourish and the means for settling, and enforcing, 
‘boundary disputes’ between them.”913 Rather than providing a rival source of identity or 
demanding loyalty to itself, the pluralist state is an “ideologically neutral,” or 
“disinterested,” “broker” who maintains discussions among the first-level communities so 
they can be “partner[s] in the negotiations of public life” for the common good.914 
Accordingly, the secular part of procedural secularism here means the refusal to 
“privilege” a “confessional group” over others, not the absence of faith.915 On this vision 
of the state’s new mission “to harmonize and, to some degree, regulate this social 
variety,” the state as broker fundamentally assumes the previous histories of diverse first-
level associations, accepts the commitments of subject to them, and values the 
complexity of their interactive “co-existence.”916 That new recognition of alternative, 
complex loyalties not only transforms state sovereignty by shaping the state’s new 
mission. The state’s recognition also limits its sovereignty by its openness to “scrutiny” 
and criticism from first-level communities in order to keep the state faithful to its new 
mission for the common good.917 State sovereignty, then, is not “inviolable” nor self-
grounding.918 Rather, the state is a de-centered, cooperative service for the procedural 
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916 Ibid., 80, 135. See also ibid., 30, 39, 53, 60, 81, 126-128, 134. 
917 Ibid., 39. See also ibid., 30-31, 60. 
918 Ibid., 55. See also ibid., 52. 
	 266 
facilitation of and generated by public, interactive discussion among a plurality of first-
level associations.919 
II. Situating Williams in Relation to Hauerwas and Dorrien 
 There is much more to say about Williams’s project, but I will do so below in 
relation to Hauerwas and Dorrien. It is tempting to employ Williams for mediating 
between Hauerwas and Dorrien, since there is so much warrant for doing just that. 
Williams has worked for dialogue in politics, and he has attempted to broker discussion 
in the same global denomination to which Dorrien (priest) and Hauerwas (layman) 
belong. Williams also moves in-between seemingly incommensurate positions such as 
Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s. Hauerwas and Dorrien can appreciate Williams’s positive 
description of “the central conviction of political liberalism”: “the idea that political life 
can and should be a realm of creative engagement” between valued, diverse peoples.920 
More complex is how Williams meets the divergent positions of Hauerwas and Dorrien. 
On the one hand, with Hauerwas, Williams emphasizes the particularity of individuals 
and of corporate bodies; in effect, he opts for radical democracy in the political sphere. 
On the other hand, with Dorrien, Williams works through liberalism to get beyond it 
through Hegelian mutual recognition, equality, and universal human dignity. But 
Williams configures equality and human dignity differently.921 																																																								
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http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1353/archbishops-first-presidential-address-at-lambeth-conference; 
Rowan Williams, “Archbishop’s Second Presidential Address at Lambeth Conference,” The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived 
Website, Jul. 29, 2008, http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1352/archbishops-second-presidential-address-
at-lambeth-conference; Rowan Williams, “Concluding Presidential Address to the Lambeth Conference,” The Archbishop of 
Canterbury Archived Website, Aug. 3, 2008, http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1350/concluding-
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 I will develop those points of continuity, but I do not use Williams primarily to 
mediate between Hauerwas and Dorrien. Williams as mediator would miss 
distinctiveness and promise of his work about and for discussion. That work is not only 
revolutionary in regard to the modern nation-state’s sovereignty, and so his work 
deserves a hearing in its own right. Williams also provides more than a mediating 
position for Dorrien and Hauerwas. 
 For two reasons I focus on Williams in relation to Hauerwas and then Williams in 
relation to Dorrien in the next sections. First, I support my contention that Williams 
maintains much of the political surplus in each of Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s thought. 
Second, I develop the roots upon which Williams draws in going beyond them to open up 
a new political horizon. I begin setting up the latter argument here by contending that 
Williams’s work is about transforming state sovereignty. This contrasts with Hauerwas 
and Dorrien who assume the permanence of state sovereignty, albeit in complex, 
different ways. Then I can detail further how Williams goes beyond them in order to 
bring them together informed by the promise of Williams’s work. 
III. Williams and Hauerwas on Radical Democracy,  
and the Roots of Williams Going Beyond Hauerwas 
 Hauerwas has praised, defended, and incorporated Williams’s thought with 
increasing regularity. Over the last fifteen years their positions have further converged on 
important points. They construct democracy similarly, for instance. Both emphasize 
democracy as decentralized, local, and ad hominem discussion between individuals and 																																																								
presidential-address-to-the-lambeth-conference; Rowan Williams, “Archbishop’s Pastoral Letter to Bishops of the Anglican 
Communion,” The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Aug. 28, 2008, 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1225/archbishops-pastoral-letter-to-bishops-of-the-anglican-
communion. 
	 268 
groups in their traditioned particularities. In contrast to liberal democracy’s suppression 
of difference and of conflict, Williams and Hauerwas emphasize the possibility of 
nonviolent conflict and resolution among particulars in discussion. Both emphasize 
deliberation between particularities as a form of practical reasoning. This interactive 
discussion with others in immediate proximity is fundamental for discovering the 
common good. Both reject theocracy, even though Hauerwas calls himself a “theocrat,” 
and Williams affirms the primacy of God’s sovereignty over the state.922 They also 
approach interfaith dialogue similarly. Although Williams argues that Christianity plays 
an important role in England’s political recognition of a deeper pluralism, nevertheless he 
and Hauerwas refuse to accept––and Dorrien too––the position that Christianity ought to 
play a special role over other faiths in interfaith relations. For all three, interfaith dialogue 
operates best through practices like the scriptural reasoning project, in which people of 
different faiths interpret their texts for one another and reason practically together.923  																																																								
922 “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 248. See also Hauerwas, CC, 253 n. 38; Williams, FPS, 19, 126-128; Williams, OCT, 36-
37; Rowan Williams, “The Ethics of SDI,” in The Nuclear Weapons Debate: Theological and Ethical Issues, ed. Richard J. Bauckham 
and R. John Elford (London: SCM Press, 1989), 171. 
923 See below for Hauerwas’s affinity for Williams; Hauerwas, DT, 211-212; Hauerwas, SU, 104 n. 31, 156-157; Hauerwas, WAD, 
143; Hauerwas, WT, 184-185; “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 247, 249; Williams, FPS, 133-134, 147, 296-297, 301; 
Hauerwas, DT, 192-195; Hauerwas, STT, 184-185; Hauerwas, WT, 76; Hauerwas, WAD, 140-144; Williams, OCT, 174, 177; 
Hauerwas, SU, 69, 71-75; Dorrien, EDE, 364-366; see below for interfaith dialogue. 
 For a selection of Hauerwas’s explicit affinity, use, and more of Williams’s work in chronological order by (mostly) book, 
see Hauerwas, PK, 90, 173 n. 21 (1983); Hauerwas, AC, 40-43 (1991); Hauerwas, AN, 206 n. 39 (1992); Hauerwas, IGC, 248 n. 2 
(1995); Hauerwas, STT, 35-36 (1998); Hauerwas, CSC, 18-19, 39-40, 64, 75-76, 84 (2004); Hauerwas,  DT, 12, 113-114, 179 (2004); 
Hauerwas, PF, 17 n. 5, 23 n. 20, 27-28, 67, 83, 84 n. 20, 86, 100, 102-109, 174 n. 13, 179 n. 27, 202 n. 2 (2004); Hauerwas, Matt, 89-
90, 117-118, 240 (2006); Hauerwas, SU, 11, 106-107, 123 n. 3, 142, 158 n. 48, 209-213 (2007); Hauerwas, CSCH, 28, 63, 149 (2009); 
Hauerwas, WAD, 129 n. 36, 157, 160 n. 30, 161-164 (2011); Hauerwas, WwW, 24 n. 21, 43 n. 24, 48, 53, 184  (2011); Stanley 
Hauerwas, “Review of Rowan Williams’s Faith in the Public Square,” Theology 116, no. 2 (2013): 122; Hauerwas, WoAp, 113-115 
(2013); Hauerwas, WT, 38-39, 203-206 (2015). CDRO is an anomaly insofar that Coles, not Hauerwas, explicitly raises Williams. 
However, in the introduction––presumably written by both Coles and Hauerwas, but in a particular sentence matching Hauerwas’s 
writing style––it is written that “Coles’s reading of Rowan Williams in this book wonderfully exemplifies what Hauerwas’s students 
meant” (10). 
 The final conclusion to my project will explicitly deal with Williams’s theopolitics in relation to Hauerwas’s own. As for 
Hauerwas’s participation in and accounts of the practical reasoning of scriptural reasoning, see Stanley Hauerwas, “Pharaoh’s 
Hardened Heart: Some Christian Readings,” Journal of Scriptural Reasoning 2, no. 2 (2002); Stanley Hauerwas, “Postscript: A 
Conversation with Stanley Hauerwas on Peace and War after Scripture,” by Jacob Goodson, Journal of Scriptural Reasoning 8, no. 1 
(2009); Hauerwas, WwW, 112 n. 43. For Dorrien, he raises the “Gamaliel model” in the question and answer session following his 
lecture “Social Ethics for Social Justice: The Idea of Economic Democracy,” Collins Lectures, Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon, 
“God’s Economy,” Trinity Episcopal Cathedral, Portland, OR, Nov. 29, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFE9J7XsOL0, see 
one hour and twenty-four through twenty-five minutes. For Williams, besides instances like FPS, 133-134, 301 and OCT, 174 on 
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 The tensions between Williams and Hauerwas emerge in Williams’s constructive 
understanding of state sovereignty, his transforming of state sovereignty, and his 
presuppositions undergirding both. Given Hauerwas’s critiques of political liberalism and 
liberal theology, there is at least tension specifically over the general layout of Williams’s 
pluralist state, its neutral role, and its monopoly on legal force. Then there is the issue of 
Williams actually working to transform state sovereignty itself from hegemonic to 
pluralist. I focus on the four points of tension in order. Some of the tensions can be 
resolved in ways that show how Williams is congruent with Hauerwas’s political surplus. 
Other issues remain tendentious. The most important of these places concerns the 
transformation of the state’s structure. It is the site for both fruitful overlap between 
Hauerwas and Williams, and for Williams going beyond Hauerwas. 
Agreement over Pluralist, Deliberative Democracy in Practical Reason 
 The first point of tension is Williams’s description of the pluralist state as an 
“association of associations” or “community of communities.”924 Hauerwas once seemed 
																																																								
mutual discovery in inter-faith dialogue, as Archbishop of Canterbury he founded the annual Building Bridges Seminar in 2002 and 
was active in leading it up to his retirement from the Archbishopric in 2012, when he handed it over formally to the Berkley Center at 
Georgetown University. For him interviewed about the seminar by President of Georgetown John DeGioia, see: “The Archbishop on 
Building Bridges Christian-Muslim Seminar 2010,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZ3Qj9bHiCc. For some of the specific 
volumes produced by the Berkley Center that Williams is in, see: Michael Ipgrave, ed., Scriptures in Dialogue: Christians and 
Muslims Studying the Bible and Qur’an Together (London: Church House Publishing, 2004); Michael Ipgrave, ed., Bearing the Word: 
Prophecy in Biblical and Qur’anic Perspective (London: Church House Publishing, 2005); Michael Ipgrave, ed., Building a Better 
Bridge: Muslims, Christians, and the Common Good (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008); Michael Ipgrave, ed., 
Justice and Rights: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Michael Ipgrave, ed., Justice and Rights: Christian and Muslim Perspectives 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); Michael Ipgrave and David Marshall, eds., Humanity: Texts and Contexts 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011); David Marshall, ed., Communicating the Word: Revelation, Translation, and 
Interpretation in Christianity and Islam (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011); David Marshall, ed., Science and 
Religion: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012); David Marshall, ed., Tradition 
and Modernity: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); David Marshall and 
Lucinda Mosher, eds., Prayer: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013); David 
Marshall and Lucinda Mosher, eds., Death, Resurrection, and Human Destiny: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2014). 
924 Williams, FPS, 3, 126; Rowan Williams, The Truce of God, updated ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 128 
(hereafter TG). 
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to reject Martin Marty’s construal of “association of associations,” because it demands 
“distance” rather than “personal intimacy.”925 The emphasis on argument in such a 
framework, Hauerwas argued, is ultimately a call “to be ‘civil’ to one another.”926 But the 
reasons undergirding Hauerwas’s criticisms are not easily applicable to Williams. He 
assumes social intimacy rather than social distance, as I noted earlier. In fact, Williams 
claims that distance is the source of violence. Yet, the tension on civility and argument is 
more complicated since Williams assumes both.927 
 For Hauerwas, civility is a “bourgeois project” that suppresses pluralism by 
privatizing “affect,” conflict, truth, and the good for the illusion of peaceful “public 
demeanor.”928 When civility as such frames association of associations, Hauerwas argues, 
a notion of peace is achieved by an overarching morality of civil relations without “any 
theological justification.”929 Marty, consequently, interprets US Christianity in light of 
the US but not the converse. In contrast, Williams rejects an account of civility or 
tolerance that re-enforces the privatization of religious belief, for his account of politics is 
in search of the truth.930 
																																																								
925 Hauerwas, BH, 29. Hauerwas also rejects John Casey’s position on civil associations (Hauerwas, CAV, 98-100). Although 
Hauerwas’s actual addressing of civil association itself is too brief, both Casey and Marty draw from Michael Oakeshott, and by 
Hauerwas’s estimation, Casey’s decision to do so is his book’s “greatest disappointment” (Hauerwas, CAV, 97). John Casey, Pagan 
Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1990), 192-193; Martin E. Marty, The One and the Many: America’s Struggle for 
the Common Good (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 120-129; Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), 257-266, 272-274, 314-315. 
926 Hauerwas, BH, 29. 
927 “Archbishop’s Anti-War Message,” BBC News, Dec. 26, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/2606971.stm is a short, 
written report of the Rowan Williams’s audio message on “Thought for the Day,” BBC Radio 4, Dec. 26, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/audio/38249000/rm/_38249488_archbishtalk.ram; Williams, FPS, 129, 147. 
928 Stanley Hauerwas, “The Importance of Being Catholic: A Protestant View,” First Things, Mar. 1990, 28. The quoted text is largely 
about John Murray Cuddihy, The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). But this is not all about Cuddihy. Soon after the quotes above, Hauerwas addresses the issue of 
pluralism and Christianity’s public voice vis-à-vis the Catholic church, abortion, and “justice as participation” (29). Being present––on 
the one hand in order to shape the moral order, and on the other hand to be one voice among many––is precisely part of what 
Hauerwas takes issue with concerning Marty’s project on association of associations (BH, 29). 
929 Hauerwas, BH, 29. 
930 Williams, FPS, pp. 3, 17-18, 21, 89-91, chp. 10, pp. 292-293, 301. 
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 Lending Williams further credibility here for Hauerwas’s position is that more 
recently Hauerwas cites Williams on “truth-telling” and Jesus as the truth right after 
Hauerwas rejects civility.931 This raises the fact that Williams provides theological 
support for his vision of interactive pluralism. He asserts that mutual argumentation 
directed toward the truth can replace the state’s hegemonic sovereignty “because…the 
theological roots of modernity” are “a Christian-inspired culture of argument and what a 
theologian would call ‘eschatological reserve’ about excessive political claims.”932 This 
entire framework, from mutual argumentation to eschatological reserve, is supported by 
his trinitarian theopolitics that I will raise in the final conclusion to this project. But 
suffice it to say for now, these theological points shape Williams vision of argument and 
the limitations of the state. Williams meets Hauerwas’s concerns about association of 
associations by endorsing social intimacy and truth and by providing a theological 
justification for his approach.933 
 The second point of tension is the issue of neutrality. Hauerwas has long rejected 
the notion of political liberalism’s neutrality. But in Williams’s pluralist account, the 
“state apparatus” “must be ideologically neutral” in order to be “a reliable and creative 
broker” among first-level associations.934 Williams may, at first glance, appear to re-
institute aspects of political liberalism that he and Hauerwas reject, but the truth is more 
complex. 
																																																								
931 Hauerwas, PF, 67; Williams, OCT, 82. 
932 Williams, FPS, 83. 
933 For an instance of Williams meeting Hauerwas’s concerns, Cavanaugh affirms not only Williams’s positive response to 
Cavanaugh’s work on the category of religion, but also Williams working against monopolistic sovereignty, his emphasizing of 
complex space in society, and his maintaining of the eschatological reserve. William T. Cavanaugh, “Spaces of Recognition: A Reply 
to My Interlocutors,” in “Symposium on William Cavanaugh’s The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of 
Modern Conflict,” 361-362. 
934 Williams, FPS, 80, 126. 
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 Earlier I noted Williams’s agreement with Hauerwas that the neutrality of the 
liberal order, undergirded by autonomous rationality, is far from neutral. Accordingly, 
Williams’s pluralist state need not claim the neutral objectivity in autonomy provided by 
autonomous reason. Any sense of the state itself is not autonomous, and the state’s 
neutrality is ordered by the common good. These are seen in Williams’s alternative to 
programmatic secularism’s reduction of the individual to rational self-interest. Williams 
privileges instead the particularity of individuals and of corporate bodies. Each 
particularity determines its understanding of the good, and through mutual relation to one 
another they realize the common good. The state, then, “cannot in any simple sense have 
goals of its own, goals that are potentially in competition with those of its constituent 
communities.”935 Rather, the state’s mission and laws are oriented by the first-level 
associations finding the common good in discussion. So the state’s immediate goal is “to 
create the conditions, within a complex social environment, that allow each group to 
pursue what it sees as good. If any group’s notion of what is good veers towards 
undermining the good of other groups, the law’s task is restraint and control of any such 
tendency, as well as the defense of the whole network against destabilizing from 
outside.”936 
 Hauerwas affirms such practical reasoning between social bodies in order to 
determine and pursue the common good. Yet, Williams’s qualified account of pluralistic 
neutrality may still be too much for Hauerwas. He observes that “attempts to create a 
stable human community, to ensure we can communicate, have ended in failure.”937 This 
																																																								
935 Ibid., 58. 
936 Ibid., 50. 
937 Hauerwas, WAD, 127. 
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is because, for Hauerwas, “our ability to communicate depends on being a member of a 
particular community,” and “the more concrete our discussion…the more we become 
isolated from one another.”938 He “do[es] not know how” to give an account of how to 
“negotiate diversity” without liberalism’s transcendental endeavor to oversee diversity 
that actually suppresses diversity.939 Instead, with MacIntyre and against Hegel, 
Hauerwas argues that “traditions…resolve conflicts” within themselves and “between 
traditions.”940 
 So Williams’s pluralist state might appear to fly in the face of Hauerwas’s 
tradition-dependent view. But in fact Williams is giving a partial account of how to 
negotiate diverse particularities without liberal hegemony. The reason why Williams’s 
account is both constructive and partial is because he forms an account of the state in 
light of discursive practical reason between particularities. For him, “the law of the state 
is what provides the stable climate for all first-level communities to flourish and the 
means for settling, and enforcing, ‘boundary disputes’ between them.”941 Williams’s 
view of a multi-layered society and the broker state has a Hegelian background, since he 
argues “it is a great mistake to think of Hegel as some kind of an apologist for monolithic 
centralism.”942 But Williams also distances himself from the abstract universalism of 
																																																								
938 Ibid. For an earlier, parallel argument, see Hauerwas, CC, 93. But elsewhere Hauerwas has also expressed appreciation for “unity 
that ‘emerges from dialogue’” rather than a third language, and that dialogue can allow for a real pluralism which does not trivialize or 
suppress diversity (BH, 27). This option dialogue without suppression I will develop later as the fruit of Williams’s political vision. 
939 “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 248. Hauerwas also does not give an account of how to negotiate diversity because he is 
“trying to help Christian recognize that we are part of the ‘diverse’” (ibid., 248). Elsewhere he finds even the word pluralism to be an 
“abstraction capable of ideological perversion.” See Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church in a Divided World: The Interpretative Power of 
the Christian Story,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 8, no. 1 (1980): 80 n. 18 which does not appear in the re-print of the essay (CC, 
110). 
940 For the quote, see Hauerwas, STT, 185. See also Hauerwas, AE, 114-116. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, WAD, 141-
144, 146. 
941 Williams, FPS, 50. 
942 Ibid., 51. 
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Hegel. Williams rejects the notion that one can have “a position outside or beyond 
diverse faith traditions from which to broker a union between them in which their 
convictions can be reconciled.”943 This rejection of an objective, outside position means 
for Williams that no rationality or state violence can create unity by the state resolving 
diverse “transcendent values.”944 Healthy peace cannot be achieved nor truth realized 
through the homogenized suppression of diverse particularities. Rather, all that is left, 
and is absolutely necessary, is “negotiation and the struggle for mutual understanding” 
among particularities.945 The state’s raison d’être is to serve traditioned dialogue and to 
“facilitate…co-operation” between individuals and corporate bodies “through [the 
state’s] own sponsorship and partnership” in order to achieve the common good.946 
 As chapter one noted, Hauerwas’s critique of neutrality relies on rejecting 
liberalism’s procedural system of rules that enforce and frame the morality of self-
interest. How then is Williams’s pluralist state not reproducing a similar procedural 
morality? Are ‘procedure’ and ‘discussion’ the new morality for illuminating an abstract 
“common moral ‘property’” between faiths?947 No. Similar to Dorrien’s position, 
Williams uses terms like “common moral ‘property’” and “universal horizon” in political 
life to denote unity through interrelated difference for the common good.948 Yet, 
																																																								
943 Ibid., 296. 
944 Ibid. See also ibid., 113-115, 124. 
945 Ibid., 297. 
946 For the quote, see ibid., 58. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, FPS, 298; Williams, WA, 64. This paragraph, in light of 
others on the mutual discovery of the common good (above) and the neutrality of the state (more below), shows one of many ways 
that Williams does not fit into an account of the liberal-communitarian divide as described by Hauerwas: “Liberals want government 
to remain neutral between rival conceptions of the human good. Communitarians want government to give expression to some shared 
vision of the human good that will define some type of community” (IGC, 25). Williams here is driving between the liberal-
communitarian divide, with his political vision employing elements of both while being wholly either (FPS, 259-260). So as he writes 
elsewhere the divide “is not actually very much help” concerning his “more-than-liberal” political vision (LI, 86-87). 
947 Williams, FPS, 298. 
948 Ibid., 121, 298. See also ibid., 307; Dorrien, review of The American Spiritual Culture, 120. 
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Williams qualifies such unification in a way that overlaps with Hauerwas’s concerns. 
Unity, from start to finish, describes “corporate…discernment” among distinctive 
particularities in equality and “mutual generosity” rather than abstract, universal 
rationalism.949 Williams’s position can be understood as corporate discussion discovering 
a universal horizon like human dignity, but always in particularity. Any “common moral 
‘property’” is about the particular common good discovered in particular discussions 
between particularities. The procedure, then, is practical reasoning between particularities 
that are historical, corporate, and public instead of “timeless,” individual, and private 
communities.950 In this case, Williams’s notions of neutrality and procedure lack the key 
hallmarks of programmatic secularism that Hauerwas rejects, and Williams promotes 
much of what Hauerwas embraces. 
Tension over Legal Force and Transforming the State 
 The third point of tension is the issue of legal force. Earlier I raised Williams’s 
sympathy for Hauerwas’s and Cavanaugh’s argument against the wars of religion 
narrative, which illuminates that the state’s sovereignty is through its monopoly on 
violence. However, nuanced as always, for Williams the pluralist state’s sovereignty is 
“the agreed monopoly of legal force and a recognition of where the ultimate court of 
appeal is to be located for virtually all practical and routine purposes.”951 Phrases like 
“the ultimate court of appeal” should not be separated from Williams’s reliance on 
practical reason, his argument for multiple jurisprudences, and his emphasis on corporate 																																																								
949 Williams, FPS, 121. See also ibid., 124, 306-307; Hauerwas, DT, 211-212; Hauerwas, SU, 156-157. 
950 Williams, FPS, 299. See also ibid., 121, 298, 300. 
951 Ibid., 60. 
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particularity.952 Hauerwas has made similar arguments about such matters. The phrase 
“monopoly on legal force” is the sticking point, and not just between Williams and 
Hauerwas. William’s theology and politics, as Hauerwas rightly argues, are effectively 
pacifist witness. Williams understands the major world religions as inherently nonviolent, 
despite his “brush with death” on September 11 in lower Manhattan.953 He has 
consistently been deeply critical of war, of state violence, and of their isolating roots in 
fear, security, and hubris. Hauerwas, in his arguments on just war and nuclear 
proliferation, appreciatively cited Williams’s work on peace. In an activist move that 
would hearten Dorrien, Williams with others performed an act of civil disobedience on 
Ash Wednesday 1985 at Alconbury airbase. They were arrested “at gun point” and 
briefly jailed for “scaling the fence” and occupying a runway––by holding a service of 
																																																								
952 Ibid., 60-61. 
953 Rupert Shortt, Rowan's Rule: The Biography of the Archbishop of Canterbury (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 
11. See also ibid., 212-217; Williams, FPS, 95, 293-294, 303-304, 308; Rowan Williams, “Address at al-Azhar al-Sharif, Cairo,” The 
Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Sept. 11, 2004, 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1299/archbishops-address-at-al-azhar-al-sharif-cairo. 
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“sitting and singing psalms” and “scattering ashes”––in protest against nuclear 
weapons.954 How then should legal force be understood?955 
 On one level the “monopoly of legitimate coercion” is not the same as legal 
force.956 In Williams’s thought, coercion has a consistently negative connotation, and it is 																																																								
954 Andrew Goddard, Rowan Williams: His Legacy (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2013), 26; Rowan Williams, “Dr. Rowan Williams,” by 
Gay Byrne, The Meaning of Life with Gay Byrne, episode 5, series 10, aired Mar. 1, 2015 (Dublin: RTÉ). The arrest was part of 
Williams’s Anglo-Catholic socialism, his criticism of Margaret Thatcher, and his involvement in the Jubilee Group, of which he was a 
leading member. For all that he was labeled a subversive by the MI5 in secret. The only publicly available source available about MI5 
seems to be the well-timed, indirect hit-piece by Jason Lewis and Jonathan Wynne-Jones, “MI5 Labelled the Archbishop of 
Canterbury a Subversive over Anti-Thatcher Campaigns,” Telegraph, Jun. 18, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8584157/MI5-labelled-the-Archbishop-of-Canterbury-a-subversive-over-anti-Thatcher-
campaigns.html. 
 To briefly describe William’s civil disobedience and arrest above, I have used the historiographic principle of 
interpretation that looks for agreement rather than disagreement in order to determine what can be said to have happened. That 
principle is necessary because the actual location, administration of the location, and the date of Williams’s civil disobedience are, 
oddly, points of confusion. Williams’s short biography on Magdalene College’s website (“The Master,” 
http://www.magd.cam.ac.uk/dr-rowan-williams/) notes Lakenheath air base, as does a couple other newspaper and magazine articles. 
However, Williams himself says and others write that his civil disobedience was at Alconbury air base in Cambridgeshire, which is at 
least an hour drive from Lakenheath in Suffolk. Those others are: “Dr. Rowan Williams,” by Gay Byrne; Theo Hobson, Anarchy, 
Church, and Utopia: Rowan Williams on Church (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2005), 25; Shortt, Rowan’s Rule, 121; Rupert 
Shortt, Rowan Williams: An Introduction (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse, 2003), 47; Tom Frame, “Rowan Williams on War and Peace,” 
in On Rowan Williams: Critical Essays, ed. Matheson Russell (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009), 174. All of them state that the 
Williams’s arrest occurred in 1985, and all but Williams designate Alconbury as RAF Alconbury. The latter could lead one to assume 
that it was administered primarily by the Royal Air Force. By contrast, both Williams and Oliver O’Donovan describe the base as an 
American military base (Oliver O’Donovan, “Archbishop Rowan Williams,” in “Rowan Williams: The New Archbishop of 
Canterbury: A Symposium,” Pro Ecclesia 12, no. 1 (2003): 5). While O’Donovan’s 1984 rather than 1985 dating of the arrest may 
have been a simple typographical error, the administration of the air base can be easily reconciled. The RAF designation is about air 
bases being located in Britain and once having been under RAF control but now primarily a site of USAF operations or a site of joint 
cooperation. Both RAF Alconbury and RAF Lakenheath have been under the US’s Air Force in Europe (USAFE) or Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) since the early 1950’s. For brief histories of RAF Alconbury and RAF Lakenheath, see Harry R. Fletcher, Air Force 
Bases, vol. 2, Air Bases Outside the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, United States Air 
Force, 1993), 97-99, 121-123. 
955 Hauerwas, CET, 78-81; Hauerwas, SU, 211-213; Hauerwas, WoAp, 114-115; Williams, Dost, 29-39; Williams, LI, 161-162; 
Williams, OCT, 174-180, 232-238; Williams, OJ, chp. 23; Williams, WA, 164-167; Rowan Williams, “Being a People: Reflections on 
the Concept of the ‘Laity,’” in Church and World: Essays in Honor of Michael Plekon, ed. William C. Mills (Rollinsford, NH: 
Orthodox Research Institute, 2013); Williams, OCT, 268-269, 273-274; Williams, TG, 8-23, 42-43, 48-52, 55, 99; Williams, WA, chp. 
9; Williams, WD, chps. 3-4; Williams, “The Ethics of SDI”; Rowan Williams and George Weigel, “War & Statecraft: An Exchange,” 
First Things, Mar. 2004; Hauerwas, AN, 206 n. 39. Williams has also followed Hauerwas’s work on nonviolence. See Rowan 
Williams, The Lion’s World: A Journey into the Heart of Narnia (London: SPCK, 2012), 45.  
 Some may balk at claiming that Williams’s work is effectively pacifist capable of negotiation. Shortt, for instance, judges 
Williams’s Truce of God a failure on Niebuhrian terms while ignoring the book’s constructive source for the “community of 
communities” (Shortt, Rowan's Rule, 174-183, 348-349; Williams, TG, 128). But for Williams, “Figgis is a far more sophisticated and 
resourceful a thinker than Niebuhr and his work is very relevant to the time we live in. The work of David Nicholls did something to 
recover his reputation but it is extraordinary that for decades he has been ignored. He is not only a political thinker but a theologian 
who was trying to hang on to a Catholic identity that was plural and dispersed and yet was also profoundly orthodox” (Williams, “A 
Higher Responsibility”). So for someone who, like Dorrien, holds to a progressive realism in debt to Niebuhr, this chapter makes an 
appeal for a different vision of negotiation and powers in the political arena. Undergirding that alternative is, as next chapter will 
develop, a different account of reality. One that is marked by the triune God. Considering my engagement with Dorrien to come, I 
believe his response would be a yes and no, but the no would be grounded in more so from other influences than Niebuhr. 
956 Williams, FPS, 39. Emphasis is mine. When Williams uses “monopoly of coercion” (ibid.) and coercion in a similar sense but 
without “monopoly” (ibid., 4, 95, 295, 298, 309): they are wholly negative save for one pragmatic instance in which Williams argues 
for the theological voice limiting “the acceptable methods of coercion” (ibid., 56). But there are three grades to Williams’s use of 
“monopoly of legitimate force,” “monopoly of legal force,” and it truncated to “monopoly of force.” First, once he uses negatively 
“monopoly of force” when it is strictly legal positivism, which correlates with him negatively using the term “monopoly of power” 
(ibid., 80, 302). The latter is used to name the same sort of impulse in Williams’s use of “monopoly of coercion”: hegemonic 
sovereignty rooted in violence as found in the birth of the nation-state. Second, he uses “monopoly of legitimate force” as only 
descriptive as still part of the emerging market-state (ibid., 45), but soon after positively affirms the “monopoly of force” in terms of 
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constitutive of the state’s hegemonic sovereignty. Legal force allows for armed services 
and police to protect human dignity: “the state provides protection against homicide.”957 
But how can legal force be affirmed if the state’s violence is intrinsic to the state’s 
sovereignty? Williams is not beholden, in theory or practice, to the legacy of the modern 
state’s formation by war and coercion. His understanding of legal force issue located 
instead in other historical roots and in the notion of the pluralist state’s different 
sovereignty. Christianity’s legacy of attentiveness to Jesus’s sovereignty and of providing 
a culture of deliberative argument changes the state’s raison d’être. This change allows 
for defense or enforcement of values while mitigating state violence more thoroughly 
than just war principles designed to limit coercive state sovereignty. How? The issue is 
sovereignty.958 
 Just war principles are applied over the regnant understandings of sovereignty. In 
this frame, Williams grants that state violence may sometimes seem to be “the only 
available option” for some, like “police action” under “international law” and working 
with “non-national moral communities.”959 But killing involves a “total mutual rejection” 
that closes any discussion with finality.960 In this way, the state’s violence “denies the 
deepest purpose of the state.”961 Williams can make this qualification because he 
endorses an ordained potestas, not an absolute potentia, in a specific way. Discussion is 
																																																								
under law rather than “pure legal positivism” (ibid., 46, 47). Third, in the frame of the pluralist state, he positively uses “monopoly of 
legitimate force” (with force qualified as “restraint”) and “monopoly of legal force” (ibid., 50, 60). While the second and third uses of 
monopoly are under law, Williams only grants the market-state, the second, on his terms strikingly similar to the pluralist state, the 
third. I am unsure if these delineations of coercion and force illuminate or cast doubt on Frame’s claim that “Williams does not draw 
any systematic distinction between force and violence in any of his writings” (“Rowan Williams on War and Peace,” 184). But what is 
certain is that Williams can be too vague. 
957 Williams, FPS, 46. 
958 Ibid., 83. 
959 Williams, TG, 33, 121; Williams, WD, 46. 
960 Williams, TG, 34. 
961 Mike Higton, Difficult Gospel: The Theology of Rowan Williams (New York: Church Publishing, 2004), 131. Although Higton 
does not give a citation for Williams for the sentence from which I quote, Higton seems to be summarizing Williams, WA, 164-165. 
This is one instance of why Higton is one of Williams’s best interpreters. 
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the state’s raison d’être, not violence, since it has in a different kind of sovereignty. His 
pluralist, second-level state does not have the autonomous exercise of raison d’état 
because that exercise is limited by first-level associations. This means two things 
concerning violence. First, the church, a corporate body with responsibility to be a 
faithful witness to Jesus’s gracious and loving alternative, is vital both for 
“challeng[ing]…all war-oriented policy” and for recovering truth, health, hope, and 
repentance for true peace.962 Second, transforming the state’s sovereignty and its reason 
for being in line with the common good should structurally and practically change the 
state’s orientation to violence. This change reduces actual violence.963 
 Hauerwas is quite critical of international police-like intervention. On his terms, it 
seems that Williams’s witness makes warfare more sober and self-critical. It may then 
appear that there is no way to reconcile Williams and Hauerwas on the state’s use of 
violence. However, Williams’s appeals to the role of discussion and to the use of legal 
force raise the related issues of domestic policing and punishment. Here there is not only 
the potential of merging Hauerwas and Williams, but also the possibility of their 
convergence concerning the state more broadly. Hauerwas’s rhetoric against warfare and 
violence appears to preclude policing tout court. But he affirms domestic policing in 
order “that the innocent be protected from homicidal maniacs.”964 Hauerwas can do so 
because he makes a nuanced distinction, a qualitative difference between policing and 
war. He “assumes[s] most of what police officers do is nonviolent response to violence,” 
																																																								
962 Williams, TG, 33. See also ibid., 20-24, 26-39, 49, 51, 57-87, 119-123. 
963 Williams, WD, 34; Williams, FPS, 30, 61, 126-129; Williams, WA, 164-165; Williams, “War & Statecraft,” 15-16. 
964 Hauerwas, WAD, 80. See also Hauerwas, PF, 27. 
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and as a pacifist, he would like to see police “not [be]…required as part of their task to 
use lethal weapons.”965 It seems then that the police have to think on their feet, ask 
questions, and address concerns in order to resolve conflict. Williams’s category of 
potestas––at least in publication––surprisingly lacks such a distinction, or even much 
mention of the police. However, Williams offers a judicial mirror to Hauerwas’s policing 
framework. Williams’s vision for reforming the UK system of punishment privileges 
mutual recognition and dialogue to protect the victim, to care for the perpetrator, and to a 
restorative end for all affected parties. That specific domestic account is in continuity 
with his larger vision of the state. He does allow for the state to defend the politics of 
discussion. But the most basic ground for the state’s reason for being is to serve 
discussion, not engage in violence or forms of self-serving power such as President 
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. So Williams opens the door to Hauerwas’s 
hope, “the possibility that a state could exist for which war is not a possibility.”966 But 
how does that come about?967 
 The fourth point of tension is transformation. Williams seeks to transform state 
sovereignty through a politics of recognition, while at most Hauerwas favors altering 
specific state practices in light of Christian witness. The heart of Williams’s proposal is 
the transformation of the meaning of state sovereignty from the hegemonic monopoly 
																																																								
965 Hauerwas, BH, 280 n. 19. See also Hauerwas, DF, 128-129; Hauerwas, PF, 27; Hauerwas, WAD, 80. In fact, he actually finds 
public services like the police are unduly burdened by the community’s privileging of self-interest rather than the services oriented by 
the common good (Hauerwas, WAD, 141). There is further possibility of convergence between Hauerwas and Williams concerning 
prison. But Hauerwas’s constructive proposal, the transformation of punishment practices, is too brief. So I will raise it soon towards 
another end. 
966 Hauerwas, AN, 196. 
967 Hauerwas, DT, 176, 184-186; Stanley Hauerwas, “What Makes America So Prone to Intervention? A Conversation with Stanley 
Hauerwas, Pacifist Theologian, on Syria and Why ‘Humanitarianism’ is a Red Herring,” by Noah Berlatsky, Atlantic, Sept. 5, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/what-makes-america-so-prone-to-intervention/279393/; Hauerwas, WAD, 80; 
Williams, FPS, 253-262; Williams, TG, 128; Williams, “The Ethics of SDI,” 166-170. 
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over the public sphere into support for interactive pluralism. Hauerwas agrees with the 
attempts to recognize diversity, but he has long rejected the idea of transforming the state. 
For him, the church’s job is witness, not “control.”968 Against Constantinianism, 
Hauerwas likens the church to a “peasant” that “does not seek to become the master, but 
rather she wants to know how to survive under the power of the master.”969 In this light, 
Williams’s work to transform the state could appear similar to liberal Protestantism’s 
Constantinian impulse to control history to make it come out right. Williams’s project 
could also seem parallel to what undergirded liberal Protestantism’s work, specifically a 
theology of the state and Christianity’s mission to be a handmaiden to the state. After all, 
from a theological ground Williams gives a theory of the state, and he was the highest 
ranking archbishop of the English state church that is caesaropapist by definition.970 
 If these congruities are true all the way down, they would place Williams more on 
the side of transforming culture than on Hauerwas’s emphasis on the primacy of ecclesial 
embodiment being witness. However, Williams is more in continuity with Hauerwas than 
it may seem because Hauerwas’s position and Williams’s proposal are more complex 
than what I have already delineated. Their difference is not over the idea of social 
transformation, but rather the kinds of engagement through which that transformation can 
be achieved. 
 Transformation is a word Hauerwas avoids because it evokes H. R. Niebuhr’s 
account of transforming culture. But despite Hauerwas’s rhetoric, his critiques and 
																																																								
968 Hauerwas, AE, 151. See also Hauerwas, PF, 128; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 146; Hauerwas, WAD, 168-181. 
969 Hauerwas, DF, 105. 
970 Williams, FPS, 38-55, 58-61; “Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law,’” 248; Hauerwas, AE, 62-63; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 
38-39. 
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positive witness acknowledge a different kind of transformation. In his rejection of state 
and society’s autonomy on the basis of Christian witness, he implicitly allows some sort 
of transformation of the state “by Christ.”971 Constructively, Hauerwas’s account of 
ecclesial agency and witness assumes his infrequent but explicit acknowledgement that 
the world can, and he hopes it will, respond positively to Christian witness. This 
distinguishes Hauerwas’s understanding of transformation from H. R. Niebuhr’s. The 
process of transformation further distinguishes Hauerwas. Transformation is achieved 
through practical reasoning between particular individuals and groups. Rather than 
supply “a better theory,” Hauerwas points to “a practice of” Christian justice and 
“punishment that can be imitated” for ending capital punishment and reforming 
prisons.972 Hauerwas focuses on practice instead of theory, in part, because of his concern 
for particularity over and against an abstraction like the term “state.”973 The issue for 
Hauerwas is the faithful witness of Christian particularity to society, especially the 
specific individuals in government offices.974 
 Hauerwas limits engaging power dynamics to thoroughgoing, ad hoc practical 
reasoning in particular, immediate contexts. He employs this methodological “tactic” to 
create a critical response to liberal hegemony alongside a constructive understanding of 
transformation through the witnessing practice of faithful Christian embodiment.975 
Hauerwas’s account of the church is in order for it to challenge the world to be more like 
																																																								
971 Hauerwas, PF, 196. I am citing the body of the text for support, rather than footnote 23 where Hauerwas writes––in a potentially 
confusing way––that he does “share Dulles’s view of the transformation of the state in modernity.” This statement appears to be both 
historical description concerning the change in justice, but also normative in light of what Hauerwas contends next about changing 
capitol punishment, and his argument about justice in the body of the text. 
972 Hauerwas, PF, 200. See also ibid., 195-199. 
973 Ibid., 196. See also ibid., 195, 197. 
974 In a conversation Hauerwas told me about his reticence to use the word transformation. I have not found a published note about that 
reticence; however, it can be seen in Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 39-48. For the rest of the paragraph, see Hauerwas, AE, 63; 
Hauerwas, WAD, xiii; Hauerwas, WW, 59 n. 3. 
975 Hauerwas, AC, 17-18. 
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the church. His political thought could then be construed as a call to transform state 
sovereignty to allow for the particularity of Christian witness. That call, however, is 
generally subtext at best. Most of Hauerwas’s work concerns asserting Jesus’s 
sovereignty, maintaining faithful witness to it in community, and critiquing the dangers 
and failures of liberalism in light of Christian faith. Without faithful witness, which has 
been lacking, the world would not know what or how state sovereignty should be.976 
 Though vital, this project maintains an implicit assumption of state sovereignty as 
permanent in a specific way. Hauerwas’s longstanding claim that the church as an 
alternative political order appears to preclude tearing down the state’s mechanisms and 
replacing them in terms of the state’s self-understanding. His emphases on practical 
reasoning in opposition to hegemonic mechanisms and to overriding theory mitigate 
transforming the undergirding state sovereignty in line with a different ‘theoretical’ 
vision. Though Hauerwas opposes liberal hegemony and would like to see it transformed, 
he lacks the conceptual resources to, or simply declines to, reach in and transform the 
underlying structure––or to give an account in Hauerwas’s parlance––of state 
sovereignty. Well of course, one might say, if he tried to do that he would be succumbing 
to Constantinianism! That is not the case with Williams’s vision, as I will address below. 
But to the point here, a Constantinian charge hides the implicit assumption of 
permanence. Hauerwas’s political alternative of radical democracy exposes the poverty 
of the state because cultivating an alternative is just as much resistance as embodying an 
alternative. But both resistance and embodiment can be problematic here in terms of 
																																																								
976 Hauerwas, PF, 22-23; Hauerwas, WT, chp. 1; Ryan, The Politics of Practical Reason, chp. 3; Hauerwas, PK, chps. 5 and 6; 
Hauerwas, AE, 37-38, 43-63; Hauerwas, PF, 200; Hauerwas, WGU, 207. 
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assuming permanence. Resistance presupposes something to reject. But rejection need 
not be permanent if the constructive alternative takes over, or at least if radical 
democracy is practiced locally. However, while Hauerwas is trying to help develop a 
complex space, he is not constructively addressing the state’s account of itself that 
reduces the complexity of social space. There could be complications to such a claim in 
view of Hauerwas’s recent publications. But any thought about substantive, constructive 
change of state sovereignty is marginal.977 
 Although often subtext, Hauerwas understands that “as Christians we will best 
serve God and our neighbor by seeking to form a common life in the world as we see 
it.”978 So Hauerwas notes that this “may well mean we must attempt to develop 
institutions, like the university,” that are “necessary for the development of practical 
reason.”979 Yet, it is unclear whether or not the state could be included in “institutions” 
because the next sentences emphasize Christian witness and reject liberalism’s political 
order.980 
 Further, like Williams, MacIntyre, and Benedict XVI, Hauerwas supports the 
notion of subsidiarity that is heavily weighted towards the local community. He does so, 
like Williams, in light of a diasporic Christianity and an encroaching, leveling global 
																																																								
977 Hauerwas, DT, 211-212; Hauerwas, WW, 191; Long, The Goodness of God, 102-103. Besides what I argue through Williams, there 
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practical reason rather than theory (“Hauerwas on ‘Hauerwas and the Law.’” 234, 238). For an example of indigenous peoples’ 
“philosophies and practices…penetrating” and changing “the formal Canadian criminal justice system,” see Craig Proulx, “Blending 
Justice: Interlegality and the Incorporation of Aboriginal Justice into the Formal Canadian Justice System,” Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 51 (2005): 81. 
978 Hauerwas, WAD, 146. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Ibid. For the liberal order: “What we cannot fear or try to repress in the name of peace is conflict…” (ibid.). 
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capitalism. But on the issue of subsidiarity, Hauerwas gives scant attention to the modern 
state.981 
 Hauerwas also claims that “an alternative imaginary needs to be constructed” to 
“the logic of war and the imperatives of the war system,” within the context his argument 
that state sovereignty depends on war and sacrifice, and vice versa.982 This claim appears 
to be the closest Hauerwas has come recently to calling for the transformation of state 
sovereignty, but the call is indirect. His “Appeal to Abolish War” was primarily aimed at 
the church, even though Hauerwas also saw the appeal as contravening the “barrier” 
between “church and world.”983 Despite Hauerwas’s sympathies for Williams’s political 
vision, Hauerwas lacks both a constructive vision about the state as detailed as 
Williams’s pluralist state and an execution of its implication––that it requires 
constructively transforming state sovereignty itself.984 
 I will return to later the assumption of permanence in terms of complex space 
because both raise an issue worth addressing now. One might argue that Williams 
replaces hegemonic sovereignty with a ‘better theory,’ the English state pluralists’ social 
vision of interactive pluralism and of the pluralist state. Such an argument would assume 
an overriding distinction between practice and theory in Hauerwas and William. That 
separation might explain why Williams ends up calling for the transformation of state 
sovereignty and Hauerwas does not in explicit terms. However, the practice-theory 																																																								
981 Hauerwas, AE, 112; Hauerwas, WAD, 142-148, 157-158, 161; Williams, FPS, 55, 276; Williams, TG, 129. I will deal with 
Williams’s sympathy for subsidiarity in more detail later. 
982 Hauerwas, WAD, 51. See also ibid., 48; Hauerwas, AE, 35-36, 120-136, esp. 124. 
983 Hauerwas, WAD, 39. See also ibid., 45-46. 
984 Typifying Hauerwas’s desire and reticence is his line: “I am more than happy to work to make the kind of modest state…[that] 
Stout wants [as] a reality” (PF, 237 n. 46). The question that Hauerwas puts to Stout is that he "needs to tell us a good deal more about 
what he means by a ‘civic nation’…and how that ‘nation’ is or is not related to the modern nation-state” (ibid.). Williams works for 
the vision of a “modest state” that at least gives some answers to Hauerwas’s question. 
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distinction does not need to determine Hauerwas and does not do justice to Williams. 
Hauerwas’s aversion to “a better theory” has not kept him from using descriptive 
categories that are currently more theoretical than a reality.985 He explicitly frames his 
argument for the Christian transformation of policing within Williams’s rejection of the 
“market-state” because the market-state undercuts the common good.986 Williams’s 
expansion of politics might lead one to see him as working from a ‘better theological 
theory’ of culture or society to order a theology of the state. However, such a conclusion 
would only be true if construed too broadly. Not only, as I will note in the final 
conclusion to this project that his account of the imago trinitatis is a trinitarian formed 
ecclesial account of creation––not a theology of the state in the Staatsmetaphysik sense. 
But also four important details show that his ‘theory’ of the state is not simply a theory, 
and is built on much that Hauerwas embraces. The latter significantly qualifies any 
similarity with US liberal Protestantism. 
 First, Williams is not attempting to give a full or universal account of culture 
precisely because it is always dynamic. Rather, it is more accurate to say, that like 
Hauerwas, Williams broadens politics beyond the boundaries of citizenship and the state 
by emphasizing mutual practical reasoning and authoritative corporate bodies other than 
the autonomous state. Constructively similar to Hauerwas, recall that Williams puts 
forward a theology of politics constituted by particularity, corporate bodies, mutuality, 
discussion, practical reason, and the common good.987 
																																																								
985 Hauerwas, PF, 200. 
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 Second, Williams’s practical theory parallels Hauerwas’s arguments that 
emphasize political virtue, construe the state in terms of function, and privilege the 
common good. Williams’s argument about “a theology of the state in functional terms” is 
for “a theology of ‘political virtue’ rather than a Staatsmetaphysik.”988 His understanding 
of “covenantal mutuality” includes, for deepening relations, both “carefully crafted 
compromises” and “formation of political character” in “virtues like prudence…justice,” 
and “mutual” or “social trust.”989 Within this functional approach, not only is state power 
limited by the critical and co-operative participation of first-level associations, but also 
both levels are in accord with the teleological direction of discovering and working for 
the common good.990 
 Third, Williams’s concrete work to transform state sovereignty began with him, in 
his then pastoral office, in the mode of practical reasoning. In this, he argued for 
expanding the state’s practice of accommodations to faith to include corporate faith. In 
following sections, I will focus on Williams’s concrete work of expansion, and how that 
transforms state sovereignty. But the point here is that Williams calls for the 
transformation of the state through Christian witness for the common good. 
 Fourth, one might argue that the reason Williams’s voice was heard nationally is 
indebted to modern Constantinianism: his pastoral work is inseparable from his highest 
ecclesial office in a caesaropapist church. This critique misses that the substance of his 
vision, which runs against modern Constantinianism. Williams’s political ecclesiology is 
effectively pacifist. The church as a particular, corporate body challenges the state to 
																																																								
988 Williams, WA, 166. Emphasis original. 
989 Williams, FPS, 117-119. See also ibid. 121, 300. 
990 Ibid., 30, 61, 121, 126-129; Williams, TG, 126-129. 
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change its understanding of its mission from primarily monopolizing violence to 
adjudicating discussion. So discursive, practical reasoning for interactive pluralism marks 
both Williams’s political vision and his attempt to realize it. This vision and his work for 
it does not privilege Christianity in a way that it controls the situation or becomes a 
handmaiden to state hegemony. Christianity is to be one of the diverse communities in a 
society where all faiths have an equal voice in procedural secularism. 
 So does Williams give into the idea that Hauerwas avoids that the “social 
order…must be destroyed for the church to be the church”?991 Is Williams at once 
Constantinian and tribalist? He is neither precisely because he does not opt to destroy but 
to call the state’s sovereignty to cohere with complex space. Hauerwas objects to 
Constantinian “control” because it is predicated on the delusion of autonomy.992  He 
continues, “we lose the necessities that create imaginative alternatives that make it 
possible for us to live without denying the difficult task of acknowledging our humanity 
and that of our neighbors.”993 That objection, however, does not apply to Williams. His 
understanding of “covenantal mutuality” and procedural secularism are precisely an 
imaginative alternative that countermands autonomy and makes space for corporate 
Christian discipleship.994 In recent work Hauerwas shows sympathy for the work on 
difference by Jonathan Sacks, who Williams draws upon for “covenantal mutuality.”995 
In earlier work, Hauerwas appreciatively evaluated Williams’s “work [as] an invaluable 																																																								
991 Long, The Goodness of God, 102. 
992 Hauerwas, AE, 151. 
993 Ibid. 
994 Williams, FPS, 117. See also ibid., 442-44, 57-58, 121, 300. 
995 Ibid., 117. See also ibid., 121; Hauerwas, WAD, 117-119, 123, 133. Here Hauerwas is addressing Jonathan Sacks’s The Dignity of 
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resource for helping the church ‘to be where we are.’”996 Hauerwas emphasizes 
Williams’s sense of God’s open time and love for dialogue and redemption both inside 
the church and between the church and the world. The issue of time is particularly 
important since the two aeons framework is fundamental to rejecting Constantinianism 
and constructing an alternative.997 
 What marks the difference between Williams and Hauerwas is not whether to 
transform political practices. Instead, Williams calls for the wholesale transformation of 
state sovereignty, while Hauerwas does not. Hauerwas’s critical position is 
simultaneously rich and limited due to his concerns about theory’s relation to practice, 
particularity and witness, liberalism’s hegemony, and Constantinianism. In light of 
similar concerns, however, Williams still calls for the transformation of state sovereignty. 
Therefore, something else is in play. It is, in short, divine sovereignty. A chapter five 
would have argued that the issue is ultimately rooted in a seemingly ‘small’ trinitarian, 
soteriological point concerning command and obedience which reverberates into 
Hauerwas’s church-world distinction. Divine gift is turned into command to Jesus and 
thereby to humanity, and their proper response is turned into obedience. But for the sake 
of space, in the final conclusion I will describe Williams’s account of divine sovereignty. 
Then in reference to Hauerwas, I will simply take up a significant implication of his 
trinitarian, soteriological point: his distinction between obedient creation (church as 
faithful witness) and disobedient creation (world). That is, Williams answers a question 
that Hauerwas has not fully accounted for: on what theological basis does the church have 
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a developing argument with the world? Before I can develop this claim and further 
engage Hauerwas’s solution of practical reason, I need to develop further how Williams’s 
interactive pluralism is predicated on his understanding of discussion and mutual 
recognition. 998 
IV. Williams and Dorrien Going through Liberalism to Go Beyond It,  
and the Roots of Williams Going Beyond Dorrien 
 In contradistinction to Hauerwas, Dorrien has almost never engaged Williams’s 
work. Dorrien’s only published note about Williams is indirect and less than positive. 
Dorrien briefly summarizes Theo Hobson’s 2005 characterization of Williams’s 
“ecclesiology…as standard Anglo-Catholicism sandwiched by an unwieldy Radical 
Orthodox compound of anarchy and utopia.”999 In Dorrien’s own nuanced way, he 
affirms Hobson’s assertion “that the best context for speaking and living the gospel is the 
liberal state,” over and against positions held by Hauerwas and John Milbank.1000 Dorrien 
does so, in part, because “the way beyond liberalism is through it.”1001 His positive 
valuation of the state and liberalism, set in contrast to Williams’s “unwieldy….anarchy,” 
gives the appearance that Williams is on some ‘other side.’ However, the truth is far more 
complicated.1002 Williams effectively opts for going through liberalism to go “beyond it” 
																																																								
998 For a selection on the Trinity and/or humanity in given command and responsive obedience, see Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 141-
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in a way somewhat similar to Dorrien and for some of the same reasons as Dorrien.1003 
However, Williams wants structural transformation of the state because he is less 
beholden to aspects of liberalism that Dorrien maintains. Here I will focus on the 
congruities and incongruities of their politics, which are predicated on Hegel and the 
English state pluralists. From that complex overlapping and distinguishing of Williams 
work with Dorrien’s political surplus, I conclude that Williams goes beyond Dorrien. 
Similarity and Difference in Human Rights and Mutual Recognition 
 Williams and Dorrien largely follow a Hegelian mode of reasoning to go, as even 
Williams puts it, “beyond liberalism.”1004 Drawing from his and Gillian Roses’s 
interpretation of Hegel’s conception of “concrete freedom,” Williams constructs a 
politics of kenotic “mutual recognition.”1005 That politics opens up secularism to focus on 
the common good beyond programmatic secularism’s minimal self-interests of individual 
autonomy. So in the positive Williams parallels Dorrien’s insistence on the social aspect 
of intellectual intuition that involves mutual recognition within the whole. There is also a 
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parallel in the negative. Williams argues against ecclesial “tribalism” by asserting “a 
prohibition against imagining any individual or group interest in isolation from the good 
of all, and a procedural insistence upon self-questioning, in the wake of this 
prohibition.”1006 Similarly Dorrien maintains the common good in an open perspectivism 
and emphasizes the negative in Hegel’s dialectic.1007 
 The difference between Williams and Dorrien arises in who else they include 
besides Hegel. Williams takes a philosophically realist turn by adding Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Since Hauerwas’s qualified realism also employs Wittgenstein, one might 
then expect that Williams would reject the language of human rights in the manner that 
Hauerwas does. Williams argues that “too much is at stake” not only for secularism to 
ignore the critiques of rights as “excessively abstract.”1008 But also, somewhat paralleling 
Dorrien’s criticism of Hauerwas, Williams criticizes those who use “anxieties about their 
freedom to make religiously based ethical judgments an excuse for denying the 
unconditionality––and the self-critical imperatives––of the language of rights.”1009 
Instead, one must “salvage” and support “something from…the language of rights” 
because it “is…the only intelligible way of expressing how the state is itself under 
law.”1010 In that philosophically realist frame, Williams has critically accepted rights for 
some time and has recently advanced a constructive argument for human dignity as 
well.1011 																																																								
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 Instead of the minimalism of the social contract and autonomous freedom in 
which rights are their own ends, Williams re-grounds human dignity and rights in a 
cluster of ideas in order to serve negotiation for the common good. All persons are 
created in the imago Dei. The Christian mission is one of universal proclamation. 
Historical and communicative embodiment is inseparable from the mutual recognition of 
another as gift. These points attend to how both the relation between God and humanity 
and the relation between human beings constitute not only human dignity directly and 
indirectly, but also in turn human rights. Williams grounds his support for human rights 
in “an attitude of receptivity towards” the whole of humanity because all humanity is 
related under God’s sovereign “invitation” in the gospel.1012 Williams’s advocacy for 
“mutual personal recognition” shapes rights “language” such that it must be “grounded in 
a clear sense of the dignity of the other, not simply of the claims of the self.”1013 Failure 
to recognize human rights is not only unloving and inhospitable, but also rejects 
recognizing equal belonging crucial for “civil discourse.”1014 
 There is much for Dorrien to agree with here, especially the issues of mutual 
recognition, equality, and rights. In fact, like Dorrien, Williams could be understood as 
framing religious pluralism partly as a justice issue. But Dorrien’s primary emphasis on 
Hegel does not preclude Dorrien relying on the Kantian construal of equality in terms of 
human autonomy and choice. In contrast, Williams argues for liberalism’s creative 
																																																								
“simply prescribed by authority,” or a form of logical positivism to evade “complete relativism in public morality,” and relatedly, 
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engagement as reducible neither to “a principle simply of democratic rights, nor 
individual liberties.”1015 Williams’s understanding of human dignity and rights relies not 
on Kant, but on Williams’s assumptions about the nature of bodies and language. His 
account of equality rests on his framework of discourse among particularities in mutual 
recognition rather than on abstractions like choice. Ironically, this difference between 
Dorrien and Williams now marks a place of agreement for rights language between 
Hauerwas and Williams. In recent work Hauerwas shows appreciation for Williams’s 
framing of rights as attentive to the communicative nature of human bodies in concrete 
particularities and traditions.1016 
 Recall that, for Dorrien, equal autonomy is an end in itself as much as it is 
necessary for flourishing. In attention to such ends, he allows his broader theological, 
social vision to be reconfigured in light of liberation. However, also remember Dorrien’s 
position that liberation theologies need to be grounded in a broader vision like the social 
gospel and economic democracy. So questions remain as to whether or to what extent 
Dorrien will let an even broader social vision transform his understanding of liberalism. 
Williams’s vision offers an alternative of how to work through liberalism to go beyond it. 
This can be seen in their similar and different visions of radical democracy.1017 
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The Difference that Social Bodies Make 
 in Radical Democracy and Transforming the State 
 Williams was never for anarchy. Instead, he has long been for what is tantamount 
to radical democracy in the same vein as Dorrien’s radical democracy: “pluralistic, 
contextual, and pragmatic.”1018 In particular, they both draw from the English state 
pluralist tradition for their normative visions of radical democracy. Hobson missed 
Williams’s consistent reliance on the English state pluralists informed by Hegel’s 
positive valuation of “intermediate civil associations.”1019 Dorrien’s arguments for a 
“decentralized economic democracy” not only similarly rely on deep sympathy for guild 
socialism.1020 But also that guild socialism he connects directly and indirectly to some of 
the same figures in the English state pluralist tradition which Williams draws upon. In 
fact, Williams and Dorrien see an overlap between, and argue for, integrating the English 
state pluralists and liberation theology. Williams’s and Dorrien’s appeals to the English 
state pluralists also indicate their affirmation of subsidiarity, which they do for similar 
reasons. Hobson’s charge of anarchy misperceived Williams’s emphasis that the church’s 
“focus is necessarily local and mobile.”1021 In the same vein, Williams emphasizes local 
associations like “microcredit institutions in alliance with civil society bodies.”1022 
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Dorrien also understands that “the building of healthy communities [is] best dealt with on 
a community and regional basis.”1023 
 Williams gives an important role to the state at national and international levels, 
in part, to promote ecological justice against the capitalist abuse of a finite world. Dorrien 
also resists negating the importance of international and federal levels of governance for 
ensuring universal human rights and healthcare, enforcing economic regulation of the big 
banks, and negotiating ecological issues that invariably affect multiple communities. At 
the same time, Williams broadens his interactive pluralism in mutuality to the 
international level. He argues that a kind of ecclesial “advocacy” for “non-national,” non-
governmental organizations are essential to help resolve international conflict.1024 
Similarly, Dorrien has worked with the World Council of Churches and social justice 
organizations. Williams also, like Dorrien, engages the ecological crisis from a view 
about the interrelatedness of the person within the whole.1025  
 Their difference here in terms of state sovereignty is that Williams opts for 
transforming it through recognizing corporate equality. This is where the anarchism 
charge may come from today, since Williams’s vision is an alternative to the nation-
state’s sovereignty and to its ongoing transformation into the market-state. By contrast, 
Dorrien’s privileging of equal choice is secured by the state. These differences can be 
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seen in how Williams works for transformation, and how Dorrien works with the nation-
state and key aspects of the market-state.1026 
 To claim that Williams’s transformation of state sovereignty is anarchic and/or an 
impossible ideal overlooks the process of transformation that he proposes. It is ‘practical’ 
in Hauerwas’s terms and ‘pragmatic’ in Dorrien’s. The reconfiguration of state 
sovereignty for cooperative, interactive pluralism begins by expanding the state’s 
recognition of other corporate bodies through its legal accommodations to their 
individual members becoming accommodations of the corporate bodies. In this legal 
frame rather than public relations, Williams’s ‘Shari’a lecture’ was a practical and 
successful first step in expanding the state’s juridical accommodations according to the 
corporate nature of faith. Granted the state may not have realized yet the social bodies 
themselves as legal authorities in any full sense, but the pragmatic first step occurs in 
corporate bodies such as English Muslim communities receiving accommodations 
indirectly.1027 
 Williams then gives the corporate bodies a critical voice. He emphasizes that 
pushing the state to re-conceive “religious belonging” in a corporate mode expands state 
accommodation for intermediate communities so that they can be “critical participa[nts]” 
inside “the institutions of the secular state.”1028 For Williams, “communities of faith have 
a stake in the decisions of the state and its moral direction.”1029 The state can be held to 
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ideals of protecting human dignity and of co-operation without losing the state’s role as 
“a proactive transnational sovereign power.”1030 The immediate aim here is a state “that 
can be held to account” rather than one that conceives of itself as sacred.1031 And that aim 
is for a broader account of politics: the fullness of minority voices is crucial for 
understanding the common good. They are accordingly raised up more robustly in 
Williams’s framework than one that privileging the choices of autonomous individuals. 
Thus, the first step in Williams’s proposal for transforming the state is built on situating 
individuality and equality with and within authoritative corporate bodies other than the 
state, but still working with the state.1032 
 Williams’s category of corporate critic is significant for understanding his 
agreement and disagreement with Dorrien. When they are looked at from a distance, they 
have significant parallels. Dorrien emphasizes minority voices and human dignity. In 
order to achieve those ends, his project is about Christianity’s critical participation in 
democratic process without giving up on gospel truth that makes Christianity Christian. 
He also stresses the importance of “religious pluralism” in particular.1033 He critiques, 
accordingly, theological resistance to it such as the social gosplers’ Christianizing and the 
various forms of Christian supersessionism.1034 
 However, crucial points of disagreement between Dorrien and Williams concern 
corporate bodies, equality, and state sovereignty. I assume Dorrien wants to hold up the 
corporate nature of Christianity since he affirms that the church is a social ethic, since he 
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is an Episcopal priest, and since he travels an ecclesial lecture circuit. But his published 
work does not develop a corporate account of the church. Nor does Dorrien seek to 
expand the state’s juridical accommodation to religious faiths for the individual or the 
corporate body. Instead, he aims to publicly realize “the claim of the gospel to religious 
truth” in a way that is beholden to the US liberal order’s ideals and its structure.1035 
Dorrien’s argument for securing religious pluralism is about it as a “justice issue” that he 
frames with the duty of “respect” in the First Amendment.1036 For him, developing the 
First Amendment’s protection of respect grounds his resistance to the privatizing 
dissolution of Christianity’s corporate nature. But simply asserting freedom of speech 
plays into the individualism inherent to the social contract. There is a better way, despite 
its limits. The US courts have the category of arbitration to make accommodations to 
religious bodies and their laws. This is how law courts in Texas have acknowledged the 
importance of Islamic law courts for a Muslim divorce. So Dorrien construes respect only 
in the negative. Further, despite being an Episcopal priest, his published work lacks a 
robust, constructive, and normative account in his own voice concerning corporate 
bodies of faith. That lacuna presumably comes partly from his debt to state sovereignty. 
He seeks to secure equality for choice on the basis of the state’s sovereign status quo in 
two ways.1037 																																																								
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 First, Dorrien shores up the contemporary nation-state through ensuring equality 
in politics and in economics without violating the individualism of political liberalism. 
Dorrien’s normative relation between politics and economics is an ethos of democratic 
equality. Because of this similarity, they can be mutually informing. On the one hand, he 
upholds liberalism’s social contract in order to secure individual equality and to fight 
“turbo-capitalism.”1038 On the other hand, economic democracy’s emphasis on equality 
helps secure equality in the social contract. However, economic democracy does not 
realize intermediate civil associations in the political sphere, just in the economic sphere. 
Equality is between individual citizens in democratic politics, while equality is found in 
communal forms like unions and co-operatives in democratic economics. So Dorrien 
wants to change economics, but he does not extend the communitarianism of his 
economics into the structure of democratic politics.1039 
 Second, although Dorrien does not engage the state qua market-state, he partially 
embraces it insofar as he works to secure economic choice for all through and alongside 
the state. Under the influence of global capitalism, the nation-state, which exists for “the 
welfare of the nation,” is currently transforming into the market-state, whose reason for 																																																								
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being is “maximiz[ing] the opportunity of its citizens.”1040 In terms of equality and 
choice, Dorrien also seeks to secure just such maximization of opportunities in politics 
and economics. To these ends, he critiques global capitalism running roughshod over the 
local and global capacities of unions and the state’s regulatory power. One instance is the 
major banks lobbying for economic autonomy.1041 
 These constructive and critical arguments put Dorrien against and with the 
market-state. On the one hand, he requires aspects of the nation-state’s welfare. He 
assumes it in his persuasive argument for the public option of single-payer, universal 
health care. Thereby Dorrien also shows his resistance to privatization of the public 
commons that occurs in the market-state. On the other hand, Dorrien’s economic 
democracy coheres with the state’s acknowledgement of “other institutions” that rise 
while the state increasingly centralizes its power in a more narrow way than before.1042 
He emphasizes a decentralized, local, and grass-roots movement for establishing 
economic democracy, “a third way between the systems of the competitive market and 
the state.”1043 But some federal centralization is still important for Dorrien. It not only 
secures “environmental protection” and public, universal health care.1044 Economic 
democracy also requires social democracy. That is, the state provides some measure of 
both “social ownership” and investment in the economy in order to help democratize the 
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economy and to ensure choice.1045 Dorrien, then, seeks to maintain much of the welfare 
state, but he works critically with key hallmarks of the burgeoning market-state.1046 
 Both Williams and Dorrien argue for broadening a sense of the “political” beyond 
the state.1047 In fact, I understand Williams’s political horizon as the ground for fulfilling 
Dorrien’s proclamation, that “we need new forms of community that arise out of but 
transcend religious affiliation, culture, and nation.”1048 However, they differ as to how 
much they embrace political liberalism. Dorrien is a communitarian through and through 
with regard to his economics for equal choice. But in his politics for equal choice, he 
implicitly assumes a social contract between equal individuals when he holds that their 
equal and individual dignity, “rights,” and “opportunity” are absolutely necessary.1049 
This political frame situates a welfare state in which operates the updated social 
gospelers’ social creed for the proleptic but partial transforming the soul of society. Even 
his emphasis on equal choice in economics, like the social gospelers, indirectly reinforces 
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political equality over against those privatizing the commons. Because of his assumption 
and project, Dorrien presupposes the permanence of the state’s sovereignty. He calls for 
additions to it, but he cannot call for the transformation of it to the same degree that 
Williams does. Yet, Dorrien’s communitarianism opens the door for him, in the future, to 
follow Williams. Williams emphasizes that a corporate sense of equality should be a 
primary component of a “broader vision of what political humanity looks like.”1050 So 
what truly differentiates Dorrien and Williams is not so much if one should go through 
liberalism in theory and the liberal state in practice. Instead, Williams embraces a broader 
sense of the political on the wide terms of society’s complex constitution rather than on 
the narrow terms of the state. Williams, then, is less beholden to certain aspects of 
liberalism than Dorrien. Thereby Williams is more structurally transformative of the state 
than Dorrien is. But Dorrien could move in Williams’s direction if Dorrien’s social 
concern for democratic transformation will include state sovereignty itself entirely.1051 
V. Williams’s Political Horizon Going Beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas 
 Hauerwas, Dorrien, and Williams have different answers on how to transform 
political life. Hauerwas argues that the truthful, faithful witness of the church 
proleptically embodies the eschatological kingdom. That embodied witness is how the 
world comes to know itself as the world. Only then can the world be transformed in the 
light of Jesus, the truth. Dorrien argues that Christianity’s truthful, faithful work is about 
the liberative and spiritual transformation of society’s soul. Christianity is grounded in a 
																																																								
1050 Williams, FPS, 25. 
1051 Dorrien, EDE, chp. 9; Dorrien, SS, 304-307; Dorrien, “Communitarianism, Christian Realism, and the Crisis of Progressive 
Christianity,” 365-371, 375-378; Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 26; Dorrien, SS, 305; 
Dorrien, RCG, 112, 161. 
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spiritual center that is deeply concerned about justice for flourishing. Williams argues for 
discussion in society in a way that coheres with aspects of both Hauerwas’s and Dorrien’s 
positions. So Williams’s position could mediate between Hauerwas and Dorrien.  
 Yet there is potential for much more in Williams’s project. His focus on pluralist, 
interactive discussion opens our imaginations to a new horizon for state sovereignty. That 
is also a new horizon for Hauerwas and Dorrien, which can release their projects from a 
dead-end impasse. Williams’s work helps move beyond an impasse about survival within 
a political structure to changing the structure’s fundamental nature. So here I further 
develop the horizon of Williams’s political vision in relation to Dorrien and Hauerwas. 
The implications of Williams’s political work releases the pressure of the state’s current 
understanding of its sovereignty that divides and limits both Dorrien and Hauerwas. 
 I have described some of the horizon’s aspects, but there are more implications in 
his pluralist state that round out his vision and establish the new horizon’s potential. 
Williams argues for reforming the state’s hegemonic sovereignty that demands private 
faith be translated into secular categories in order for it to have a public voice. When his 
work is extended to the US theological discussion, he illuminates how it is unnecessarily 
fractured by a conflicted response to both the hegemonic sovereignty of the modern 
nation-state and the categories of programmatic secularism. 
Transformation: Cut Out the Permanence of Privatization and Translation 
 Chapter one raised Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s complex agreement and 
disagreement about the privatization of Christianity and the translation of it into secular 
idioms. This is worth returning to now since I have identified the heart of their 
disagreement and since it serves as a foil to Williams. Dorrien thinks Hauerwas’s position 
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leads to isolation from society; Hauerwas turned the charge back to Dorrien, questioning 
Dorrien’s position as leading to isolation from the church. They have since effectively 
responded to one another’s positions, although not in direct reference to one another. To 
answer Stout’s criticism of isolation, Hauerwas has given accounts of radical democracy 
that rest upon practical reasoning and the work of Yoder, Williams, and Sheldon Wolin. 
Dorrien, for his part, has called for recovering truth and liberal theology’s spiritual center 
in the form of a personalist gospel that once preached well in churches.1052 
 Yet Hauerwas and Dorrien are still beholden to privatization and translation, their 
differences notwithstanding. Hauerwas still focuses on particularity, especially the 
particularity of Christianity’s corporate nature, to provide an alternative to the dead-end 
of liberalism’s political order. He looks to some like an isolated antagonist withdrawn 
into his tribe because the liberal order’s ‘neutral’ public sphere and social contract 
undercuts the particularity of Christianity’s corporate embodiment. But in truth, his 
refusal to save the liberal order stems from the way he is un-willfully bounded by the 
perverting illusions of privatization and translation that he resists wisely on the church’s 
terms. 
 Dorrien is, however, willfully bounded by privatization and translation because of 
his pragmatic streak and his sympathy for liberalism. But he also astutely maintains a 
critical reserve while he works within the liberal order. He attempts to avoid the pitfalls 
of privatization and translation. So he privileges idealism and intellectual intuition. He 
emphasizes liberation and social gospel morality. He stresses the importance of love for 
																																																								
1052 Dorrien, SS, 359; Hauerwas, review of Soul in Society, 420; Hauerwas, SU, chp. 10 and pp. 209-213, which allows for a richer 
interpretation of p. 175. 
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social transformation. He recovers Christianity’s spiritual truth of loving, personal Spirit. 
Yet, his own constructive solution for recovering liberal theology’s spiritual center is 
only briefly mapped, in part, because of the 2012 presidential election. That kairotic 
moment appeared to ‘necessitate’ a conventional response by social ethics: privatized 
faith translated as morality into the public sphere. That was the method for Dorrien’s The 
Obama Question, although in other ways it was an analytical and explanatory tour de 
force. So Hauerwas and Dorrien are prevented from realizing their political surplus by the 
categorical boundaries of privatization and translation that they assume are permanent 
aspects of the liberal state.1053 
 In contrast to both Hauerwas and Dorrien, Williams cuts the Gordian knot of 
privatization and translation. They are not simply absent in interactive pluralism. They 
are replaced with precisely what they repress: the acceptance of authoritative corporate 
bodies in public life. Privatization is no longer a tool for an uneasy ‘peace,’ since 
corporate groups are recognized as legitimate authorities for members as political 
subjects and for public life on the whole. Life together in an interactive pluralist society 
depends on mutual recognition by such groups in direct communication with each other 
so that their language does not need to be translated into a ‘neutral’ public sphere. Mutual 
recognition raises up the fullness of political life in both its complex diversity and mutual 
commonality. This fullness allows for multi-faceted co-operation in discussion for the 
																																																								
1053 Dorrien, OQ, 2, 116, 167, 216-228; Dorrien, EDE, 164; Dorrien, RCG, 161. For Dorrien articulating his realistic-pragmatic take on 
the kairotic moment, which he says also required putting briefly putting aside Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit, see the question 
and answer session following his lecture “Social Ethics for Social Justice: The Idea of Economic Democracy,” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tFE9J7XsOL0, hour one and minutes fifteen through twenty and fifty-six through fifty-nine. For 
other places where Dorrien writes explicitly about seizing the moment, see EDE, 184; Dorrien, OQ, 204. 
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common good, instead of orientation to the common good undercut by suppressing 
plurality justified on the grounds of Hobbes’s state of nature.1054 
 Hauerwas finds such a vision attractive, and Dorrien may also at least in part. 
Nevertheless, they are still bound to their disagreement over privatization and translation 
because of their division over the issue of sovereignty. Dorrien critically appreciates the 
triumphs and promise of liberalism’s political order, but Hauerwas sees a thoroughgoing 
hegemony. I have shown how Williams holds to both. Like Dorrien, Williams appreciates 
and constructively builds upon liberalism, albeit in somewhat different ways than 
Dorrien. Like Hauerwas, Williams rejects state hegemony and its mechanisms of 
privatization and translation. 
 Both Dorrien and Hauerwas’s appeals to subsidiarity counter increasing federal 
power, but they lack a robust vision or argument for a new political structure to transform 
the state’s account of itself. Williams is not so beholden to the immutability of hegemonic 
sovereignty and its mechanisms (Dorrien). Nor does Williams’s critical response focus 
strictly on constructing an alternative qua ecclesial polis (Hauerwas). Because Williams’s 
political imagination does not assume the permanence of the modern state’s hegemonic 
sovereignty, he is able to re-conceive it as procedural secularism for interactive pluralism. 
Williams opts to transform state sovereignty by subjecting its potestas to a new political 
																																																								
1054 Williams, FPS, 60-61, 271, 279-298; Williams, WA, 293-294; Williams’s closing comments in his moderating of a question and 
answer session for Luke Bretherton in “Interfaith Lecture at Lambeth Palace: Question and Answer Session: Audience with Luke 
Bretherton,” The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Jun. 4, 2009, 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/canterbury//data/files/resources/780/09_06_04_Interfaith_Lecture_Q_A.doc. 
 Williams’s emphasis on practical reasoning directly between communities does not require natural law as a foundationalist 
form of reason to create unity in politics. Nor does Williams require “secular reason” for public discussion as more friendly positions 
to his vision hold. This is how Williams meets the potential and avoids the failure that Long has seen in Stout’s unification of 
pragmatism and democracy. J. Budziszewski, “Natural Law, Democracy, and Shari’a,” in Shari’a in the West, 188-193; Robert Audi, 
Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 112; Long, Speaking of God, 270-272. 
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horizon in which corporate bodies, their particularity, and their authority are essential to 
the primacy of mutual recognition and discussion in public life.  
 This is not impossible idealism as those with Niebuhrian concerns might object. 
Very practical means, most visibly through jurisprudence, undergird the realization of 
mutual recognition in Williams’s vision of interactive pluralism and the pluralist state. He 
shrewdly but without deceit engages in practical reasoning to expand the state’s most 
important self-referential categories. Expansion is to such a degree that the state’s 
understanding of its mission, categories, and sovereignty are transformed. Such 
transformation is in light of other corporate bodies and their authority in order to 
approximate more closely to Williams’s pluralist state. In effect, Williams’s practical 
theory expands the state’s categories and practices like over-inflating a balloon to the 
point that it explodes. But here the analogy breaks down, for explosion might seem like 
anarchy. However, the expansion transfigures rather than destroys, because what 
Williams focuses on is not confined to the limits of liberal categories.1055 
 For example, Williams’s argument for expanding the state’s juridical 
accommodations to corporate bodies recognizes that faiths, like Islam, have their own 
juridical methods of reconciliation, like Shari’a, that are authoritative for their members. 
Williams employs the Jewish scholar Ayelet Shachar’s notion of “transformative 
accommodation” to describe “a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to choose 
the jurisdiction under which they will seek to [resolve] certain carefully specified 
																																																								
1055 Expansion is a possibility since “the liberal state has repeatedly had to make accommodation with minority communities, not 
simply with individuals––ethnic minorities who identities have been damaged by state centralism, religious groups, even those making 
a specific choice of lifestyle” (FPS, 40). Williams has perceived a pragmatic opening in the equally pragmatic “concessions” to 
multicultural accommodations, even though they are at odds with the ideological primacy of the individual (ibid.). 
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matters.”1056 While this is called accommodation, what distinguishes it from the 
accommodations by the state today is a process of “mutual” transformation through 
relation “without compromising the distinctiveness of the essential elements 
of…communal loyalties.”1057 In this new framework, jurisdictions of the state and the 
corporate faiths transform each other through “overlapping,” “supplementary” 
jurisdictions and work to keep from falling back into a monopolistic system of 
jurisprudence.1058 Jurisdictions undergo at least a partial leveling, where religious 
authorities do not merely fit into a simple category delineated by the state. In the latter is 
the tired category of the state policing relationships themselves. But rather than through 
the filter of the state and its language, multiple jurisdictions reflect a web of powers with 
each distinctive node in direct dialogue with others.1059 
 There is an important feminist critique put to Williams here. He acknowledges 
that such a system will not be without tension or even conflict, and so he attempts to be 
																																																								
1056 Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 20; Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and 
Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 117-145. See also Ayelet Shachar, “State, Religion, and the Family: 
The New Dilemmas of Multicultural Accommodation,” in Shari’a in the West, 131-132. 
1057  Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶ 21. See also ibid., ¶ 20. 
1058 Ibid., ¶¶ 10-11, 13-14, 20-21; Bernard Jackson, “‘Transformative Accommodation’ and Religious Law,” Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal 11, no. 2 (2009): 132. Jackson also rightly notes that the term “‘parallel’ jurisdictions” is a distortion of Williams’s argument 
(ibid.). 
1059 Some have called into question that Williams used Shachar’s account of transformative accommodation because it is, critics claim, 
competitive rather than consensual governing. But such criticism is too narrow. It misses the fact that right now the state’s sovereignty 
is hegemonic and its jurisprudence is monopolistic. That antagonistic governing needs to change in order to realize Williams’s 
pluralist and ‘consensual-like’ account of first and second-level communities. Further, in Williams’s vision of the pluralist state, 
transformation is fundamentally about maturation, not antagonism; and how he gets there is through supplemental jurisdictions. For 
the critique of Shachar, see Russell Sandberg, Gillian Douglas, Norman Doe, Sophie Gilliat-Ray, and Asma Khan, “Britain’s 
Religious Tribunals: Joint Governance in Practice,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33, no. 2 (2013): 2-3, 21-22. For a defense of 
Williams’s position that meets the narrow critique, see Robin Griffith-Jones, “Religious Rights and the Public Interest,” in Islam and 
English Law, 193-194. Sandberg and company study on the Family Division of Beth Din and Shari’a councils also overlooks a 
practical example of the state’s accommodation to supplemental jurisdiction. A Canadian-English Jewish divorce under the Jewish 
court Beth Din of America was recognized by Justice Baker’s 2013 ruling in England’s High Court (Family Division), one of the most 
senior courts overseeing England and Wales. The case not only exemplifies the kind of permeable boundaries that Williams calls for. 
The case also, in the judge’s own words, “illustrates the principle propounded by Archbishop Rowan Williams in his 2008 lecture 
‘Civil and Religious Law in England: a Religious Perspective’ … that ‘citizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the 
abandoning of religious discipline, any more than religious discipline should deprive one of access to liberties secured by the law of 
the land, to the common benefits of secular citizenship’” (AI v. MT, [2013] EWHC (Fam) 100, [1], [35], [2013] 2 FLR 371). For an 
insightful connecting and developing of Williams’s work on transformative accommodation to the divorce case, see Tarama Tolley, 
“When Binding is not Binding and when not Binding, Binds,” 493-500. 
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particularly sensitive to the plight of women.1060 However, some see conflict as indicating 
failure and Williams’s vision as regression. More sympathetic critics, such as the Muslim 
scholar Samia Bano, ask why Williams’s vision is any better or necessary in terms of 
opening space for Shari’a courts. Bano raised important issues concerning women that 
need to be further addressed. But she also answered her own question. In the fearful, 
ignorant, and arrogant responses to Williams’s ‘Shari’a lecture,’ Bano notes the 
continued ghettoization and marginalization of Muslim women as unenlightened 
Muslims. So very necessary is Williams’s fundamental point which Bano admires: to 
open complex space in order to negotiate, rather than suppress, the conflict between 
diverse peoples in their communities for the common good. In doing so, as Shachar 
notes, jurisprudence is transformed, and accordingly the state’s sovereignty. In 
Williams’s terms, the state begins to open the door to first-level associations when the 
state opens up to the corporate reality of faith. This shift changes the state from 
overriding the associations with the social contract’s individualism that creates 
ghettoization and marginalization.1061  
Situating Dorrien and Hauerwas in Williams’s Complex Space 
 Williams’s horizon goes beyond Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s in a way that calls 
Dorrien and Hauerwas to greater attention to aspects of the other’s project while 
eliminating some of the major reservations they have about each other.  
																																																								
1060 Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England,” ¶¶ 2, 10, 13. 
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 Hauerwas’s emphasis on particularity and witness need not be understood as 
isolation if political equality is reconfigured in light of corporate bodies. Williams’s 
understanding of mutual recognition and in particular communal language actually 
expands the category of equality to include corporate bodies in the political ‘sphere.’ This 
expansion-inclusion opens the potential of liberalism’s stress on creative discussion to 
allow for all aspects of life, including first-level associations, to participate in public life. 
 Williams’s incorporation of corporate bodies in politics also opens up new paths 
for contemporary liberal theology. Liberal theology conceived anew would not cease to 
exist for Dorrien as a mediating theology. In fact, mediation is all the more important in 
Williams’s pluralist state. However, contemporary liberal theology would undergo 
significant change in its basic assumptions of privatization and translation, which are 
present even in Dorrien’s emphasis on morality. For Williams, mediation is about 
discussion directly between particularities (e.g., scriptural reasoning) occurring in the 
political ‘sphere,’ rather than mediation including translation into an abstract, third 
language qua morality. The challenge for liberal theology’s hybridity is the need to 
reckon better with conflicting distinctiveness and incommensurable truth/revelation 
claims between communities. In doing so, liberal theology could then reclaim the 
distinctiveness of the Christian truth that Dorrien affirms and that Hauerwas emphasizes. 
Williams’s stress on living as participating in multiple communities might even 
invigorate Dorrien’s hybridity and dialectical recognition of truth in liberal theology. 
 Once the first-level associations are recognized as important voices for the 
common good of society, they can then be critical and co-operative participants in 
politics without the trappings of Constantinianism. Williams argues for the recognition of 
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first-level associations for three reasons. First, “politics is too important to leave to 
politicians.”1062 Second, the converse, “politicians are too important to leave to 
politics.”1063 Third, the recognition of corporate bodies is a necessary step for the 
particularity of Christianity’s corporate witness to get a receptive hearing as a participant. 
Hauerwas assumes the corporate nature of Christian witness and its importance for 
politics. But there were problems even in his explicit but brief flirtation with Christian 
witness aimed at transforming the practical aspects of the state’s disciplinary justice. He 
does not sufficiently indicate how he thinks Christianity’s corporate body can be 
recognized by state authorities. Nor does he develop how the church’s specific practices 
can be “imitated” by the state authorities.1064 
 By contrast, Williams’s emphasis on corporate bodies could be quite helpful in, as 
Hauerwas desires, reforming prisons away from their practices that create “social 
alienation” and steer them toward communion.1065 That transformative vision is not 
unlike Dorrien’s social gospel sense of transformation. But leveraging Williams towards 
such ends cannot be set in the same frame as the social gospelers and R. Niebuhr. Unlike 
them, Williams’s work is in the context of transforming the state in a democratic but non-
Constantinian fashion. 
 I argued above that Williams’s transformative vision not only lacks the hallmarks 
of Constantinianism, but it also emphasizes Christianity’s distinctive particularity that 
modern, liberal Constantinianism suppresses. Christianity’s corporate nature is important 
																																																								
1062 Williams, “Faith & Politics.”  
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Hauerwas, PF, 200. Hauerwas would presumably point to his former student, James Logan, Good Punishment?: Christian Moral 
Practice and U.S. Imprisonment (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008). However, Logan appears to agree with my 
criticism (ibid., 198). 
1065 Logan, Good Punishment?, chp. 3. See also ibid. p. 189 and ch. 6; Hauerwas, BH, 11-12; Hauerwas, PF, 200. 
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for both its nonviolent politics of reconciliation and its role as critical witness to the state 
rather than its handmaiden. Williams can maintain these while working towards political 
transformation because his theopolitics are about having a developing argument with the 
world. I will develop this ground in the final conclusion within a constructive criticism of 
Hauerwas. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Williams goes beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas because he establishes a new 
political horizon, the transformation of the hegemonic state into a pluralist state for 
supporting a robust, interactive pluralism. I argued that Williams maintains much of the 
political surplus in Dorrien and Hauerwas. But I also contrasted William’s vision with 
elements in Dorrien and Hauerwas in order to show that Williams opens up a new 
understanding of political sovereignty, in a way that resists the contemporary framework 
which both divides and limits Dorrien and Hauerwas. What results is a space for fresh 
discussion in US theology and social ethics. By virtue of Williams’s horizon going 
beyond Dorrien and Hauerwas, they can be freed from a conflictual discussion driven by 
the categories of privatization and translation. Williams’s new vision, and his work to 
realize it, can re-invigorate the discussion. Dorrien and Hauerwas can see each other’s 
projects in a new light, specifically by re-thinking transformation and the distinctive 
particularity of Christianity’s corporate body. But to do so requires considering how 
Williams’s trinitarian theopolitics can stimulate development in Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s projects.
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CONCLUSION 
 Chapter four loosened the grip of problematic political assumptions and began to 
chart a direction away from the social justice-faithfulness discontent. Support for these 
changes and continuing development requires an engagement with deeper theological 
issues. So by way of conclusion, I suggest that Williams’s trinitarian theopolitics of love 
and gift in mutuality and plenitude provides a way to reconsider aspects of Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s projects. I will briefly address the issue of Trinity and plenitude in Dorrien’s 
project, but I will focus on the church-world issue in Hauerwas’s project. Such 
reconsideration is not a closure, as if Dorrien or Hauerwas should simply adopt 
Williams’s position. Instead, reconsideration is about an encounter with Williams that 
makes possible a fresh discussion between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions, or at 
least those indebted to them. 
I. The Ground of a Different Theopolitical Horizon: Trinitarian Gift and Love 
 Political liberalism’s attempt to create peace by autonomy, Williams argues, 
ironically assumed a logic of violence. Self-determining became self-ownership in need 
of security, which is tantamount to anti-gift. Supporting ownership and security gave rise 
to a Hobbesian “law and lawlessness” dichotomy instead of a gift-economy and the 
common good.1066 So Williams rejects holding tightly to oneself. Rather, God unites 
human freedom with human dependence by, in Jesus and his church, calling one to 
receive the difference of the other as a gift and to reciprocate in kind with gift. Out of this 
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dynamic not only “emerge[s]…selfhood.”1067 Not only constitutive to the subject, 
maturation, and peace are recognition, gift, and reciprocity mediated through a storied, 
traditioned community. But also, for Williams, human flourishing implies a “deeper level 
of agency or liberty.”1068  
 Later I will address Williams’s understanding of human agency. Here the issue is 
how divine sovereignty itself is “a deeper level of agency or liberty.” Since divine 
sovereignty is rooted in “the nature of God” who is triune, Williams maintains that the 
Trinity is “of cardinal importance.”1069 Williams’s political vision is grounded in divine 
sovereignty in terms of the triune economy of love, gift, mutuality, dispossession, and 
freedom. But here I will only explicitly focus on divine sovereignty as trinitarian 
difference-in-mutuality in terms of love and gift.1070 
 The Hegelianism of Williams’s account of mutual recognition is critically 
appropriated in light of a more significant, theological truth: the Trinity is the root of 
mutual recognition. Hegel circumvents his own account of difference-in-relation because, 
according to Williams, Hegel does not abide difference in the end. By contrast, the 
Trinity is a unity that spans all gaps of its internal differences while still maintaining 																																																								
1067 Williams, OCT, 243. 
1068 For the quote, see Williams, FPS, 222. See also Williams, WA, 142. For the rest of the paragraph, see Williams, FPS, 229; 
Williams, LI, 47-52; Williams, OCT, 268, 273; Rowan Williams, Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel (Cleveland, OH: 
Pilgrim Press, 2008), 18-19 (hereafter Res); Williams, LI, 61; Williams, OCT, 146-147, 269-270; Williams, Res, 38; Williams, WA, 
15, 70-73, 79-81; Rowan D. Williams, “The Body’s Grace,” in Theology and Sexuality: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. 
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WA, pp. 15, chp. 4, pp. 81-83. The preceding paragraph above should indicate that the ordo cognoscendi matters, and I do not intend 
to undercut it even though my argument will go in reverse (Williams, OCT, 161). To thoroughly show all the dynamics at work in 
human flourishing leading up to economic Trinity, one would need to work through creation and incarnation to the Trinity since 
Williams assumes, like Barth, Donald MacKinnon, and Hauerwas, that “the structure of revelation itself…correspond[s] to God’s own 
being”––although Williams does frame such revelatory correspondence in a non-foundationalist way by using Paul Ricoeur’s 
understanding of horizon (Williams, OCT, 142. See also ibid., 143-145, 160-161; Williams, WA, 108, 142.). However, for the sake of 
space, I will begin with Trinity. 
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difference. With Hans Urs von Balthasar, Williams describes the “positive otherness” of 
the triune persons as relating in the “mutual sharing” of dispossessive “self-giving.”1071 
One important implication of this relation is that “differences matter.”1072 But difference 
is not sheer difference, but “unity-in-difference.”1073 Differences can be maintained in 
unity because difference-in-relation is ordered by the fusion of love and gift.1074 
 For Williams, constitutive to difference is an open orientation toward the other, 
much like Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s descriptions of love. Because this orientation of 
love is in effect mutual recognition––or “mutually constitutive presence” in Williams’s 
words to emphasize analogy more strongly––love constitutes triune difference and its 
“positive distance.”1075 But love is more than orientation. From the orientation to another, 
Williams articulates an outward going and relational understanding of love that is 
common to Aquinas, Hegel, and Eastern Orthodoxy. Love is ecstatic affection 
(“ecstasis”), which drives one to reach out to the other for a mutual indwelling (mutua 
inhaesio or “reciprocal inhaesio”).1076 But ecstasy and mutual indwelling is also another 
way of expressing kenotic, mutual “self-giving” in the Trinity that “grow[s]” in 
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plenitude.1077 The Trinity’s internal kenotic self-giving is gift-giving that establishes and 
affirms difference. This may appear to create a dueling articulation of God’s work as love 
or gift. Or it may suggest that one precedes the other in the trinitarian life and God’s 
interaction with humanity “because our speech is temporal.”1078 Either way, Dorrien 
emphasizes love and Hauerwas privileges gift. But Williams simultaneously upholds love 
and gift to the point that they converge like “a Moebius strip” in the intra-trinitarian life 
because of its relational economy.1079 The openness of God’s love is a gift, and God’s 
openness makes difference a gift. Similarly, the mutual indwelling of the triune persons is 
achieved in ecstatic affection and self-gift.1080 
 On an initial glance, this convergence of love and gift may appear less than 
helpful for engaging Dorrien and Hauerwas. After all, I went to lengths in chapter two to 
show that Dorrien and Hauerwas are more complex than only love or grace respectively. 
The issue is which one is privileged. This may simply reflect that, as Williams notes, 
human analogy fails to fully grasp, in any concrete sense, this love-gift convergence in 
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the intra-trinitarian life. So Williams’s convergence of love and gift may simply appear to 
one as more of a rhetorical than substantive contrast to either Dorrien or Hauerwas.1081 
But rhetoric matters; in Hauerwas’s parlance, “words matter.”1082 For Dorrien’s 
idealism, words signify, no matter how incompletely, what truth undergirds and thereby 
orients one’s thought within the Whole. So he privileges love’s openness in humanity’s 
existence of interrelation, but he largely lacks gift and its dynamism in his normative 
accounts. For Hauerwas’s Wittgensteinian position, words shape the person. So 
Hauerwas subsumes love under gift: humanity’s existence is contingent on receiving and 
responding to one another and to divine gift. Dorrien and Hauerwas disagree, then, about 
what determines reality. This disagreement undergirds their difference on church and 
world. In contrast, Williams’s convergence of love and gift in the trinitarian life is 
maintained throughout his work. Of utmost importance for Williams is that the triune 
establishment of and openness to difference are ecstatic self-gifts to humanity for 
continually opening humanity to “flourishing” in God’s ever expanding economy.1083 
Dorrien and Hauerwas would affirm much of that statement in different ways, but 
Williams can simultaneously overlap with both of their respective emphases on love and 
gift. The triune relations of love-gift in the mutuality of “positive otherness” characterize 
both the difference between God and humanity and therein how God relates to 
humanity.1084 As Williams writes: “God desires us [creatures], as if we were God, as if 
we were that unconditional response to God’s giving that God’s self makes in the life of 																																																								
1081 Dorrien, “Economic Crisis, Economic Justice, and the Divine Commonwealth,” 25-26; Dorrien, “Not Dead Yet,” 27; Hauerwas, 
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1082 Hauerwas, WwW, 100. 
1083 Williams, OCT, 73. See also ibid., 74. 
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the Trinity. We are created so that we may be caught up in this, so that we may grow into 
the whole hearted love of God by learning that God loves us as God loves God.”1085 In 
other words, from the particularity of God pro nobis, Williams focuses on the relations of 
God in se in such a way that the internal relations in mutuality are God’s sovereignty. 
This account of divine sovereignty marks Williams’s difference from Dorrien and, to a 
lesser extent, Hauerwas. With Williams, the Trinity’s fruitful, loving, and giving internal 
relations are God’s sovereignty. 
For instance, recall from chapter two that Dorrien’s apophaticism has difficulty 
giving a trinitarian account of God in se, which has been supplanted with an account of 
personal Spirit. Yet for Williams, the triune relations are the source of plenitude and, 
thereby, the source of not only creation’s existence but also William’s apophaticism. 
Humanity cannot full plumb the depth of the triune life. However, humanity comes to 
know both this and its dependence by God’s pro nobis invitation to and humanity’s 
responsive, developmental participation in the triune economy. The reason why 
dependence and development are linked is partly because, for Williams, humanity is the 
image of God’s “divine liberty…always exercised in mutual love and creative self-
bestowal” (love-gift).1086 In other words, following Eastern Orthodox theologians, 
Williams maintains that the imago Dei is the imago trinitatis. The imago trinitatis is, for 
him, a cataphatic emphasis on relations within a larger apophatic turn. Human relations 
are predicated on and analogous in terms of agency to the intra-trinitarian life of creative 
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plenitude and “unity-in-difference,” not correlations between God and humanity like the 
analogia entis or the incarnation as the model for human relations.1087 The imago 
trinitatis effectively establishes the trinitarian economy as the ground for human agency 
from which stems human development in human history within God’s plenitude.1088 
Such a framework can critically develop, among other issues, Dorrien’s 
personalist assumptions about human freedom, his concerns for interfaith dialogue, and 
his advancements in economic democracy. For instance, although Dorrien has a far more 
detailed account of a political economy than Williams, Williams’s account is shaped by 
divine plenitude and gift whereas Dorrien does not. But I will leave such critical 
development for another time. Instead, I will show here how Williams’s framework can 
critically develop Hauerwas’s position on one specific issue in the disagreement between 
him and Dorrien.1089 
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II. Toward a Theological Account for a  
Developing Relation between Church and World 
 Recall from chapter one that Hauerwas applies the term “the world” to Christians 
in terms of disobedience (agency), but he also separates the church and world in terms of 
their traditioned communities. Sometimes he even equivocates between world and 
creation: the “world” can refer to the planet Earth, one’s social context as it is and as 
deceptive, etc.1090 Despite these problems with clarity and consistency, I established that 
Hauerwas’s work is primarily concerned about ecclesial witness to the human creatures 
and their traditioned communities who do not know or who reject God. So my use of the 
term “world” below reflects that emphasis in light of Hauerwas’s equivocation. The test 
is how the church’s reciprocity with the rest of creation can turn enemy-creatures into 
friend-creatures. Here I am concerned with part of that change, the turning of enemies 
into neighbors. How can the church, as made up of God’s human creatures attempting to 
be faithful to God’s invitation, on the church’s terms understand and enter into a 
developing argument with the world, as made up of God’s human creatures who do not 
know or who reject God? 
 I am not convinced by Dorrien’s 2009 description of his 1995 claim: that the 
problem here is Hauerwas’s “sharp dichotomy” between the church and world.1091 
Difference matters, especially on the issue of human violence and Christian pacifism. 
Rather, Hauerwas has not given a sufficient theological account for a maturing 
relationship, through response back and forth, between church and world after the world 
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responds positively but partially to ecclesial witness. Hauerwas’s difficulty here, I will 
argue, results from a two-tiered problem that undergirds Christian and non-Christian 
difference and, in turn, that governs their relation. The first tier is Hauerwas’s accounts of 
witness and friendship are categorically separated. Hauerwas attempts to overcome that 
separation through practical reasoning, but it alone is insufficient for a theological 
account of a developing relation between the church and world. The second tier regards 
Hauerwas’s account of gift, that produces the obedient and not-obedient dichotomy 
undergirding the categorical separation of witness and friendship. However, there is no 
theological support for practical reasoning that can address the obedient and not-obedient 
dichotomy. The sectarian withdrawal critiques levied at Hauerwas are not only wrong, 
they are superficial misdiagnoses. They do not account for the tiers and the problems 
therein. Nor do the criticisms, even Dorrien’s isolationist charge, offer a sufficiently 
trinitarian solution for human beings as relational creatures. However, Williams’s 
theological framework does through reciprocal trinitarian love-gift in abundance. The 
imago trinitatis in creation supplies the necessary ground for how the church can be 
appropriately open to the world and, in turn, how the church can have a developing 
argument with the world. 
Tier One: Friendship, Witness, and Practical Reasoning 
 For Hauerwas, ecclesial witness is revelation to the world. Witness makes 
Christian truth intelligible by the particular embodiment of it in relations and in practical 
reasoning, not by translating truth into claims of autonomous, abstract rationality. 
Witness as such is the gift of representing God to the world, as according to Hauerwas’s 
co-creator and representation dichotomy. Christian witness on Christian terms is the 
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grounds for discussion rather than closes discussion, since Hauerwas grants “that the 
world can respond to the distinctive character of Christian witness.”1092 However, the 
proclamation of truth in word and deed has a narrow understanding of reciprocity for 
those inside and outside the church. Witness is primarily about ecclesial faithfulness, not 
for the sake of discussion with the world alone. Perhaps Hauerwas’s most explicit note 
about the world’s reciprocity and its affect on the church is in Resident Aliens: “Now, one 
of the problems with witness is that people hear it. Then they tell it back to you, and you 
think, is that what I said? But the gospel is not the Gospel until it’s been received. That 
often times works as a judgment on our lives.”1093 So Hauerwas understands the good 
news as gift, and reciprocity is constitutive of it. But his articulation of ecclesial witness 
is largely unidirectional and critical: to “identify the world as the world” exposes the 
falsity of the world’s claim to autonomy.1094 In a rare occurrence, Hauerwas briefly 
acknowledges that the world’s response to ecclesial witness can “create an 
epistemological crisis within Christianity.”1095 But even granting that acknowledgment, a 
question still remains. If representative witness is revelatory, then what about a 
reciprocity that allows for development in the world that is not immediately 
conversion?1096 
 Friendship is the gift of mutual care (love) that enables virtuous development. So 
intra-human friendship might be the answer since witness and friendship are intertwined 
for Hauerwas. Witness constitutes patient friendship, and witness is the result of 
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friendship. But the church can only witness for friendship, because witness from 
friendship only makes sense in the church. So witness and friendship are categorically 
separated: witness is how the church relates to the world; friendship is how the church 
relates internally. This separation stems from Hauerwas’s normative privileging of 
ecclesial friendship as obedient response to a given, particular Christological command. 
That account places friendship within loyalty to an ecclesiological frame. So in the 
context of communities with different historical traditions, Hauerwas holds that “the 
church is never a friend to the world,” which is “an enemy.”1097 Conversely, to be 
“friends with the world” makes Christians “enemies of God and one another.”1098 But 
such polemical frankness should not obscure that Hauerwas qualifies his rejection of 
ecclesial friendship with the world in two ways.1099 
 First, he qualifies ‘the world.’ He notes that often “what we are wont to call ‘the 
world’ [are] strangers who speak to us as friends.”1100 Elsewhere Hauerwas asserts that 
“our commitment to the church finds expression through the necessity of friendship 
beyond the church.”1101 While these qualifications show that the world as a concept is 
more fluid than his rhetoric indicates, the qualifications are perhaps further equivocation. 
Hauerwas leaves “the world” rather vague as a concept. Nor does he explain how 
Christians can have friendship with strangers in relation to their different loyalties, even 
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though the most important distinction between both Christians and strangers for 
Hauerwas is their different loyalties.1102 
 Second, answers to both criticisms are found in the performance of Hauerwas’s 
actual friendship with ‘worldly strangers.’ The irony of Hauerwas’s explicit development 
on radical democracy is that it was stimulated not by the criticisms of Christians––like 
those of, as Dorrien narrates, his and Albrecht’s––that “rolled off Hauerwas for 
years.”1103 Rather, it was the similar critique by Jeffrey Stout, the non-Christian and 
friend of Hauerwas. Part of Hauerwas’s response was Christianity, Democracy, and the 
Radical Ordinary, a co-written book of correspondence with his friend and former 
colleague at Duke, Romand Coles, who is not a Christian. How can these friendships 
with non-Christians be explained? 
 On the one hand, Hauerwas’s relating to the ‘secular world’ indicates a more 
constructive understanding of the world than I have used the term for Hauerwas. 
Insomuch as the term ‘the world’ simply names that in which human beings live, the 
world as a concept is vague. The vagueness is because the world as such depends on 
humanity existing in local, particular relations through which one reasons to act. The 
world-as-particular-relations indicates that practical reasoning in discussion is operative 
for Christian friendship with the ‘secular world,’ which has a different agency than the 
church. On the other hand, Hauerwas is a friend through his “constancy”––similar to 
patience and courage––embodying Jesus “across and through…many different loyalties 
and actions.”1104 “Constancy” implies that witness is a perennial undercurrent at the very 
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least. Therefore, to the question “How to have a developing argument with the world?,” 
Hauerwas answers by eschewing abstract theory while upholding practical reason and 
witness.1105 Christian worship, for Hauerwas, shows Christians their contingency as 
creatures and ultimately their vulnerability to all in the manner of Jesus’s nonviolence. 
Hauerwas performs this sort of vulnerability in his dialogue with Stout and Coles. To 
give Hauerwas’s performance more weight, his discussions with Stout and Coles are 
doing what Williams understands as negotiation for the common good.1106 
 So Hauerwas complicates an easy separation of witness and friendship through 
his account of practical reason. Yet the latter is insufficient for a full theological account 
of a developing relation between the church and world, for practical reason does not give 
a developed account to answer the question, what about dynamic growth in the church-
world relation? I value performance as describing growth in friendship with a worldly 
stranger; however, such performance still requires an interpretative account. Hauerwas 
has given illuminating interpretation before in his narrative work. But a similar 
interpretation of friendship with worldly ‘strangers’ is also necessary for the church-
world relation. Too often appeals to practical reason over against ‘theory’ give the 
appearance of an alchemic bridge between points A and C, as unclear as C may be. That 
is a pyrrhic victory since we are left with little imaginative vision about what to do next 
in the mutual development (maturation) of friendship with ‘worldly strangers.’ Towards a 
next step, Hauerwas raises resources like the university for practical reasoning, and he 
employs Williams and Alasdair MacIntyre for support on the university and practical 
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reasoning, respectively. As important as cultivating a place for discussion is, this is in 
continuity with Hauerwas’s normal tendencies. He focuses on witness for setting the 
ground of discussion. Yet, he largely eschews giving a robust account of how to develop 
the discussion other than his own aporetic practice of engaging the world. The latter is 
still often in the primary frame of witness.1107 
 Practical reason alone is also theologically insufficient to link friendship and 
witness. If there is no theological account, the door has been implicitly opened to liberal 
theology’s primacy of experience and reason. Hauerwas’s response, witness and practical 
reasoning (or practical “wisdom”), both guards against liberalism and repeats the witness-
friend problem.1108 But the framework of friendship within witness encourages the 
appearance that Hauerwas holds to what Williams rejects: a theology that opts out of 
“nature by treating ‘God’ as a successful rival for our attention.”1109 That is not true of 
Hauerwas at his best, but there is some resonance since there is a deeper, theological 
lacuna. Hauerwas lacks specific aspects necessary for a robust theological account of 
how the church can have a developing argument with the world when it responds 
positively but partially.1110 
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Tier Two: Insufficient Theological Ground for  
a Developing Church-World Relation 
 The deeper, second tier is that Hauerwas’s position needs a better theological 
account to relate friendship and witness within the church-world relation. Gift might be 
the way to address the link between friendship and witness since gift undergirds both. As 
chapter two also showed, Hauerwas has, with some debt to Williams, a theology of 
particular grace that plays a significant role in holding together Hauerwas’s constructive 
work from God’s sovereignty to human creaturehood to human agency (friendship). 
Further, within the context of reflecting on the elderly, the poor, the disabled, and 
L’Arche, Hauerwas maintains that gift undergirds mutual recognition, love, and 
friendship. But to the detriment of his understanding of grace and his categories of 
friendship and witness, he has not sufficiently taken account of Williams’s full sense of 
mutual recognition in theological terms.1111 
 Gift is the ground for humanity’s contingency, both in the asymmetry of the God-
human relation and in the mutuality of intra-human relations. Yet Hauerwas extends the 
command-obedience framework from the asymmetry of the God-human relation to 
negatively impact the mutuality of intra-human relationships. The creator-creation 
relation in non-mutuality frames humanity’s positive response as obedient, representative 
witness. When that account is applied to ecclesiology and other traditioned communities, 
the church’s obedient witness is set over-against the world’s disobedience to given 
command. But that framework overlooks too much the extent of relational mutuality, on 
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a theological basis, between human creatures as applied to the church and world relation. 
Recall the categories of friendship and witness. Openness and mutuality are vital to 
Hauerwas’s understanding of friendship. However, openness and mutuality are also 
theologically underdeveloped in his account of the church-world relation because 
obedience to gift undergirds ecclesial witness and creaturely existence.1112 
 Hauerwas’s concept of stranger, if derived from Mosaic law and so a theological 
category, is not so helpful here as it might seem. His description of it is more 
underdeveloped and equivocated than his account of the world. What is a human stranger 
if she or he is a creature but not defined as either obedient to covenant-loyalty to God or 
disobedient to their creaturely status ordained by God? Hauerwas’s answer employs the 
ancient Greeks: “Strangers were those people who did not necessarily share your stories, 
but who seemed capable of hearing your stories and appreciating them with 
understanding.”1113 That answer shows an openness to mutual recognition; however, the 
framework is nothing but sheer openness to potentiality. Strangers can be Christians and 
non-Christians. The reason why someone is a stranger is simply that she or he is not close 
relationally speaking and/or that she or he is not part of the immediate community 
(assuming something in common). But that account of stranger is not truly a third 
category between the dichotomy of obedient and not-obedient human creatures. Rather, 
the concept of stranger is a product of practical reason that qualifies the dichotomy. 
Strangers can be those who have yet to be recognized as obedient and not-obedient. 
																																																								
1112 Hauerwas, US, 79; Hauerwas and Pinches, CAV, 39, 41, 46; Hauerwas, AE, 45-46; Hauerwas, BH, 259 n. 19; Hauerwas, CC, 49, 
225-227; Hauerwas, Matt, 25, 173-175; Hauerwas, PK, 69, 77; Hauerwas and Willimon, RA, 24-29; Hauerwas, STT, chp. 2; Hauerwas 
and Willimon, TTG, 19-20; Hauerwas, WAD, 171; Hauerwas, WGU, 191-192, 195-200 (including 198 n. 52), 211-212; Hauerwas, 
WT, 45, 47-48, 52, 68. 
1113 Hauerwas, PS, 5. See also Hauerwas, PK, 133. 
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Strangers can be those who are already recognized to exist but are either relationally 
unknown Christians or not-obedient (non-covenantal loyalty) people who can be allies 
with Christians. That description of strangers is too expansive to be the same as the 
stranger as a theological category when transposed to Jews as covenanted and non-Jews 
as strangers to each other in the covenant of the Mosaic law. Even when Hauerwas’s 
focus on the non-Christian stranger parallels that Mosaic dichotomy, he employs practical 
reason to solve a categorical, theological bind concerning reciprocity.1114 
 Coles also sees the problem of mutual reciprocity. He challenges Hauerwas to 
take further account of gift and reciprocity between church and world, because doing so 
would more positively develop Hauerwas’s understanding of witness. What gives weight 
to Coles’s point is that he makes it in light of not only Jean Vanier and L’Arche, but also 
Williams, who “calls Christians to the experience of being foot-washed by 
‘unbelievers.’”1115 The need for further development is, I think, correct. At the same time 
that D. Stephen Long defends Hauerwas, Long also echoes Nigel Biggar’s now partially 
dated challenge to Hauerwas. He assumes God but actually writes little about God in 
published work. A result of that was little theological exploration to ground theopolitical 
avenues in addition to what Hauerwas has developed. For all of Hauerwas’s reliance on 
gift and his narrowing of it for the church-world relation, Hauerwas’s account of a 
																																																								
1114 Exodus 22:21; Leviticus 19:34; Deuteronomy 10:19, 23:7; Hauerwas, PS, 4-6, 65; Hauerwas, WAD, 146-147. For other instances 
of stranger in Hauerwas’s work, see Hauerwas, CC, 2, 10, 26, 51, 106; Hauerwas, PK, 108-109, 133; Hauerwas, RA, 68, 83, 91, 138; 
Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church and the Mentally Handicapped: A Continuing Challenge to the Imagination,” in Critical Reflections 
on Stanley Hauerwas’ Theology of Disability: Disabling Society, Enabling Theology, ed. John Swinton (Binghamton, NY; Haworth 
Press, 2004; repr. New York: Routledge, 2008), 58; Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, “How the Church Managed before there 
was Ethics,” in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, 42. Hauerwas’s category of stranger is even larger: God is also a 
“stranger” (PK, 144). 
 Hauerwas’s use of practical reason to solve a categorical bind should not be surprising since he understands theology itself 
as a form of practical reasoning (WT, chp. 1). I am not against that in general, for theology is faith seeking understanding in relation to 
one another and to God. My concern is that Hauerwas’s reliance on practical reasoning allows him to maintain his privileging of the 
command-obedience framework rather than re-work it in light of a larger frame. 
1115 Coles, CDRO, 213. See also ibid., 214-216. Coles is citing Rowan Williams, afterward to The Blackwell Companion to Christian 
Ethics, 498. 
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theology of gift itself is ironically underdeveloped. The point of his work is more about 
developing the theopolitical implication of gift rather than, he once admitted, developing 
a theology of gift itself. In Hauerwas’s terms, he refuses to separate theology and 
practice. But despite even Hauerwas’s practice of dialogue, he has not articulated a 
theological way of thinking about friendship and the economy of grace to sufficiently 
account for his own practice of developing reciprocity between church and world. 
Consequently, Hauerwas lacks crucial elements necessary for his and Williams’s 
accounts of deliberative democracy.1116 
 So the issue here is the development of certain unfulfilled theopolitical 
trajectories in light of a more robust trinitarian account begun with Hauerwas’s work on 
the Holy Spirit. But the development of gift cannot be achieved by supercharging it on its 
own. This would either fail to extricate the primacy of the command-obedience 
framework or would expand grace such that it becomes little more than the sheer 
openness of generalized love, eliminating particularity and difference. Coles overlooks 
crucial theological similarities between Williams and Hauerwas because, as Cavanaugh 
points out, Coles questionably construes Williams’s apophatic openness in order to 																																																								
1116 Coles, CDRO, 211, 215-216; Long, “Capitalizing and Fetishizing the Particular,” 52-55, 58. For Hauerwas’s admission, see WW, 
169 n. 21 which appeals to John Milbank, “Can a Gift be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” Modern Theology 
11, no. 1 (1995). Hauerwas presumably does not raise his earlier chapter “The Politics of Charity” (TT, chp. 9) partly because it had a 
Christological focus rather than a trinitarian one. The latter Hauerwas developed via Milbank out right and then extended it by 
attention to Williams (WW, chp. 12; PF, chp. 3). For gift playing an important but largely assumed role in more recent work, simply 
see Hauerwas, CDRO. For Hauerwas on gift therein explicitly, see 107-110, 204-206, 310, 314. For Hauerwas lacking a sufficient 
theological account of his own practice of developing reciprocity, see Hauerwas, WAD, 146. 
 I characterize above Hauerwas’s development as partial for a number of reasons. His answer to Biggar was the Decalogue, 
as Long rightly notes, and that issue of command-obedience was framed by Barth (Long, “Capitalizing and Fetishizing the Particular,” 
57; Hauerwas, STT, 37-38). But Hauerwas has since clarified that his critique of humanism does not mean a rejection of humanism on 
his own terms (STT, 145; AE, xv-xvi, 58-59, 142-143, 156-157). Stemming from that humanism, Hauerwas continues to clarify that 
his earlier work on the difference between the agencies of the church and world is not born out of hatred for the world, a “Manichean 
dualism” wherein “the world is evil and the church is not” (WT, 49). Rather, “because Christians believe we are what the world can 
be, we can act in the hope that the world can and will positively respond to a witness of peace” (WAD, xiii). That framework has been 
behind even Hauerwas’s seemingly most critical book title, Against the Nations (Long, Goodness of God, 102). So my concern about 
the theological basis for recognizing the world’s positive but partial response is a question about how Hauerwas’s project can be 
extended in a more positive mode. Of course, that does not mean ignoring critique, a sharp no to sin––to violence. 
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challenge Hauerwas. Coles also glosses over: Williams’s stress on the importance of the 
church as a corporate body built on the particularity of Jesus; Williams’s emphasis on the 
necessity of Christian faithfulness in order to be witnesses; and Williams’s affirmation of, 
like Hauerwas, the church-world distinction rooted in divine sovereignty. Further, to 
follow Coles here would ask Hauerwas to simply be more like Dorrien since Coles 
privileges the solidarity of love to construe receptivity but underplays gift like Dorrien. 
So I am not repeating Dorrien’s critique of Hauerwas on the church-world distinction.1117 
 Rather, Hauerwas needs a theologically developed account of the church-world 
relation in light of a more coherent trinitarian framework that connects love-gift in 
abundance and mutuality to intra-human relations. Even though he does not explicitly 
connect the imago Dei to the imago trinitatis, he has linked the imago Dei to “imago 
Christi” within an implied trinitarian frame.1118 A couple years later he noted not only the 
importance of that trinitarian account, but also that he had insufficiently developed it. The 
latter is still the case, especially concerning the church-world relation. More recently 
Hauerwas has written that “what is required is a theological account of language in which 
																																																								
1117 Hauerwas, WT, chp. 2; Hauerwas and Willimon, HS; Cavanaugh, “A Politics of Vulnerability,” 109-110; Coles, CDRO, 180-181; 
Williams, FPS, 66-74, 92-93, 305-306; Williams, OCT, 24-25, 143, 170-177, 212, 202-206, 229-234, 284-285; Williams, TG, 75-87; 
Williams, “Being a People,” 209-210, 214-222; Rowan Williams, “Christian Identity and Religious Plurality,” Ecumenical Review 58, 
no. 1 (2006): 69-75. For Coles on love and solidarity, including the beloved community, see CDRO, 38, 42, 59, 63, 67, 81, 185, 220-
221, 224-227, 251, 336-338, 340. Coles does positively raise gift or grace from time to time, see CDRO, 173, 182, 188, 225, 246. But 
Coles’s emphasis on love-solidarity and his lack of gift seem to stem his worries about the church as a gift. That framework, he 
argues, sets boundaries and insulates the church from encounters while mirroring Constantinianism (ibid., 210-212). It is worth noting 
that Coles distinguishes insulation from sectarianism and acknowledges that his conversation with Hauerwas qualifies the insulation 
critique (ibid., 211). I am not convinced about the mirroring of Constantinianism. As for Coles’s insulation critique, it is not fatal even 
if one grants it as a true possibility. He finds a community of gift as articulated by Jean Vanier so “very difficult” to receive precisely 
because one has to actually see L’Arche (ibid., 245). If such an embodied social imagination is such a dramatic alternative, the 
solution to Hauerwas’s problem cannot be Cole’s rejection of the church as “constituted prior to its encounter with the world” 
(Cavanaugh, “A Politics of Vulnerability,” 107). That rejection not only overlooks Christianity’s historical beginnings and 
continuation in the world and in God’s kingdom that is part of Christianity’s distinctiveness but without it being “purely ‘sect-like’” 
(Williams, OCT, 285). But also Coles’s rejection can implicitly eliminate the difference necessary for interactive discussion and then 
mutual development of both parties in light of each other’s words to the other (Williams, FPS, 170). Since I have already emphasized 
difference in chapter four, below I will focus on Williams’s account of mutual development. 
1118 Hauerwas, IGC, 194. Emphasis original. See also ibid., 193. 
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the human being as a linguistic creature participates in the very life of the Logos, the 
Word, that is, Trinity.”1119 Indeed, the trinitarian frame needs further development, even 
if Hauerwas may not be initially interested in doing so in terms of the imago trinitatis. 
Williams has achieved just such a development and extended it to the church-world 
relation. His trinitarian fusion of love and gift in mutuality and abundance undergirds 
mutual recognition and negotiation. This unified love-gift expands grace based on 
theological particularity, the Trinity’s kenotic mutuality in love-gift. That particularity 
frames humanity’s and Jesus’s obedience not as command-obedience but as open (or 
attentive) and ecstatic self-gift in the mutual sharing of and the mutual dwelling within 
one another. Through this account of reality, Williams gives a more adequately robust 
account of creation to sustain Hauerwas’s practice.1120 
Williams’s Theopolitics of Gift-Negotiation in Openness and Mutuality 
 Williams argues that, in intra-human relations, the gift economy by itself “fails to 
be a politics at all.”1121 Instead, politics is constituted by gift combined with negotiation. 
The church’s joining of gift and negotiation marks its internal relations and, in turn, its 
relation to the world. Out of divine freedom, the church and creation on the whole are 
given the “liberty” and the time for the “‘negotiation’ of needs, the patterns of giving and 
receiving, speaking and hearing––stripped of violence-inducing anxiety.”1122 Accordingly 
Williams goes beyond Hauerwas’s positive construal of the world’s response almost 																																																								
1119 Hauerwas, WAD, 149. See also Hauerwas, AE, 112. 
1120 Hauerwas, “Failure of Communication or a Case for Uncomprehending Feminism,” 237; Long, “Capitalizing and Fetishizing the 
Particular,” 53; Williams, “The Deflections of Desire,” 121-122 (that seems to be his best and fullest summary of the issues from 
humanity’s and Jesus’s ‘obedience’ and Gethsemane to without command and fissure that can be found elsewhere in varying degrees 
of development and often not entirely connected to one another: Williams, Dost, 152-153, 176-177; Williams, OCT, 121-122, 140-
142; Williams, OJ, 17, 40-41, 68-71, 98, 130-131, 165-167, 198, 245, 250, 257, 274-277––see esp. 198, 250). If I had more space, I 
would show how Williams here is different than how Hauerwas appropriates him in PF, chp. 3, esp. p. 100.  
1121 Williams, LI, 70. See also ibid., 71 
1122 Williams, OCT, 73, 145. See also ibid., 249, 268-275, 284-287. 
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always in terms of clarifying the church’s witness. Williams stresses that the Holy Spirit 
pushes the church into asking questions of both the church and the world for continuous 
dialogue within the church and between the church and world. This question-driven 
dialogue is how the Holy Spirit keeps the church open for creative growth internal and 
external to itself.1123 
 Williams’s openness to externality and negotiation is undergirded by his 
trinitarian account. The mutual trinitarian relations, the “necessary and irreducible 
reciprocity between Logos and Spirit,” ground the “model of relation between Christ and 
his body.”1124 That model, in turn, is the ground for a critical mutuality between church 
and world. Williams argues that Christianity’s “commitment undertaken in baptism” is to 
proclaim “that the Word of God is sovereign,” and to identify with that through 
embodying Jesus’s life in the body of Christ.1125 This account of Christianity’s 
distinctiveness in a Christological and trinitarian frame grounds “resistance” to what 
Williams would come to call programmatic secularism.1126 Yet the church’s 
“Christological and trinitarian focus” means that “the purpose of [baptismal] commitment 
is” not only the self-gift of witness, but also the gift of love that emphasizes the other’s 
voice and receives it in active listening.1127 This Christian subjectivity makes possible 
“the free identification of the believer with the world.”1128 The political form of witness, 
dialogue, and identification is Williams’s political vision of interactive pluralism and a 
pluralist state. That vision works to create openness to mutuality in order to allow for the 
																																																								
1123 Williams, LI, 70-71; Williams, OCT, 73; Williams, OCT, 123-124, 144-145, 173-180. 
1124 Williams, OCT, 174. See also ibid., 288; Williams, “Creation, Creativity and Creatureliness,” 28. 
1125 Williams, “Being a People,” 214, 216. See also ibid., 209-210; Williams, OCT, 230-233. 
1126 Williams, OCT, 174. See also ibid., 233. 
1127 Williams, “Being a People,” 216, 221. See also ibid, 210-211. 
1128 Ibid., 217. 
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mutuality in interfaith dialogue to be constitutive to public life. The openness to 
mutuality in politics and in interfaith dialogue is an important first step for the church to 
have a developing relation, even friendship, with the world. All these are based 
theologically on the inherent openness in the triune relations for embracing the other.1129 
 Williams’s construal of mutuality also indicates presuppositions about the world. 
It is open to the church, the world develops in negotiation, and the world’s openness and 
negotiation are grounded in the triune relations, even though the world may reject the 
triune God. The world’s openness can be described as “commitments need imaginative 
testing” through negotiation, or “responsive testing,” since that is a method applicable to 
atheist and Christian alike.1130 This method is, for Williams, about human development in 
mutuality, not either side developing in itself where mutual interaction has only been 
construed in terms of witness to the other. Development in mutuality, for goals like the 
common good, marks a partial maturation of the world before any strict conversion 
moment.1131 
 The maturing relation between the church and world is grounded by the answer to 
a question, what is the theological basis for mutual development on the part of the world? 
Like Hauerwas, Williams affirms Jesus’s particularity and the church-world distinction in 
terms of identity and agency. But at the same time, Williams’s triune fusion of gift and 
love in abundance marking all of creation allows for a partial overlap of the church and 
																																																								
1129 Williams, OCT, 174-176, 178, 233-238; Rowan Williams, “To What End are We Made?,” in Who Is This Man?: Christ in the 
Renewal of the Church, ed. Jonathan Baker and William Davage (New York: Continuum, 2006), 19-21. 
1130 Williams, Dost, 242; Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 42 
(hereafter EW). See also ibid., 44-45. 
1131 Williams, FPS, 178-179; Williams, TG, 51, 55; Rowan Williams, “Divine Presence and Divine Action: Reflections in the Wake of 
Nicholas Lash,” The Archbishop of Canterbury Archived Website, Jun. 30, 2011, 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2131/divine-presence-and-divine-action-reflections-in-the-wake-of-
nicholas-lash; Williams, Dost, 113, 131, 174-175; Williams, EW, 32-33, 57-65, 153-154, 183; Williams, OCT, 176; Williams, “To 
What End are We Made?,” 19-21; Williams, Dost, 236-238; Williams, EW, 99. 
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world in terms of agency. So in contrast to Hauerwas, Williams can maintain the 
similarity and distinction between the church’s and world’s agencies. How Williams can 
do so is critical. He holds that human agency is in the image of the triune relations. 
Hauerwas need not fear this ‘natural theology’ about human agency. Eastern Orthodoxy 
and Williams develop the imago trinitatis in an ecclesial-liturgical frame, rather than 
focus mostly on mental faculties or appealed to some generalized abstract content. 
However, here I will focus on the imago trinitatis as a theology of creation itself for 
discussion.1132 
																																																								
1132 Williams, “Being a People,” 216-219; Williams, FPS, 178-179; Williams, WA, 225-226. For the imago trinitatis developed in an 
ecclesial-liturgical frame, see Williams, FPS, 177-179; Williams, OJ, 257-258; Williams, ToT, 136; Williams, WA, 19; Rowan 
Williams, “The Church as Sacrament,” International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 10, no. 1 (2010): 8, 10-11; 
Williams, “The Spirit of the Age to Come,” 621-624; Williams, “The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaievich Lossky,” 267-283. Aside 
from the East, there is also Williams’s reading of Augustine for the imago trinitatis through triune relations rather than mental 
faculties (“Sapientia and the Trinity,” 321-332; “Divine Presence and Divine Action”). For Williams’s brief appeals to “homo 
eucharisticus,” which further places the imago trinitatis in an ecclesial frame. Rowan Williams, Anglican Identities (Lanham, MD: 
Cowley, 2003), 109; Williams, FPS, 96, 183; Williams, “Being a People,” 215-219, 221; Rowan Williams, “Liturgical Humanism: 
Orthodoxy and the Transformation of Culture,” Orthodoxy in America Lecture Series (New York: Fordham University, Orthodox 
Christian Studies, 2014), 14, http://www.fordham.edu/downloads/file/2144/rowan_williams_lecture. Williams’s phrase “homo 
eucharisticus” is a summary of Gregory Dix, The Shape of Liturgy, new ed. (London: Continuum, 2005), xxxviii-xxxix. For “homo 
liturgicus,” which is functionally the same as homo eucharisticus but this time in a merging of Thomas Merton and Evdokimov, see 
Williams, ASA, 33, 36.  
 Homo eucharisticus raises a solution to an initial tension between Hauerwas and Williams over the imago Dei. Hauerwas’s 
characterization of the imago Dei as sharing Jesus’s mission, the imago Christi, may appear to not meet or perhaps even to reject the 
imago trinitatis as relational (IGC, 188). Williams affirms the sharing of the mission and the imago Christi, but also emphasizes 
“representing and bearing of the world to the Father…the vocation of the human being to become a priest within creation” (“Being a 
People,” 219; Dost, 207). This framework follows the pattern of the economic Trinity in terms of missio (“Being a People,” 210-211, 
220-221). When that pattern is joined with the body of Christ––“where persons…exist only in communion, in mutuality, in an utter 
being there for each other,” in a phrase the homo eucharisticus––following Jesus’s mission to God’s creation implies an analogical 
reflection of the immanent Trinity’s processio (Williams, OJ, 257-258; Williams, “Creation, Creativity, and Creatureliness,” 32. See 
also ibid., 25, 28.). So there is a way for Hauerwas to move to the imago trinitatis. 
As for the Eastern voices in their own right on the imago trinitatis, see Georges Florovsky, The Collected Works of 
Georges Florovsky, vol. 1, Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1972), 39, 67; Georges 
Florovsky, The Collected Works of Georges Florovsky, vol. 3, Creation and Redemption (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1976), 38, 70-71, 
189; Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John H. Erickson and Thomas E. Bird (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1974), 175-181, 190-194; Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976), chps. 6, 9; Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia, “The Human Person as Icon of the Trinity,” Sobornost 8, 
no. 2 (1986): 16-21; Kallistos Ware, “The Holy Mountain: Universality and Uniqueness,” in Mount Athos: Microcosm of the Christian 
East, ed. Graham Speake and Kallistos Ware (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 188-195 (the way that Ware writes about the Orthodox 
monastic communities on Mount Athos can be read as realizing the imago trinitatis within and between ecclesial communities of 
prayer, which Hauerwas’s position would appreciate); Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church, rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 
1964), 244-245; John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1997), 15-23; John D. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, ed. 
Paul McPartlan (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), chp. 6, esp. p. 249. There are, of course, caveats. One could argue that Sergius 
Bulgakov’s triune account of creation and humanity’s divinization is abstract. Additionally, Williams is sympathetic to Bulgakov. 
However, Bulgakov still privileges the ecclesial frame and Williams’s own position is always fleshy. Sergius Bulgakov, The Lamb of 
God, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008), 143-145; Sergius Bulgakov, The Comforter, trans. Boris 
Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 318-319; Sergius Bulgakov, The Orthodox Church, trans. Lydia Kesich 
(Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1998), chp. 1. 
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The Imago Trinitatis for Discussion with the World 
 Creation is constituted by its internal mutual relations reflecting the Trinity’s 
creative economy of love-gift. Although the creator’s love is a vital theological ground 
for human value, Williams maintains that everyone should be recognized as “not merely 
bound to a common divine Master.”1133 Analogically similar to the triune economy of 
God in se, every human being is “bound in a relation of mutuality according to which 
each becomes the bearer of necessary gifts to the other.”1134 This “universal,” “mutual 
recognition” and reciprocity is the way love’s openness to the other’s difference is 
manifested socially.1135 Love’s mutual indwelling produces “a shared social world” for 
the common good.1136 From this framework follows a political implication. Mutual 
recognition and reciprocity of love-gift recognize “non-negotiable[s],” like human dignity 
and equality, which are necessary to negotiate liberating discussion even with those who 
may not seem “naturally loveable persons.”1137 Oppressive master-slave relations are 
undercut by the notions that all human beings are “‘unique and irreplaceable’” and that 
their inherent value is shared in the other.1138 Human creatures are in this together and 
“responsible” for one another, even if one affirms a church-world distinction.1139 It is a 
sin not to receive the whole of humanity as a gift.1140 
																																																								
1133 Williams, FPS, 156. 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 Ibid., 123, 162. See also ibid., 122, 170. 
1136 Ibid., 169. See also ibid., 163, 168. 
1137 Williams, Dost, 182; Williams, FPS, 158. See also ibid., 121-122, 156-157. 
1138 Williams, FPS, 165. “Unique and irreplaceable” is Williams quoting Sarah Bachelard, “Rights as Industry,” Res Publica 11, no. 1 
(2002): 4. 
1139 Williams, Dost, 157, 159. See also ibid., 110, 150. 
1140 Williams, FPS, 161, 171; Williams, OCT, 71-75; Williams, “Creation, Creativity, and Creatureliness,” 28; Williams, “The Spirit 
of the Age to Come,” 622; Williams, FPS, 156-157, 159, 177-179. 
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 Human creatures’ participation in the openness and mutuality of trinitarian self-
giving includes receiving concrete human bodies. Williams’s arguments for mutual 
recognition and human rights is rooted in the fact that material bodies are “a system of 
communication” that “will always be carrying meanings or messages that are inalienably 
[their] own.”1141 Communication is not reducible to speech or even “self-awareness” 
since it does disservice to children or those with “mental disabilities.”1142 Rather, human 
bodies are communicative simply by existing, and that is “realize[d]” through the 
reception of another’s bodily communication.1143 Accordingly, attentiveness to 
embodiment as communicating with the other is vital for humanity to develop together 
and to resist silencing by physical abuse, even murder, by dominating institutions such as 
slavery. In other words, giving oneself is always an act of vulnerability, and it calls for 
similar vulnerability in the one who receives and returns it. That mutual vulnerability is 
made possible because Williams frames the other’s body as ultimately a divine gift to be 
received.1144 
																																																								
1141 Williams, FPS, 153, 156. 
1142 Ibid., 153-154. 
1143 Ibid., 156. 
1144 Ibid., 152, 154, 156, 170-171; Williams, OCT, 241; Williams, FPS, 159. For his earlier, community oriented argument for rights 
connected to “conversation” see LI, 93 and OCT, 263. 
 Hauerwas finds Williams’s “account of rights…grounded in our recognition of our bodily character” to be “persuasive,” 
but “the bodily character of language might have been developed more fully” (Hauerwas, “Review of Rowan Williams’s Faith in the 
Public Square,” 121). The same could be said for Williams’s work on sexuality. He largely assumes bodily communication framed in 
open (love) grace instead of developing the actual concrete embodiment as communication itself through open self-gift (Williams, 
“The Body’s Grace,” 310-317). So it is worth noting a few concrete examples, of concrete embodiment as communication itself 
through open self-gift, not restricted to an ecclesial context. Bodies, vulnerability, ecstatic self-giving, and mutual indwelling (love) 
call to mind the initial act of procreation, the fetus developing in the mother’s womb, and the parent(s) nursing an infant with the 
mother’s milk. Vulnerability and love-gift can also be seen in the open gift of a naked embrace that is literally a life-sustaining act of 
heat exchange for someone in hypothermia. More metaphorically but still very real, self-giving occurs in other bodily communicative 
acts. Body posture subconsciously indicates a state of mind. Dance gives one’s self over to music and other(s). The labor of creating 
art employs, as Williams notes, a skilled body to pour a vision larger than their own into an object for others to interact with 
(“Creation, Creativity, Creatureliness,” 29-31). One could even include the act of foot washing, as Coles does, or the less 
sacramentally explicit bathing of the infirm out of ecstatic care for them (CDRO, 216-217). 
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 Humanity can continue to dialogue together in love-gift because the 
inexhaustibility of triune plenitude is the ground for dialogical exploration, and in turn, 
for maturation. For one “to enter into conversation is always to be…at risk” of being 
“misheard or consciously distorted.”1145 Feminist theology has rightly raised critical 
concerns about self-gift used to justify coercing women into a vulnerable position of 
passive and one-sided self-sacrifice. Williams implicitly addresses such concerns by 
specifically noting that in self-giving there is a “capacity for confrontation,” which he 
later repeats as “mutual answerability” in the context of Sophia.1146 Williams can allow 
for vulnerable and confrontational self-gift because of plenitude. It includes not only the 
gift of the other. Plenitude is also the “time and space” necessary to recognize the 
“misrecognition” and overcome it in dialogue for development.1147 So triune 
superabundance does not close history or suffocate human agency. Rather, “human 
liberty posits a space for an ‘excess of being’…a background of depth and surplus in 
reality itself which holds and makes sense of all these dialogical processes.”1148 As with 
the triune relations, human relations have some measure of creativity in reciprocal speech 
																																																								
1145 Williams, Dost, 132. 
1146 Ibid., 153, 208-210. I note Sophia here because of feminist emphasis on Sophia, even though Williams is working with male 
Eastern Orthodox theologians. For two examples, see Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia's Prophet: Critical 
Issues in Feminist Christology, 2nd. ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), chps. 5-6; Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The 
Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse, tenth anniversary ed. (New York: Crossroad, 2002), chps. 7-9. Williams further 
sympathizes with other concerns in feminist theology. He joins the feminist rejection of patriarchy (LI, 44), and he affirms feminist 
insight “that the making of my body into a distant and dangerous object that can either be subdued or placated with quick gratification 
is the root of sexual oppression” (“The Body’s Grace,” 316). For a frank discussion on Teresa of Avila and patriarchy––including 
sexual repression and receptivity, with the latter applied also to male mystics as “queering the discourse in the sixteenth century”––see 
“An Interview with Rowan Williams,” 164-165, 167-168, partly in light of Rowan Williams, Teresa of Avila (London: Continuum, 
1991), 213-214. See as well his argument setting the ground for the ordination of women, Rowan Williams, “Women and the 
Ministry: A Case for Theological Seriousness,” in Feminine in the Church, ed. Monica Furlong (London: SPCK, 1984). 
1147 Williams, Dost, 135, 139. See also ibid., 133-134, 136-138, 141, 236-237. 
1148 Ibid., 134. See also Williams, EW, 32-33. 
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to other human beings. That creativity is dependent on the mutually contingent 
recognition of the other and intelligible dialogue with each other.1149 
 The imago trinitatis, then, underwrites Williams’s account of dialogue between 
traditions for discovering the common good within one’s community. Human beings 
develop through dialogue, the mutual and continual exploration of each other within 
abundance. The theopolitics of relation-in-plenitude reflects the pattern of the triune 
economy because the theopolitics stems from the triune God’s pro nobis universal 
invitation––or open gift/given openness––and in se relations. 
 Since Hauerwas lacks a developed theological account like the imago trinitatis 
that supports Christians’ dialogue with the world, his overly narrow theological 
understanding of human agency in response to divine sovereignty privileges obedient 
witness in a way that hinders a developing reciprocity between the church and world. 
Williams’s better, internally coherent theological account of dialogue with the world 
serves Hauerwas’s aims in a context responds partially but positively to witness. Witness 
is indeed crucial for Christian participation in deliberative democracy. However, we need 
a larger account of negotiation in a deliberative democracy than witness in practical 
circumstances. Williams helps supply the ground for just such an account from 
																																																								
1149 Williams, OCT, 167-168, 178-180; for a good summary of feminist objections, see Anna Mercedes, Power For: Feminism and 
Christ’s Self Giving (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 1-11; for a longer treatment, see Marta Frascati-Lochhead, Kenosis and Feminist 
Theology: The Challenge of Gianni Vattimo (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), chp. 6; for more constructive 
work, see Catherine Keller, “Scoop up the Water and the Moon Is in Your Hands: On Feminist Theology and Dynamic Self-
Emptying,” in The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation, ed. John B. Cobb Jr. and Christopher Ives (N.p.: Orbis, 
1990; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005); Williams, Dost, 133-134.  
 Hauerwas presumably affirms dialogue in plenitude when described in terms of time since he uses Williams’s work to 
write: “we must learn to engage in everyday tasks as common as learning to speak the truth and, perhaps even more demanding, to 
hear the truth through the time-consuming work of conversation” (SU, 210). Admittedly, Hauerwas is addressing the church in this 
specific instance. But earlier in the book he uses Williams on discussion in the university (106). So there is a promising possibility for 
Hauerwas to affirm much of this section above if one makes a composite from his uses of Williams. 
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Christianity’s particular understanding rather than from an appeal to an abstractly 
theoretical or ideological external standard. 
 However, the value of Williams’s horizon, the imago trinitatis and dialogue 
rooted in the mutuality and plenitude of triune love-gift is not nor should be reducible to 
shoring up deliberative democracy. His theological horizon goes beyond both 
Hauerwas’s faithful witness in gift and Dorrien’s mediating dialectic in love. But rather 
than sublate and unify them in Williams’s horizon, I have argued that his horizon offers 
critical help for developing aspects of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions. These 
developments take a step towards my larger hope, to constructively begin moving beyond 
the fracture in US Christianity. Those who hold to the positions of Dorrien and Hauerwas 
can enter into a fresh theopolitical discussion after they take into account Williams’s 
horizon for their respective projects.  
III. Conclusion 
The faithfulness versus social justice binary is far too simplistic and superficial to 
sufficiently account for the differences between Hauerwas and Dorrien. One should not 
miss that Hauerwas is concerned about justice and Dorrien is equally concerned about 
faithful, counter-cultural witness. However, even the church-world distinction, in terms 
of Hauerwas denouncing but Dorrien critically affirming liberalism and liberal theology, 
overlooks too much. Their different responses to liberalism and their similar critiques of 
liberal theology are not simply undergirded by rival constructive projects. Those 
responses, critiques, and projects are dependent on sharply divergent accounts of 
relational truth and the nature of reality. 
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 But even the relations that determine human existence are created and shaped by 
some-‘thing’ more. At the heart of Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s theologies and their 
differences are divergent accounts of divine sovereignty, which determines human 
subjectivity, human agency, and intra-human relations. Dorrien’s apophatic embrace of 
panentheistic monism emphasizes the sovereignty of love. This framework involves the 
universality of Spirit, the similarity of spirit, and the autonomy-in-relation of human spirit 
for free flourishing. Hauerwas’s cataphatic proclamation of Jesus’s universal particularity 
stresses the sovereignty of gift. This framework involves the universal particularity of the 
triune creator, the creaturehood of humanity, and the friendship of human creatures with 
each other and God. 
 These divergent positions give dramatically different responses to the state’s 
sovereignty and its mechanisms. For Dorrien’s position, the state’s limited sphere is part 
of how the Spirit’s transformative love is realized. For Hauerwas’s position, the state’s 
hegemony makes it a negative force that demands a shift in divine sovereignty, as seen in 
Dorrien’s account where Christianity may be critical but is fundamentally integrated into 
the state’s project. So at work in the fracture between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s positions 
are two vectors: political sovereignty acting on divine sovereignty, and divine 
sovereignty acting on political sovereignty. 
 Because of political sovereignty acting on divine sovereignty, Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s positions are put in irreconcilable contradiction. But they can be seen as 
contrary, in a place of creative and interactive tension, if they are freed from the specter 
of state hegemony. Williams’s work on transforming state sovereignty provides that 
release. Williams’s horizon of trinitarian mutuality and plenitude in love-gift, which 
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frames his theopolitics, offers critical help for the development of Dorrien’s and 
Hauerwas’s projects. That re-framing and developing, in turn, can support a fresh 
discussion between Dorrien’s and Hauerwas’s contrary positions. Through such a 
discussion, then steps can be taken to address the fracture at the heart of their 
disagreement.1150 
																																																								
1150 For the difference between contradiction and contrary, see Robert Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 1990), p. 10, chp. 3, esp. p. 71. What differentiates Doran’s account of contradiction-contrary from mine is 
that I have not aimed or tried to resolve the Dorrien-Hauerwas tension with Williams, a third. 
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